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United States NEWS

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DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO

REPORTING . . . INTERPRETING

AND FORECASTING THE

NEWS OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS

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AT WASHINGTON

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REG. U. S. PAT. OFF.

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STRIKE WAVE AHEAD?

RIVALRIES IN 'BIG 5'

★

DEFENSE IN ATOM AGE

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WAR BOARDS' FUTURE



Harold H. Burton . . . New Supreme Court Justice
(See People of the Week)

What is Koppers ?

this . . . and more!

THOUSANDS of American families have found a greater winter comfort in their homes and new freedom from the drudgery of their domestic heating plant through coke. To this, Koppers has made a great contribution.

Most of the modern plants in this country for the production of coke have been designed and built by Koppers. A number of them are operated by Koppers. Koppers has carried on much of the research work which has resulted in better methods of producing coke, and it has also conducted many of the studies of coals which have resulted in better cokes. The systems for the domestic distribution of coke in several large American cities have been developed and operated by Koppers. And this company aided in designing a domestic coke stoker which has made this fuel even more popular by helping to make coke furnace operation automatic.

Koppers coke is exceptionally low in ash because it is made from low-ash coals. It is economical, because coke has so large a proportion of carbon—the material in solid fuels which produces heat. It is smokeless and clean. It requires less furnace work. (Except in the most severe weather, a coke furnace need be tended only twice in 24 hours.) Coke can be burned in any kind of furnace and makes a quick heat and a steady, uniform heat.

In spite of all that Koppers has done to develop coke and to make it better for domestic use, coke is only one of Koppers' businesses. This company produces piston rings, pressure-treats timber, and manufactures roofing, road paving materials, coal tar chemicals, and many other products.—Koppers Company, Inc., Koppers Building, Pittsburgh 19, Pa.

KOPPERS

THE INDUSTRY THAT SERVES ALL INDUSTRY

Buy War Bonds . . . and Keep Them!

Announcing

ROSIN RUBBER

—a new tire-type synthetic rubber that adds miles to your tires

NOW you can get better truck tires—tires made with a new kind of synthetic rubber—the first major improvement announced by any tire manufacturer since before the war.

These tires are made from a special synthetic rubber using rosin base soap as emulsifying agent.

Discovery of this superior rubber was made in the research laboratories of The B. F. Goodrich Company, and early development was undertaken by this company and others working on the cooperative government synthetic rubber research program. The full scale production of this new rubber and its application for tire use were pioneered by B. F. Goodrich. First tests were so startling that hundreds of tires were quickly built. Now tires made with the new rubber have undergone more than 3,000,000 miles of intensive testing under all road and climatic conditions.

Here's what these tests show as superiorities compared to tires made with ordinary synthetic rubber:

1. greater resistance to cracking
2. greater resistance to bruising
3. cooler running
4. better tread wear
5. ability to withstand higher speeds

All B. F. Goodrich truck and bus tires are now made with this new type rubber. These tires are not as good as natural-rubber truck tires but they are far and away the best synthetic truck tires we have ever built—offering you longer wear and more miles per dollar than tires built of ordinary synthetic.

B. F. Goodrich research continues to improve tires for every purpose. See the B. F. Goodrich man first for help on conservation, for service, for tires.

Truck Tires BY

B.F. Goodrich

The March Of The News

Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

Scarcities. Official predictions were that shortages of soap, shortening, cooking oils and paint would ease after October 1. The Agriculture Department said that rationing of shortening and cooking oils probably could end on January 1. Sugar supplies grew tighter, with allocations for October, November and December 28 per cent smaller than in any previous quarter of this year. The duration of meat rationing, Secretary Anderson said, is to depend on how much meat is sent abroad. At worst, he predictied a meat ration equal to prewar consumption.

Clothing prices. The Office of Price Administration authorized a slight increase in ceiling prices on low-priced wearing apparel, to encourage greater output. The War Production Board urged clothing manufacturers to expand output in low-priced lines to meet a huge demand as servicemen return to civilian life.

War housing. The Government's war housing program was terminated. The National Housing Administration said that future financing of home purchases would follow normal peacetime procedures. The agency said it had $2,000,000,000 in authorizations to insure loans to buy, build or improve homes, with $1,000,000,000 additional for mortgage insurance.

Draft deferment. Selective Service said induction would be postponed for youths who enter high school before becoming 18 years old. The deferment will continue until such boys graduate or reach the age of 20, whichever date is earlier. The instructions must be pursued "continuously and satisfactorily."

Weather forecasts. Plans for re-establishing the system of weather reports from ships at sea were announced by the Weather Bureau, as part of a program of intensifying the Bureau's civilian storm warnings and oceanic-weather forecasting.

Tires. It will be "many months," WPB and OPA said jointly, before automobile tires are in easy supply. Local ration boards were reported swamped with tire applications. September allocations of bus and truck tires were substantially increased because of increasing number of unfilled applications.

Nylons. WPB predicted that some 360,000 pairs of nylon hosiery should be ready for distribution by December 1. OPA told nylon makers that they should be able to sell the new hosiery at less than 1942 prices, because of lower operating costs.

Surplus property. In August, surplus property that had originally cost $74,069,000 was sold for $19,776,000, the Surplus Property Board announced. During the month property costing $622,146,000 was declared surplus, increasing unsold inventories to a total of $3,071,735,000. Other surplus property developments:

War plants. The Reconstruction Finance Corp. said 34 surplus war plants had been sold for $33,552,000. Their original cost was $45,155,000. Sixty-two plants that cost $285,182,000 have been leased.

Veterans. SPB approved the segregation of reserves of surplus commodities for sale to veterans through the Smaller War Plants Corp.

Tourist trade. The Commerce Department predicted a quick growth for the tourist trade with the reappearance of gasoline, new tires and automobiles. Such trade was growing rapidly when wartime restrictions were imposed, and a continuation of that trend was expected.

Casualties. War casualties rose to 1,071,266, on the basis of reports received by September 20. Army figures were: 205,569 killed, 571,698 wounded, 24,131 missing and 120,988 prisoners of war. Navy figures were: 54,068 killed, 80,236 wounded, 11,197 missing and 3,379 prisoners.

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...no job for an amateur

The best way to avoid a lot of "blind alley" figuring when planning an air conditioning installation is to call on the experience of a qualified expert—right from the start. That's the sure way to arrive at *correct* air conditioning.

By *correct* air conditioning Westinghouse means the scientific blending of correct temperature, humidity, circulation, ventilation and air cleanliness.

Consider these advantages of Westinghouse *correct* Air Conditioning: First, an air conditioning plant which will provide exactly the conditioned air you want to "live" with. Second, an installation which can be depended upon to give continued trouble-free and economical service. Third, correctly engineered equipment resulting from Westinghouse know-how.

If you're thinking about air conditioning, write for your copy of "How to Plan Correct Air Conditioning." Call your nearest Westinghouse Office, or write Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 150 Pacific Avenue, Jersey City 4, New Jersey.



The Heart of Correct Air Conditioning

WESTINGHOUSE HERMETICALLY-SEALED COMPRESSOR

The entire mechanism of the Westinghouse Hermetically-Sealed Compressor—including its motor—is sealed gas-tight. This feature means sealed-in *power and* sealed-out *trouble . . . has been* service-proved *in thousands of Westinghouse installations. Compact and lightweight for easy installation. Low operating costs.*



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Westinghouse CORRECT Air Conditioning

PLANTS IN 25 CITIES OFFICES EVERYWHERE

KEEP ON BUYING VICTORY BONDS

Favorite subject in 30,000 schools!

The famous "three R's" are "four R's" now. To reading, 'riting and 'rithmetic, modern schools have added *right eating.*

Last year, some 30,000 American schools served nourishing, well-planned mid-day meals. From these lunches, children learn good eating habits. And they gain a respect for food that can be of lasting benefit. War has shown more sharply than ever before how *much* a nation's health depends on diet.

School lunch requirements are flexible in so far as most foods are concerned—because of local preferences and facilities. *But there is one food for which there is no alternative*—one food that is basic in every lunch for every child—*a half-pint of whole milk.*

Milk, of course, is nature's most nearly perfect food. Here at National Dairy we've worked with milk and its many products for many years—making them purer, richer, easier to serve all the time.

Our laboratories have developed milk products in special wartime forms—with promising peacetime uses—all contributing to the health of the nation.

Dedicated to the wider use and better understanding of dairy products as human food . . . as a base for the development of new products and materials . . . as a source of health and enduring progress on the farms and in the towns and cities of America.

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PRODUCTS CORPORATION
AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES

FROM THE NATION'S CAPITAL

Tomorrow

Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off

A LOOK AHEAD

Newsgram

Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

24th and N Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

In the approaching showdown over wage rates for workers.....

A rising wage trend will get tacit support from the Administration.

No new wage policy, however, will be announced by Government. Policy now is to let wages rise until they push against price ceilings. This will stand.

Collective bargaining is to be promoted to settle disputes over wage rates.

Demand for a 30 per cent increase in base pay--a standard CIO policy--is not likely to be accepted by industry, or pushed by Government.

A rise of 15 per cent in base wages is probable for the period ahead.

The wage-price crisis promises to be reached sometime around midyear, 1946. At that time the price-control issue again will be fought out in Congress. Odds now are on the side of scrapping controls after June 30, 1946. Result probably will be upward price adjustments on most manufactured products.

Underlying union argument for higher wages is this:

On a 48-hour week, at $1 an hour, a worker received $52 in take-home pay. That included $40 straight time, $12 for 8 hours overtime at time and a half.

On a 40-hour week, the same take-home pay would require $1.30 an hour.

White House advisers do not go as far as this in their support of union demands, but they do favor some wage increases. They reason this way:

Higher hourly rates are justified to offset income loss from end of overtime.

Wage-salary incomes must stay high to assure mass markets and prosperity.

Profit margins are wide enough to allow substantial wage increases.

Prices need not rise in step with wage increases. Large volume of business, plus increasing efficiency, will yield adequate dollar profits at lower prices.

Industry can afford a lower ratio of profits to sales if volume is large.

That is the official line. It ties in with the jobs-for-all program, with the theory that industry costs can drop faster than wages rise as capacity output is approached. The attitude also is that profits would be exorbitant unless wage rates are increased above the wartime base level.

Threats of strikes can be counted on to increase in the weeks ahead. But there is increasing doubt that threats will lead quickly to large-scale walkouts. Strike wave, if it does develop, probably is several months off at least.

Union policy in collective bargaining has changed. That is the real reason for the growing number of strike threats, for the increasing excitement.

Bargaining negotiations usually take place before any strike is threatened.

Now, unions are taking strike votes before negotiations begin. Underlying idea of this tactic is that union negotiators are strengthened in making deals.

That does not mean that bargaining will not be tried. Union leaders and managements will dicker before a strike is called, and those discussions usually continue for weeks and sometimes for months. This, at least, is the path unions hope to follow. It depends on how well they can discipline the rank and file.

Labor Department reorganization actually adds little to the authority of

(over)

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Labor Secretary Schwellenbach. Fact is Government power over labor is waning.

Labor agencies transferred to the Department really are on their way out. War Manpower Commission, War Labor Board are in the process of liquidation. And Congress is preparing to give U.S. Employment Service back to the States. That leaves Mr. Schwellenbach almost where he was before.

Conciliation Service is to be the mainstay of Government policy. But this agency has no power to direct settlements, to enforce decisions.

Labor-management conference, scheduled to open November 5, is not expected to deal with immediate labor-management issues, such as wage policy, the closed shop, union responsibility. These problems are too ticklish for amity.

Stronger machinery to handle labor disputes is likely to be recommended for the Labor Department. But the conference is unlikely to approve any proposal that would give an arbitration board the power that the War Labor Board exercised.

Demobilization and veteran re-employment are to complicate the labor problem in a few months. This will become a major issue in 1946.

Veterans of two years' service will be out of the Army by late winter.

Point score for enlisted men will drop to 70 on October 1, to 60 on Nov. 1.

Discharges will reach 450,000 this month, rise to 550,000 in October and stay at 700,000 to 800,000 a month until spring.

Most of these veterans will have no job rights, and unemployment could center on this group, aggravating the labor situation. When unemployment insurance benefits for veterans and war workers alike expire, the issue may become hot.

Size of the peacetime Army will be another issue before Congress and the country by next spring. That's when the War Department will present its case.

A force of 2,500,000 is likely to remain as the official goal.

Continued draft of 18-year-olds probably will be urged to maintain the force.

Parents and Congress, however, can be counted on to oppose this plan.

Prevailing sentiment gives every indication that the country wants to forget about war, to get sons and husbands and fathers out of uniform and keep them out.

Tied in with U.S. military strength are commitments this country may make toward maintaining world peace. Right now peace plans are not going very well. Foreign ministers in London have not approached a solution to major problems.

Italian settlement is bogged down over the Yugoslav border dispute.

Italian colonies are generating into a struggle between Britain and Russia.

Balkan governments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary are delaying treaties.

U.S.-British attitude is that these governments are not yet representative.

Russian view is that they are satisfactory, but the Greek Government is not.

German problem remains unsolved, both for occupation and reconstruction.

At bottom, the situation is that foreign ministers are unable to agree on any major policy. Thus they are turning specific issues over to experts, hoping that groundwork can be laid for policy decisions at some later meeting.

World economic settlements also are moving slowly in London and Washington.

Middle East oil pact is complicated by British trade controls in that area.

British trade controls, in turn, are linked with dollar credits to be made.

Dollar hoarding by the British, with resulting loss of U.S. exports, now is being suggested as the only alternative to a generous advance by this country.

Credit advances also are being sought by Russia, China, most of Europe.

Suspicion is growing in Congress that this country simply will be unable to afford demands now being made on U.S. resources. Prospect is that any proposals by the Administration for foreign aid will be closely scrutinized. This attitude in Congress already influences current negotiations.

See also pages 11, 20, 52, 85.

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Ethyl comes back...

You've often missed Ethyl, haven't you?

So have millions of other car owners often missed the eager, responsive power of America's finest gasoline.

Before long there will be a full supply of top-quality Ethyl. You'll be able once more to keep your tank filled with liquid power that will bring out all the performance that was built into your engine.

Knocking and sluggishness will be just wartime memories.

Yes—you're really going to enjoy driving again.

The Ethyl emblem on the pump is your guide to top-quality gasoline.

ETHYL CORPORATION

Chrysler Building, New York 17, N. Y.

Look for the **ETHYL TRADE MARK**

Big Fuel Conservation

already achieved by Iron Fireman



Saving Coal has been our business for 21 years

THE urgent requirement for fuel conservation brings Iron Fireman firing economies into sharp focus. There is one sure way to save coal—*burn it automatically with high combustion efficiency.*

For 21 years Iron Fireman stokers have been doing this job well, in boilers of all types. On top of this they save countless manhours—a wartime "must." And they produce steam at minimum cost.

Without cost or obligation, you can have a survey made of your heating or power plant and receive a report including an estimate of what Iron Fireman automatic firing can accomplish for you.

Our nationwide organization of qualified factory representatives and dealers is at your service. For full information write Iron Fireman Mfg. Co., 3764 West 106th Street, Cleveland 11, Ohio, Pioneer and Leader in its field. Plants in Portland, Oregon; Cleveland, Ohio; Toronto, Canada.

IRON FIREMAN

Automatic Coal Stokers

INDUSTRIAL • COMMERCIAL • RESIDENTIAL

News-Lines

Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

What you as a businessman CAN and CANNOT do as a result of federal court and administrative decisions:

YOU CANNOT usually be denied recognition of your ***partnership,*** for income tax purposes, because your partner is absent in the armed forces. In one case of a father-son partnership, where the absent son received his full share of the business profits, the U. S. Tax Court rules that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue erred in taxing the entire business income to the father when the son was unable to perform personal service because of his military service.

* * *

YOU CAN, as a dealer, buy surplus ***automobile parts*** from the Government on a fixed-price basis. The Department of Commerce is offering for sale, through its Office of Surplus Property, quantities of standard auto parts, equipment and accessories. You are eligible to buy if you are a distributor, wholesaler, retailer or the operator of a service garage or of a fleet of motor vehicles.

* * *

YOU CAN, as a manufacturer, use an adjustable pricing method for many ***radio parts*** that you sell for installation in new radio sets. This Office of Price Administration pricing system, however, does not apply to a few parts, such as tubes and cabinets.

* * *

YOU CAN, as an industrial user, obtain a fourth-quarter allotment of ***meats*** and canned fish from your rationing board or OPA district office. New applications must be filed for the fourth quarter.

* * *

YOU CANNOT, for tax purposes, fail to treat as ordinary income, in the year of receipt, the amount that you get for termination of your life interest in the income of a trust. In one case, the U. S. Tax Court so holds, refusing to recognize the amount as a capital gain.

* * *

YOU CAN now build up your supplies of a number of items heretofore subject to inventory control. The War Production Board releases from this control about 25 groups of articles, including ball and roller bearings, dry-cell batteries, asbestos materials, fibrous glass products and certain machinery and tools.

* * *

YOU CAN now apply to the Treasury for an extension of time for payment of your corporation's taxes and for a carry-back adjustment. The Bureau of Internal Revenue issues forms to be used in seeking such adjustments under the Tax Adjustment Act of 1945.

* * *

YOU CAN charge a higher price for ***bricks and tiles*** if you are a manufacturer in the area east of the Rockies. OPA authorizes an increase of $2 a thousand for bricks and 80 cents a ton for tiles.

* * *

YOU CAN obtain ***zinc*** for your production activities from the Government's stock piles. WPB announces that large supplies of this metal will be available to make up for deficiencies in output of zinc for reconversion products.

* * *

YOU CANNOT always avoid action under the Fair Labor Standards Act by raising the pay of an employe in return for his release of overtime pay due under the Act. A circuit court of appeals rules that one employe did not bar himself from a subsequent action for overtime pay by signing such a release.

* * *

YOU CANNOT assign an employe temporarily to a lower-rated job without giving him his regular rate of pay. In handing down this ruling, the National War Labor Board says that, if the employe accepts the lower-rated job when no work is available at his regular job, he can be paid at the rate for the lower job after he has worked there 40 hours.

* * *

YOU CANNOT usually be required to accept a rated order for certain forms of ***steel, copper or aluminum*** that you produce unless the order is received at least 30 days before the first of the month in which shipment is wanted. This relaxation of priority controls by WPB, however, does not apply for orders rated AAA.

Conclusions expressed in these paragraphs are based upon decisions and rulings of courts and Government bureaus. In making their decisions, courts and bureaus consider many facts which, for reasons of space, cannot be set forth in detail. THE UNITED STATES NEWS, *on written request, will refer interested readers to sources of this basic material.*

Sinclair Lewis has her mellow with mirth . . .

. . . that means a lot, Colgate, to advertisers like you!*

SHE'S young—so she likes to live and laugh and love. She's young—so she likes to look forward and dream and plan. She's young—so she likes to read Cosmopolitan.

She is finding huge enjoyment in a story by Sinclair Lewis—one of the brilliant authors who fill every issue of Cosmopolitan. And she feels like the friend of all the world!

Cosmopolitan publishes the finest writers, because our editors know that great writing makes great reading. Great reading mellows the mood. It exercises the emotions. It sets Cosmopolitan's young audience to longing for the better things of life.

Think what that means to your Palmolive ads in Cosmopolitan, Colgate! Think what it means to Colgate Dental Cream and Tooth Powder, to Cashmere Bouquet products, to Halo Shampoo and Super Suds. Keep talking to her about Colgate-Palmolive-Peet products while she's under the magic spell of Sinclair Lewis . . . Louis Bromfield . . . Faith Baldwin. For emotion makes wars. Emotion makes marriages. Emotion makes sales!

**An advertiser in Cosmopolitan since 1917*

Cosmopolitan

GREAT WRITING MAKES GREAT READING

Emotion makes Wars ✓
Emotion makes Marriages ✓
Emotion makes Sales ✓

What's the cost per bushel, Boss?

GROWING corn in a greenhouse suits the Boss's personal taste, but he'd be the last one to try it on a commercial scale. The Boss knows that such "high-falutin'" culture just can't cultivate fast enough or wide enough for mass production and mass sales.

So do the 47 smart business firms who year after year consistently plant their advertising seeds in Puck-The Comic Weekly. Big operators, they know they've got to harvest a huge sales crop on a low-cost basis. To do that they use the publication that cultivates the millions.

No stuffy greenhouse, Puck has the vitality of America in its colorful pages. Every week its all-star cast entertains over 20,000,000 of the people you want to cultivate. There's "Jiggs and Maggie," "The Katzenjammer Kids," "Skippy," "Little King," "Blondie," "Tillie the Toiler," "Toots and Casper," "Little Annie Rooney," "Popeye," "Donald Duck," "The Phantom," "Prince Valiant," "Snuffy Smith," "Jungle Jim," "Flash Gordon," "Tippie" and others.

Distributed through 15 great Sunday newspapers from coast to coast, Puck, the only national publication of its kind, is read in over 6,500,000 homes every week.

For those companies who have products to sell today or brand names to impress on the minds of millions there are big color pages, half pages or one-third pages available in Puck. To learn more about how your company can effectively sponsor advertising in this publication, write or telephone Puck-The Comic Weekly, 959 Eighth Avenue, New York 19, N. Y., or Hearst Building, Chicago 6, Ill.

VOLUME XIX—No. 14 The United States News WASHINGTON, D. C.
Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

The National Week ★ ★ ★
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IS U. S. STRIKE WAVE AHEAD? TESTS SOON ON DEMANDS

Sporadic Walkouts While Large Unions Get Ready for Showdown

Outlook for compromise on 30 per cent increases sought by leaders of CIO

Labor unrest in this country is threatening to bring a production slowdown that could delay industrial reconversion at a time when consumers are clamoring for new goods. It also threatens to deny immediate jobs to thousands of war workers at a time when full employment is a national objective.

This unrest already is manifesting itself in strikes that are slowing up the manufacture of new automobiles and other products. It appears in the threat of a strike against the numerous plants of General Motors Corp. by the CIO United Auto Workers. It also is present in such other key industries as oil, lumber, steel and rubber. How serious this strike threat is to the national economy will be determined by events of the next few weeks.

As matters now stand, the number of workers actually on strike is small by comparison with some previous periods of labor unrest. What causes concern, however, is the prospect that labor's current drive for increases in basic wages may lead to serious industrial tie-ups in the weeks ahead if these demands are not met. Adding to this concern is the Government's present state of unpreparedness to handle disputes. The War Labor Board gradually is being liquidated and new machinery for handling disputes still is in the formative stage.

The situation is one that raises many questions.

> How serious are strikes now in progress? What is the outlook for further strikes? What are the issues behind the strike threats? How does the Government propose to handle the situation?

The answers are contained in the appraisal that follows:

Strikes now in progress. There has been a marked increase in the number of strikes since the end of the war. However, most of these strikes have involved small numbers of workers and have been settled quickly. Issues are numerous, ranging from demands for wage increases to grievances over discharge of workers, seniority problems, holiday pay, changes in hours of work, promotions, layoffs, and others.

What now brings the labor situation to the fore, however, is not so much the daily average of 100,000 to 150,000 workers who actually have been on strike, but the number of workers who have been laid off as a result of strikes, and the fear that the situation is on the verge of becoming more serious. In the Detroit area, the number of workers on strike has been averaging around 30,000 to 40,000 a day, but an additional 40,000 or more have been laid off by the Ford Motor Co. and other concerns because the struck plants have been

—Acme

UAW LEADERS FRANKENSTEEN, REUTHER, THOMAS, ADDES



—Harris & Ewing

PRESIDENT TRUMAN & HENRY FORD, II

. . . can the Administration find a collision-proof plan?

—Justus in Minneapolis Star Journal

TICKLISH

unable to supply parts needed in new cars and other products.

Many of these strikes have resulted from grievances that accumulated during the war, when employes were working long hours and were held somewhat in restraint by the no-strike pledge. However, strikes in the future are likely to be concerned with larger issues of higher pay and shorter hours.

Probable trouble spots of the future include the following industries:

Automobiles. Strikes involving the big automobile companies, if they come, probably are a month to two months away. The CIO United Auto Workers are demanding a 30 per cent increase from the industry as a whole, not from just a single concern. However, there has been no real collective bargaining as yet on the union's demands, and until the union and the auto companies have had a chance to consider each other's proposals, there are likely to be no authorized strikes.

Local unions in plants of General Motors, Chrysler and Ford companies are talking of taking Government-sponsored strike votes to arm themselves with legal authority to strike if negotiations fail.

It does not follow that a union will strike just because it votes to strike. If negotiations are proceeding satisfactorily, the strike may be withheld or abandoned.

Oil. The situation in this industry already is tense. Strikes have been called in a number of refineries scattered throughout the country, and more strikes are in prospect. CIO Oil Workers are asking 30 per cent increases. The outlook is not bright for an early settlement of troubles.

Lumber. A delicate situation exists also in the Northwest pine and fir industry. The AFL Lumber and Sawmill Workers have voted to strike unless the industry meets their demand for a wage increase of 20 cents an hour. A special panel of conciliators of the U. S. Conciliation Service is trying to effect an agreement. A strike could break out there at any time.

Steel. There is no immediate strike threat in this industry. CIO Steelworkers are asking increases of $2 a day, but negotiations have not started.

Rubber. Genuine and prolonged collective bargaining over CIO Rubber Workers' demand for a 30 per cent increase is expected. That should eliminate a strike threat for some time.

Coal. John L. Lewis's United Mine Workers have made no new demands on the mine operators. Miners' take-home pay remains unchanged from wartime because of continuance of overtime. This overtime pay probably will continue while the coal shortage prevails. Trouble in the mines over wages is not expected for some weeks or perhaps months.

Wage demands. Labor will be making many demands at the bargaining table in the weeks ahead, but the principal issue will be wages. A 30 per cent advance is almost a standard demand with CIO unions. These unions contend that workers are entitled to 30 per cent more in hourly wages to maintain wartime living standards, now that earnings are being depleted by loss of overtime.

The accompanying chart, based on figures compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and a study made by *The United States News* shows that a 30 per cent increase in basic wages would more than compensate workers for the increase in living costs and the gain in worker productivity that have taken place since 1939. What that study shows is this:

Average weekly earnings of factory workers in 1944, before withholding taxes, were $46.08, representing straight-time and overtime pay for 45.2 hours. This compared with $23.86 for 37.7 hours of work in 1939. However, living costs increased 26.6 per cent after 1939. Adjusting the $46.08 for the cost-of-living increase leaves the worker with a real wage of $36.51 in 1944. This was his gross

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

ACTUAL INCOME: The dollars and cents in worker's pay envelope . . .

earning in purchasing power, compared with the $23.86 earned in 1939.

Much of this gain has been wiped out since the war, however, with the loss of overtime pay. Average earnings for 40 hours, with overtime eliminated, now are $37.20 a week, before withholding taxes. The worker's real earnings have shrunk to $28.66 since the end of the war, when his take-home pay is adjusted for a 29.8 per cent increase in living costs since 1939. This compares with average earnings of $23.86 a week in 1939, and assumes 40 hours of work in 1945 compared with average hours of 37.7 in 1939.

Thus, on these calculations, the factory worker now is better off by $4.80 a week than he was in 1939. However, his income tax is higher now than it was in 1939.

A 30 per cent rise in hourly wage rates would increase the worker's weekly pay to $48.40 for 40 hours of work. Adjusted for the 29.8 per cent increase in cost of living since 1939, his real wages would be $37.29.

A real wage of $37.29 a week would exceed the 1944 wartime real wage of $36.51 a week, and would far exceed the 1939 wage of $23.86.

Increased efficiency of workers during the war is cited by unions as one justification for higher wages. But the study shows that an increase in real wages from $23.86 to $37.29 a week would be far greater than the probable gain in efficiency of labor since 1939. Under normal conditions, labor productivity increases about 2½ per cent a year, which would indicate a gain of slightly more than 15 per cent in efficiency since 1939.

All of labor's wage demands will not be resisted by industry. Compromise increases will be worked out in many cases. Despite the CIO's insistence on 30 per cent, there will be settlements based on considerably less. The unions eventually may be willing to settle for raises of around 15 per cent.

The Government will be playing a new role in labor disputes as the country heads into this coming period of economic uncertainty. Instead of settling disputes by compulsory arbitration as it did during the war, it will act henceforth as a mediator and conciliator. The War Labor Board, the Government's wartime labor-disputes agency, now becomes part of a reorganized Department of Labor. It will fast fade from the scene and its dispute-settlement functions will be assumed by a strengthened U. S. Conciliation Service, a branch of the Labor Department.

With the passing of WLB, Secretary of Labor Lewis B. Schwellenbach becomes the No. 1 man in the Government in the field of labor relations. He now is charged with responsibility for keeping labor peace.

Although the Government still has power under the War Labor Disputes Act to seize plants, Secretary Schwellenbach believes that power should be used rarely. He is relying on collective bargaining, plus Government conciliation, to settle most disputes that will arise in the weeks ahead. He also is counting on the forthcoming labor-management conference to produce recommendations for holding strikes and lockouts to a minimum. That conference is scheduled to start Nov. 5.

There are many persons, however, who fear that it will take more than Government conciliation to settle the pending fight over wages. These persons hold the view that the Government may have to develop a wage policy and provide some method of enforcing it. That would mean a return to partial wartime controls, which industry and labor had been led to believe were dead with the end of the war.

There is no evidence that the Truman Administration has any plan for reviving these wage controls. Wages will be permitted to rise to a point where they do not require price increases. But there is a wide area of disagreement between unions and employers as to how high wages can go under present price limitations.

—Uzanas in Hartford Daily Courant

HOGGISH

of U. S. Factory Workers



... REAL INCOME: The pay envelope's contents adjusted for cost of living

RIVALRIES WITHIN THE 'BIG 5'

Soviet Wish to Rule Colonies on Britain's Mediterranean 'Life Line'

Attempt by Mr. Byrnes to find some common ground at foreign ministers' meeting

The job of drawing final settlements of the European war is getting snagged on a new set of rivalries among the Big Five powers. Foreign ministers of the Big Five, meeting at London, are finding that those rivalries now are centered on the Mediterranean Sea and surrounding lands, with ramifications extending far beyond.

Involved is the question of what is to become of former Italian colonies in Africa, former Italian Islands in the Mediterranean, the city of Trieste. Involved also are peace terms for the Balkan countries, the future of the Dardanelles, oil in the Middle East, friction between Russia and Turkey over Armenia, friction between Britain and France over Syria, and the Arab-Jewish dispute over Palestine.

Main opponents are Britain and Russia, who are renewing their age-old clash for dominance in that part of the world. This time, however, the United States and France also have interests at stake, and even China is being drawn in.

Russia's Foreign Commissar, V. M. Molotov, has startled British leaders by proposing Russian intrusion into territory Britain long has considered her special sphere. Speaking for the U. S., Secretary of State James F. Byrnes is trying to find a common ground that will preserve the unity in peace of the five Allies who fought through to victory in the war.

Basis for the rivalries lies in the divergent points of view of the Big Five powers taking part in the London talks. To understand the position of each, it is necessary first to know its special point of view.

What Britain wants in the Mediterranean region is to safeguard her "life line" connecting the home islands with India, Malaya and Australia. The vital portion of that route extends from the Strait of Gibraltar through the Mediterranean and Red Seas. All territory bordering on it is regarded by Great Britain as closely related to the security of her empire, and, therefore, her special sphere of interest. For a century, she has prevented Russia and other powers from encroaching on this territory.

What Russia wants, second only to security along her own borders, is to assure herself of a year-round outlet to the oceans. That is why, in spite of British opposition, she has tried for a century to break out of the Black Sea to the oceans by way of the Dardanelles and the Mediterranean.

—Barrow in Jersey Journal

THIS MAY TAKE A WHILE

What France wants is to protect her own North African possessions bordering on the Mediterranean, and her favored position in Syria and Lebanon. She is not in favor of any changes elsewhere that would tend to upset the status quo of those lands.

What the U. S. wants in the Mediterranean area is mainly to promote stability and democracy in Europe and eventual self-government for at least some of the colonies in Africa. This country's only direct interest in the region lies in a desire for access to the oil of the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia.

The role of China, as the fifth big power sitting in, is that of bystander. Like the United States, she is pressing for eventual self-government for dependent peoples.

These divergent points of view go far to explain the stubbornness with which the various issues are being disputed by the delegations of the Big Five.

The Italian colonies are the object of the keenest rivalry between Russia and the Western powers. Originally, it is reported, the U. S., Britain and France favored letting Italy keep most of her colonies, but under a United Nations trusteeship. Russia is said to have opposed this flatly. The

—Acme

COMMISSAR MOLOTOV
. . . the British were startled

U. S. then switched to a compromise plan, under which the colonies would be placed under joint trusteeship of the United Nations. Russia, however, favors trusteeships by individual nations and wants to become the trustee of Tripolitania on the Mediterranean and of Eritrea on the Red Sea. It is this request, granting of which would place Russia athwart Britain's "life line," which has stirred up strong British opposition. Indications are that the matter will be deferred, pending further study by deputies after the foreign ministers have gone home, and that final decision may have to be made by the Big Three leaders in another meeting.

—Seibel in Richmond Times-Dispatch

FISHING IN JOHN BULL'S POND

Trieste is the subject of another clash, involving Yugoslavia, backed by Russia, and Italy, backed by Britain. A preliminary decision by the foreign ministers is to make the city a free port, with the boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia to be drawn by the deputies in conformity with the make-up of the population. This leaves to further bargaining the final decision on just who is to govern Trieste.

The Dodecanese Islands, once owned by Turkey and more recently by Italy, are providing ground for another vigorous debate. The U. S. and Britain favor giving the Islands to Greece on the ground that most of the inhabitants are Greek. This idea, however, runs into Russian objections to the present Greek Government. Complicating the picture is the fact that the Islands dominate the Mediterranean approach to the Dardanelles and the Black Sea. Russia, therefore, wants to be certain that military control, at least, is in hands that are not unfriendly to her.

The Balkans are still another bone of contention among the big powers. Here, the argument is not over boundaries, but over the character of the present regimes and the handling of elections.

U. S. and Britain are backing the present regime in Greece, and are satisfied with plans for an election. They object, however, to the regimes in Bulgaria and Rumania as being Communist-dominated, and contend that election plans do not measure up to Western standards. They are unwilling to conclude peace treaties with these countries until the governments are changed.

Russia is taking a directly opposite position. She objects to the regime in Greece as being fascist-dominated, but expresses complete satisfaction with the regimes in Bulgaria and Rumania.

This entire situation may remain deadlocked until another Big Three meeting.

Other areas present issues that may prove equally thorny, but that have not come into the foreign ministers' meeting.

The Dardanelles question remains to be settled, probably at a conference to revise the Montreux Convention. Prospects are that Russia will insist on military bases that would give her effective control, while Britain will attempt to block her. The U. S. wants to make these straits an international waterway, open to all.

Moslem countries of the Middle East also threaten new controversies. Here U. S.-British interest is in keeping Russia out. Britain has been supporting the Moslems of Syria as against France, and the Moslems of Palestine as against the Jews. Russia's position is not yet clear, but she is showing more and more interest in this area. She is said to be taking a hand in the internal politics of Northern Iran, and to be pressing for annexation of two Armenian provinces of Eastern Turkey.

In these various questions centering around the Eastern Mediterranean, the long-time policies of Russia and Britain tend to come into conflict, and all the arts of diplomacy that can be exercised by Secretary Byrnes are needed to prevent a head-on clash that will stymie efforts to reach workable peace settlements.

The second U. S. venture in 26 years into Europe's politics, thus, is running into crosscurrents as turbulent as those that Woodrow Wilson encountered a generation ago. Prospects are that weeks and months will pass before all the issues now raised are threshed out, and Secretary Byrnes has indicated he might have to make concessions on some points. U. S. officials recognize that this country's bargaining power rests largely on the fact that each of the other four powers needs our financial aid to recover from the war. Even this bargaining card, however, is held to be too weak to make the other powers sacrifice interests they consider really vital. Upon the strength of this card and the manner in which it is used will depend the success or failure of the U. S. in getting her way on what is to be done in Europe.



—Acme

UNION JACK IN LIBYA
. . . a life line was at stake

FUTURE OF ALLIED WAR BOARDS

Continuance of Some Combined Action in Peacetime Organizations

Value to United Nations of experience in military and economic co-operation

The machinery through which this country, Britain and other Allied nations pooled their war efforts now is about to be dismantled. In both military and economic fields, the combined boards are winding up their work and preparing to disband. Thus, the idea held earlier by both American and British officials that the combined boards would have a value in time of peace seems to be going overboard in the rush to throw off all wartime controls.

During the war, the U. S. and Britain set up a close partnership for military action and for joint handling of production, raw materials, food and shipping. The reasoning of those who wanted to keep the wartime machinery was that it could be useful in helping the world reconvert to peacetime production in an orderly way.

A postwar scramble for American equipment by nations hit hard by the war was foreseen as one situation the combined boards could help to meet.

The prospect of surpluses in such raw materials as wheat, cotton, oil aluminum, copper and rubber was held to be another reason why the boards should be kept in operation.

The argument was that planning would be needed to meet both types of situations, and machinery for such planning already was in existence. A further argument was that the combined boards could serve as the nucleus around which the new United Nations Organization could be built.

Although the combined boards in their present form are preparing to go out of business, some of those earlier ideas of permanence still are in the picture.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, through which the U. S. and Britain dovetailed their military operations, eventually will be succeeded by a Military Staff Committee, to be set up under the Security Council of the United Nations. That Committee will be composed of the chiefs of staff of the U. S., Britain, Russia, France and China. Even though the present machinery is scrapped, the experience gained will offer a basis for the five-way military collaboration that is to come.

The Combined Production and Resources Board may be given a new status that will permit continued fact finding and the dissemination of information considered useful to business. Work of this Board, which served as a kind of "international WPB," was primarily in U. S. and British hands, but took in Canada, Brazil, India, France and other countries, as particular types of production were planned. Now the Board is dealing only with products remaining on the critical list, such as coal, textiles, trucks and other transportation equipment. The American portion of the Board's staff probably will be shifted into either the State or Commerce Department, pending such time as it may be attached to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

The Combined Raw Materials Board likewise may continue in another form. This Board, in which the U. S. and Britain are partners, still is allocating to claimant countries the raw materials that remain scarce. Among these are tin, natural rubber, lead, and hides and skins. Each represents a separate problem, and the probable period of scarcity varies from a few months to a year or more. Eventually the American staff of this Board, like that of the Combined Production and Resources Board, is likely to be shifted to the State or Commerce Department.

The Combined Food Board, on which the U. S., Britain and Canada are represented, apparently will stay in existence for a year or more. This agency has made possible a planned distribution of world food supplies in the light of requirements. Present outlook is that, as long as relief needs abroad remain acute, the Board will continue to allocate supplies of such scarce foods as sugar, fats and oils, and meats. Over the longer range, functions of the Board may be assumed by the Food and Agriculture Organization or some other agency of the United Nations.

The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and its present successor, the United Maritime Authority, have had experience that may provide a basis for some form of co-operation in the shipping field. The current plan, under which 16 nations have been pooling their shipping, is to come to an end within six months after V-J Day, and commercial operations are to be resumed under a "mutually acceptable formula" now being worked out.

The question now being raised is what the consequences will be if the wartime machinery of international co-operation is scrapped. At the end of World War I, abandonment of economic controls opened the way for the inflation of 1919-20 and the resulting depression of 1921-22, in both the U. S. and Britain. This time, some officials contend that world recovery will be delayed if the combined boards of wartime are allowed to die. But, in any case, they point out, these boards have made history that is bound to have an effect on the work of the United Nations Organization in the future.



—Acme

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. . . the first chapter is finished, a new one begins

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

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OUTLOOK FOR NEW HOMES

Delay in Building Boom Despite Lifting of Many Wartime Restrictions

Scarcity of materials as a factor. Move by OPA to hold down costs of construction

Out of a tangle of dispute, Washington officials have reached a decision to lift the wartime ban on new home construction. A second decision, involving price controls, remains to be made by Congress. It, too, is wrapped in economic controversy. Meanwhile, the man who wants to buy or build a home is trying unsuccessfully to penetrate the maze of discussion and learn when his new house may become available. Several plain facts, however, are emerging. One of them is that he probably must wait a while.

Boom's beginning? It is clear now that no sizable start on home construction can be made until next spring. For one thing, unfavorable winter weather soon is to intervene. And, of equal importance, many essential building materials are scarcer than commonly is supposed; scarce, that is, in relation to the tremendous demand that is expected for them.

With a start in the spring, officials estimate that some 500,000 houses can be built in 1946, as against an estimated demand for 12,000,000. After that, the forecast is for 1,000,000 new homes annually. Thus, it is obvious that, even at such a high rate of building, many who want new homes must wait, some for a number of years.

Even that prospect depends upon the presence of a number of factors favorable to a home-building boom. How best to keep the factors favorable is the point on which the Washington dispute turns. Behind the controversy stands, first of all, the specter of inflation.

The fear is that, with demand tremendous and materials insufficient, the cost of new houses might quickly be bid up to prohibitive levels and the boom be killed in its infancy. Those involved in the dispute remember very well the history of home construction after the first World War. Demand was high then, too. In 1919, some 400,000 new homes were built. But prices soared to a point that discouraged buyers, and only 250,000 homes were constructed in 1920.

To prevent a repetition of this sequence of events, a series of controls has been devised.

Materials. The first trouble is a shortage of materials, and the Office of Price Administration is clamping firm dollars-and-cents ceiling prices upon them until they can become more plentiful. The War Production Board, meanwhile, is exercising its power over the size of inventories, to prevent big contractors from acquiring and hoarding more than their share of the materials. At the same time, a number of federal agencies are trying to stimulate the production of these commodities in the hope that, by spring, sufficient quantities may be turned out to ease the upward pressure on prices. The stimulations include higher ceiling prices on some materials, if OPA is satisfied that such a course will increase production.

Construction costs. In addition, OPA imposes ceiling prices on the services of contractors, the firms that do the painting, roofing, plumbing, paperhanging, wiring and other special work that goes into house construction.

Financing. Where the price of finished houses is concerned, federal credit agencies are to try to discourage excessive mortgage lending and insufficient down payments. The National Housing Administration is preparing to advise all prospective buyers on home values, whether NHA's financing facilities are used or not. OPA has a loose form of control over the price of houses built to order, and wants that control strengthened.

But OPA thinks these measures are insufficient.

Home price ceilings. OPA also wants power to fix the price of houses built on a speculative basis for general sale to the public after their completion. It would strike a total of labor costs and the ceiling prices of materials used, add a profit margin for the builder and so determine the price of the house. OPA, further, intends to ask Congress for authority to do this. Congress turned down such a proposal last spring. OPA also wants authority to control the price of building lots and of used houses offered for sale.

—Ewing Galloway

NEW HOUSES
. . . behind the controversy stands a specter

Objections. The building industry and the suppliers of building materials are up in arms against this program. They argue that ceiling prices on materials are unnecessary and should be abandoned. Such abandonment, they contend, would spur production to a point where competition would restrain prices. There are arguments, too, that such ceilings would prove difficult, if not impossible, to enforce.

It also is argued that ceiling prices on finished homes would discourage the commercial builder, whose enterprises usually are highly speculative, and hold back the building boom by offering insufficient profit incentives.

There the question now rests. Much more controversy is inevitable. For the time being, the obvious conclusion is that new homes are to be very slow in returning to the market.

Services' Demobilization Goal: Release All Who Can Be Shipped

Transportation and Separation Process as Limitations on Speed

Period of capacity discharge that is to precede decision on size of peacetime forces

Present clamor for speeding up demobilization of the armed forces will not change the rate of discharges in the months ahead. That essential fact comes out of the criticism and explanation that have been hiding details of what is being done to speed release of servicemen and women.

The Army and Navy demobilization program is to discharge the maximum number that can be brought home from overseas with available transportation and put through separation centers in this country. That system, scheduled to reduce the Army to 2,500,000 men by next July and the Navy to 558,000 men by next September, is being criticized from many sides. Most servicemen and women are homesick and anxious to get back to civilian life. Members of Congress, under pressure from their constituents, have their own ideas as to how to step up demobilization. And from Japan, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur added fireworks to the demonstration by reducing to 200,000 the estimate of troops required by next spring to police Japan and Korea. That statement came as a complete surprise to General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, and to President Truman.

Criticism of the armed forces for slowness in demobilizing or for ignoring the special needs of such groups as doctors, fathers or skilled workers now is running into fixed-figure estimates on discharges that military officials say cannot be increased. Both President Truman and General Marshall emphasize that the current rate of discharges is limited by the number of ships and airplanes available for troop movements, and by the capacity of separation centers in this country. On this basis, officials consider that men are coming home as fast as the services can get them out of Europe and Asia.

The President and General Marshall also are looking ahead to next April or May, when decisions must be made as to the permanent strength of the peacetime Army and Navy and the size of occupation forces in Germany and Japan. By that time, too, the U. S. will have to meet the problem of maintaining enough trained personnel overseas for handling what will remain of the 8,000,000 tons of supplies now in Europe and the 800,000 tons spread out over many small islands in the Pacific. But, for another six months, the speed of demobilization is not affected by any discussions now going on with regard to these problems. Several million men can be returned from overseas before the number abroad is cut down to anything like the estimates being made on the size of occupation armies and the permanent Army and Navy strength.

—U. S. Army

GI FAMILY RECEIVING THE GOOD NEWS
. . . even the White House is surprised

For this reason, field commanders have been ordered to use all possible means for hastening troops to this country. As a result, projected rates of discharge have been increased several times in recent weeks. This fact in itself has brought criticism in the belief that public and congressional pressure alone could force a speeding up of demobilization. But discharge plans now in effect are considered by Army and Navy officials as fixed at the maximum rate possible. (See pages 85 and 90.)

Transportation. In the Pacific, the Navy is converting aircraft carriers, with their vast hangar decks, into troop transports to carry as many as 2,000 officers and men per voyage. A replica of the Air Transport Command's "Green Project," by which 150,000 men were flown to this country from Europe before Japan surrendered, is being set up in the Pacific. At present, high-point men are being flown to the West Coast at the rate of 6,000 a month. That rate eventually will reach 20,000 men returning by air each month.

Separation centers. In this country, the number of Army separation centers to process men and women out of the ranks is being increased, as is the capacity of each center. The Army Air Forces and the Navy maintain their own separation camps. The time required for releasing one soldier has been cut from 18 days to 44 hours. As a result, the number of men being separated from the Army has increased from 3,800 let out on August 1 to 17,000 being released now each day. The rate will reach 25,000 per day by Christmas. Between now and Christmas 2,600,000 of the Army and Navy personnel are to be released under present point systems.

Army demobilization schedule. The present 80-point minimum needed by enlisted Army personnel for discharge is to last but a few days more.

On October 1, the critical discharge score for enlisted men will be reduced to 70 points. Army officers, who now need 80 to 100 points for release, then can get out with 75 points. Enlisted WACs in October will be released with 36 points as against the present 41. WAC officers will

be discharged if they have 39 points, as against 44 needed now.

On November 1, the point score for enlisted Army personnel will be dropped to 60 points. Enlisted WACs on that date will be eligible for release if they have 34 points. These critical point scores will be continued until winter, when the point system will be abandoned.

Late in winter, Army personnel with two years or more in the service will be eligible for immediate discharge.

Medical personnel is being handled apart from the point system. But not fewer than 17,000 of the 45,000 doctors now in Army service are to be released by Christmas. In addition, 3,500 dentists and 25,000 nurses will be released this year.

Low-point personnel in this country is to be released beginning about Nov. 1 if it is not needed for necessary operations.

Navy demobilization schedule. The Navy point system differs from that of the Army, but it also provides a steady flow to this country of personnel eligible for discharge. Under the present schedules, enlisted personnel needs 44 points for discharge and officers 49 points. WAVE enlisted personnel will be released with 29 points, and WAVE officers with 35 points. Enlisted Coast Guard personnel will be released with 40 points, and officers with 43 points. Enlisted marines will be released if they have 70 points on the Army scale for counting age, service and dependents.

Army releases. Army strength on September 1 was 8,050,000, as shown in detail by the accompanying chart. Total now is 7,800,000 men and women. Between V-E Day and September 1, the Army released 581,000 for all reasons. By the end of September, another 450,000 will have been discharged. In October, the rate will be 550,000, and thereafter it will climb to as much as 800,000 a month, according to Gen. Marshall. At that point, the rate of discharges will level off. By July 1 of next year, Army strength will be down to 2,500,000. So far, no definite estimates have been presented by the Army as to its permanent postwar personnel needs.

—Acme

TOKYO TOURISTS
The General provided fireworks

Navy releases. Fewer than 50,000 of the Navy's personnel were released prior to this month. During September, 132,000 officers and men are being discharged. The rate of monthly releases will climb to 283,000 in January, and will remain at that level through August of next year. By Sept. 1, 1946, Navy strength will be down to 500,000 men and 58,000 officers. That is the personnel Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal is asking as necessary to man and supply the postwar fleet.

Congressional reaction to these programs is mixed. Congressmen for weeks have been snowed under with as many as 1,000 letters, telegrams and telephone calls a day requesting help in gaining the release of servicemen or women or urging that the rate of discharges be speeded up. Congressmen are helpless to do anything about these requests except in cases of emergency. But the feeling is that explanations by President Truman and General Marshall about problems of demobilization have come too late to stem the furor.

Added to that is the fact that Army officials insist that present demobilization rates are dependent on 500,000 draftees and 300,000 volunteers joining the Army by next July. If Congress limits or removes the draft and not enough men volunteer, some veterans now overseas who are eligible for release will have no replacements. In that case, some of those veterans may be held in the services.

The Army now is soft-pedaling this fact, as it is anxious to avoid further criticism. Indications are that it will not risk cutting present schedules even if not enough draftees or volunteers become available. But, at the same time, Army officials insist that present discharge rates cannot be increased. On this basis, announced schedules for releasing servicemen and women from the armed forces may be considered final until such time as decisions are reached on the permanent strength of the postwar Army and Navy and long-run occupation requirements.

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

DEFENSE IN ATOMIC AGE: PLANS FOR BIG U. S. FORCES

Absence of Proof That Large Armies and Navies Are Obsolete

New emphasis on watching world arms development and keeping abreast by science

Military and naval planners are trying to figure out a defense for America in the atomic age. They are pursuing the old theory of a defensive device for every offensive weapon. They want to be able to stop an atomic bomb or anything else that the scientists of an enemy might send against the United States.

That is the basic problem with which America's defense planners are wrestling in trying to work out plans for the permanent military and naval establishment of the United States. It is a factor in demobilization, in continuing the draft, in urging universal military training, in developing America's Army and Navy of the future.

Neither service knows what new weapons scientists may unleash. Each service is laying new stress upon intelligence work which will keep the United States informed of what other nations are doing. Both the Army and the Navy are trying to tie scientific research into the traditional plans for defense. Each service is counting heavily upon the airplane. But the Navy still wants ships of all types. The Army still wants universal service and trained men.

B-29s. How to stop an enemy plane carrying an atomic bomb that could wipe out an entire city with one explosion is only one phase of the defense problem. There are all sorts of scientific devices that may be combined with the atomic bomb, such as radar-guided, long-range, rocket-propelled missiles of the V-bomb type. Compared to some of these, an airplane is easy to intercept. The B-29s that made the spectacular nonstop flight from Japan to Chicago, if they had been enemy planes, might have been met, if not stopped, many miles before they reached the United States. Radar detection devices would have picked up the approach of the B-29s, would have foretold how many of them were coming, how fast they were traveling and their location at any given minute. Jet-powered interceptor planes could have leaped out to meet them. But the weapons of the future will strike with a speed more rapid than that of sound. Present devices will give no adequate warning of their approach.

Defense problem. The flight of the B-29s showed clearly the nature of the new defense problem, however. It demonstrated to Army and Navy planners that the whole of the United States is open to swift and deadly attack by an enemy in any quarter of the world, even if that enemy is armed with weapons that are no better than those which the U. S. now has. And there is little hope of keeping those weapons out of the hands of other nations.

At the time the war ended, the Japanese were building bombers with which they hoped to hit the West Coast of the United States. The B-29s on the 5,995-mile leap from Hokkaido to Chicago used the same fields that had been built for long-range Japanese bombers. In the hands of the Japanese, the B-29s, armed with atomic bombs, could have flattened any city along the Pacific Coast or in the Middle West, or, given tail winds instead of head winds, could have wiped out Pittsburgh or Detroit with one wallop.

From Germany, the B-29s, flying the Great Circle route, could have hit any city in America. The Middle and Far West are just as vulnerable as the East. A 5,995-mile flight from Berlin, following the Great Circle route, could have hit

HOW MANY OCEANS WILL THE ATOMIC BOMB COVER?
THIS NAVY WILL COVER FIVE OCEANS, AT LEAST.
FORRESTAL
POSTWAR NAVY 1,079 SHIPS
CHAIRMAN WINSHIP HOUSE WAR ATTAIRS

—Berryman in Washington Star

PLOTTING THE POSTWAR NAVY'S SIZE

—U. S. Navy

PLOTTING DEATH IN THE RADAR ROOM

. . . until ships have met the atomic test, traditions will carry on

—Acme

HEARTS FOR AMERICA'S ROBOT BOMBS
. . . the premium is still on brains

Los Angeles or any point to the eastward.

Navies. The flight of the B-29s from Japan occurred on the same day that Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal was telling Congress that the atomic bomb would require land or carrier-based planes to deliver it. (Full text of Secretary Forrestal's testimony on page 93.) The Secretary was thinking of carrier-based planes for taking the bomb across the ocean or launching it upon the enemy from the sea. But the Japanese used Kamikaze, or suicide, pilots in the war just ending. To a lesser degree, so did the Germans. And a new type of floating landing field was devised during the war.

How destructive the atomic bomb may be when turned loose upon a battleship or a fleet is yet to be determined. The steel tower to which the bomb was attached for the test in New Mexico disintegrated. But the steel frames of buildings were left standing in Hiroshima. Many of the steel or concrete buildings there can be repaired.

Until ships have met the atomic test, naval planners are proceeding along traditional lines. The Navy will consist of an active fleet, a ready reserve and a laid-up reserve. Sixty per cent of the present fleet will be laid up with only caretaker crews. About a third of the remainder will be kept as a ready reserve, used to train midshipmen and reservists, in shape to be put into active service quickly. The remainder —about 300 major combatant ships, plus auxiliary craft—will be kept in active service. That is Secretary Forrestal's plan.

Army plans are less crystallized as to numbers of men and planes and quantities of equipment. The Army is fully aware of the rapidity with which weapons can become obsolete. Secretary Robert P. Patterson favors scrapping all present weapons except those immediately needed, so as not to create stagnation and send America into the next war with outmoded arms.

The Army Air Forces, now the most modern in the world, figure that every piece of equipment they now have will be obsolete within two or three years. It already is working on a new bomber—the B-36—that will fly farther and carry more bombs than will the B-29. With the lighter atomic bomb, instead of the old-fashioned kind, this range is increased.

Scientific research. Both the Army and Navy are pressing for an agency, backed by plenty of funds, to go ahead with scientific research. The atomic bomb and radar are only two of the more dramatic developments by scientists during the war. The range of studies was wide. They produced such widely varying things as DDT, a new flame thrower, expanded production and use of penicillin, and a kind of woolen socks that won't shrink.

Work still is going forward on jet engines, rockets, supersonics and electronics. Air Forces men are frank to admit that they have no idea what the airplane of the future will be like. But they, like the other military and naval planners, want America to keep ahead of the rest of the world in scientific development.

The atomic bomb. Army men argue that the atomic bomb does not lessen the need for universal military training. They think that it only makes more technical the kind of training that must be given soldiers if they are to keep abreast of the scientific developments that are brought to war. Until they are certain that the new weapons make large armies unnecessary, they want enough man power trained to command the respect of the rest of the world.

Both services also are demanding a tie-in with industry, and close planning so that quick industrial mobilization can be had. They also want an intelligence force that will keep the United States informed of the potential striking power of any other nation before this country is attacked. With such information, they think the American Navy and Air Forces can fight off any attacker before the Army Ground Forces come to grips with him. They think the next blow will come quickly, through the air.

—Acme

HIROSHIMA
. . . Los Angeles, Chicago, Pittsburgh?

Air-Commerce Expansion: Geared to Public Demand

Mass Acceptance by Passengers and by Business As the Prerequisite for Heralded Era of Aviation

Immediate prospects of increased speed and safety, and further cuts in rates

The pattern of postwar aviation now is taking shape. It reveals many new advantages for those who travel or ship by air. But it also shows that the "air age" glowingly predicted by the more optimistic enthusiasts still is rather far away. To look at the actual situation, present and future:

Rates. The air lines have clipped nearly 25 per cent off prewar domestic rates. Nowadays it costs about 4½ cents a mile to fly. Some air-line officials predict rates as low as three cents a mile within a few years.

Routes. Scheduled flights continue to link only a comparatively few large centers. Air-line service to 382 cities has been approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board, but only 282 are receiving it. The problem is one of supplying adequate equipment and airport facilities. A later, large-scale development of "feeder lines" connecting remote towns with through plane routes is generally predicted.

Speeds. Faster flights are a certainty, for many runs. As yet, the increase above prewar cruising speeds of 150 to 180 miles an hour is not appreciable. But a general increase to 200 or more is looked for, and some planes will cruise at speeds up to 300. The latter, appearing before the end of the year, are to be primarily for long runs and for transoceanic flying. They are to reduce the New York to Pacific Coast flights to 10 hours, from the present 14.

Plane types. The big, fast planes to be delivered this year will carry 43 to 51 passengers. Cabins will be air-conditioned and "pressurized" to make high-altitude flying agreeable. They are to contain all that is new in comfort devices. These glamor aircraft are to be comparatively scarce for some time to come, however, and most flights will be made in two-motored commercial transports of the present type. Some 400 of these now are in use.

Number of planes. The number of air-line planes may double in the next two to three years, but is hardly expected to increase beyond that. Much depends on the public reaction to postwar flying. Some have predicted a fivefold increase by 1950, as compared with prewar figures, in the number of passenger-miles flown. This remains to be shown. But, after the expansions of the war, aircraft manufacturers are in a position to meet, very quickly, almost any developing demand for planes.

Schedules. Frequent departures, with no necessity for reservations, on much-traveled runs, such as New York to Washington or San Francisco to Los Angeles, are the goal of the air lines. On longer flights, the public may get a choice between frequent departures in smaller planes, or in big aircraft at more widely spaced intervals.



—Acme

AUTOS BY AIR
. . . at reduced rates, anything could fly

Safety. The war has brought the development of many safety devices, such as radar, radio and landing instruments. Moreover, the new planes, as a result of wartime advances, are to be better built for their job. Accidents were on the decline in commercial aviation before the war, and officials think this trend certainly is to be accelerated.

Air cargo. The air lines now hope to build up a big business in air cargo, which they largely neglected before the war. The Air Transport Command of the Army has given the lines a lesson in the possibilities of this field. In prewar days, a small volume of cargo was simply carried in unused space on passenger planes. Now, at least 11 transport planes are carrying cargo only, and the number is to increase.

Prewar cargoes consisted mostly of valuable papers, material for newspaper and magazine publication, and perishable flowers, vegetables and fruits. But air shipments of merchandise were gaining before the war, and the lines hope to stimulate a sizable business in this field, on the ground that quick deliveries enable a merchant to carry smaller inventories and obtain a more rapid turnover.

Rates have been high, with some exceptions, running 60 to 70 cents per ton-mile. Now, there is talk of cutting the rate to about 30 or 35 cents, or perhaps a little lower, in the expectation that a greatly increased volume would make cargo operations profitable at that figure.

Airports. Much of the future of commercial aviation depends on the development of airports. More airports, with longer runways to accommodate the big ships are needed. Many such projects are planned, and the Federal Government may help. The Senate recently passed a bill providing $75,000,000 a year for five years for airport construction, and the House is considering the proposal. In any event, airport construction is to be a time-consuming process.

Multiple regulation and taxes. The air lines are watching, uneasily, a trend toward double regulation and taxes—by the States and the Federal Government. State taxation of one line, in Minnesota, has been upheld by the Supreme Court. If it spreads, the lines say, the downward trend in rates may be impeded. Three States enacted regulatory legislation this year, and 21 more considered it.

Overseas flight. With planes of the type coming this year, 11-hour service between New York and London is promised, with other distances in proportion. Departures could be stepped up to meet whatever demand develops. Rates now run 17 cents a mile. They are being refigured on the basis of the new planes' performance, and reductions are promised soon.

All this shows that aviation is ready to go as rapidly as demand makes possible. But the air age is not to come overnight.

CONTINUING SHORTAGE OF DOCTORS

Release of 28,000 From the Services as Only Temporary Relief

Growing need in veterans' hospitals. Training of medical students slowed by the draft

Evidence is accumulating that the United States is heading for a shortage of doctors and dentists. Within 12 months, 28,000 will be released by the armed forces. Their return to private life will bring some relief. It will solve none of the long-range problems.

The signs of shortage are developing at a time when there is a mounting need for civilian medical care, restricted during the war years. The shortage may be years in reaching its maximum, but the causes are now apparent:

Draft of 18-year-old students will cut the enrollment in premedical schools. It will be reflected in medical schools three years hence unless enough veterans and women enter training to fill the gap.

Veterans' care will take thousands of doctors out of civilian practice. The Veterans' Administration is making plans to care for 300,000 patients in the next 20 years. Anticipating a doctor shortage, it is quietly planning future hospitals near established medical centers.

Army and Navy will be larger in the future than during any period of peace in U.S. history, with a resultant need for more medical officers than before the war.

War itself cost many doctors their lives. Others have become incapacitated by injuries. The increased load put on doctors who stayed at home has been the cause of additional casualties in the medical profession.

The war left thousands of communities with insufficient medical protection. In many sections, the need now is acute. Such areas are putting increasing pressure on Congress, on public health officials and on the armed forces to get physicians out of uniform and back into private practice.

Demobilization of medical officers is through point systems. The Army and Navy are co-operating with the War Manpower Commission's Procurement and Assignment Service in the return of doctors to their private practice in communities that are in great need of their services now. That will bring relief, particularly during the coming winter. But the problem of the future cannot be solved by demobilization. That problem is to assure adequate medical care for the entire population. It is complicated by the fact that the trend among civilian doctors and dentists for years has been away from rural communities and toward the cities. Here is the outlook, by professional groups:

Doctors. Army and Navy now have 20,000 young doctors who never have been in private practice. If, upon demobilization, they establish themselves in areas of greatest need, medical care may reach normal peacetime levels by next spring. Should they settle in the cities to specialize, however, the over-all medical care of the nation will suffer and the distribution of physicians in ratio to the population will be worse than it is now.

The problem of medical protection for remote rural areas is attracting increasing attention of public health officials. To offset the medical trend toward the cities, the suggestion has been made that State universities offer tuition-free medical courses to students who agree to practice at least two years within the State in designated communities.

Dentists in uniform generally intend to resume private practice, according to a recent survey. But 22 per cent of those who answered a questionnaire say they do not plan to return to their old communities. They want to establish themselves in small cities, further reducing the dental care in rural areas.

Seventy-three per cent of those in uniform plan further study after they are demobilized. But most of them will specialize. Only 5.7 per cent will take courses in child dentistry, a present shortage field. More than half of the answering dentists will need new equipment to return to full-time practice. For these and other reasons, the demand for dental care is expected to exceed the capacity of dentists for another 10 years.

Nurses, trained for the Army and Navy, will be demobilized along with doctors and dentists as the military need for them declines. But there is no way of determining what they plan to do when they return to private life. Such things as retirements, marriages and the increasing staff needs of veterans' hospitals will have a bearing on the number to be available for private practice.

Supply and distribution of physicians, dentists and nurses thus becomes the immediate riddle of postwar medical protection for the nation. An estimated 15,000,000 rural residents are without adequate doctor care or hospital facilities. War dislocations caused the doctor-patient ratio in about a third of all U. S. counties to drop to one physician for each 3,000 population. In many big cities, the ratio is a doctor for each 700 people.

The immediate job ahead is to spread the available medical care evenly over the entire population, and keep it there.

—Acme

DOCTORS AT THE FRONT
. . . the home-front diagnosis isn't encouraging

"In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened."
GEORGE WASHINGTON

The United Sta

(These two pages present each week the opinion of The Editor. T
the other members of the staff who report, interpret, and forec

September 28, 1945

MACARTHUR'S PREDICTION

By David Lawrence

Quite a flurry was occasioned last week at the Department of State and in Congress because General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander in the Far East, disclosed that we might be able to police Japan with about 200,000 troops.

Promptly the Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, rushed into print with a rebuke which said, in effect, that the General was endeavoring to lay down broad policy—something which the Government back home alone is supposed to do. Promptly also members of Congress rose to the General's side and expressed resentment over what Mr. Acheson had said.

Actually the conflict of view is a tempest in the teapot because there is a measure of support for each approach. Inability to sit down and talk over the whole matter brought the misunderstanding.

But there is nevertheless separate significance in what was said by General MacArthur and what was said by the Department of State.

The General declares the occupation task is proceeding smoothly and he sees no reason to maintain a large army there. He is mindful of the fact that we have a big navy patrolling Japanese waters, with carrier planes available at a moment's notice, that we have land-based air forces at Okinawa and in the Marianas, and that for all practical purposes we have the power to coerce the Japanese to do what we wish—certainly we can quickly quell any incipient resistance movements.

Then what is all the fuss about? What does the State Department mean when it says our Army is an "instrument" and not a "determinant of policy"?

Lack of coordination: The American people are entitled to an explanation of this remark. Can it mean that the Department of State is still living in the atmosphere of November 1941 when, after prolonged negotiations with the Japanese Government, the whole matter was suddenly turned over to the Army and Navy with the abrupt comment that the Secretary of State had "washed his hands" of the controversy and that it was then up to the armed forces?

Clearly the American people have no intention to approve in 1945, at the close of a horrible war, any such repetition of the lack of coordination which existed in the days preceding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Now is the time for this problem of what is governmental policy in the foreign field to be minutely examined. If we have a policy with respect to Japan which involves the use of military force beyond the requirements of policing and the maintenance of order, by all means let us hear the whys and wherefores of such a policy.

State Department unprepared? Is it possible that the real truth is the Administration and particularly the Department of State has been caught unawares, that the genial Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who is busy with the meeting of the Council of Five in London, forced out of the Department recently the best-posted man in America on the Far East, Joseph Grew, without making adequate provision for the formulation of Far Eastern policy by competent advisers?

Have we in the State Department a transition muddle with respect not only to the Far East but to Latin America which the President has failed to perceive, and how much has the desire to put men with a bit of political party background into office occasioned a complete upset in the Department of State and deprived the country of experienced personnel at the very moment when the nation needs from that Department helpful policies to carry out the objectives of the war?

The Congress is as much responsible for foreign policy as is the Department of State. Its foreign affairs committees must be taken into the confidence of the President and the Department of State in the formulation of foreign policy.

If the Department of State has some plan to keep a big occupying army in Japan long after the best military mind we have out there thinks it is necessary, this is important news to the fathers and mothers of the boys who must stay overseas and the parents of those 18-year-olds who must interrupt their educations and submit to a peacetime draft.

These are not insignificant matters which can be dealt with by hush-hush diplomacy or in the privacy

States News

U. S. Pat. Office

(Our pages of The United States News are written in their entirety by professional news irrespective of the editorial views expressed here.)

"I wholly disapprove of what you say but will defend to the death your right to say it."
VOLTAIRE

Time for State Department to let people know its plans for use of military force as instrument of foreign policy—Peace can be enforced through fair treatment of defeated nations.

of the Government departments. It is the people's business and they have a right to know.

General MacArthur may have talked at the wrong time so far as his superiors in the War Department are concerned, for at the same moment he was using the figure of 200,000, the War Department was trying to proceed with an orderly demobilization, and it is obvious that General MacArthur's pronouncement gave stimulus to some ill-considered proposals being made in Congress nowadays to disband the Army almost overnight.

If the General's timing was wrong, this is something for General Marshall to caution him about, so that subsequent statements will be submitted to the War Department before being released to the press—communication is almost instantaneous between Tokyo and Washington these days.

But the comment by the Under Secretary of State calls for explanation by the President. The people are entitled to know what our policy is to be not only in Japan but in Germany. Do we intend to enforce peace by the sword indefinitely or will there be a genuine effort made to enlist the cooperation of the former enemy peoples so that the foundations of a real peace may be laid?

There are two concepts about making peace. One is that by keeping a standing army in their midst, you encourage enemy peoples to love you, and also that by brandishing a pistol constantly, you educate them never to want to go to war again.

The other theory is that democracies do not maintain large standing armies and hence must find some other means to insure peace besides the presence indefinitely of an armed force on the soil of a defeated country.

Japanese know defeat: But, it will be asked, isn't the latter a "soft" peace? Aren't the Japs going to bide their time and rise up against us once more because we withdraw so quickly—before "they know they are beaten?"

The answer is that the Japanese people know now they are beaten—and those persons who don't know will find out soon enough through their own press because the facts are being given to the Japanese by their newspapers and radio. What the censorship hid during the war is now being revealed.

It may be asked, on the other hand, how does anyone discover when a whole nation is contrite and humble—how do such a people show that they have tasted defeat and have learned their lesson?

If there be any lesson at all in the use of physical force, then no demonstration by any army or navy or air force can equal what the atomic bomb demonstrated in two Japanese cities. Maybe if it had happened to us and tens of thousands of our men, women and children had been killed here in America, we might understand how the Japanese feel.

Rehabilitation of a people: Only those of us who refuse to look facts in the face can argue that the Japanese do not know now they are beaten. They have lost all—their colonies and their overseas possessions. Their factories and their cities have been bombed so extensively that our Army Air Forces already are boasting that the atomic bomb really didn't end the war and that it would have ended anyway in a few more weeks of action from the air even if we hadn't used the atomic bomb.

Clearly we must destroy any remaining industry in Japan that can be used for war purposes but beyond that we have little to worry about. Japan can be kept disarmed without a long-drawn-out occupation. It can be done by vigilance and decisive action at the first sign of any resistance or plan for vengeful action.

What should our policy be? To restore Japan to the family of nations as a producing member at the earliest possible moment. We must stabilize the Far East and we can do it by economic cooperation and commonsense measures based on moral rather than physical force.

Someday governments will discover what more and more individuals are discovering every day, namely, that in penology the philosophy of tolerance and fair treatment—the very thing the Scriptures teach us—accomplishes more toward rehabilitation and reeducation than the lash or the threat of the lash ever did.

How Public Invested Its War Savings

(Gross Savings Accumulated January, 1940—March, 1945, Inclusive)



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

U. S. citizens now hold $129,600,000,000 in cash and other liquid savings accumulated during the war, the biggest backlog of potential buying power in history. What they do with this wartime wealth in the months immediately ahead will have a telling effect on prices, industrial production and the whole national economy.

The sum is greater than the annual national income of prewar years. If it is poured out in an unrestrained rush to buy goods, it will carry the seeds of inflation. Spent carefully, the money can stabilize domestic markets for industry and services as they return to full peacetime output.

Gross savings of $182,000,000,000 were accumulated between January, 1940, and March, 1945. However, as shown by the Pictogram, gross savings include the purchases of homes and durable goods and payments on debts, along with cash, securities and insurance held by individuals. The wartime savings break down in these classifications:

Liquid savings amount to $59,000,000,000 in cash and on deposit, $42,400,000,000 in securities and $28,200,000,000 invested in insurance. Although insurance premiums are classified as liquid savings, they are not a source of immediate spending money, since most individuals borrow on their insurance only as a last resort. Of the $42,400,000,000 held in securities, $36,000,000,000 is in Government savings bonds, which are readily convertible into cash.

These three groups of savings represent the potential spending power pent up largely because of wartime shortages. They are regarded as a strengthening factor in postwar markets for automobiles, building materials, household furnishings and other types of civilian durable goods that have been unavailable or scarce for five years or more.

Other savings during the war years include $7,600,000,000 that went into home buying, $42,700,000,000 in purchases of durable goods such as automobiles, farm machinery, household appliances, plumbing fixtures and hardware, and $2,100,000,000 in payments on debts.

Much of the money paid on old debts during the war years actually can be added into the potential buying power represented in cash savings, because it means that money which normally would go into debt payment now is free for spending in some other way. As an example, during the war many farmers used their increased income to pay off mortgages. Now, instead of using current income for mortgage payments, they can spend the money for new equipment, house repairs or other needed improvements.

RIGHT OR LEFT: CAPITAL PUZZLE

Executive's Actions Variously Interpreted by Political Partisans

New Dealer displeasure at dropping of Stabilizer Davis, naming of Mr. Burton to Court

New Dealers now are asking questions about President Truman's future course. Many of them are leaving Washington to return to private law practice, to head colleges, or to take jobs in private industry. They say the President talks liberal, but is listening to conservative advisers.

But anti-New Dealers who stand on the far right wing are not too happy. Many of them would like to see some of the laws of the Roosevelt era wiped off the books. But neither Mr. Truman's deeds nor his words indicate that he is willing to accept their point of view.

New Dealers like Oscar Cox, counsel for the Foreign Economic Administration, and Edward F. Prichard, Jr., a Treasury adviser, are leaving Washington for private business. Others have gone, too. Still others are thinking of leaving. But Ben Cohen, author of many a New Deal law, is becoming counsel for the State Department. And Henry A. Wallace has no plans to quit as Secretary of Commerce.

Chief complaints of the labor and New Deal groups are that the President dropped William H. Davis as chief of the Office of Economic Stabilization and, on the same day, appointed Senator Harold H. Burton, Ohio Republican, to the Supreme Court. Although separate acts and apparently barren of anti-New Deal intent, some New Dealers regard the two actions as symptomatic of what is happening behind the scenes.

Mr. Davis went out when his duties were transferred to John W. Snyder's Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. Labor regarded Mr. Davis as a long-range advocate of higher wages. And Mr. Burton, although praised lavishly in Congress by members of both parties and generally regarded as liberal in his views, had incurred the ill will of some labor elements by his co-sponsorship of a bill to require compulsory arbitration of strikes.

What the situation boils down to is this: The President still is regarded as too far to the left for some anti-New Dealers. And some New Dealers are beginning to think of him as too far to the right. Robert E. Hannegan, the Postmaster General, says, however, that Mr. Truman is more concerned with whether he is "right or wrong" than whether he is "right or left."

In Congress, much of the legislation requested by Mr. Truman is bogging down or working its way slowly toward compromises that are short of what Mr. Truman asked for. He is settling for less than he asked for in the unemployment compensation measure. He is getting a Pearl Harbor investigation that he thought was unnecessary. And Congress is pounding away at demobilization plans, although, so far, the draft has been held intact.

Even the plans for occupation of Germany and Japan are being drawn into congressional debate. Dean Acheson, the Under Secretary of State, was taken to task in the Senate for a statement that was construed as admonishing General of the Army Douglas MacArthur that final decisions on Japanese policy would be made in Washington rather than in Tokyo. Without prior consultation with Washington, the General had announced that 200,000 troops would be enough for the occupation of Japan after the country had been taken over.

When Mr. Acheson's name came up for confirmation by the Senate for his new post, Senator Wherry, (Rep.), of Nebraska, asked that a vote be deferred. Mr. Wherry said Mr. Acheson had blackened the name of a great American general. Others pointed out that the name of the General had not been mentioned.

Changes. The appointments of Mr. Acheson and Mr. Burton and the departure of Mr. Davis and various New Dealers are only part of the changing picture. At a six-minute press conference, the President disclosed several major changes.

Henry L. Stimson, the 78-year-old Secretary of War, went out of the Cabinet, his third post under four Presidents, and Mr. Truman chose another Republican, Under Secretary Robert P. Patterson, to succeed him.

At the end of the week, Mr. Truman went off for a rest with Democrats at an island resort in Chesapeake Bay. He had no comment on a story that Thomas E. Dewey, the 1944 Republican presidential candidate, had refrained for patriotic reasons from charging Mr. Roosevelt with foreknowledge of the plans of the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor. The story was that General of the Army George C. Marshall had told Mr. Dewey this would tip off the Japanese that the Americans had broken their secret code.

—Acme

GENERAL MACARTHUR
From Japan, a statement . . .



—Harris & Ewing

UNDER SECRETARY ACHESON
. . . from Congress, a rebuke

Our Veterans need Your help!

TO EMPLOYERS:
Your employees will find helpful advice on the home-coming of their Veterans in the booklet "Coming Home." Metropolitan will gladly send you enlarged copies of this advertisement suitable for posting on your bulletin boards.

An Important Message from Major General NORMAN T. KIRK, The Surgeon General, U. S. Army

YOU have undoubtedly heard much concerning the difficulties of readjustment which confront the returning Veteran.

Actually, the vast majority of our Veterans will return from the War physically fit—ready and anxious to take up civilian life again.

Some will not be so fortunate. There will be those who are disabled . . . some physically and some mentally scarred.

The United States Army and Navy provide medical treatment and care for our men in the services; the Veterans Administration for those who are discharged. In many cases there comes a time when, for sound medical reasons, it is best for the Veteran to return to his home environment.

Once at home, it is, of course, the family's responsibility to help him with sympathy and patience to get back to normal as fast as possible. There is much that parents, wives, and relatives can do.

The help which cannot be given in the home becomes the responsibility of *your community*, which should be prepared to offer such Veterans various aids, including:

1. ***Medical advice, if needed.***
2. ***Assistance in obtaining work which will be consistent with impairments.***

For those who return hale and hearty . . . it is the responsibility of the community to extend every aid which will facilitate a rapid return to everyday life.

This may be achieved if the Veteran may obtain, if necessary:

1. ***Help in securing employment through competent vocational counsel.***
2. ***Advice on legal, educational, domestic affairs and other questions.***

Many communities already offer helpful services to Veterans. If yours does not, you—who belong to business, civic, church, and other community groups—may take the lead in establishing such assistance in your own community. If your town already supports Veterans Aid bureaus under various auspices, let me urge you to help in *co-ordinating* their valuable services, so that Veterans will have the best your community can give them.

The Veteran has earned your respect. I know every American will want to do everything he can to help the Veteran to readjust himself to his regular civilian life.

N. T. Kirk

U. S. ARMY

Ask for these free booklets . . . *Metropolitan has prepared several Booklets which contain suggestions for the reception of returning Veterans. Send today for your free copy of the Booklets of particular interest to you.*

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Booklet KB—*"Employment of the Handicapped Veteran"*

Booklet KC—*"Re-employment of the Veteran"*

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



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Question of the Week

Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

Do you believe it possible to maintain the American Army at sufficient strength by a volunteer system of enlistment?

Because of widespread interest in the subject of whether Selective Service should be continued in order to fill the needs of the armed forces, The United States News *asked members of Congress, military and naval experts and others for their views.*

Answers were printed last week. Others appear herewith.

Rep. A. L. Bulwinkle

(Dem.), N. C.; Member, House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy,

answers:

I do not think it possible for some months or years yet that the Army and Navy can have sufficient personnel by voluntary enlistment. In the first place, the average man in the service now wants to return to civilian life. We must realize that the Army, with the work cut out for it in the Pacific, must be a substantial force, and it will be necessary to retain a sufficient reserve force in the United States. The Navy must have, and should have, at least 500,000 men in order to perform its functions. For these reasons, I do not believe for some time yet we will have a sufficient number of volunteers to maintain the armed services.

Col. Paul G. Armstrong

Springfield, Ill.; State Director, Selective Service System,

answers: (by telegraph)

Cessation of war removes patriotic incentive for voluntary enlistment for occupation forces. I do not believe anywhere near enough men will volunteer for this service and it will be necessary to continue some form of draft if men who have rendered overseas service are to be relieved.

Senator Revercomb

(Rep.), W. Va.; Member, Senate Committee on Military Affairs; Member, The American Legion,

answers:

Yes. If the Army of the United States is opened for enlistment for a fixed period of one year, I believe that within a short time sufficient enlistments will be obtained to sustain the needed Army, and Selective Service may be ended.

The only way for voluntary enlistment in the Army at present is for a man to offer himself for induction to a draft board

Here's how American Magnesium is building 40-gallon Oil Tanks for P-47N Thunderbolt fighters.

Certainly . . . MAGNESIUM SHEET HAS FORMABILITY

It took a heap of squeezing, many humps and hollows to fit this 40-gallon oil tank into a former 28-gallon tank space. Magnesium sheet has the formability to do the job.

American Magnesium's more than twenty-five years' experience in working with magnesium provides real know-how. Mazlo Magnesium sheet can be successfully formed cold, warm or hot, depending upon the design of the part involved.

American Magnesium will gladly share the know-how gained through its many years of designing, manufacturing, and assembling magnesium parts. For this assistance we invite you to write Aluminum Company of America, Sales Agent for Mazlo Magnesium Products, 1712 Gulf Building, Pittsburgh 19, Pennsylvania.

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REG. U.S. PAT. OFF.

AMERICAN MAGNESIUM CORPORATION

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

Shown here is a complete unit using the "Z" Fold Cartridge. It cleans the oil used in the cutting operation—then returns it in a continuous stream to be used again and again. Partially exploded view shows HYCAR seal and spindle assembly.

HYCAR seals put filter performance "in the bag"

IF the bag-like refill cartridge in an industrial oil filter isn't properly sealed at both ends, clean and dirty oil will mix together, making the filter useless. That's why Briggs Clarifier Company engineers, after rigid test of many materials, selected HYCAR synthetic rubber for the sealing rings in the type "Z" Fold Refill Cartridge.

There were 4 performance characteristics needed in the material selected. First, it had to be resilient to slide over the spindle inside the unit—no buckling or tearing during installation of the refill cartridge. Second, it had to resist deterioration—remain unaffected by hot oils, acids, water. Third, it had to resist vulcanization to the metal spindle even at continued high temperatures. Finally, it had to *stay* resilient—maintain a perfect seal for the full long life of the refill cartridge.

That HYCAR could meet these requirements is plainly shown by the list of properties in the box at the right. They tell why HYCAR has in 5 short years become an important basic material for American industry. *Ask your supplier* for parts made from HYCAR. Learn for yourself that it's wise to use HYCAR for long-time dependable performance. *Hycar Chemical Company, Akron 8, Ohio.*

CHECK THESE SUPERIOR FEATURES OF HYCAR

1. *EXTREME OIL RESISTANCE—insuring dimensional stability of parts.*
2. *HIGH TEMPERATURE RESISTANCE—up to 250° F. dry heat; up to 300° F. hot oil.*
3. *ABRASION RESISTANCE—50% greater than natural rubber.*
4. *MINIMUM COLD FLOW—even at elevated temperatures.*
5. *LOW TEMPERATURE FLEXIBILITY—down to —65° F.*
6. *LIGHT WEIGHT—15% to 25% lighter than many other synthetic rubbers.*
7. *AGE RESISTANCE—exceptionally resistant to checking or cracking from oxidation.*
8. *HARDNESS RANGE—compounds can be varied from extremely soft to bone hard.*
9. *NON-ADHERENT TO METAL—compounds will not adhere to metals even after prolonged contact under pressure. (Metal adhesions can be readily obtained when desired.)*

Hycar

Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

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Synthetic Rubbers

and then serve for the duration of war and six months after. That is an uncertain length of time. Duration of war means when war is officially declared ended.

Fix the time of enlistment for one year. Open it to civilians, men in the service, and discharged servicemen. When men know they will serve one year, it is my belief that volunteer enlistments will fill the needs of the Army, when volunteering today through draft boards means service for an indefinite length of time.

Admiral Richard H. Leigh

(Ret.); Claremont, Calif.; Former Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet; Former Chairman, General Board of the Navy,

answers:

My answer is an emphatic, "No." I agree fully with our President, the War and Navy Departments in this matter.

We only have to look back to the close of World War I to recognize the need of Selective Service for a short time. I was Acting Chief of the Bureau of Navigation shortly after World War I and came up against the almost insurmountable job of demobilization and the keeping in commission of the rapidly dwindling Navy at that time. It was a tremendous job to keep ships partially manned.

Naturally a large majority of the Navy men were weary, wanted to get home and into civilian life, and few indeed cared to enter active naval service. Scarcely any for a while were volunteering. Military service was not wanted. Few volunteered—and the same on a greater scale applies now both to the Army and Navy.

Inquiries among enlisted men invariably brings the answer, "I want to get home, I am so weary." These men agree with me that for at least two years we could not get the volunteers needed. Soon we would be able to get them, but not now.

John D. Clark

Albuquerque, N. Mex.; Past President, Southwestern Division, American Association for Advancement of Science; Associate Member, Naval Consulting Board; Member, Selective Service Educational Occupational Advisory Board, Santa Fe,

answers:

No, I do not believe it possible to maintain the Army at sufficient strength by a volunteer system of enlistment.

My opinion has been formed largely as a result of some service since 1940 in three different positions with Selective Service in a community having young men of a wide variety of backgrounds, from well-educated university students to an abundance of common laborers.

The armed forces must have personnel of *quality*. Numbers alone are not sufficient. A volunteer system does not insure both. Careful selecting does. Again, young men are helped for their life work by a term in the Army.

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

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*Reg. U. S. Pat. Off.

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Pro and Con of National Issues

Peacetime Draft: Division in Press On Continuance

On continuance of the military draft, now that war is over, there is wide difference of opinion among commenting editors. Even with reduced estimates of needs for occupation forces, many consider conscription necessary to allow the return of those who fought. Others oppose the draft of 18-year-olds, and urge the use, for occupation, of servicemen already trained but not sent overseas.

Pointing out that, even if only 200,000 troops should be needed in Japan, the Army's total occupation forces will be "from four to five times the size of our regular establishment prior to the war," the Baltimore (Md.) *Sun* (Ind.-Dem.) considers "recourse to some form of peacetime draft" probably necessary.

The Roanoke (Va.) *World-News* (Ind.-Dem.), however, asserts that "there are ample men in camps in this country who have seen no foreign service, to provide replacements for some time to come, without continuing the draft of 18-year-olds."

Temporary continuation of the draft, says the Hartford (Conn.) *Courant* (Rep.), "may be hard on the 18-year-old . . . but how about the 20-year-old, drafted in 1943?"

Similarly, the New York *Herald Tribune* (Ind.-Rep.) finds it "difficult to see how the draft can be discontinued . . . without inviting serious dangers and jeopardizing . . . victory."

"We can't win the peace if we listen to the same demagogues who voted to end the draft four months before Pearl Harbor," declares the Philadelphia (Pa.) *Record* (Ind.), warning that "we must not . . . end our occupation too soon."

Continued draft of 18-year-olds "smacks too much of the beginning of compulsory military training," says the Marshalltown (Iowa) *Times-Republican* (Rep.).

The Fort Worth (Tex.) *Star-Telegram* (Ind.-Dem.) "if universal military training is not adopted . . . without delay . . . the U.S. will be inviting attack."

The Chicago (Ill.) *Sun* (Ind.) thinks that peacetime military training, which it has urged in the past, "may still be necessary," although atomic bombs "have created much uncertainty"; that temporary continuation of the draft "would furnish adequate forces for the next year or two . . . but the process of forming a permanent policy cannot be safely postponed."

680 YEARS OLD—and a witness to all the wars since Kublai Khan—this giant finally went to war itself. It was probably the biggest Douglas Fir tree ever harvested . . . a monster which stood 256 feet high in the forest. Sprouted in the year 1265, this patriarch was 227 years old when Columbus discovered America. Its growth through nearly seven centuries had given it a girth of 30 feet at the stump. Can you guess how much lumber this enormous trunk contained?

World's oldest recruit

ELEVEN CARLOADS from this single tree! The carriers used were "log flats"—long, low super-strong railroad cars. The trunk was cut into eleven sections, and each section made a carload. Lumber cut from the tree—much of which moved via Northern Pacific—totaled 71,542 board feet, or enough to build four complete homes. But homes had to wait. There was a *war* to win . . .



IT'S WEARING VICTORY HONORS, today . . . for its lumber went into PT boats, gliders, the materiel of war. But now, before long, such lumber will make *homes*, and the Pacific Northwest has timber enough *to build millions of new dwellings.* For the great peacetime building job, Northern Pacific will continue to carry an important part of the timber crop along the "Main Street Of The Northwest"



NORTHERN PACIFIC

Main Street of the Northwest

WHAT AGENCY SHIFTS MEAN

Added Authority to Mr. Schwellenbach Despite Time Limit on Boards

Increase in importance of U. S. Conciliation Service as WLB relinquishes powers

Appraisal of President Truman's executive order enlarging the Department of Labor points up these facts of importance to employers and workers:

Lewis B. Schwellenbach, as Secretary of Labor, becomes the top labor official in Washington, although he did not get all the powers he wanted. He no longer will

—Harris & Ewing

SECRETARY SCHWELLENBACH
New authority

be helpless to intervene in labor disputes that involve the War Labor Board. WLB now is under his control. He has authority, if he cares to use it, to make policy for the Board. He has told Board members, however, that he has no intention of dictating policy.

The War Labor Board will continue to function for the time being as a tripartite agency—composed of representatives of industry, labor and the public. It will liquidate its affairs as rapidly as possible, with its duties confined largely to disposal of pending cases. New cases assigned to the Board will consist mostly of those in which employers and unions agree to accept the Board's decision.

Resignations from the Board can be expected, although Secretary Schwellenbach will make every effort to keep the present membership. Chairman George W. Taylor already has resigned. He will be succeeded by Vice Chairman Lloyd K. Garrison. Board members are not too pleased with the transfer. They are wondering how WLB can continue as an independent agency, even in its dying days, when it has lost control over matters of policy, procedure and personnel.

WLB has a number of unfinished cases. Many decisions affecting wage stabilization are hanging fire.

It will be up to the forthcoming labor-management conference to decide whether WLB shall have a successor. If not, some agency must be designated to take over WLB's wage-stabilization duties prescribed by the Stabilization Act. That Act does not expire until June 30, 1946.

The U. S. Conciliation Service takes on new importance under the reorganization. It will be strengthened, enlarged, given wider authority. Its chances of settling disputes are improved, now that WLB is disappearing as a court of final appeal. The Conciliation Service's Director, Edgar L. Warren, stepped into a number of troublesome situations. Strikes are threatening to tie up the oil, auto and other industries. (See page 11.)

Conciliation Service technique will be to bring disputants together and try to find a common meeting ground. Special panels of conciliators will be appointed in certain cases. In others, individual conciliators will be sent in. The staff of conciliators will be increased, and efforts made to obtain able, experienced men.

The War Manpower Commission is abolished, but part of its duties are transferred to the Labor Department. Principal agency of WMC to be shifted is the U. S. Employment Service. However, the Senate has voted to return USES to the States, and the House probably will



—Harris & Ewing

CONCILIATOR WARREN
New importance

follow suit. The only important remaining function of WMC is the Apprenticeship Training Service. That goes back to the Labor Department, where it once resided.

Retraining and Re-employment Administration. This agency, formerly headed by Brig. Gen. Frank T. Hines, is shifted from the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion to the Labor Department. This move will give Secretary Schwellenbach important power in settlement of the conflict over veterans' re-employment rights and in making Government policy on employment rights of veterans who have no jobs to return to. This is largely a co-ordinating agency with supervision of activities of other agencies in the fields of retraining, re-employment,

—Acme

MESSRS. DAVIS & SNYDER
New shift

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

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

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vocational education and vocational rehabilitation.

Bernard M. Baruch proposed recently that a "vigorous, imaginative" director be appointed to head the agency to make certain that the "human side of demobilization is not forgotten."

Three of the four agencies that Mr. Schwellenbach now inherits are in process of passing from the Washington scene. WLB and WMC are being terminated and USES is headed back to the States. So what Mr. Schwellenbach actually gets in the highly advertised reorganization is some disappearing agencies, plus the Retraining and Re-employment Administration, which is not a permanent agency and probably will be terminated when reconversion problems are cleared up.

Even though the agencies he inherits are due soon to disappear, Secretary Schwellenbach gets real authority in the field of labor disputes. That is where his importance to employers and unions will lie. With a strong Conciliation Service under him, and the War Labor Board in a secondary role, Mr. Schwellenbach becomes, in fact, a true Secretary of Labor.

Other agencies may yet be brought into the Labor Department fold. The National Labor Relations Board was scheduled to be shifted to Secretary Schwellenbach's jurisdiction for administrative purposes, but this plan was postponed at the last minute. The transfer may yet be made. Difficulties arose over whether NLRB and the Labor Department should have the same legal counsel.

Secretary Schwellenbach also had expected that labor divisions of the War Production Board, Army, Navy, Maritime Commission and State Department would be put in his Department. Here, again, a last-minute hitch developed.

In the field of wage stabilization, President Truman also made an important shift. He abolished the Office of Economic Stabilization and transferred its functions to the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, headed by John W. Snyder. Abolished also in the move was the post of Director of Economic Stabilization, held by William H. Davis. Mr. Davis, former Chairman of the War Labor Board, retires to private law practice after almost five years of war service in Washington.

Adjusting future disputes. A pattern for handling labor disputes of the future is available for adoption by the labor-management conference, if that conference feels that legislative action is necessary. This pattern is to be found in legislation being sponsored by Senator McMahon (Dem.), of Connecticut.

The McMahon bill adheres closely to the line now being followed by the Truman Administration. That line is that the need for compulsory arbitration ended with the war, and that henceforth labor relations should be conducted with a maxi-

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

Navy* hospital uses heating-ventilating units housed in sturdy Ls.....

The McIntyre Engineering Company of San Francisco, designers and builders of fifty-two heating and ventilating units needed for a southwestern Navy hospital, housed this equipment in sturdy, compact Ls. With Ls it was easy for McIntyre to provide cabinets in the variety of sizes needed to house units of varying capacity, and just as easy to make almost immediate delivery. Ls assemblies—built from interchangeable parts produced by mass production methods—are available in any desired size or style. And no special tools, trimming, fitting, welding, or riveting are required for their erection.

Lindsay Structure, modern method of all-steel or all-aluminum construction, adapts to an infinite number of applications. Previously shipped only as unassembled parts, Ls is now—through a new wartime service—obtainable completely or partially preassembled and ready for installation of equipment. Write for information. Lindsay and Lindsay, 222-C W. Adams St., Chicago 6, Ill.; 60 E. 42nd St., New York 17, N. Y.; Lindsay Structure (Canada) Ltd., Dominion Square Bldg., Montreal.

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

Ls framing members support even the heaviest equipment—no space-wasting reinforcements are needed.



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mum of collective bargaining and a minimum of Government interference.

Three steps would be available under the bill for settlement of labor controversies:

A Conciliation and Mediation Division would be established within the Department of Labor. This division would attempt to bring an agreement.

A U. S. Board of Arbitration would be available if the first method failed. This independent agency, appointed by the President, would be used only when both parties to a dispute agreed, but its decisions would be binding.

A special board of inquiry could be appointed by the President if the dispute vitally affected the public interest, if the parties refused to arbitrate, and if a strike resulted. This board would attempt to determine the causes of the strike and publicize them. Hearings of this sort would let the public in on the facts behind the strike, and the assumption is that a strike that did not have public support would fail to achieve its purposes.

—Harris & Ewing

SENATOR MCMAHON
. . . a premium on bargaining

The McMahon bill was drafted after consultation with prominent leaders of industry and labor, some of whom will be presented at the labor-management conference. It is the type of legislation that is more likely to appeal to Congress and to industry and labor than is the controversial Ball-Burton-Hatch bill. The latter measure provides for compulsory arbitration, in some cases, and contains other features opposed by labor.

Also the McMahon bill falls in line with Secretary Schwellenbach's idea of a stronger U. S. Conciliation Service, and in that respect fits into the pattern recently cut out for the reorganized Labor Department. The legislation is sponsored also by Senators Thomas (Dem.), of Utah; Hayden

Bows and Arrows would never have beaten a panzer division



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

You gave the men and women, now returning from the services, the finest equipment the world ever saw—and they won the war.

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These are the same jobs you have in business. The same new equipment can give you the same important savings. Veterans want and deserve it, for they know it helps them produce more and so be worth more to you. You and they *both* benefit.

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IN MASSACHUSETTS

Kennedy Co-Head of Special Commission

Joseph P. Kennedy, former ambassador to the Court of St. James's, and State Sen. Cornelius P. Haley of Rowley yesterday were elected to serve as co-chairmen of the special commission to draft a plan for the creation of a State Department of Commerce.

The election was held at the State House at the organization meeting of the group, which has been given a grant of $7500 for expenses and a time limit of June 15 to study the subject and file a report with the Legislature.

Former Ambassador Kennedy announced after the commission had conferred with Gov. Tobin that an extension of time will be requested to permit the commission to make studies of commerce departments now in operation in New York and Pennsylvania. He said the commission will invite trade associations and similar groups to appear before it here to submit views on the proposed department.

Former Rep. Raymond P. O'Connell of Springfield, legal adviser to the State Department of Labor and Industries, was elected to serve as clerk of the commission. The commission will meet for action Tuesday in Room 423 at the State House, Co-Chm. Kennedy announced.

can't tell whether there will b
reply."

The general feeling in Paris wa
scribed as one of injured French
Some French newspapers caut
Britain that "appeasement" of
Arabs in Syria held dangerous po
sibilities for Britain elsewhere i
Middle East.

SYRIA REJOICES

Arrival of British Tanks Sig
Wild Outburst in Terrified
cus—Reveal Lease-Lend Pla
in French Bombing—Delay
ing British Orders

BY FRANK O'BRIE

DAMASCUS, June 1 (AP)—
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put an end to French shellin
ing, bombing and machine g
pillaging the oldest capita
since Tuesday.

The people came out of
like gophers when they he
king of Sherm

DE GAULLE SLAPPED

Photo by Boston Globe

Boston Post
June 2, 1945

MASSACHUSETTS . . . birthplace of American industrial life . . . takes pride in its diversity of top-ranking manufacturing interests and the stable skilled labor market that sustains them. Since 1941 hundreds of manufacturers have established in Massachusetts because, geographically, it is closer to major consumer markets of America and the world.

★Action in every step! Joseph P. Kennedy, Massachusetts' own MAN OF ACTION, known by business interests throughout the world, sparks the move to establish the NEW Department of Commerce for Massachusetts — for state-wide progress in industrial expansion.

Railroads, motor transport and airlines connect nation-wide markets with Massachusetts, and modernized expansion and improved service is in the making. Within 500 miles of Massachusetts is 38% of America's population, 54% of its salaries and wages, 50% of income taxes and 72% of the nation's savings. Massachusetts offers unsurpassed technical and engineering services and its research facilities are world renowned. You're nearer to markets, material and manpower when you establish a plant in Massachusetts.

THE Go light IS on IN

MASSACHUSETTS

HEART OF NEW ENGLAND'S MASS MARKET OF EIGHT MILLION

Write for the ACTION booklet, "The Open Book." Massachusetts Development and Industrial Commission, 20 Somerset Street, Boston 8, Mass.

(Dem.), of Arizona, and Tunnell (Dem.), of Delaware.

Veterans' re-employment rights. A new and somewhat broadened interpretation of the rights that veterans have in reclaiming their old jobs is going out to local draft boards from Selective Service headquarters. This interpretation, in the form of a handbook, supersedes the controversial Local Board Memorandum 190-A and other Selective Service interpretations of the draft law.

High points of the handbook are these:

Superseniority theory is unchanged. Veterans still are held to have absolute reinstatement rights entitling them to re-

—Harris & Ewing

SENATOR THOMAS
. . . arbitration by consent

place nonveteran employes of greater seniority.

Temporary jobs. The new instructions hold that, when the question arises of what constitutes a temporary job, the veteran should be given the benefit of the doubt. The draft law denies re-employment rights to those who held temporary jobs before entering service. It now is held that, before a veteran is deprived of re-employment rights, it must be shown clearly that the job he left was temporary. In deciding whether a job was temporary, all of the facts and circumstances relating to the employment relationship must be considered.

When two or more veterans left the same job, the veteran with the greatest seniority gets first call on the job when he returns. Seniority is computed on the basis of time spent on the job before entering service, plus time spent in service.

Tenure of employment. Once a veteran has been reinstated, his employment right extends for a year. This one-year right is not affected by any collective-bargaining agreement covering other workers. In case

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This is another of a long series of steps toward the goal we have set for ourselves... the goal of ever-better things for everyday Americans.

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America's largest producer of rayon yarns and staple fibers

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

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BUY MORE WAR BONDS

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of layoffs or partial shutdowns, veterans must be retained for one year "subject only to the superior claims of other veteran employes; in the case of complete shutdowns, veterans, too, may be laid off." The guarantee of one year's employment ends a year from the date of reinstatement.

Minimum wages. Much will be heard by employers in the next few weeks about raising the legal minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act. A drive now is on to raise the minimum from 40 cents to 65 cents an hour.

Many bills are before Congress providing for a higher minimum, but the one that appears likely to get the most attention is sponsored by Representative Mary Norton (Dem.), of New Jersey, chairman of the House Labor Committee. It calls for a flat increase to 65 cents, ef-

—Harris & Ewing

REPRESENTATIVE NORTON
. . . the White House was "agreeable"

fective Jan. 1, 1946. Unlike other bills, it makes no provision for increasing the number of workers covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Administration strategy is to concentrate on increasing the minimum and leave out all extraneous matter. In this way it is hoped to avoid attempts to subject the act to a deluge of antilabor amendments.

President Truman has asked for a higher minimum wage, but has set no figure. Mrs. Norton conferred with the President before introducing her legislation, and came away with the impression that Mr. Truman was "agreeable" to the proposal. However, it is understood that the President will be satisfied with a 55-cent minimum. There is little likelihood that the Congress will go higher than 55 cents, if it decides that an increase is necessary to compensate low-paid workers for the rise in the cost of living that has occurred since 40 cents became the legal minimum.

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His findings may enable you to cut costs and reduce mistakes in handling your payroll, the posting of accounts receivable, distribution of sales and costs, and virtually every other phase of your general business bookkeeping.

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

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"Billiard"

Sandblasted so that the grain stands out in relief. Light in weight.

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Kaywoodie Pipes are made for your pleasure, with the experience of 94 years of continuous operation at making pipes. Discriminating smokers all over the world have adopted Kaywoodie as their favorite. May be had at your dealer's in various styles, from $3.50 to $25.

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We've Been Asked:

ABOUT U.S. AID FOR VETERANS

The speed-up in demobilization is centering attention on the benefits and privileges available for men leaving the services. During the war years, provisions for discharged servicemen have been greatly expanded. Severance pay alone will cost several billion dollars. Also, there will be unemployment insurance, free education, free hospitalization, loans and other special advantages for veterans of World War II. Budget estimates for various veteran programs during demobilization and in the early postwar years are $4,000,000,000 a year.

As more men leave the services, complaints are increasing over restrictions that sometimes bar veterans from getting full benefits. There are protests that red tape and other requirements make it too difficult for ex-servicemen and women to obtain loans, that they often are unable to get education at Government expense, and that surplus property is not made available to them as promised. As a result of these criticisms, Congress is considering changes to provide special rights for veterans.

All in all, many more payments and privileges are available for servicemen now than were received by those leaving the Army and Navy at the end of World War I. A survey of these benefits shows:

When a man first leaves the service:

To begin with, a serviceman receives from $100 to $300 demobilization pay. All those with discharges other than dishonorable get at least $100 when mustered out. Those who served 60 days or more, entirely within the U.S., receive checks for another $100 one month after discharge. And all who have served 60 days or more with some service outside the U.S. or in Alaska are sent additional checks for $100—making a total of $300—two months after separation from the service.

This mustering-out pay goes to enlisted men and to many lower-ranking officers. That is, most Army and Marine officers up through the rank of captain, and Navy and Coast Guard officers through the rank of senior-grade lieutenant are eligible, unless they are in the higher-grade pay bracket for their ranks because of long service, etc. In addition, men leaving the services get travel pay back to their homes.

After demobilization, the first consideration of most men is a job. If a discharged veteran is unable to find a job:

Special unemployment benefits are provided for veterans of World War II in the GI Bill of Rights. This can mean a weekly payment of $20 up to 52 weeks for those unable to find work. Here is how it works: If a veteran cannot get a job and wants to work, he goes to the nearest U.S. Employment Service office. There he files an application for work and fills out an application to the Veterans' Administration for unemployment pay. If he qualifies, he gets $20 a week. A veteran must have served 90 days or have been discharged for service-connected disabilities. This usually entitles him to 24 weeks of unemployment pay. Beyond that, he can get an additional four weeks' payment for each additional month of service up to the maximum. Thus, a man or woman who served 10 months might qualify for the full 52 weeks of payments—a total of $1,040.

A veteran who cannot find a job can apply for unemployment compensation as soon as discharged. But, while receiving payments, he is supposed to report weekly to the USES office. Also, he must be able to work when he applies for compensation, and is supposed to accept a suitable job if offered. A self-employed veteran whose net earnings are less than $100 a month can get a payment from the Veterans' Administration to net him up to $100 a month.

When it comes to finding a job:

The Selective Service Act affords certain re-employment rights to servicemen, but many of those in the armed forces will not be able to return to former jobs. For one thing, a man must have been employed on other than a temporary basis when he entered service. Many men, particularly younger ones, did not leave regular jobs. Furthermore, the returning veteran must be able to perform his former duties. And an employer cannot be required to take back a serviceman if the employer's circumstances have changed so as to make this impossible or unreasonable.

Certain preferences are granted veterans in filling new jobs. Openings in the Federal Government now are being filled almost entirely with veterans or displaced Government workers. Also, veterans are given extra credits on Civil Service examinations—5 points, and 10 points for those who are disabled as the result of service. In addition, USES is supposed to give preference to veterans in referring them to available jobs.

If a vet prefers school, rather than work:

Almost every veteran can get up to one year's schooling or training at Government

"How Much?"

Your product or service can answer that better than the price tag

WHAT does your customer mean when he asks "How much?" You can be sure it's more than how much *you get* for your product or service. What he's most interested in is how much *he gets* for his money.

Finding the right answer to the customer's "How much?" is a No. 1 postwar problem, whether you are producing or selling goods or services. Ways must be found to furnish more for less—if you are to compete profitably with others and do your share toward achieving full employment.

That's *our* problem, too. When *you* ask "How much?" we realize that our answer must prove that you can achieve even greater savings in your business *now* through the use of Standard Register systems of written records.

And as we give you more for your postwar dollar, we will be helping you give your customers more. For better systems are better tools of modern management, doing a better job of controlling every operation of business, eliminating waste and unnecessary costs.

See for yourself how well Standard Register answers your "How much?". Phone your local Standard Register representative, today. Ask him to tell you how the specialized, exclusive, proven techniques and tools he employs insure you the *greater* values in Standard's systems: *effective* control of your business and *simplification* of your paper work.

If you are not taking full advantage of the facilities Standard now offers for detailed, scientific analysis and improvement in the design, method of writing or control procedure of business form systems—investigate at once.



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Shall We Educate Our Children

As Well As We Do Our Servicemen?

A timely message from J. H. McNabb, President, Bell & Howell Company

The speed and thoroughness with which our armed forces have trained millions of young men for war are amazing.

How was it done? With intensive application of methods previously used and proved in this nation's schools, including *far greater use of sound motion pictures* than ever before made in education.

Why haven't our schools made as widespread use of this proved, superior method of instruction as have our armed forces? Most educators lacked neither appreciation nor readiness. But they did lack, and *still* lack, the necessary funds.

A relatively modest appropriation per school per year can provide for an excellent audio-visual program. Shall we make the necessary funds available . . . educate our children as well as we do our servicemen? The answer is up to you parents, and to you taxpayers who appreciate that the prime requisite of a successful democracy is a well-educated citizenry.

J. H. McNabb

Pupils learn 40% more in less time via motion pictures, research and experiment prove. And students gain maximum advantage from the perfect reproduction of sound and picture offered by the war-proved, trouble-free performance of Bell & Howell's Filmosound Projector.

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Please send: ( ) booklet "Learning Unlimited"; ( ) booklet "Movies Go to Work"—how sound movies serve industry and commerce; information on ( ) 8mm. ( ) 16mm. Cameras and Projectors or ( ) 16mm. Filmosound Projectors for home use.

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SINCE 1907 THE LARGEST MANUFACTURER OF PRECISION MOTION PICTURE EQUIPMENT FOR PROFESSIONAL, PERSONAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND EDUCATIONAL USE

expense. For many, this would be in the nature of a refresher or retraining course. Those who were under 25 when they entered service or who can show that their education was interrupted by their service can get more extensive educational privileges. For those who qualify, there is a wide choice of schools and courses, so long as they meet school requirements and keep up with their studies. How long they can stay in school depends on length of service, with a maximum of four years.

The Government will pay up to $500 a year to cover a veteran's tuition, fees, books, etc. Veterans without dependents receive $50 a month; those with dependents, $75. Veterans with service-connected disabilities often can qualify for more liberal allowances during their educational, training and rehabilitation courses.

GI loans for veterans:

Provisions are made for veterans to obtain loans for buying homes or farms or for setting up businesses, but these often are hard to get. Actually, these are private loans from banks, other lending institutions or individuals. The Government guarantees one half of each approved loan, with a top guarantee of $2,000. Both the lender and the Government must be satisfied that the borrower will be able to repay the loan, and that he is making a sound investment. A movement is under way to get the Government to assume up to 75 per cent of the risk involved in GI loans.

Other benefits and preferences for veterans:

Various Government agencies are supposed to give preferential treatment to veterans. For example, the law offers, to those who served in World War II, a preference in buying surplus property. This might involve an automobile, farm machinery, business equipment or a war plant. Steps have been taken to carry out these provisions, but some veterans complain they are having trouble buying from Government surplus stocks. The Office of Price Administration has rules for helping veterans to get rationed foods to start businesses, and the War Production Board gives special concessions in obtaining materials.

Most veterans with service-connected disabilities can qualify for pensions. Maximum payments for the most seriously injured have just been raised from $265 to $300 a month. Hospital facilities also are provided for those with service disabilities. Veterans whose ailments are not traceable to their service also are entitled to free medical care in Veterans' Administration hospitals if they are unable to pay for hospitalization, and provided space is available.

IT'S ALWAYS A STRAIN MOVING ARMIES

For nearly four years we were building up our forces in Europe — to do a job. The job was done — and how!

And now, in the short space of 10 months, or less, the millions of men who did the job in Europe are coming home — and along with them, the other millions who did the Pacific job, too. The end of the war does not mean that train travel will be less.

The total train travel this year will be nearly five times what it was before the war.

All this must be done with virtually the same equipment available in 1940, for during the war years the railroad program of buying new cars was halted by the government because of other and more pressing war needs.

This means that now everything that rolls must be pressed into service. Sleeping cars have been taken off regular trains on all runs of less than 450 miles, so that approximately two-thirds of all sleeping cars are now available for troop train service. Coaches are being taken off regular trains. What's left in regular trains must serve not only civilians but a heavy military traffic as well. So travel is difficult for all — civilians as well as soldiers.

The railroads have two great needs — more cars and more men. Government agencies, military and civilian, are cooperating to recruit the men to help in moving the record load which is just ahead.

Since V-E Day, the government has authorized the building of passenger cars but not many can be completed in time to help meet the present peak travel load.

In the meanwhile, railroad equipment and railroad men are working harder than ever before — for the railroads must do the job with what they have.

AMERICAN RAILROADS

Look into COLORADO SPRINGS as a Location for Your Plant



GET THE FACTS about Colorado Springs as a city where industries find it to their advantage to locate.

Low taxes. Utility rates among nation's lowest. Skilled labor of pioneer Western stock, loyal and efficient. Easy access to basic metals and raw materials. Fast transportation facilities to all parts of America.

Center of rich, rapidly expanding postwar market. Abundant water from snowsheds of Pikes Peak, so pure it is used in storage batteries. Average 310 sunshiny days a year —no depressing hot spells; mild, open winters with little snow, wind, fog. Excellent housing and living conditions.

Plan now for postwar Western business—plan to *live* while you work. Get the facts about Colorado Springs.

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Gives you facts and figures about Colorado Springs and the Pikes Peak Region —low costs for fuel, power, light, taxes—detailed information on natural resources, transportation facilities, housing, climate, many other interesting facts. Mail coupon for your copy now.

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Please send me 24-page illustrated booklet, "Fit Your Plant Where You and Your Workmen Can Keep Fit."

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AMERICA'S FINEST YEAR 'ROUND CLIMATE

Special Report

(This article represents the result of an extensive research on a topic of outstanding importance in National Affairs.)

MACHINE ERA IN COTTON BELT: ECONOMIC HEADACHE FOR SOUTH

The mechanical cotton picker, which has been on the way since 1850, finally has arrived. The cotton farmer, like the wheat farmer of 20 years ago, now can see the possibility of total mechanization. The South, without even looking very hard, can foresee changes during the next five or ten years that will be revolutionary.

When steel fingers, instead of human ones, pick cotton, costs will go down. When flame machines, instead of the man with the hoe, can kill weeds and thin out cotton plants, costs will go down still more.

When costs go down, prices may also go down. But, first, governmental price supports would have to come down. Whether or not prices come down, the cotton picker and total mechanization will mean larger and more efficient farms; therefore, fewer farms in the cotton belt.

If farms become larger and fewer, and become almost totally mechanized, fewer people will be needed to work the land. Displacement could reach 73 per cent of the farm population in a rural area like the Delta country of Mississippi. That possibility, even if stretched over a 10-year period, is the headache of the mechanical revolution coming in the South.

Price, though, remains the root of the cotton problem. With U. S. prices above world prices, competition against cotton has been stimulated both at home and abroad. The result has been more foreign cotton and cotton substitutes, and more rayon and paper products in this country to do the work cotton used to do. Presumably this trend will continue unless cotton can get its costs and prices down.

Mechanical pickers, which promise to bring about such cuts, are now in commercial production. More than 100 are in use. The International Harvester Co., which began to develop a cotton picker 40 years ago, has produced most of them. It will produce another couple of hundred next year, perhaps more if materials and facilities permit. Other mechanical pickers are nearing production by Allis-Chalmers and John Deere.

The IHC picker is a tractor with a high steel housing on top. The machine straddles the row of cotton. Barbed revolving spindles, 600 of them, catch and extract the cotton from the open bolls.

The machine picks more than 1,000 pounds of seed cotton an hour. For human pickers, a normal season average would be 15 pounds of seed cotton an hour.

At the Hopson plantation in the Delta, where the IHC co-operated with the owner in test runs, IHC estimates the



—USDA

COTTON PICKER
. . . steel fingers will revolutionize the South



Tapping an Electric Furnace

He's safer in a Republic plant than at home

Republic is a safe place to work. The probability of accident or injury in a Republic Steel plant is less than in your own bathroom or kitchen!

Today steel ranks as the third safest American industry. This compares with eighth place in 1932. The first industrial plants in all Ohio to fly the Distinguished Service Safety pennant awarded by the National Safety Council were Republic's Berger Mfg. Division at Canton, and Bolt and Nut Division, Cleveland. Their record for 1944: Berger—4½ million man hours worked without a disabling accident; Bolt and Nut—2½ million.

Right at the peak of all-out war production in 1944, Republic won 20 other awards presented by the National Safety Council Metals Section, in national competition with 408 other steel companies. There were 6 first, 2 second, and 2 third place awards, plus 10 certificates of merit for improvement in accident records.

Many years of safety education and accident prevention at Republic are behind these results. For example, it is a long-standing rule that the 60,000 men and women in Republic plants and mines join their foremen in regular monthly meetings to discuss accident prevention activities.

All foremen are constantly on the alert for unsafe operating practices. Practical safety suggestions from men and women on the job receive prompt attention. A never-ending campaign goes on for the elimination of every possible hazard in plant layout and operation.

Beyond all this, Republic's safety program, which has gone on year after year, in war and peace alike, is an important part of the still broader program aimed at *making Republic a good place to work—a good company to join and a good place to stay.*

Truscon Windows of Beauty for Your New Home

Attractive in design, spacious in glass area and free from annoying rattles, Truscon Residence Steel Windows—both double-hung and casement types—are easy to operate.

They will not warp, stick or rot under any conditions. They are reasonable in first cost and low in final cost because the necessity for repairs and adjustments is practically non-existent.

These windows, together with specially designed screens and storm sash, will add features of quality to homes of any price and help maintain values that protect your investment for a lifetime.

Truscon also manufactures a complete line of products for all phases of general building construction; all types of steel windows and doors, open-truss and clere-span joists, metal laths and accessories, steeldeck roofs, complete steel buildings, reinforcing materials, radio towers and steel poles.

BUY and KEEP War Bonds

The Army-Navy E flag waves over 7 Republic plants and the Maritime M floats over the Cleveland District plant.

REPUBLIC STEEL

GENERAL OFFICES: REPUBLIC BUILDING, CLEVELAND 1, OHIO
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ALLOY, CARBON, STAINLESS STEELS • COLD FINISHED STEELS
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FARM FENCE • WIRE • FABRICATED STEEL PRODUCTS

machine effects a net saving of $16.02 a bale over hand picking.

But cost figures do not reflect the advantage in harvesting cotton when the crop is at its peak. Machines could finish the job long before Thanksgiving; hand pickers are often in the fields after Christmas, with serious loss in cotton quality. To many large growers, a chief advantage of the machine is the freedom it gives from dependence upon an uncertain labor supply and possible labor trouble.

Not many cotton farmers can put $3,900 into a machine, even when it includes a tractor useful for other jobs. A man with 150 acres in cotton can afford to, however, or three men with 50 acres each.

Total mechanization of cotton farming means more than a picker. It means sowing by machine, thinning by machine, weeding by machine, spraying or dusting

—U. S. Forest Service

THE HUMAN ANGLE
. . . no more Christmas cotton?

by machine, as well as picking. Next to picking, thinning takes most man-hours.

Planting, spraying, and dusting long have been done by machine. Now comes thinning and weeding by machine. Though not yet commercially produced, except for sugar-cane weeding, flame cultivators seem clearly in sight for cotton. Jets of controlled fire kill weeds, but not the tougher cotton plants. A similar machine, designed to kill alternate blocks of cotton plants with flame, is under experiment and is said to look promising.

Application of all of these mechanical aids means that man-hours of labor needed to grow and harvest a bale of cotton in the Delta drop from 160 to 28. Thus, the 4,000-acre Hopson plantation gets along with 40 skilled workmen instead of 130 families of 600 to 700 persons.

Wartime scarcity, not of cotton but of man power, called forth use of the ma-



POWER BY
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CONTINENTAL

CONTINENTAL . . . BUILDING THE HIGHWAYS OF PEACE

On the highways of peace, Continental Red Seal Engines are proving their stamina and versatility. In the crane that loads the trucks, in the trucks themselves, and in the spreaders that lay the pavement there's Red Seal Power. Every Continental Red Seal engine has the added stamina, the dependable power created by the Continental team of advanced engineering and precision manufacturer.

Continental Motors Corporation
MUSKEGON, MICHIGAN

LOOKING UP THE TRACKS

To Demobilization To you returning Veterans we feel the same urgent responsibility for getting you Home as we did for getting you to the Front. There are inspiration and satisfaction in the happy ending of a job that only yesterday had nothing but the grimmest aspects. Count on us to keep the supply lines open and to serve you faithfully.

To Reconversion To Industry we say it is our purpose to gear our operations with yours, in order to smooth and shorten the route to Reconversion and Peacetime Commerce. We will provide the type of transportation required by manufacturers for the prompt delivery of needed raw material and for the economic distribution of finished goods.

To Modernization To Travelers, as soon as demobilization permits, we pledge a full and quick transition of passenger service—tuned to the times and to the traditions of The Milwaukee Road . . . To old friends, who at times relinquished their privilege to travel in their accustomed style, we convey our gratitude for their patience and understanding . . . Good days of comfort and hospitality for all Milwaukee Road patrons are ahead.



The Milwaukee Road looks forward to being unceasingly busy in performing these jobs. A long-term program of development and modernization of plant and facilities is being carried forward. Later plans, now in the making, will be progressively unfolded.

Look up the track! The signals say "All clear!" Let's go!

CHICAGO MILWAUKEE ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC

THE MILWAUKEE ROAD

Richmond is the largest industrial district on San Francisco Bay...



Over 80 manufacturing concerns are located in the greater Richmond area that extends more than 20 miles along the shores of San Francisco Bay. This is the largest industrial area in central California—and vast expanses of choice industrial land are still available for manufacturers seeking Pacific Coast locations.

Richmond has a large supply of available industrial land . . . on deep water, rail lines or highways . . . at exceptionally low prices.

Richmond has one of the largest labor pools of any West Coast area—embracing a wide variety of skills and crafts.

Richmond labor has a long record of full cooperation and high productivity.

The reasons for Richmond's rapid growth are of keen interest to any manufacturer. There's Richmond's strategic location—centrally situated with relation to major West Coast markets. There's industrial land—lots of it—priced at bed rock. There's the Pacific Coast's greatest natural harbor, San Francisco Bay, with Richmond its chief tonnage port. There's adequate transportation . . . with 2 main line railways. And there's a tremendous labor supply, with a wide variety of skilled and unskilled crafts.

Richmond has all of this and MORE! But why not make *your* West Coast plant location on the intelligent basis of FACTS.

WRITE FOR "RICHMOND WINS THE PEACE"

The amazing story of a city that grew five times in population during 3 years . . . and its plans and facilities for the post-war. Worth owning . . . and free! Write on your business letterhead.

RICHMOND CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
DEPT. 104 — RICHMOND, CALIFORNIA

Richmond, California

Largest tonnage port on San Francisco Bay

Largest industrial area on San Francisco Bay

chines at this time. Since 1940 about a third of the Delta's rural man power has left farms to join the services or work in war industries at higher wages. The Government encouraged farm-implement makers to devise steel substitutes for men, and the War Production Board allocated small amounts of scarce steel for the purpose.

Yet, sponsors of the machines hardly could have picked a time when cotton faced greater difficulties. Since last winter, special committees of Congress, of State and federal experts, and of the whole cotton industry have been in frequent session to ponder cotton's postwar problem.

The world has more than 26,000,000 bales of cotton on hand, a record. Of this total, the U. S. has 10,000,000 bales.

—USDA

ACREAGE PLANNING
. . . a tradition uprooted?

Meanwhile, the U. S. and the world have a new crop coming on.

With the world price less than 15 cents a pound, and the U. S. price 20 cents or more, millions of bales of cheap foreign cotton are ready to flood the world. U. S. exporters at present can meet that competition only by means of an export subsidy. Even a subsidy, however, is not expected to move the whole current excess of domestic supply over domestic consumption. This is particularly so when domestic consumption is dropping from its wartime high of 10,000,000 bales a year.

U. S. policy, adopted to keep cotton acreage down and income up, has been based on the twin expedients of near-parity loans to keep domestic prices high and export subsidies to enable the U. S. to move high-priced cotton in competition with low-priced foreign cotton.

High U. S. prices have stimulated for-

These are the things that make America strong... the industries that RB&W has served during its 100 years of developing better fasteners for better products.

NO. 4 *Construction*

Stepping Over MOUNTAIN STREAMS... HOPPING OVER BAYS



Bridges . . . important symbols of the construction industry . . . from the picturesque covered bridges of old New England—to the giant steel structures such as the Golden Gate Bridge that spans San Francisco Bay . . . have been steadfastly held together with the aid of Russell, Burdsall & Ward Bolts and Nuts . . . In fact, since 1845, when RB&W's history began, *every* division of the construction industry has relied on RB&W fasteners. With the help of these products, one-story buildings grew to touch the sky . . . and in these same years RB&W also grew from a handful of craftsmen, developing much of their own new equipment and processes, to an organization of *thousands* of employees—scientists, research workers, engineers, trained craftsmen—still pioneering and improving RB&W processes and products . . . RB&W's proved ability to put the ideal combination of strength, accuracy and finish into fasteners . . . is the reason why today, as throughout the past 100 years, RB&W products continue to be *stand-bys,* not only in the construction industry, but in the farm implement, automotive, railroad, power, aircraft, and general manufacturing industries as well. Specify the RB&W EMPIRE brand for *your* product.

100 Years.. MAKING STRONG THE THINGS THAT MAKE AMERICA STRONG

RB&W

RUSSELL, BURDSALL & WARD BOLT AND NUT COMPANY

Factories at: Port Chester, N.Y., Coraopolis, Pa., Rock Falls, Ill. *Sales offices at:* Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, Chattanooga, Los Angeles, Portland, Seattle. *Distributors* from coast to coast. The industry's most complete ready-to-use catalog.

NORTH CAROLINA—STATE OF *Progress!*

With an unpleasant job behind us, North Carolina turns from the destruction that is war to the arts of peace to again devote its full energies toward the building of a more progressive economy. Few states can equal the record achieved by North Carolina in the past two decades. In commerce, in industry, in agriculture; in education, in government and in social progress, the Old North State enjoys a justly earned reputation for being *"out in front."*

The future beckons with potentialities far greater than anything achieved in the past. A state of vast resources populated by a progressive and friendly people spells opportunity unlimited for North Carolina.

The Seaboard Air Line Railway, like North Carolina, made its full contribution to the winning of the war. As an integral part of North Carolina, the Seaboard joins its friends and neighbors of this great state in the call . . . *"Back to Progress."*

SEABOARD
AIR LINE RAILWAY
THROUGH THE HEART OF THE SOUTH

Buy more WAR BONDS!

If you want a reprint of this advertisement in full color, write Seaboard Air Line Railway, Norfolk 10, Virginia.

eign competition until foreign growths now comprise three fifths of world stocks. Before the war, the foreign share was one third. While U. S. acreage has been kept down—now at its lowest point in 60 years—U. S. production has not been relatively reduced. U. S. output, on half the acreage of the predepression years, is down only 20 per cent. The explanation is an increase of 46 per cent in yield per acre.

At home, high U. S. prices have stimulated substitutes for cotton, notably rayon and paper. Rayon production in the U. S. has soared from 23,000 bales in 1920, when cotton was king, to 1,700,000 bales in 1944. Cotton had the tire-cord market to itself up to 1935. By last year, rayon had 40 per cent of it, and threatens to grab more this year.

What to do? How can cotton meet its competition in price, both at home and abroad? Should it encourage mechanization, and, if so, what about displaced families?

Congress last winter appointed a special committee under the chairmanship of Representative Pace (Dem.), of Georgia. The committee held extensive hearings, but it is still wrestling with the problem. Other committees, governmental and private, also are seeking solutions.

One plan, proposed by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics as a final solution, would encourage the trend toward efficient production, mechanization and all, by offering heavy Government aid to get inefficient producers and acreage out of cotton. Then, it would let cotton meet price competition, here or abroad. The plan would cost the Government $4,000,000,000, plus $2,000,000,000 in credits, over 10 years.

The BAE plan assumes that mechanization and other trends toward more efficient cotton production will continue anyway, as they have in the past. Instead of fighting the trend, the BAE plan proposes to help it along. That would enable cotton, it is believed, to meet price competition both at home and abroad. But because efficient cotton production would displace millions of farm workers, the BAE plan would have the Government assist displaced workers in finding new opportunities in livestock and dairy farming, and in timber. This would coincide with the South's goal of a more diversified agriculture.

Recommendation by the Pace Committee of any radically new plan is described as doubtful. The inclination to adhere to the present plan is strong. Many growers, and the larger farm organizations, say a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.

Loans at or near parity, export subsidies and acreage restrictions are expected to continue during the next two years, and probably longer. There will be emphasis on new uses for cotton, such as insulation, and all conceivable methods of stepping up consumption. If Government fi-

Sailor's star...

The keeper sees no sentinel of the shore—to him the light is just a nightly chore, lenses to polish, long steps, a drab existence on bleak rocks. But through boyhood's eager eyes, the lighthouse is the lookout, the sailor's star, beacon with welcome beams for ships of steel, the fishing fleet, trawler and tanker, the migrant wayfarers manned by mariners of the main . . .

Too much advertising sees the product with jaded retina. Gravure gives fresh vision . . . captures the glamour and the gleam, invites new impressions, adds drama to a dish of food, a dash of adventure to apricots, adhesives, or air lines . . . in pictorial sections of high penetration, with 90% readership, at home, each Sunday.

Metropolitan Group makes gravure a national medium . . . combines Sunday picture sections in 25 great newspapers in 22 cities . . . offers 12,800,000 circulation, covering hundreds of choice markets and half the better buying homes in the United States. Match list and market—any ten cities get lower group rates—and light the way to better sales with . . .

Metropolitan Group Gravure

Atlanta Journal • Baltimore Sun • Boston Globe • Boston Herald • Buffalo Courier-Express • Chicago Tribune • Cincinnati Enquirer • Cleveland Plain Dealer • Des Moines Register
Detroit News • Detroit Free Press • Los Angeles Times • Milwaukee Journal • Minneapolis Tribune • New York News • Philadelphia Inquirer • Pittsburgh Press • Providence Journal
Seattle Times • St. Louis Globe-Democrat • St. Louis Post-Dispatch • St. Paul Pioneer Press • Springfield Union & Republican • Syracuse Post-Standard • Washington Star
NEW YORK 17: 220 East 42d Street • DETROIT 2: New Center Building • CHICAGO 11: Tribune Tower • SAN FRANCISCO 4: 155 Montgomery Street

Management and Labor pull *TOGETHER* in CONNECTICUT

You will need this *vital* and *dependable* Connecticut asset to assure success for your post war factory or branch.

Cooperative teamwork between management and labor has been a reassuring Connecticut characteristic for years, with 99% of labor disputes settled by *mediation* or *arbitration.*

Connecticut has one of the greatest concentrations of highly-skilled labor in all America — tops in making clocks, watches, airplane engines, machine tools, hardware, silverware, business machines, hats, cutlery, wire and cable, electrical equipment, etc.

Connecticut has one of the finest and best integrated transportation networks in the United States—rail, air, water, over-the-road. Close to the Nation's greatest markets and sources of semi-finished materials. Connecticut has a balanced State budget—and no State Income Tax to whittle down earnings of management or employees.

Business executives are invited to write for further information. Address Department 71, Connecticut Development Commission, State Office Building, Hartford, Connecticut.

You'll make the *RIGHT* connections..in

CONNECTICUT

nancing of the cotton program becomes an issue, some new tax basis may be urged. One proposal, mentioned quietly now, calls for taxes on cotton substitutes, to support the cotton program. This would be similar to the tax on oleomargarine.

Mechanization and other efforts to cut production costs will continue. The pace may be retarded by acreage restrictions, but not halted. A larger labor supply and lower wages would also retard the march, but apparently not halt it. Large growers, with money to spend on machinery, see great advantages in a relatively complete independence of labor supply. Even small growers, better off than in years, are expected to invest heavily in tractors enabling one family to do the work of several.

Down in the Delta in 1940 there was an average of one rural family for every



—Harris & Ewing

REPRESENTATIVE PACE
. . . still wrestling

27 acres of cropland. Even now some farms get along with one family for every 100 acres. The mechanical picker will speed that trend.

Industrial employment is looked to as the solution for displaced farm workers. To encourage full employment in the South, Senator Bailey (Dem.), of North Carolina, has introduced what is called a supplement to the Full Employment bill. Under a plan developed jointly by the departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, the Commerce Department would recommend loans by federal lending agencies to help finance approved industrial development by either individuals or community groups.

Meanwhile, the South expects its wartime industrial boom to resume in peacetime.

THE ARISTOCRAT OF BONDS

In harmony with hospitality, Kentucky Tavern always strikes the right note. It's the key to perfect drinks because its uniform quality has been a tradition of the same Kentucky family for 74 years.

©1945
Glenmore Distilleries Company, *Incorporated,*
Louisville, Kentucky

THERE'S ONLY ONE BETTER BUY IN BONDS . . . *WAR BONDS!*

MONTANA

The rails of Union Pacific . . . the Strategic Middle Route, uniting Montana with the East and the West Coast . . . carry an abundance of the state's products to feed and clothe the nation, to supply industry with essential raw materials.

Out of the picturesque mountain country come cattle, sheep, wool, ores, minerals, lumber and petroleum. Grain, vegetables and fruits also are produced to help meet the needs of America and our Allies. Montana is truly the Treasure State.

Like all the western territory served by Union Pacific, Montana looks ahead to a postwar development that might well be called Opportunity, Unlimited. It invites the interest of industrial concerns seeking a site where raw materials are readily available. It extends a welcome to enterprising individuals who seek a contented, healthful life amid the scenic beauty and friendly western atmosphere of *your America.*

NOTE: Write Union Pacific, Omaha, Neb., for information regarding industrial or business sites in Montana or other western States.



THE PROGRESSIVE

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD

BLUEPRINT FOR TAX REDUCTIONS: BENEFITS TO BUSINESS, INDIVIDUALS

Major provisions of a tax-relief plan to serve until Congress can get to work on over-all tax revision now have been agreed upon. Although experts have not completed all details, the goal is to pass a transition tax bill by November 1.

Tax policy now crystallizing:

For corporations:

Excess-profits-tax repeal, effective Jan. 1, 1946, is probable. Treasury and Senate favor repeal, and their views are expected to dominate.

Capital stock tax and declared value excess-profits tax may be repealed, though this is not certain.

Small-business taxes are likely to get some concessions, either through higher credits or lower rates on corporate earnings of less than $100,000.

Individual income taxes still are under study, with tax committees uncertain about the form of relief to be given.

Across-the-board cuts of fixed percentages are favored by Senator George, (Dem.), of Georgia, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and by leading Republicans. Suggested credits range from 10 per cent to 20 per cent.

Repeal of the normal tax of 3 per cent on all incomes above $500 is supported by Representative Robertson (Dem.), of Virginia, of the Ways and Means Committee.

A combination of the two proposals for individual tax relief now is taking shape. This would merge normal tax and surtax exemptions, thereby giving each taxpayer a $500 credit for himself and another $500 credit for each dependent for normal tax. Then a percentage credit of 10 per cent of the tax would be granted to all taxpayers.

—Harris & Ewing

REPRESENTATIVE ROBERTSON
. . . tax cutter

This compromise proposal, according to its sponsors, has the advantage of removing from tax rolls heads of families with small incomes, and of giving greater benefits to all taxpayers. In addition, it would result in the loss of less revenue than would repealing the normal tax.

Underlying all tax plans are the twin goals of stimulating business and still meeting needs for high revenue. The Budget Bureau estimates a $30,400,000,000 deficit in the current fiscal year, ending June 30, 1946, under present rates. Any tax reduction would increase that deficit.

Business recovery is deemed to demand repeal of the excess-profits tax, which is regarded as a brake on new enterprise and business expansion. Repeal of this tax, however, would not affect revenues for the current fiscal year, since corporations would pay excess-profits taxes in 1946 on earnings made in 1945. Repeal of the levy on 1946 earnings, however, would reduce by $1,951,000,000 the revenues payable in 1947, under present estimates of corporate earnings for next year.

The estimated yield from excess-profits taxes for 1946 is $3,951,000,000. Repeal of this levy, however, would add to cor-

—Smith in Williamsport Sun

THIS WE GOTTA SEE

HARWOOD'S
Blended
CANADIAN WHISKY
90.4 Proof
Sole UNITED STATES Importers
R. C. WILLIAMS & CO., Inc., NEW YORK, N.Y.

PICTURE OF A MAJOR MARKET

...which is still growing!

● Population, income, retail sales, and other figures paint an impressive picture of the California of 1945. More important to business and banking executives everywhere is the fact that this market holds promise of continuing development.

If the possibilities of this market are a serious consideration to you, follow the lead of business, industrial, and banking executives everywhere. Direct your inquiries to this bank which serves California through branches in more than 300 cities and towns—a statewide service which offers many unique advantages. Your inquiries will receive prompt attention.

RESOURCES OVER 4½ BILLION DOLLARS

California's statewide bank

Bank of America
NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION

MEMBER FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION • MEMBER FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Main Offices in the two reserve cities of California... San Francisco - Los Angeles

porate incomes subject to the 40 per cent normal tax and surtax, and bring $2,000,000,000 in revenue.

Normal tax repeal on Jan. 1, 1946, would result in the loss of around $2,500,000,000 in revenue in that year, since individuals are on a pay-as-you-go basis. Merging of exemptions, however, would cut the revenue loss to $800,000,000, which would allow for some reductions in surtax brackets. A 10 per cent reduction would amount to a revenue loss of $1,140,000,000 under the prospective 1946 national income of approximately $121,800,000,000.

About half of this revenue loss would be reflected on the books for the present fiscal period, which means that the deficit would increase by $1,940,000,000.

Tax relief, in fact, must be tailored to budget needs of $20,000,000,000 to $25,000,000,000 for several years to come. That means that, if the excess-profits tax is to be repealed, individuals will have to accept relatively high taxes. Established corporations probably can pay a 40 per cent tax on earnings without undue hardships, particularly in view of probable business volume in the years ahead. Small corporations, on the other hand, will need some tax relief.

Long-range tax plans. When Congress settles down to drafting a genuine postwar tax plan sometime next year, there will be no lack of proposals from experts outside of Government. Latest tax program comes from the Committee on Postwar Tax Policy, headed by Roswell Magill, New York lawyer and former Under Secretary of the U. S. Treasury.

Chief criticism of this plan, like others suggested by the Committee for Economic Development, Beardsley Ruml and H. Christian Sonne, and the Twin Cities plan, centers on the point that it probably puts the postwar revenue goal too low. The Magill Committee proposes various rates to meet a federal budget of $15,000,000,000, $18,000,000,000 or $22,000,000,000. Official estimates place postwar revenue needs at not lower than $25,000,000,000.

Budget balancing is the keynote of the latest tax proposal. The group believes that the federal budget can be balanced in the fiscal year 1948-49, and should remain in balance each year thereafter. Debt reduction and reduced federal spending also are urged.

Debt retirement under the other plans would not be undertaken until conditions of business prosperity prevailed. Twin Cities would begin to reduce debt when national income exceeds $120,000,000,000; C. E. D., when it is consistent with high levels of employment; Ruml-Sonne, when production hit an agreed level.

Individual income tax rates, under the latest proposal, would begin at 15 per cent to 20 per cent, depending on the budget. The 3 per cent normal tax would

SOUTHERN STEEL . . . Symbol of Tomorrow's South

In Southern steel, produced in Southern mills from Southern iron ore, coal and limestone, you have the perfect symbol of the postwar South... *strength* and *endurance.*

For there's a strong and enduring prosperity in the making throughout the length and breadth of the territory served by the 8,000-mile Southern Railway System.

It's a product of the growing skill and ingenuity of Southern workers . . . the courage and foresight of Southern leaders . . . the will to progress cherished by all Southerners.

It can be seen in the better products coming in ever-increasing volume and variety from Southern mills and factories . . . the huge crops growing in Southern fields . . . the vast forests and productive mines of the South . . . the mild climate and fertile soil . . . its wealth of untapped natural resources . . . and the availability of efficient, dependable railroad transportation.

It's reflected by upward-moving population figures . . . by new industries . . . by national awareness that the Southland is indeed a "land of opportunity."

These things, together, mean for the South a "tomorrow" of prosperity and progress that will be as strong and enduring as Southern steel.

Look Ahead . . . Look South!

Ernest E. Norris

President

LOOK SOUTH LOOK AHEAD

SOUTHERN RAILWAY SYSTEM

The Southern Serves the South

INDUSTRIAL MAINE

. . . was built around the special skills of Men

The real picture of *industrial Maine* is one of community enterprises, large and small, developed around the special skills of *men*—of men with a pride in their work and a responsibility to their jobs; of good citizens, active in community life and wholly contented with the way they can live as they work, in Maine.

Men like PHILIP TAYLOR, "printer." Taylor's textile experience dates back nearly 50 years to 1896, in the days of wood block printing prior to the advent of stencils. Taylor's personal hobby is cabinet making at which he is also expert.



—or GEDEON MAHEUX, who has been with his present mill for 42 years. Maheux owns his own home, spends his spare time in his gardens.



—or men like "WIN" TEBBETTS, who has been with his present company for just short of 40 years. He comes from one of his community's oldest families; in his younger years was a famous ball player and still takes an active interest in sports; has been a member of his lodge for 50 years.

These men are typical of our textile craftsmen. (Last year Maine mills produced cotton and woolen goods with a value of over $192,000,000.00.) Theirs are the skills around which our textile industry was built—skills which are characteristic of our whole body of industrial workmen. In the postwar period, with the advent of many new materials and processes, the availability of workmen like these will be of prime importance.

Is your organization planning to de-centralize some of its operations, to build or re-locate? Then, whatever you make, consider the advantages of a home in industrial Maine. We'll be happy to spend time with you surveying possible building sites, or existing establishments which might be converted to your needs.

• • •

Send for a copy of "Industrial Maine", a text book of Maine's resources and industrial facilities.



MAINE DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION
INDUSTRIAL SERVICE
STATE HOUSE, ROOM N.
AUGUSTA, MAINE

be repealed, and the $500 exemption for each taxpayer and each dependent retained.

Corporation taxes, as a general rule, would be no higher than for individuals. The excess-profits tax would be repealed forthwith, and so-called double taxation of corporate dividends eliminated.

A federal sales tax of 5 per cent would be imposed if the budget reached $22,000,000,000.

Capital gains tax would be left unchanged for five years, and estate, gift and gasoline taxes would be changed into exclusive tax provinces for States.

A political obstacle to the Postwar Tax Policy plan, as to the other plans, is that top-bracket income tax rates are cut proportionately more than those in low brackets. The Committee argues strongly, however, that tax rates in the lower brackets, where most of the dollar income lies, must be high if budgets are to be high.

Export financing. Policies of the Export-Import Bank have become of special interest as a result of vast loans reported under discussion for Britain, China, Russia and other foreign nations. Amounts talked about include $6,000,000,000 for Russia, and from $3,000,000,000 to $6,000,000,000 for Britain.

Capital available to the Export-Import Bank, however, since its permanent establishment by Congress this summer, is $3,500,000,000. Bank policy, as stated by its president, Wayne Chatfield Taylor, is to make only loans and guarantees that aid specifically the export and import trade of the United States.

Actual loans, meanwhile, are known to be on the books or under active discussion for Brazil, Chile and Ecuador in Latin America, and Greece, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands in Europe. These are in addition to loans already on the books. Every Latin-American country has had one or more loans since the Bank was created in 1934.

Brazil is borrowing $38,000,000 to buy 14 new cargo ships. American shipyards will build them, at a time when war orders have left a big gap. Chile wants to build steel mills, using American materials and know-how, and is borrowing $33,000,000. A $20,000,000 loan to Ecuador, under discussion, apparently would mean purchase of American road-building machinery and materials.

The Greek loan is reported as a line of credit for $250,000,000. The Greek Government has put in orders for $20,000,000 worth of U. S. bridge and road-building machinery and materials.

European loans usually involve more money and, in some cases, are on different bases than the Latin-American loans. The loan to Norway, a long-term credit for $50,000,000, was negotiated by the Export-Import Bank, but is being carried

Passengers' choice for the *Coach of Tomorrow*

How New York Central's wartime travelers made post-war travel news!

Fighters, service wives, business men . . . these were some of the wartime passengers New York Central asked to become its post-war plans committee.

And how they responded! Thousands answered questionnaires telling what *they* wanted in future trains . . . choosing from newly developed ideas and from features now on latest Central coaches.

The car visualized here reflects the choice of these passenger-planners. And now this wartime guidance is helping New York Central's designers and engineers plan new trains that will mean more jobs and finer travel in the years of peace ahead.

BUY VICTORY BONDS



HERE'S HOW THEY VOTED

Reclining Seats . . . Overwhelmingly, passengers chose adjustable reclining seats...a development from those now on the Mercury, Empire State Express and other crack New York Central trains.

Wide View Windows . . . This was the winning window...extra wide and non-fogging...made to order for viewing New York Central's scenic Water Level Route.

Personal Reading Lights . . . Nearly 2-to-1, passengers voted for individual lights which could be turned on at each seat for reading...off for napping.

Lounge-Type Dressing Rooms . . . Almost 2-to-1, passengers preferred spacious lounge-type dressing rooms rather than a number of small, individual washrooms.

Conditioned Air at 72° . . . By passenger vote, 72 is the right "degree of comfort" for winter air conditioning. But most felt that summer coach temperature should vary somewhat with that outdoors.

Thrifty Dining Car . . . Low-cost meals in a separate dining car ...similar to New York Central's present Pacemaker diner...won far more votes than any other method of eating en route.

Public Address System . . . A public address system to announce stations and points of interest was favored by 70%.

NEW YORK CENTRAL SYSTEM

NEW YORK CENTRAL The Water Level Route

JET PROPULSION RADAR
ATOMIC ENERGY TELEVISION WALKIE TALKIE

Weighs less than 20 lbs... No larger than a cigar box!

AND NOW...

MORECORDER

THE PERFECT ELECTRONIC DICTATING MACHINE!

1. Absolutely *true* voice recording. No scratching or office noises.
2. Records both ends local and long distance telephone conversations—perfectly!
3. For conferences, hospital records, court reporting, spot dictation!
4. Leaves your hands free!
5. Really portable (less than 20 pounds—and no larger than a cigar box)
6. No fussing with cylinders that break. No shaving.
7. Lowest initial cost—lowest upkeep cost!

So simple and easy to operate — your secretary will love it! Saves time! Makes work easier! Helps produce more per day! For your new dictating machine — see the *MORECORDER* in *action!*

WRITE *for the illustrated MORECORDER brochure that will show you what the machine looks like—and how it works. MORECORDER MANUFACTURING CO., Balto. I, Md., Dept. A.*

IF YOU SAID IT . . . MORECORDER HAS IT!

MORECORDER

THE FINEST ELECTRONIC **VOICE RECORDER**

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mainly by commercial banks designated as agents. The agents may turn the entire loan back to the Export-Import Bank at any time. Most of the interest goes to the commercial banks, but a small part accrues to the Government Bank by virtue of its guarantee.

A $20,000,000 loan to Denmark is understood to be on a similar basis. There also is the possibility of funding and increasing the $100,000,000 credit extended to the Netherlands early this year by New York banks, after approval by the Government. The Netherlands credit was the first sizable private bank credit to a European country since the war ended in Europe.

Banking circles are expressing special interest in the policies involved in such loans, and in the effect on traditional types

—Harris & Ewing

WAYNE CHATFIELD TAYLOR
. . . not competing with private banks

of foreign investment. By utilizing the resources of private banks, however, the Export-Import Bank can stretch its $3,500,000,000 capital materially. President Taylor says it is a cardinal principle of the Bank to avoid competition with commercial banks.

Interest rates and terms vary in the new loans. Usually the Export-Import Bank extends credit at 4 per cent. The loans to Brazil and Chile are said to be at 4 per cent, one running for 10 years, the other for 20. The Greek loan, however, is understood to be at 2⅜ per cent for 30 years, and the Norwegian loan for 20 years at a rate of 3 or 3½ per cent.

U. S. businessmen seeking credit from the Export-Import Bank to finance specific export or import transactions are urged by the Bank first to exhaust the possibilities of commercial credit. The Bank offers special aid to small firms, and has a revolving fund for that purpose.

Chicago and Northern Illinois Transportation Facilities— Unsurpassed in all the World









Like spokes of a wheel . . . rail, air, truck and shipping lanes fan out from Chicago and Northern Illinois to all parts of America. To the manufacturer located in this area, these facilities mean quick receipt of raw materials . . . speedy delivery of finished products to every corner of the United States, to markets on the far side of the world. There is a wide choice of available plant sites with ready access to all transportation.

By rail—22 trunk line and 17 belt and terminal railroads serve Chicago and Northern Illinois. 7,726 miles of railroad track converge in the Chicago industrial area alone. This is greater than the main line mileage in 39 of the 48 states. Here shippers find excellent pick-up and delivery service, facilities for loading and unloading cars with greater efficiency than any other rail center in the nation.

By air—For any operation where the element of speed in transit is essential, Chicago and Northern Illinois is the ideal place in which to locate postwar plants. Nine principal airlines connect this territory with every major city in North America. Geographical features which have made this area the crossroads of commerce, are now making it a great international airport. Specific plans for air routes from Chicago to the leading markets throughout the world have been approved.

By truck—Over 600 truck and bus lines offering 24-hour-a-day service speed parts, products and people from Chicago and Northern Illinois to 24,000 United States communities. More than 600 miles of new superhighways, now projected, will enable fast carriers to express products to all parts of the territory—and additional highway facilities will speed delivery to every corner of the nation.

By water—10,000 miles of inland waterways serve Chicago and Northern Illinois. Trans-Atlantic vessels can come direct to Lake Michigan ports via the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes. The Illinois deep waterway provides a direct link with the Gulf of Mexico. In 1940, a record 43,500,000 tons of lake and Illinois waterway traffic totaled more than the traffic passing through the Panama Canal.

To industry and business seeking locations, transportation is only one of the many advantages offered by the Chicago and Northern Illinois territory. As an aid to business, agriculture and industry, we have established a department to assemble and distribute factual data concerning this area. You are invited to make use of the services of this department. Communicate with the Territorial Information Department, Marquette Bldg., 140 S. Dearborn St., Chicago 3, Ill.—'phone RANdolph 1617.

Industries locating in this area have these outstanding advantages

Railroad Center of the United States • World Airport • Inland Waterways • Geographical Center of U. S. Population • Great Financial Center • The "Great Central Market" • Food Producing and Processing Center • Leader in Iron and Steel Manufacturing • Good Labor Relations Record • 2,500,000 Kilowatts of Power • Tremendous Coal Reserves • Abundant Gas and Oil • Good Government • Good Living

TERRITORIAL INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

Information on the industrial, agricultural and residential development of Chicago and Northern Illinois

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY · PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NORTHERN ILLINOIS
WESTERN UNITED GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY · ILLINOIS NORTHERN UTILITIES COMPANY

Temporarily, GORDON'S GIN is being shipped in the round Victory bottle ... 100% NEUTRAL SPIRITS DISTILLED FROM GRAIN • GORDON'S DRY GIN CO., LTD., LINDEN, N. J.

"The Yeas and Nays"

Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

EDITOR'S NOTE: *Brief letters of comment and suggestions are invited. Those not intended for publication, and those with which writers desire to have only initials used, should be so marked.*

Faster Release for Officers?

Sir:—The orders on which many of the officers are being sent overseas are in response to requisitions made up last June and which anticipated invasion of Japan.

We believe our only hope is for Congress to order or persuade the War Department to release officers and men who have served three and one-half or more years and who want to leave, such releases to be granted without qualifications, such as if transportation is available or if the men are not essential; to utilize volunteers who want to stay in the Army and draftees who have had only a short term of service.

If volunteers are insufficient, it is up to the country to make foreign service more attractive than it is now. Additional overseas pay, and overseas quarters for families and friends would accomplish a lot. (The State Department does not separate families indefinitely.)

It may be noted that many of our men were depression victims who were just getting established when war came. Many fear they will find it difficult to find civilian employment because their age and other circumstances will be against them.

In the Pacific — D. W. M., Captain Signal Corps

Of Bad Men and Good Snakes

Sir:—In the main, I quite agree with Senator John L. McClellan, U. S. Senator from Arkansas, in what he says concerning Emperor Hirohito in the August 17 issue, but when he says that the only good snake is a dead one, I disagree with him.

If the good Senator will go to the trouble of consulting Raymond Lee Ditmars' fine book on snakes and reptiles, he will find that we have some 165 different kinds of snakes on the North American continent. We have the rattlers, of which there are about 14 or 15 different species, then we have the pit vipers, the coral snakes, the copperhead and the moccasin. The bite of any of these could cause death. The others are all harmless. The harmless variety are the farmer's best friend!

Senator McClellan ought to apologize to lovers of harmless snakes. In view of the treatment accorded our boys by the Japs, it would have been more to the point if he had said the only good Jap is a dead one.

Kankakee, Ill. — HENRY T. KOBER



Good companies settle here . . .

Today, as always, Southern New England is the heart of the world's richest, most highly-concentrated market . . . the best of all reasons why industry should—and does—make this its home.

Draw a circle 500 miles from the center of Southern New England and you will include 58,000,000 consumers. Into that circle, Southern New England pours not only consumer goods but its producer commodities—machinery, tools, ball bearings—the parts and equipment that keep other industries going.

Beyond that circle looms the great world market of tomorrow . . . a market that will be served most efficiently by Southern New England's strategically located ports.

Southern New England has its personal appeal, too. For with its many delightful residential communities, its hills, lakes, and sandy beaches never more than a few miles from where you work, Southern New England is a great place to live and play.

and stay!

As you weigh the future of your new or expanding business, consider Southern New England.

Search where you will, you won't find a more favorable spot . . . *anywhere.*

For your business and personal postwar planning, we offer an industrial booklet in full color: "Southern New England for Tomorrow's Industry". This booklet is yours for the asking. Write to P. E. Benjamin, Manager of Industrial Development, The New Haven Railroad, 80 Federal Street, Boston 10, Mass.

This is one of a series of advertisements presenting the industrial advantages of Southern New England.

THE **NEW HAVEN** R.R.

Serving **SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND** *with a network of rail and highway transportation that puts every manufacturer* ON THE MAIN LINE.

Spencer Tracy in the M-G-M motion picture "A Guy Named Joe" • Painting by Harry Anderson

"What's it like up there, Pete?"

"*WHEN you're up there* . . . everything's kinda still, and you've got a feeling you're half-way to heaven. You don't even seem to hear your own motors—just a kind of buzz far off . . . like the sky was calling you . . . like the sky was singing you a song . . . .

"And somehow it's never eight o'clock up there . . . it's always now. The earth's so far below you don't care about it any more. It's the sky that's important. The sky is your pal. You feel like nudging the sky and saying, 'Hello sky—how are *you* today, sky—and how was the moon last time you saw him?'. . .

"The wind-draft comes straight off the morning star, and the clouds float toward you like old friends you never want to say goodbye to. . . . And you say to yourself, 'Boy, oh boy—this is the only time a man's ever alive—it's the only time he's really free!' And the old sky, he smiles back and says, 'You're right, brother—you're right!'"

—Excerpt from script of motion picture "A Guy Named Joe"

Is air travel something that fits into your life? Add to Spencer Tracy's word-picture the practical advantages of flight—its revolutionary saving in time, its basic economy, its restful comfort, its "go when you want to go" schedules. There are few travelers, indeed, who will not prefer it to any other . . . few who will not find in it new and unsuspected value to themselves. *Air Transport Association, 1515 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W., Washington 5, D. C.*

This advertisement is sponsored by the nation's airlines and leading manufacturers in the aviation industry

THE AIRLINES OF THE UNITED STATES

LEADING THE WORLD IN AIR TRANSPORT

24th and N Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Trend of American Business

Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

You are going to hear a lot about business strains in the months just ahead.

Higher wage demands by workers are certain to spread, to cause friction.

Strike threats will increase as unions move to preserve wartime gains.

Unemployment will reach a probable 8,000,000 when demobilization hits peak.

Price controls on manufactured goods will be irksome and cause complaints.

Bottlenecks will occur to hinder smooth reconversion. Shortages may appear in some parts, deliveries will be delayed, some raw materials will be scarce.

All these influences will bring headaches to businessmen, to plant managers trying to speed the adjustment to peace. But for business generally they will be minor problems. Over-all outlook for profits next year and in 1947 is good.

Profit outlook is based on these assumptions, accepted as conservative.....

Industrial production in 1946 will average 142 per cent of 1935-39, and in 1947 will increase to 156 per cent. In July, output was 212 per cent of 1935-39.

National income payments will fall to $121,800,000,000 in 1946, from a wartime peak of $163,600,000,000. In 1947, they will be about $124,000,000,000.

Consumer spending will be $92,000,000,000 in 1946 and $97,700,000,000 in 1947. These estimates assume that the commodity price level will remain steady.

On that basis, the profit outlook for all corporations, including those that will operate at a deficit, or will show no profit, is this:

In 1946, gross income of all U. S. corporations will be $190,000,000,000. That compares with probable gross corporate earnings of $229,000,000,000 in 1945.

In 1947, gross earnings can be expected to reach $205,000,000,000.

That's a larger gross income for corporations, in either year, than ever recorded in peacetime. The 1941 gross, previous high, was $188,197,000,000.

The real question, however, is how much of that gross income corporations can keep in profits. And that, in turn, depends upon federal tax policy.

If excess-profits tax is repealed for 1946, corporate profits, after taxes, will amount to $5,565,000,000. Otherwise net will be $3,614,000,000.

In 1947, with no excess-profits tax, net after taxes will be $9,345,000,000.

That will be a record peacetime high. Even for 1946, net earnings will be better than any year between 1929 and 1941 if the excess-profits tax goes out. And if the tax remains, 1946 net still will compare favorably with 1937.

These estimates assume no change in the corporation normal tax and surtax.

Dividend payments in 1946 promise to exceed $4,000,000,000 with the excess-profits tax still in effect; to go to $5,000,000,000 if the tax is repealed. Retained wartime earnings will permit payments at this level, which will be more than stockholders received in any year since 1929.

1947 dividends are likely to ring up a record at $6,435,000,000.

This outlook suggests a bright prospect for investors in profit-making firms.

Business earnings prospects promise to influence tax policy. Aim of both Congress and the Administration is to promote private business, and the incentive of profits is accepted as the best business-expansion tool now at hand.

Excess-profits tax thus is likely to be repealed, effective Jan. 1, 1946. That would cost the Government an estimated $1,951,000,000, net, in revenue.

(over)

Other tax reductions promise to be tailored around excess-profits tax repeal.
Individuals will get some tax favors, but not many, in view of revenue needs.
Small corporations might get special favors in higher credits or lower rates.
Capital gains tax is unlikely to be altered, barring an inflationary boom.
The tough tax fact is that federal spending promises to be $20,000,000,000 to $25,000,000,000 a year for some years, and that won't permit many reductions.

New building regulations reflect Government policy of stimulating business. Under the program as it has been revised.....

No price limits are placed on new construction of homes, public works, or commercial buildings. WPB Order L-41, which fixed ceilings, is revoked.

Inventory controls will be kept on building materials to avoid hoarding.

Price ceilings will be raised to promote production of materials. Increases already are permitted for brick ($2 per 1,000) and tile (80 cents a ton).

Price controls over materials, however, are to be maintained by OPA. The new price-control program for building supplies has these features:

Dollars-cents ceilings are to be fixed regionally for lumber, insulation, brick, soil pipe, doors, windows, cabinets, bathtubs, washbasins, septic tanks.

Service charges are to be controlled locally for painting and papering, roof renewals, plumbing installations, excavations and other building activities.

Contractors' margins are to be tightened in an attempt to hold prices down.

Essentially, the Government hopes to promote a building boom by relaxing controls, and still prevent sharp price rises by keeping controls in reserve. It remains to be seen how this program will work. Actually, initial home building is expected to concentrate in higher-priced units until supply situation eases.

Ceiling prices on finished homes is what OPA would like to apply, but cannot.

Authority for such control is to be sought from Congress by OPA Administrator Bowles, but it is highly doubtful that Congress will comply. Prices on new homes cannot very well be fixed unless resale prices on old houses are fixed too.

Extension of price controls at the moment does not interest Congress at all.

In other areas of Government control.....

Low-cost-garment program is to be pushed by WPB. Chairman Krug threatens to order set-asides for fabrics if the present priority system breaks down.

Preticketing of garment prices may extend to wool and rayon as well as cotton.

Nylon-hosiery sales may be held back until even distribution is obtained.

Automobile rationing of some sort is almost certain to apply to early cars.

Export quotas for passenger cars and trucks are to be imposed by WPB.

Aid to business by Government will get a shot in the arm if Commerce Secretary Wallace's new program gets approval from Congress. It has White House aid. It should appeal to the small-business bloc in Congress. Highlights are these:

A census every 5 years of population, housing, industry and agriculture.

Consumer-income surveys each year to provide marketing information.

Technical research, on a cost basis, for firms that can't get it elsewhere.

Use of National Inventors' Council to promote new discoveries and processes.

General analyses of over-all business conditions, of particular trades and industries, and of particular regions. This would fit into a jobs-for-all plan.

Foreign-trade reports on markets, investment opportunities, business trends.

In addition, the Department would strengthen its present statistical studies on national income, national product, unemployment, balance of payments. Weather Bureau, Bureau of Standards, Civil Aeronautics, Patent Office would expand.

Four Assistant Secretaries are sought to direct the program--for aviation, for international trade, for industrial economy, for small business.

Field offices would be set up in every important industrial and city area where businessmen could go for advice and information and special service.

Essentially, it is a plan to draw business closer to Government.



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SOUTHERN produced with honor the fins and stabilizers, wing sections and tail groups for America's largest, fastest and deadliest Navy fighter plane . . . the Grumman Tigercat. Torpedo bay doors for Avengers . . . major wing and tail assemblies for Hellcats . . . all built with Army-Navy "E" Award-winning speed, quality, dependability . . . that's been **SOUTHERN'S** contribution to victory by air power over Japan. And with the skies again at peace, **SOUTHERN** will strive to serve, with equal honor, the world of new civilian and commercial aeronautics.

ARMY E NAVY

Southern

AIRCRAFT ✱ CORPORATION

PLANT IN GARLAND, DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

Inter-America Week

Title Reg. U.S. Pat Off

Rising Prospects Of Trade Boom In Hemisphere

Latin America is finding that adjustment to peacetime production is not as difficult as had been feared. Cutbacks of U. S. purchases of strategic materials are being made gradually. Shipping tonnage is becoming available. Prices are rising on some exports. Credits are being granted for industrial expansion. And Europe is opening up as a market.

This is a reversal of the picture of six months ago. Then, shipping and supplies were getting tighter. Reconversion jitters haunted many countries, like Chile, dependent on large-scale export trade. The best the U. S. at that time could do was to promise Hemisphere nations a fair share in whatever goods and services became available, and to hold out the expectation that some buying of strategic raw materials would continue after the war.

Now, earlier fears have vanished and problems that are occurring are not directly related to ending of the war.

U. S. buying. Purchase contracts for manganese, mica, tungsten, copper and other materials directly involved in war production have been cut back or are being tapered off. But in their stead are coming purchases of more bananas, rice, vegetable oils, nuts, rubber and other products. Sale of some items is limited only by production.

Contracts for procurement of rubber, tin, lead, abaca and sisal are being extended, in some cases into 1948, because of expected continued shortages of these products. It is believed some war-born or war-revived industries, such as rubber and sisal, will become permanent parts of Hemisphere economy. Brazil, by 1946, expects to be producing more rubber than in the boom that preceded the first World War.

U. S. selling. Production volume and the lifting of ration controls in this country are ahead of estimates of only a few months back. Latin America is sharing in this increased availability of goods, and buyers are streaming to this country to place orders, rather than relying upon agents. Resumption of many shipping services and operation of new and fast ships are opening up Hemisphere traffic. In some Latin-American ports, imports have mounted so rapidly that port fa-

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The Best Location in the Nation!

THE SUPERIOR ADVANTAGES of Cleveland and Northeast Ohio as a location for production and distribution are matched by this area's advantages as a location for management headquarters.

Many far-flung industries have their general offices here, and more managements are considering moving here postwar. You, too, should consider establishing your headquarters at this vantage point.

ONLY IN CLEVELAND and Northeast Ohio will industry find all of these outstanding assets . . . central location . . . superlative transportation . . . *adequate electric power at low rates* . . . manpower with the know-how . . . abundant basic materials, including fresh water . . . diversified industries to supply and to be supplied . . . desirable plants, warehouses and plant sites . . . favorable tax structure, with no state income tax.

Here, too, are all essential business and industrial services . . . financial . . . advertising and public relations . . . legal and accounting . . . engineering and research . . . designing . . . and many more . . . as well as an excellent living and cultural environment.

TO INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENTS we offer our confidential Location Engineering Service without charge or obligation. Send for our new five-color brochure, "The Best Location in the Nation for Many Industries".

Call, write or wire Industrial Development Division, R. C. Hienton, Director

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

76 PUBLIC SQUARE • CHerry 4200 • CLEVELAND 1, OHIO

The Grand Old Drink of the South

FROM A CURRIER & IVES PRINT

There are Many Rivers but Only One Mississippi

AMONG THE MANY DRINKS

There's Only One

SOUTHERN COMFORT

AMERICA'S MOST VERSATILE DRINK

100 PROOF LIQUEUR

SOUTHERN COMFORT CORPORATION
ST. LOUIS, MO.

cilities have become crowded, causing incoming ships to be rerouted.

U. S. lending. Hemisphere countries are better off financially than before the war. But they still are asking for credits in order to maintain their present strong position. Brazil obtained credits for a fleet of ships being built in this country and Canada. Chile has been granted a $33,000,000 loan for construction of a steel industry and related projects. Now Ecuador is to receive $20,000,000 for highways, new port works and irrigation. Most of these funds are being supplied by the Export-Import Bank, and a total of $200,000,000 is expected to be lent to Latin America by the middle of next year.

Problems. Apart from reconversion, some difficulties are being met.

Coffee is the largest single Latin-American export. This country at present must compete with sales to Europe at prices above U. S. ceilings. As a result, coffee exports to this country by Brazil, which reached a record peak in July, have dropped to a dribble. Instead, Britain is taking 1,000,000 bags this year. Switzerland, the Netherlands and Norway have placed orders and others soon are expected to enter the market.

On the basis of these sales at above U. S. ceiling prices, indications are that some increase in coffee prices may have to be made, especially as crop estimates in Brazil, principal producer, indicate a small crop in the face of rising demand. Latest rice purchase contracts with Brazil provided for an increase in price.

Sugar. Latin-American sugar production is down this year from 1944 levels because of drought, hurricanes, lack of equipment and delays in reaching a satisfactory price. No agreement has yet been reached on next year's Cuban crop, but a substantial increase in price has been offered by U. S. purchasing agencies. Peru is said to be selling sugar for export at 9 cents a pound as compared with Cuba's price to this country of 3.10 cents a pound.

Latin America's combined sugar and coffee exports in 1944 were $525,000,000 out of total exports of $1,572,000,000 to this country, or just one third. As price adjustments are made, and crops return to normal, income from sugar and coffee is counted on by Latin-American traders to help boost export totals above present levels.

Grains. In Argentina, exports of wheat and other grains to Europe have almost ceased because of lack of internal transport. This is due largely to a shortage of fuel, which has been made available to her in limited quantities only because of the nature of the Argentine Government.

The over-all picture of Latin America's economy, however, indicates that adjustments are being taken in stride, and that disruption of exports and a lack of imports are not as serious as had been expected.

COMING!

COOLER and CLEANER PIPE SMOKING

When conditions permit, cool, sweet-smoking *Kirsten* pipes will again be available at leading dealers everywhere. Right now, these fine pipes are all distributed by the armed forces to overseas service men. Scientifically designed, the *Kirsten* pre-cools each puff of smoke. Irritating tars and oils are condensed and trapped in the big radiator, leaving milder, sweeter smoke to enter the mouth, throat and lungs.

When you are able to buy your *Kirsten*, you'll be glad you waited!

KIRSTEN PIPE CO.
Dept. 176
Seattle 1, Wash.

Buy Victory Bonds

THE *Kirsten* RADIATOR PIPE
PATS. AND PATS. PEND.



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GEARING FOR PEACE *as painted by James Sessions at Warner Gear in Muncie, Indiana. From the inception of the first "horseless carriage", this great Borg-Warner plant has consistently been the leader in the mass production of gear assemblies for the automotive industry. During the war, it was one of the largest producers of transmissions for all types of motorized military vehicles.*

Makers of essential operating parts for the automotive, aviation, marine and farm implement industries, and of Norge home appliances.

The Warner Gear Division, although the world's largest independent producer of transmissions, is only one of three great Borg-Warner units making gear assemblies.

There are many fields in which Borg-Warner products benefit almost every American every day. In fact, Borg-Warner products are found on 9 out of 10 farms, in 9 out of 10 airplanes as well as in 9 out of 10 makes of automobiles. And Norge refrigerators, ranges and washing machines make the homes of millions more efficient and livable.

All of which illustrates how Borg-Warner's guiding principle, "Design it better, make it better" works in many ways to bring you ever better products at ever lower costs.

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These units form Borg-Warner: BORG & BECK • BORG-WARNER INTERNATIONAL • BORG WARNER SERVICE PARTS • B-W SUPERCHARGERS, INC. • CALUMET STEEL • DETROIT GEAR • DETROIT VAPOR STOVE • INGERSOLL STEEL & DISC • LONG MANUFACTURING • MARBON • MARVEL-SCHEBLER CARBURETER • MECHANICS UNIVERSAL JOINT • MORSE CHAIN • NORGE • NORGE MACHINE PRODUCTS • PESCO PRODUCTS • ROCKFORD CLUTCH • SPRING DIVISION • WARNER AUTOMOTIVE PARTS • WARNER GEAR

Discovery in YUCATAN

1 **"I literally stumbled on it,"** writes a friend of Canadian Club Whisky, "—a centuries-old Mayan ceremonial bowl. Holding it, I couldn't help wondering what secrets it could tell of that amazingly advanced Indian civilization whose story may never be fully revealed. That was in Yucatan last Spring while I was awaiting Clipper passage to New Orleans—nowadays just 3½ hours away by air.

2 **"The day** had started out as a turkey hunt, but even the teeming game in this hunter's dream-land couldn't compete for my attention with the fascination of the ruins, the eerie land.

3 **"One memorable** experience was swimming *underground.* You *must* go underground (or to the beaches)... Yucatan has no surface streams or lakes.

4 **"Winding up** at an henequen plantation was an eye-widening experience too—eye-widening for two reasons: the vast fields of spiky henequen (source of rope and twine) and...

5 **"The hacienda house** dating back almost to Cortez! I felt I'd been transported back three hundred years—till I sipped a treat that's prized wherever civilized moderns meet. No mistaking its distinctive flavor—Canadian Club!"

Even these days travelers tell of being offered Canadian Club all over the earth—often from a cherished pre-war supply. And why this whisky's worldwide popularity? Canadian Club is *light* as scotch, *rich* as rye, *satisfying* as bourbon—yet there is no other whisky in all the world that tastes like Canadian Club. You can stay with Canadian Club all evening long—in cocktails before dinner and tall ones after.

• That's why Canadian Club is the largest-selling imported whisky in the United States.

IN 87 LANDS NO OTHER WHISKY TASTES LIKE

"Canadian Club"

Imported from Walkerville, Canada, by Hiram Walker & Sons Inc., Peoria, Ill. Blended Canadian Whisky. 90.4 proof

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SWITLIK PARACHUTE COMPANY
Dept. V-10, Trenton, N. J.



THE BIG JOB IS DONE

but there's still another

and that is a return to the normal functioning of a peacetime world. Here at Boston's internationally known Parker House we are ready and anxious to provide you once more with the services and facilities which have made this hotel world-famous. Our entire efforts are now pointed toward the speedy achievement of *that* objective.

Parker House
BOSTON
A New England Institution
Glenwood J. Sherrard, President

People of the Week



Harold H. Burton, Republican Senator from Ohio, is President Truman's first appointee to the Supreme Court. The Senate, of course, knows him well and confirmed the nomination both quickly and unanimously. But the country as a whole is less familiar with the new Associate Justice. Lawyers, businessmen and others are asking about his qualifications for the highest federal bench, about his background and personality. Questions are raised, too, as to the effect of the appointment on the cliques that have developed within the Court. And there are suggestions that the appointment may have political repercussions.

Justice Burton's views. Justice Burton's Senate colleagues have called him a "liberal Republican," an "economic mid-



—Harris & Ewing

JUSTICE BURTON
. . . no ax to grind

Here's an EEMCO CUSTOM-BUILT SPLASH-PROOF
INVERTER

CUSTOM MOTOR DESIGNS FOR:
AIRCRAFT
SHIPS
TRAINS
INDUSTRY
PRODUCTION
POWER
PETROLEUM & CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES



As furnished now to the U. S. Government, this compact, totally enclosed, splash-proof unit converts 32 volt D.C. current into 110 volt, 60 cycle A.C. current. This specially engineered, fan-cooled model is of 500 volt amperes capacity, continuous duty operation, with 900 volt amperes peak capacity, intermittent duty. It can be adapted for use with a power supply source of 110 volt D.C.

EEMCO developed this Inverter as an exact answer to the U. S. Navy's need in certain installations for specified amounts of alternating current from a D. C. power supply source. It helps illustrate the versatility of EEMCO's successful, practical electrical engineering and manufacturing experience.

Submit your electrical problems to EEMCO. You may need an inverter of this type. Or you may need an electric actuating motor, or submersible motor, or right angle drive, or a specialized type of generator. Whatever your requirements involve, EEMCO engineers will gladly discuss your problems with you – now, for war equipment, later on for peace time service.

Get your copy of EEMCO's "Custom Built Motors for a World of Needs." For distribution on request.

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BLATZ BREWING CO., MILWAUKEE, WIS. • *In our 95th year*


Are you
GENEROUS
DO YOU ENJOY giving your loved ones gifts of the finest quality and beauty? Then you'll choose the coming Hamilton—more precise than anything you've dreamed of, thanks to discoveries we've made building thousands of timepieces for war. So wait for a Hamilton. It's coming!
WAIT FOR
HAMILTON
America's Fine Watch

Hamilton Watch Company—Makers of "The Watch of Railroad Accuracy"—Lancaster, Pa.

CUT our shipping room costs $600 a year," claim users of Marsh Stencil Machines, Brushes, Inks! Three sizes to meet Gov't Spec., 1", 3/4", 1/2". For sample stencil, shippers' handbook and prices, pin this to business letterhead, with your name.

MARSH STENCIL MACHINE CO.
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For beards as tough as copper wire, here's the answer to shaving comfort. Kit includes: Durham T-type razor, five famous Durham-Duplex heavy-duty, hollow-ground blades, strop outfit for economy and smoother shaves every time, shave stick and comb. A bargain in de luxe shaving equipment. If dealer can't supply, send $2 direct.

DURHAM-ENDERS RAZOR CORP., Dept. H, MYSTIC, CONN.

dle-roader." They have known him as a man with no causes or crusades to promote, save, possibly, that of postwar international co-operation. They consider him a man of calm, deliberate judgment, who seeks facts and then quietly makes up his mind.

In the Senate, he was a persistent advocate of governmental economy. He voted against the Administration on such issues as abolishing the National Youth Administration and confirming Henry A. Wallace for Secretary of Commerce. On the other hand, he has supported the reciprocal tariff program and measures to abolish the poll tax and make the Fair Employment Practice Committee permanent. As a Senator, too, he incurred the extreme displeasure of the labor unions by proposing a drastic revision of the National Labor Relations Act.

In the field of international relations, Senator Burton took the leadership, with Senators Ball, Hatch and Hill, in assuring the nations of the world that the Senate



—Harris & Ewing

CHIEF JUSTICE STONE
Washington looked for . . .

would not stand in the way of postwar international co-operation.

In domestic matters, Justice Burton, himself, summed up the attitude which he seems to be taking to the bench with him:

"A crisis will come at the end of the war," he once said. "We will choose between substantial freedom of enterprise with Government guidance on the one hand, and extreme governmental ownership, operation and dictation on the other. We must not win the war for freedom, then lose it to totalitarianism under a new name here at home. The foundation of our thinking must be deep faith in ourselves and in a Government dedicated to the advancement of individual character and opportunity."

Justice Burton on the Court. On the basis of these things, Washington con-

siders it obvious that Justice Burton will fall in with the more moderate wing of the Court. In split decisions, Chief Justice Stone, and Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson often have voted together to restrict federal controls over business. The opposing wing has consisted of Associate Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge, with Associate Justice Reed standing in the middle and often casting the deciding vote. Since Justice Burton simply replaces one of the moderates, Justice Roberts, who resigned some weeks ago, the appointment apparently means no fundamental change in the alignment of the Court.

Political implications. Justice Burton is the first Republican to be appointed to the Court since the Hoover Administration. President Truman has received much praise for going outside his own party to make the appointment. He did so at least partly because Justice Roberts was a Republican, and he felt that Republican representation on the tribunal should not be reduced too drastically. The only other Republican member is Chief Justice Stone, appointed by President Coolidge in 1925 and later made Chief Justice by President Roosevelt. The seven other members, all more or less pronounced New Dealers, were named by President Roosevelt.

—Harris & Ewing

JUSTICE JACKSON
. . . an increase in their wing

Politically, too, the appointment makes a change in the party division of the Senate. Justice Burton's successor is to be named by Governor Frank J. Lausche of Ohio. Governor Lausche, a Democrat, is to appoint a Democrat, increasing that party's Senate representation by one member, and bringing the division to 56 Democrats, as against 39 Republicans.

The appointment also clears the way for former Governor John W. Bricker of Ohio, the 1944 vice-presidential nominee, to

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return to national politics, by running for the Senate next year. With Justice Burton no longer an aspirant for re-election, Governor Bricker can seek the senatorial nomination without worrying about stirring up a bitter fight inside the party.

Objection. Justice Burton's appointment has been generally applauded. One objection, however, has been raised. This is that appointees to the Court should be chosen from among the outstanding members of the lower federal courts, thus promoting men of proven judicial ability. This practice was largely abandoned in the Roosevelt appointments. Of the seven men appointed by Mr. Roosevelt, only one, Justice Rutledge, came from the lower courts. He remains the only present member who had previous judicial experience. The others have been professors of law in the big universities, were elevated from the post of Attorney General, or held other Government positions. Justice Black came to the Court, like Justice Burton, from the Senate, and Justice Douglas from the chairmanship of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Where the contention that Supreme Court judges should come from the lower courts touches Justice Burton, it becomes a criticism of the fact that, due to political activities, he has been out of firsthand touch with the law for ten years. His friends believe that, if this is a handicap, he will quickly overcome it.

Justice Burton's background. Born, reared and educated in New England, Justice Burton settled down to the practice of law in Cleveland, where he remained, except for a three-year interim as an attorney for Utah and Idaho public utility companies. He began climbing the political ladder with election to the Ohio House of Representatives in 1929, and later became Director of Law, and then Mayor of Cleveland. He gave that city an administration which attracted considerable attention, and then went on to the Senate in 1941.

There, he met and became a close friend of President Truman. The President, then Senator, was impressed with Mr. Burton's industry and judgment, and had him appointed to his famous committee investigating the war effort, where their association became even closer, and their friendship deeper.

In person, Justice Burton is a stocky figure with thinning gray hair, a round face, a steady gaze and a ready smile. Although somewhat shy, he makes friends quickly, and they find him an agreeable companion. His one fetish is physical condition. At the end of a busy day he usually found time for a workout in the Senate gymnasium.

Altogether, Justice Burton carries to the Court a diligence, enthusiasm and calmness of approach that the men who know him in the Senate think will fit him well for the assignment ahead of him.

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
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DEMOBILIZATION PLANS OF ARMY

General Marshall's Explanation of System

(Transcript of extemporaneous remarks by General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, to members of Congress, Sept. 20, 1945.)

I have been a bit puzzled as to what particular phase of demobilization I should discuss this morning. I have been advised by some that your interest lay largely in the immediate situation and the prospects of the future. Others have suggested that the general perspective of what has occurred since Germany surrendered was very important to an understanding of the present situation and what can be expected later on.

I have decided to take the latter suggestion. It seemed to me the one most conducive to an understanding of an exceedingly complex and difficult problem. At the outset, I would like to say this: There has been no relationship whatsoever between the rate of demobilization and any future plans of the Army. I mean by that that all the facilities available in transportation and in personnel trained to handle demobilization have been devoted to release from the service as rapidly as possible of the largest possible number of men. It will be next spring, presumably—and if the estimates in occupation forces now forecast are accurate it will be even later than early spring—before we will reach a point where the rate of demobilization will be influenced in any way by consideration of the strength of occupation forces.

I will repeat: The rate of demobilization has been determined by transportation facilities and by the availability of trained personnel to carry its administrative requirements out. It has had no relationship whatsoever to the size of the Army in the future. That situation will not arise, as we see it now, until next spring.

There has been considerable disturbance over figures used by the War Department in making budget estimates some time ago, before we knew how the Japanese would react to the surrender. Before we knew what was to happen in an undertaking without precedent in history—the occupation of a country with an undefeated Army of 2,500,000 completely equipped and well-fed men—we had to prepare estimates of troop strength as of next July 1. These estimates had to consider the possibility of difficulties in the disarmament of Japan. Since then, we have a much more definite basis for calculations. We know now, pretty well, how the surrender is going through. We know what is happening in China, and in Malaysia, as well as in Japan; and we have more recently learned what to expect in Korea. That gives us the basis for estimates presenting a new set of figures.

But the figures for the budget had to be submitted before the occupation had started to unfold. On the basis of estimates by the theater commanders, we arrived at a figure of 900,000 for the Pacific, including the Aleutians, Alaska, Hawaii and all the other islands of the Central Pacific, the islands about to be occupied, Japan, Korea, the remainder of the Ryukyus, Formosa, and possibly some areas on the China Coast. The estimate from Europe was 400,000.

Now, on those two figures, plus what was required to support the supply lines and train replacements (in order to allow men with long service to be brought home from the occupation forces) came the figure of 2,500,000 as of July 1 next which apparently has been so disturbing to you gentlemen. It would have been much more convenient and more practical for us if we could have delayed in our budget presentation until we could know these other factors. We were not permitted to do that, because making up the budget is a long and involved procedure. You can appreciate our position.

Prior to the collapse of Germany, we had about 3,700,000 soldiers in the European Theater and about 1,800,000 in the Pacific. The remainder, some 2,800,000, were here in the United States, evenly divided between those engaged in operating the great ports of embarkation and some 3,000 service and training installations and those who were being trained as replacements for the Air, Ground and Service troops already overseas.

We were then trying to complete the destruction of the German Army so we would be free to turn our full strength to the Pacific. Meanwhile, we were proceeding to employ to the full limit, our powerful Pacific naval and air forces and limited ground forces to break down the outposts and to soften the Japanese islands so that at the close of the war in Germany we would be close to the Japanese homeland and ready to invade as soon as sufficient additional troops could be redeployed from Europe.

We had been able to go ahead with the Philippines campaign and the seizure of Okinawa. The latter was in immediate preparation for the invasion of Kyushu, the southern island of Japan, which was to have occurred on November 1. It was to have been the largest amphibious operation ever attempted up to that time.

That was the situation as we approached the end in Europe. When the cessation of hostilities in Germany came in sight, we started the redeployment to the Pacific, by holding up vessels ready to sail for Europe. We had them all carefully loaded with that in mind. This covered a period of two or three weeks. Then came the German surrender and the flow of men and arms to Europe was stopped immediately.

We turned to an all-out movement of troops to the Pacific. We had worked on those plans for well over a year—not only on the plan itself, but on all the information that we could give the public and the men themselves, on what was required. We attempted to do it largely by use of the moving picture since it was a readily available medium for reaching a large number of men. Seemingly, the understanding of the redeployment was pretty general, rapidly appreciated, and we got under way on that basis.

The gigantic redeployment undertaking, of course, had a great effect on the demobilization. There were 17 divisions in Europe scheduled to go to the Pacific at General MacArthur's request. Those divisions had to be brought home. But before leaving Europe, they had to be reassorted, all the long-term men taken out and new men injected into them. They had to be put together, reconstituted, before their movement to the United States.

There was another movement that had to have first priority. We had to move as rapidly as possible, engineer troops, signal troops, harbor troops, depot troops and special units of all

kinds, out to the Pacific so that we might keep our target date of November 1 for the invasion of Kyushu. This date was no chance selection. There were important reasons why we had to meet it.

One very dominant consideration was the season of the year. If we could not meet our target date we would set ourselves back some six months on the operation which was to follow Kyushu, until the weather again became favorable. The prolongation of the war by six months would have been tragic—financially and in human life. We had to make every conceivable effort to meet the target date of November 1.

I can illustrate a little of the problem: It was essential that we have air bases on Okinawa as quickly as possible. We had about 200 planes on Okinawa in May, operating in a rather primitive fashion. We had over 800 operating there in July, and 2,000 in August. Now, if you consider La Guardia Field in New York and the Gravelly Point Field in Washington, you will find their daily operation of planes comparatively small. I don't know just exactly what it is, but I have been told that La Guardia Field handles about 1,300 a month. That doesn't sound reasonable to me. It may be a larger figure. At Okinawa we were planning to convert a little island six miles wide, without decent harbors, or any other facilities, in a brief period of weeks into a base that would accommodate 3,000 planes before October. We had gotten up to 2,000 planes in August. To do it, we had to get engineers from Europe; we had to get signal troops from Europe, air and ground troops from Europe as rapidly as we could get them out. We sent them through the Suez, and we sent them through the Panama Canal. It was not possible to bring them into the United States without the fatal delay of the Kyushu invasion.

This movement, naturally, was disturbing to the individuals involved, but it was a hard reality of war, of immense importance to our early victory and economy of life and appropriations.

The reconstitution of the European combat divisions for shipment to the States, where each soldier would receive a 30-day furlough before redeployment to the Pacific, delayed the immediate movement of the units to the ports. Therefore, there was a period of about six weeks during which we were able to give the men of long service priority on transportation to the United States. The discharge rate from the European Theater for demobilization, therefore, was much heavier in the first six weeks following the termination of the German war than it could be six weeks later, when the divisions and their supporting army and corps troops were ready to embark. Then the long-service men had to be pushed back into a position of second priority, so that the war in the Pacific could be carried forward according to schedule.

As a result, we had a reaction of apparent satisfaction with the initial demobilization of troops from the European Theater; then when the priority could no longer be given to these men—because the divisions were now coming up to the ports—the reaction was, of course, unfavorable.

A more serious side of that phase of demobilization developed in the Philippines. The troops there had been longer overseas than any others. For example, the 32nd and 41st divisions had gone out to Australia at the very beginning of the war. Of course, there had been tremendous changes in their personnel, but nevertheless, a fair proportion of the old guard was still present in those divisions. On the average, the veterans of the Pacific had much longer service—under jungle hardships—than those in the European Theater.

This meant that when those divisions were screened of their long-service men, they were made almost unfit for combat, since their noncommissioned leadership was stripped out. When we started to demobilize on the basis of 85 points, which was just an interim number to start the demobilization, it struck a tremendously heavy blow to the efficiency of units in the Philippines. The long-service men were naturally the first sergeants, the leaders of the reconnaissance, the heads of the radar units, the commanders of intelligence teams, the platoon sergeants and corporals—the men that make the wheels go, that make a unit dependable in battle. There was a loss of about 80 per cent of our leadership in the screening. I think some of you saw the comment that the first critical score had taken away the first team; the next reduction of the critical point score would carry away the second team. General MacArthur was greatly concerned when we planned to reduce the score to 80 points. He said he could not invade Japan this fall if we made the reduction, that the Kyushu operation would have to wait until the following February or March, an unthinkable delay. So we had to retain the 85 score for the time being, despite the demands in Europe and at home to lower the score.

The same troubles beset the divisions in redeployment from Europe. When the earlier divisions reached the United States, we discovered that some of them had also lost heavily in leadership in the partial demobilization, especially the most seasoned divisions which had gone overseas early in the war. In the process of pre-embarkation screening, General Eisenhower reported that several had lost so much of leadership that they would require at least six months more of training before they would be prepared again for combat. In fact, it got so bad that, as one of them reached the United States, the report came in—I suppose it was a slight exaggeration, but it illustrated the situation—that they were no longer able to cook their food decently. They had lost most of their cooks, their noncoms, their technicians. The division would have to be completely reconstituted. Though this division had been brought home en route to the Pacific, we had to scratch it off the list.

That then was the situation following the collapse of Germany. I would like to go a little further back into this to show you that we started on plans for demobilization in November, 1943. We got them into tentative shape as early as February of 1944. From that time on it was a growing affair, with a constantly increasing number of officers employed, but quite naturally the situation and the conditions varied constantly and revisions had constantly to be made.

The point system was a result of over two years' study. We had a number of statisticians working on it, 30, I think. Also we used a survey system similar to the Gallup Poll: special teams went all over the world in 1943, and again in 1944, sampling soldier opinion by the most scientific method so we could put this thing as nearly as possible, with all of its manifest complications and almost impossible situations, on a solid basis.

We then went into the problem of redeployment and planned, as I have said, to send 17 divisions to the Pacific. We had another string of divisions in Europe tagged as reserve divisions. My own thought, and that of most of my associates, was that these reserve divisions would be released from a reserve status for demobilization long before there was shipping available to bring them back to the United States. But we did not dare release them until we knew how extensive the operations to reduce Japan would have to be. We didn't know exactly what islands we would have to go into. We didn't know whether we would be involved in an extensive campaign in Korea. There were a number of such considerations. We examined each of them, estimated our possible needs, took but a conservative percentage of the maximum requirements, and held the divisions that might be required back, tagged as reserves.

There were 17 going immediately to the Pacific, and 19 in reserve awaiting determination until we could see how the war in Japan would develop. But as I say, our own anticipation was that these last mentioned troops would be released from a reserve status before they could be returned to the United States. It would have been a serious, possibly a fatal, error to demobilize them even if we had been able to bring them home—to demobilize them before we knew what we would finally need to bring the Pacific war to an early and successful termination.

We ran along into the summer, getting straightened out as to the various difficulties and getting well under way in the redeployment to the Pacific. Then the Japanese sued for peace on the 14th of August. Nearly all priorities, about 90 per cent of them, were reversed practically within one hour. The first thing we did, and we did it immediately, was to direct General Eisenhower that from Europe first priority would go to men entitled to be demobilized, the high-score men. The troops then coming up to the ports for transportation to the United States were to be held up. They were composed of the lower-score men en route to the Pacific. By that time, however, 14 divisions had reached the United States and were on 30-day furlough. We had succeeded in demobilizing 450,000 men at the same time that we were involved in redeployment. These discharges had been given between May 10 and August 14.

When the Japanese sued for peace General MacArthur was asked what he now wanted of the 17 divisions scheduled for the Pacific; 14 were in the United States, and two were on the water en route home. He replied that he wanted six with the proportionate special supporting troops. As you know, that was later cut to three, and now this morning, or late last night, a message came in from him releasing another division, the 13th Airborne Division, which was due to sail shortly. The shipment to MacArthur was changed from 17 to 6 divisions, from 6 to 3, and last night from 3 to 2. These two are already on the water and portions of them have landed in the Philippines.

In Europe we now encountered new difficulties. In the redeployment movement there had developed a great concentration of divisions around Rheims. I think they had around eight or nine there, and three or four near LeHavre, the main port of embarkation. When the reversal of priorities took place, the European Theater found itself in a rather impossible situation. The pipe line was full, the ships were loaded or loading, and low-score Pacific troops were in all the staging areas. But the men now suddenly to be given first priority were back in Germany. We had to let them go ahead with the shipment of some of those low-score divisional troops to the United States, but General Eisenhower was directed to move some troops already at or near the ports back into Germany in order to reestablish the priority of long-service men awaiting demobilization. This same sudden termination of the redeployment, as I have explained, found us with 14 divisions plus a great many special troops, in the United States, men of less length of service than those awaiting demobilization in the Pacific and in Europe. That presented a grave complication. Fortunately, at the very start, most all of the men were home on furlough, and that gave us a slight chance to reconstruct the procedure.

First consideration had to be given to the armies in the Pacific. The damaging effect on their morale, if they learned just as they were preparing to embark for the occupation of Japan, that soldiers of much less service were being released in the United States and getting first chance at civilian jobs, while they were being moved up to Japan, would have—well, General MacArthur felt it would have had a demoralizing effect on his troops. In addition, we didn't have the capacity at that time for a tremendous day-after-day demobilization. We were releasing men at the rate, on August 14, of over 4,000 a day. The system was being rapidly built up, but the process of demobilization is rather intricate.

Just to mention one item alone: Each individual must be guaranteed a record which will protect him in the future. In the last war, men were demobilized so hurriedly that many were given records of service so incomplete they are still being corrected. We are trying to give our men all of the data required for their future relationship with the Government, the Veterans' Bureau, their employers, etc. Of course, that is quite a job. There must be numerous checks on each individual of the thousands a day that have to go through separation.

We were, as I said, proceeding at the rate of more than 4,000 men a day on August 14. Today I think the rate is up to 17,000 a day. But, as I mentioned, we had the very serious problem of the men in the United States on the original redeployment schedule and who had far lower point scores than the men still overseas. What should we do with them? The personnel operating the separation installations in the United States were under terrific pressure to work at top speed, but there was a limit to what they could handle. The real trouble was that those who could work accurately at top speeds were usually men of long service who also wished to be discharged The separation center officers were in a very serious dilemma They were being pressed in both directions. We were pressing them to discharge men more rapidly and at the same time we were taking away the only men who could do the discharging

I had organized just as Germany fell, in fact about a week before Germany fell, a special headquarters with General Caffey at its head, with orders to inspect all these installations and see just what was going on and how efficiently and expeditiously the work was being conducted. That investigation brought about a great many changes. It caused me to radio General Eisenhower to return on the next plane 15 brigadier generals of conspicuous combat service with proven administrative ability. We put these men, and others like them, in charge of all the separation centers in the United States, so that returning veterans would be in the hands of veteran leaders who understood their point of view and the services they had rendered.

I might add that we had created, many months ago, one pilot separation center as an experiment, or a laboratory, and started discharging men. It took about 18 days following the system that we had then, much the same system that was used in the last war. The Army Service Forces got their experts to work and cut down the time from 18 days to 44 hours. They cut the paper work, I think, by about 80 per cent. These changes were made at Camp Dix on an experimental basis. Then we began creating the other separation centers after the same pattern. Incidentally, in order to step up the discharges, we have authorized and begun local demobilization. It was very easy to authorize but very difficult to operate, since there must be skilled men to handle the job. It is anticipated nevertheless that we will take care of about 190,000 men by this improvised system. It may be that some of the men discharged this way will not receive quite as complete a processing as the others, but they will have their basic papers in correct form. Their records will be sufficiently accurate to protect their interests in their dealings with the Government in future years. This minimum of processing is, I believe, acceptable in order to speed up the demobilization rate.

There is considerable discussion whether the transportation of men from the theaters is being carried out as rapidly as possible. In the Atlantic, returning ships are all full. During the summer months we ran 30 per cent, you might say, over the Plimsoll mark—30 per cent over what was considered the convenient carrying capacity of the vessels. We can't do that, of course, during the winter months. We converted a great many vessels. We converted the vessels carrying wheat to Europe with fold-up bunks so the ships could carry wheat to Europe and troops back to the United States on the return trip. We converted all cargo vessels to carry some men back for demobilization.

In the Pacific, the situation was different because there the available shipping had to be devoted to movements of large bodies of troops for occupation after the surrender. We have supply vessels now off the harbor of Shanghai ready to go in. They have been lying in Manila Bay for weeks and weeks, loaded and ready to sail to the first Chinese port opened. That was even before the fall of Japan. Our shipping there is earmarked for the movement of troops to Korea, to Japan, and in so far as necessary, to ports on the China Coast. When the occupation of Japan started, General MacArthur could spare

no shipping. Ships that carried men to the occupation returned immediately to the United States for additional troops and for replacements. Shipping that left the Far East up to August 18 sailed with some empty berths. Shipping that started the homeward-bound trip later on and hereafter will arrive full up as to capacity.

As I have previously indicated, one of the most trying complexities of the demobilization problem exists here in the United States where there are large numbers of low-point men anxious for release. I'll speak first about the men of limited service.

We have a great many men in the United States of such limited service availability that they could not be sent overseas. They are employed in maintaining all of the home installations of which there are about 3,000. Fort Myer is one of these installations; Fort Benning, Georgia, is another. We can't walk off these installations and leave the tools on the ground. A great many of them are operating at full capacity and under heavy pressure in connection with the demobilization procedure. Until we can train men to take the places of these limited-service men, we could not let them go. You cannot train men in a day to do many of the more complicated jobs. Also the routine work of the cantonments must be carried on. There is this, another very pertinent factor: These men have a low-point score. If they were released right now, they would block the separation of men of longer service also now in the United States, awaiting demobilization. This is because the capacity for discharging men has not yet reached full development as it will be a little later, by November 1. Until the demobilization capacity for discharge has reached the point where these limited-service low-score men can be processed and released, without blocking, that is, delaying the demobilization of the men of longer service, the limited servicemen must wait their turn, their priority.

We believe that in the near future we will have reached the point in the demobilization when we can release from the service every man for whom we cannot find useful employment. Just what the number will be, I don't recall, but we will not hold any man in the service for whom there is not a useful job in connection with the maintenance of the Army and the process of demobilization. That will mean, incidentally, that some men will be released over here with less service, less credits, than men impatiently awaiting transportation home from the European Theater and from the Pacific. It will be done over the protest of the theater commanders, who have the great problem of maintaining morale in their commands. They are responsible for those armies. They are responsible for their discipline, morale and effectiveness, which means their cheerful compliance with orders, whatever the hardships involved may happen to be. However, I think you will agree with me that, in view of the situation in this country at the present time, the greater fury would be on the home front, if we held men without useful jobs. But it will not be a very pleasing proposition to the theater commanders.

Further, as to the men of limited service: Specifically, we hope that by the late winter we will have reached a stage in carrying out the point system—which is now governing policy and which we must not emasculate unless we want a morale situation almost chaotic to develop—when, in effect, the point system may be relaxed and two years of service will govern. That will mean that men of two years' service will be eligible for demobilization. This would take care of all the limited-service-men problems.

In all of this business of demobilization it would have been much simpler and easier for the War Department to have brought organizations and divisions back and demobilized them, as was done in the old AEF. They had only 2,000,000 men to bring into the United States in 1918. There was no confusing problem of arrested redeployment, and there was only one reinforced regiment—a Regular Regiment—to be left at Koblenz as the force of occupation. Everything else came back home.

Gentlemen, we felt that with the necessity for occupation forces and with the redeployment to the Pacific—demobilization could only be done with reasonable justice on the basis of the individual and not on that of the units. Therefore, the point system.

The theory, stating it on the blueprint basis, has been that we would successively lower the points as transportation and facilities for discharge became available. We had a very strong protest from General Eisenhower and General MacArthur against the lowering from 85 to 80 points. Their reaction was a very simple one to understand, I think. They said they were having a hard enough time returning the men of 85 or more points and if we lowered it again and gave additional men the feeling that they now had a right, a priority, for return before the shipping had cleared the previous men, they would have that many more in a turbulent state of mind. But we felt compelled to go ahead and lower the score, anyway, though we did wait until General MacArthur had landed in Japan, to see if he was to have a heavy fight on his hands.

I sent General Henry, head of the Personnel Division of the War Department General Staff, and General Edwards, the head of the Organization Division of the General Staff, out to Manila to see General MacArthur. We wanted to lower the critical score from 85 to 80. He finally stated that, if we did lower it in this country and in Europe, he would have to lower it in his Army to protect the morale of his troops. He also said that, if he had to lower it from 85 to 80, he would have to call off the operation of November 1 in Kyushu. We sent those officers out from the War Department to go with him personally into this matter. But, even so, we had to wait and delay our lowering the score here until he reached Japan in order not to demoralize his troops. The feeling was that once they had gotten under way and were en route to a new place, Japan—which fixes the soldier's attention, at least for the time being—we could go ahead and accept the hazard of the demoralizing effect on those men that might have points from 80 to 85 and still were engaged in operations. We have proceeded on that basis.

We have found from the mail that comes to us—and I think I receive as much personal mail as do most of you gentlemen, individually (and it is not all light reading, I might say)—that what was needed was more certainty, a more definite schedule for the men as to their future. To meet that requirement, I will say now that we are going down to a critical score for enlisted men of 70 points on October 1 and to 60 points on November 1. That affects a large number of people—somewhere in the neighborhood of 2,000,000.

This information will indicate the time schedule for individuals at least two months ahead.

I repeat: 70 points on October 1 and 60 points on November 1 will be the new score.

It is anticipated that, during this month of September, about 450,000 will be released, about 550,000 in October, and, thereafter, between 700,000 and 800,000 a month, with the facilities that will have been gotten well under way by that time. This rate will be maintained until we reach the point in the spring when we will be forced to determine what forces are to be required for occupation duties, and what men can be brought back for demobilization. Until then we are free to go ahead with the release of men from the Army as rapidly as possible.

Meanwhile, while all this is going on, we are training replacements for the men now overseas, and we are keeping the shipping going to the European Theater and to the Pacific loaded up with the men who are to free the veterans with long records of service.

You must anticipate that once we have gotten into the occupation of Japan a little further, and the troops have been established in various areas and settled down to routine duties,

we are going to get a strong reaction from the long-service men there to come home. The men to replace them must be on the ground, they must be ready to replace the veterans, therefore they are now en route. That is the reason for the continuation of Selective Service and the build-up of volunteer enlistments for which additional legislation is now under consideration in the Congress.

In concluding this discussion, let us look ahead to a target date of July 1, 1946, because that date conveniently relates to the fiscal budget period, and gives us a set time for planning purposes. I say planning purposes because we must do that in preparation for all planning, for the operations in Africa, Italy, France, the Philippines, and so on.

The problem is to determine definitely, as early as possible, the forces we are to maintain overseas, and what personnel is to be required in this country to maintain these overseas forces. I don't believe that this matter will be settled conclusively by July 1 1946, because we probably will not have the terms of the peace treaty by then, and its terms in relation to air forces and similar matters will be unknown. The target date of July 1, 1946, a date that should register a transition from the present fluid situation to one where we should be pretty well cleared in our minds as to just what is required for the occupation duties abroad, what is required to maintain those troops and how much of a force, otherwise, we should have.

The original Pacific estimates involved about 900,000 men, totaling General MacArthur's estimates and those for Alaska and the Aleutians and our troops in China and Burma for the time being.

General Eisenhower's estimate was for approximately 400,000 men, and, to that, you have to add the men here in training to replace those overseas with long service records and those in general maintenance of the Army.

Since then, as you know, there have been changes as the situation developed. General Eisenhower's figure is still at 400,000, and General MacArthur's recent statement that came out in the press involved 200,000 for Japan and Korea. Yesterday evening, we received from him an official statement which included that figure. His statement came in reply to our several queries on the size of the forces he would require once he had some idea of what the problem in Japan would be. His estimate of 200,000 men is for Japan and Korea only, and he anticipates that he will have a Marine division in addition to the 200,000. That figure does not relate, of course, to the Pacific in general—to Hawaii, to the Philippines, to the Aleutians and to Alaska, nor to the troops we may have in China ports.

The estimates for Jan. 1, 1946, from General MacArthur, are 1,400,000, which does not include China and Alaska. That figure will shrink by July 1, to the figure 200,000 which he thinks will handle Japan and Korea. We are not yet clear as to the other Pacific areas—China, Hawaii, Alaska and so on—but that is discussed in daily back-and-forth messages to work out the various deployments.

It is comparatively simple to figure the number of divisions required. It is exceedingly difficult to calculate the numbers required to keep the divisions going, what you have to have at various ports and depots, what you have to maintain at various other places, transit airfields, intermediate points or islands, etc.

There is also another difficult requirement to meet, which has been perplexing to us and to which, I imagine, ordinarily not much thought has been given. We have a tremendous amount of valuable materiel abroad, which we will need for the future. A few weeks ago we were moving that materiel from Europe to the Pacific so that we wouldn't be manufacturing it here and at the same time leaving it in Europe. The preparation of this materiel against tropical climate, the boxing of it alone, was an immense problem. It was made much more difficult by reason of the fact that we were taking engineers out of the European Theater and sending them to the Pacific—personnel who had been engaged in the business of preparing this materiel for shipment.

Now, we have at the present time in the European Theater, 6,000,000 tons of supplies, of a type, generally, we would wish to bring back to the United States. Six million tons is a pretty large amount, and it is scattered in depots and dumps as they existed when the fighting stopped. We have regrouped, of course, as much as we could. We have tremendous depots in the Paris District, which will require until next April to evacuate because that was the railroad and road center for movements into Germany. Depots developed, of course, from Antwerp, south and southeast as we crossed the Rhine. We have all those supplies to handle.

Now, the occupation troops in Germany, east of the Rhine, in Bavaria, are not back in France to handle those depots. We have thus a real problem on our hands. Ordinary labor we can easily get. We have just a little short of a million German prisoners working on these jobs. We have taken a great many French civilians into that work. But at each place we have to have Americans who write the English language, who can keep the records and who are dependable. These supplies will involve a large number of people. General Eisenhower is struggling to see how he can manage this business without delaying the release of men.

On the other side of the world we have between the Solomons, New Guinea and Mindanao some 800,000 tons of supplies which we have so far been unable to clear. We were unable to do that early in the game because, as General MacArthur progressed to the Philippines—and he moved two or three months ahead of schedule—he took all the service troops with him that he needed for that operation. That left all the little tropical bays or harbors, where these supplies had been stocked, without the facilities—either equipment or personnel—to handle the materiel that was ashore. We have had it inspected very carefully and card indexed, so that we know just where and what it is. But the shipping has not been available to move it.

As we got ready for the operation in Kyushu, General MacArthur did take shipping to bring a portion of these supplies forward—LST's and other small vessels—and troops were sent to handle the job. That came at a time when we would have liked to have done something on the China Coast to help Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and General Wedemeyer in their efforts to create a coast port supply and eliminate the very expensive transportation line over the Hump. To add to the difficulties in the Southwest Pacific, there are very few individuals to hire for labor. It is a very scant and very queer population, and conditions are generally primitive. Cranes and the aids that are common to organized ports are lacking. This supply problem will plague us for quite a while yet.

I hope I have covered the demobilization sufficiently, Gentlemen. General Henry, who knows all the details, is prepared to give them to you, and particularly to show you the process involved in demobilizing a man.

I would like to add this: I understand the Military Committee of the House is sending out groups to various separation stations to see the process for themselves. Any groups that you wish to form, I don't care how large or how diverse the points you wish to visit, will be welcome. We will be very glad to arrange for your transportation by air, so that you can go to any one of these areas you wish to see. I would ask that the less you do it on an individual basis, the less difficult it will be to provide air travel We can take small groups practically anywhere that you wish to go, so that you can see exactly what is happening. At first hand you can judge the efficiency of the demobilization system. Please have in mind that the problem extends all around the world; that it involves every conceivable complexity, that our effort has been to protect the rights of the individual, rather than to deal more conveniently with units, and that the demobilization has no relation whatsoever with the requirements of the postwar Army.

DISCHARGE POLICY OF THE NAVY

Official Views on Demobilization of Personnel

(Statement by Vice Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, Chief of Naval Personnel, before the Senate Military Affairs and Naval Affairs committees, Sept. 17, 1945.)

The Navy's announced goal on demobilization is as follows:

To demobilize approximately 3,000,000 men between now and Sept. 1, 1946, in order to be down by that date to a strength of approximately 500,000 enlisted men and 50,000 officers.

In other words, it is the Navy's announced intention to release in the course of less than one year six out of every seven men in the Navy which it has taken five years to build up and deploy throughout the world.

The timetable supporting this goal calls for the release of 764,000 men and 75,000 officers by Christmas. Of this total, approximately 700,000 are immediately eligible for discharge under the scores already announced, in order to get them into the pipe line now.

In connection with this goal and the timetable supporting it, I want to point out several facts. The first is that this is the initial goal, announced on August 27. This was only 12 days after the Japanese acceptance of the Potsdam terms and 6 days before V-J Day. It should be considered the minimum schedule which we intend to meet.

Timetable for Demobilization

The present strength of the Navy is 3,415,000. The rate of demobilization is as follows:

End of Month	*Officers Released*	*Officers Remaining**	*Enlisted Released*	*Enlisted Remaining**
1945				
September	11,200	313,700	121,000	2,970,000
October	16,100	298,700	171,000	2,820,000
November	21,100	278,700	221,000	2,620,000
December	26,000	253,800	251,000	2,390,000
1946				
January	25,900	229,000	257,300	2,153,700
February	25,900	204,200	257,300	1,917,400
March	25,900	179,400	257,300	1,681,000
April	25,900	154,600	257,300	1,444,800
May	25,900	129,800	257,300	1,208,500
June	25,900	105,000	257,300	972,200
July	25,900	80,300	257,300	735,900
August	23,700	57,800	256,900	500,000

*Residual figures include estimated input.

The second is that this whole question is, and will continue to be, under active review. If we find, as the military commitments of the Navy become clearer and as the schedule for return and laying up of ships becomes firmed up, that the speed with which these men are released can possibly be increased, we will increase it. Those in the Navy who are more responsible than I for the military and logistic operations will be appearing before the Naval Affairs Committees of the Congress to discuss this question.

There are three major factors which determine speed with which men may be released from the Navy. The first, and it must be the controlling factor, is the military needs of the Navy. The second is transportation. The third is the facilities to carry out the release process.

The third of these—the facilities—are not now, and we do not expect them to become, a limiting factor.

The second of these—the availability of transportation—may very possibly become a limiting factor in the future. It is not a factor which has limited our thinking in establishing this initial goal.

The first factor—the needs of the Navy—is controlling, and I am sure you will agree that we have a clear-cut responsibility not to strip our ships and our bases—nor those functions here at home which support them—so fast that efficient operation of the Navy suffers. I wish to make it clear that I am not here indicating any desire or intent to schedule demobilization to fit any luxurious ideas or to fit our convenience. I am speaking of the minimum requirements if the Navy's ships and bases are to be laid up or rolled up in a reasonably efficient manner and if the fleet is to be maintained to meet commitments in the Pacific.

In this connection I want to point out several basic differences between the Army's problem and the Navy's in this respect. A ship is not like a battalion of infantry—when the shooting stops the men in the Army unit become, except for occupational requirements, excess. When the shooting stops, most of the men on a ship do not become excess until such time as the ship has been returned to a safe and permanent harbor. The ship must continue to operate—it is still subject to all the perils of the sea and, in fact, to all the hazards except those of actual combat. Further, many ships are not released from operational requirements at all. Sizable units of the Navy must be maintained in the Pacific during the occupation of Japan, and particularly during the interim period through which we are now passing. Those ships which are not released from operational requirements must be operated, and the complicated gear and machinery which comprise a naval vessel must continue to function and to be maintained. A ship is a unit. Every man in a ship has his part to play. The ship can no more operate without its cooks than it can without its captain. A diminished but still sizable crew of all the types and rates of men on a ship must be maintained. Likewise, ships require bases to support them. These bases, even if transportation would permit it, cannot vanish into thin air. They must be maintained—on as reduced a basis as possible but nonetheless maintained—until the ships which they serve have departed from the area.

I am positive that none of us wants to see any repetition of the experiences after the last war when ships coming into port were stripped so fast that they could not even be properly laid up.

I have pointed out these difficulties not in order to make the point that the Navy should not demobilize as rapidly as possible. I make them for the purpose of making plain that these basic facts of naval life do make it impossible to demobilize the entire Navy overnight.

I have already stated, and I repeat, that these requirements

are being examined in the most realistic light. If they will with safety permit us to revise our goal we will do so.

The basic method selected to determine the order of release of individuals from the Navy is, as you all know, the point system or formula. I will cover later the reasons why this particular formula was chosen. Its major provisions are:

One-half point for each month of active service since Sept. 1, 1939;

One-half point for each year of age;

An additional credit of one-quarter point for each month of active duty outside the United States since Sept. 1, 1939; and

Ten points for a state of dependency existing as of Aug. 15, 1945.

For example, a man is 30 years old, for which he receives 15 points; has served in the Navy for 36 months, for which he receives 18 points; has served overseas for 24 months, for which he receives 6 points; and has dependents, for which he receives 10 points. This will give him a total of 49 points, 5 more than needed for his release.

This formula covers all Reserve personnel, inductees, and those enlisted men serving under expired enlistments.

The present critical scores—that is, the number of points computed on the above formula which entitle personnel to discharge—are:

Male enlisted personnel	44
Male officer personnel	49
Female enlisted personnel	29
Female officers	35

In addition, separate critical scores have been established for certain classes as follows, depending upon the greater or lesser demands for the services of these particular groups:

Male doctors	60
Female doctors	35
Male pharmacists and members of the Hospital Corps	49
Female members of the Hospital Corps	35
Nurses	35
Aviators (in flight status)	44

In addition, personnel who have been awarded one of the top medals for combat are entitled to release without regard to the number of points if they so desire.

Because of the critical need for their services, certain limited classes of personnel are not eligible for release under this formula. These classes consist of specialists, as shore patrol specialists, IBM accounting machine specialists, transportation specialists, disbursing storekeepers, classification specialists, mail specialists, specialists trained in military government duties, and oriental languages. In total, these groups who are not eligible for release under the formula do not exceed 39,000, or a fraction over 1 per cent of the Navy. All are specialists of a type critically needed in connection with occupation duties or the processes of demobilization itself with the exception of mailmen, who are needed in the interest of the welfare of the other men who must remain in the service.

All personnel who are eligible for release under the formula have the opportunity of requesting retention on active duty if they so desire. To the extent that their services are required, they will be so retained upon their request; and will, in particular, be retained if they desire transfer to the Regular Navy.

In order to protect the safety and efficiency of the Navy's ships and establishments, any person eligible for release under the formula may be retained by his commanding officer for a period not to exceed 120 days beyond the date on which he becomes eligible. Instructions to the service have been issued in order to make sure that personnel so retained are in fact necessary from the standpoint of military necessity, and these instructions make it clear that this term is not a synonym for convenience. A monthly report of all such personnel retained, together with a statement of the efforts which have been made to find or train another individual to release him, must be forwarded to the superior command, such as the type of area commander, the district commandant, or the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Enlisted men cannot be longer retained. In extreme cases, the commanding officer can request BuPers to hold an officer beyond the 120 days. These will be decided individually, under a policy which emphasizes the right of the officer to return home.

Outside of the point system there are only two important avenues of release from the service. These are:

1. Cases of extreme personal hardship. Personnel whose retention in the service will result in undue or severe personal hardship beyond that applying to others may apply for release regardless of their points, and each case is considered on its own individual merits.

2. Those normal types of release which have been long established and which antedate the establishment of the point formula. These include releases for disciplinary reasons, releases for medical reasons, the release of personnel in a limited service category as a result of service-incurred disabilities, and the release of enlisted men who are over the age of 42.

The method just outlined and the point system which it contains was selected as that which in the Navy's judgment best met these requirements:

1. Equity and fairness to the individuals concerned.

2. That which was possible in the light of the Navy's military requirements.

3. That which was administratively possible and which therefore could in fact be used.

The factors in the point formula are those which conscience demands. In deciding upon them, all the available evidence was considered, including traditional American policy on military service, national policy as expressed through the medium of Selective Service, the desires of the men themselves as expressed through the Army polls on the subject (the results of which were available to us), and the results of circularization of the proposals within the naval service.

I believe that these factors—age, length of service, overseas service, and dependency—so clearly comprise the basic equities that I see no need to discuss each of them in detail here. From all the comments which we have received—some of which are very helpful—we have seen no significant body of responsible comment which suggests that any of these factors should be eliminated or which suggests that any of them should be reduced. The great mass of all such comment suggests rather that the weight allowed one or more of these same elements should be *increased*. I would like to take just a minute or two to talk about these many suggestions which are being received from men in the service, from their families, and from the general public.

We fully realize that no demobilization formula or system which could be devised would satisfy everyone. A large majority of those in military service have a natural and proper desire to go home. We realize that many people feel very sincerely that their special class or their special group, or they as individuals, have some superior claim to earlier return to civilian life. We also realize that it is only natural and proper that they express their views and their feelings to us, to members of Congress, to their families and in other ways. Such expressions and suggestions cause no ill will or irritation insofar as we are concerned. However, I feel I should point out to this Committee the sober fact that the Navy's responsibility is to its total personnel and not to any specific group or individual therein; and remind us all of the fundamental fact that we cannot please everybody under any system.

Taking it over all, the comments and suggestions we receive break down into two major types:

1. Those which suggest that the point system be reworked to allow greater credit for one or another of the factors which it already contains.

2. Those which request or suggest release of personnel in

various special categories completely outside the point system.

With respect to the first of these types, the following facts about how you establish a point system should be borne in mind:

You start with the number of personnel who, from the standpoint of military requirements, can be released. You also start with certain basic factors based on equity which should determine who goes home and who stays. You then establish a cutting score based on these factors, which comes out to the number you can afford to let go. When you have to move rapidly (as we did after V-J Day) you may not have every piece of precise information you would like to have to support the number whom you say you can let go. You do the best you can, and you bite just as deep as you dare. Having taken these steps, you cannot then increase the weight given to one factor, such as age, or dependency, or length of service, without doing it *at the expense* of one of the other factors. In other words, if you let 10,000 more people go by increasing the weight of, say, dependency or age, you must let 10,000 less people go who would be eligible by reason of length of service or overseas service. There is only so much stew in the pot and until you put more in the pot you cannot let *more* people go under one factor without *reducing* the number who can go under one of the others.

While I have no desire to claim 100 per cent perfection for the balance between these basic factors which we have achieved in the Navy's point system, I must in all candor say that it is the best plan we have been able to attain and that we have not seen any proposals which, *when viewed in the light of the interests of all the Navy's personnel,* would be a sufficiently great improvement to justify slowing down the machinery in order to start over.

I have every sympathy for the older men who believe that age should count more; I have the same sympathy for the very young man who believes that age should count less. I have sincere sympathy for the man with a large number of dependents who believes that dependency should count more; I must also sympathize with the young, single man who believes that dependency should not count at all and that his length of service should entitle him to go home. I also have a great deal of sincere sympathy for those who suggest certain other specific reasons for release, which I shall discuss in a moment.

I am confident that the right answer to this whole question is not to vary the weight allowed the various factors. It is instead to increase to the maximum extent possible the total number who can be released. This, as I have indicated earlier, we are determined to do to the maximum extent possible.

With respect to the second major type of suggestions—those which propose letting various groups or classes of people go outside the point system—I should like only to say the following:

We feel a strong responsibility, not only to the general public but more particularly to the men themselves who are in the service, to make the point system *in fact* the major element which determines when they go home. If the point system is fair, it should be the primary method of release. I am sure you all agree that we should not publicly set up this system at the front door and then vitiate its effect by draining off people through the back door—thus preventing lowering of the point scores in the future.

I am sure I do not need to labor this point—the principle is, I believe, clear that we must make whatever point formula is agreed upon the major means of exit from the service. If we drain off personnel from the service through numerous other channels, we run the risk of not having a *system* but demobilizing on a basis of pure expediency. This policy of reliance primarily upon the point system will necessarily require the retention and reassignment of some men to jobs which they will consider beneath their skills. It will probably involve the retention of some individuals who will feel that they are not usefully employed pending their reassignment. It is our conviction that these are risks which we must take in order to avoid demobilization on a basis of convenience instead of equity. Only when the practical factors of expense and usability of the particular personnel in question become overwhelmingly clear, and where the release of the individual does **not** penalize someone else, do we intend to depart from this policy. The only major exception to date is that of the aviation cadets, some of whom are being released to inactive duty because—

(a) Their services *as aviators* are not required to relieve other higher-point men, since aviators are already being released under an accelerated score.

(b) The training program is of 18 months' duration and is very expensive.

(c) The training itself is hazardous and is not justified in view of the cessation of combat, except for those who will remain to give long periods of service after their training.

I would like to discuss specifically a few of the most common questions which we receive.

(1) Why does the Navy's formula give a flat rather than a staggered allowance for dependency?

Dependency upon an individual takes many forms, and its effect is not limited by reason of the fact that it is created by one or another type of dependents. This was recognized by Congress in the enactment of the Selective Service Act and in laws relating to dependents' allowances. Further, it is necessary throughout the process of demobilization to make determinations and computations on the simplest possible basis, in order to avoid bogging down the whole process. After careful study we came to the conclusion that it was better to grant a simple flat allowance for dependency in the interests of everybody and to consider the relatively few cases of extreme hardship arising from an unusual degree of dependency as individual cases under hardship provisions.

2. Why do we not release personnel over a certain age automatically regardless of points?

Many months prior to the end of the war and the establishment of the demobilization system, the Navy established a policy of releasing enlisted men over 42 years of age who so wished. This was done for two reasons—

(a) We wanted to keep the Navy young in age as a practical military matter.

(b) We felt that men beyond this age could be properly replaced by younger men.

When we established our demobilization formula we included age as one of the basic factors. (This is one of the essential differences between the Army's demobilization formula and our own.) Since it is so included in the demobilization formula, we feel that to automatically release men of lower ages outside the formula would give an inordinate weight to the factor of age and without relating it to length of service, dependency, and the other factors.

3. Why does not the Navy give credit for combat stars?

The use of combat stars—signifying presence of a man in a particular engagement—is not as well suited to naval warfare as it is to ground warfare. A battle or operation at sea may take place over a wide area. Personnel present on ships within the area would receive credit to exactly the same extent as those directly engaged in major combat action. Further, a considerable amount of the most gallant action on the part of naval men may take place completely outside of engagements recognized by combat stars. For instance, personnel in the Armed Guard groups on the hazardous runs during the sub menace may never have participated in a recognized or designated engagement. I know boys who have twice had their ships sunk and who wear no combat stars. Personnel on a destroyer under Kamikaze attack may likewise not have participated in a recognized engagement. Men in these and many other hazardous assignments would be penalized unfairly if combat stars were a basic element in the point formula.

THE NAVY AND FUTURE SECURITY

Importance of Sea, Air Control Despite Atomic Bomb

(Text of testimony of Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal before the House Naval Affairs Committee, September 19, 1945.)

House Concurrent Resolution 80, on which you have asked me to testify this morning, would, if adopted, "determine the size of the immediate postwar Navy, giving due consideration to the security of the United States and its Territories and insular possessions, the protection of our commerce, and the necessity for co-operating with other world powers in the maintenance of peace."

Why should we maintain any Navy after this war? There are two fundamental reasons.

First, the outstanding lesson of the past quarter century is that the means to wage war must be in the hands of those who hate war. The United States should remain strong.

Second, the Navy is a major component of that strength. In each of the past two wars, our enemies failed to control the seas—and they were defeated. In the future, as in the past, the key to victory and to the freedom of this country will be in the control of the seas and of the skies above them. Attacks upon us or attacks by us must cross on, over or under the sea. That fact is an accident of geography which you can confirm by any map. No enemy can reach us without coming across the sea. We cannot reach or defeat an aggressor without crossing the sea. Therefore, control of the ocean and of the air over it is the key to our own security. It is also the key to our ability to participate as a member of a world organization in the suppression of aggression wherever it may occur.

The control of the sea and of the air above it is the mission of the United States Navy—and the Navy will continue to discharge that mission with whatever weapons are most effective.

I think these two reasons—the importance of the United States remaining strong and the importance of control of the sea—are adequate justification for continuation of a Navy.

Do the atom bomb and rocket bomb end the need for navies as we now know them? That question was posed by your chairman ten days ago when he announced his intention to introduce House Concurrent Resolution 80. There are two answers to the question of the future of the Navy since the discovery of the atomic bomb, rocket propulsion, guided missiles, etc.

One of those answers is a long-term speculation looking into the distant future. No one knows—and I mean *knows* rather than *guesses*—the ultimate effect of atomic power and rocket propulsion on navies as we now conceive them. That answer will be a long time in evolving and it does not exist now except in terms of rather rarefied speculation.

The Navy is alert to the possible long-term effects of atomic power both as an explosive and as a propellant. The Under Secretary, Mr. Gates, has already disclosed our intention to adapt the atomic bomb to carrier-based planes. We have other lines of development and of counter measure which we intend to explore. I would be glad to arrange for an informal, off-the-record presentation for you of some of the theories being expounded by civilian physicists.

Whatever the net result of all these speculations may be, I want to repeat what I have said before about the mission of the Navy. The mission of the United States Navy is to control the seas which are important to our security *by whatever weapons are most effective.* I do not know what the Navy of the distant future will look like, but I do know what its mission will be, and the Navy's record in developing radar, guided missiles, proximity fuses and in helping with the atomic bomb gives Congress assurance that the mission will be discharged with effective weapons. In that connection, I congratulate you on

—U. S. Marine Corps

SECRETARY FORRESTAL WATCHING FLEET IN ACTION
"Control of the ocean and the air over it is the key to our own security"

your recognition in Section 7 of the resolution of the importance of research.

So much for the long-term answer to the possible effects of the atomic bomb. There is also a short-term answer.

Does the atomic bomb *immediately* destroy the usefulness of all navies now in existence? It does not. In the first place, the atomic bomb, although immensely destructive, is still a bomb, requiring land or carrier-based planes to deliver it. Moreover, the best defense against it is intercepting air power. In the second place, the limitations and uncertainties which at this stage of its development surround the atomic bomb are such that, if we were to give away our fleet and rely wholly on the bomb, we would lose control of the sea. I would like to repeat that statement. If we were to give away our fleet today and rely wholly on the atomic bomb, we would lose control of the sea. In my opinion, therefore, there is no doubt about the necessity for the continuation now of a modern Navy, its carrier forces, its surface and submarine forces, and its amphibious arm capable of taking and holding beachheads.

What size should the Navy be?

The answer to that question rests with Congress, not with the Navy, and this resolution is a proposed answer. We are appearing here today as advisers—the naval officers are professional advisers—to Congress on that question.

We have endeavored, with the information now available, to estimate the naval strength that is required to support the national policy as we understand it. In order to do this, we have had to make certain assumptions about the tasks which the nation will call upon the Navy to discharge in conjunction with the Army. They are three.

The first one we are quite sure of, the security of the continental United States and its overseas possessions.



—U. S. Navy

PACIFIC PUNCH
"Strength is relative"

The second, which derives from the Act of Chapultepec and from the Monroe Doctrine, is the security of the Western Hemisphere.

The third assumption—which is the least well defined—relates to the commitments of the United States to preserve the peace of the world.

How strong should the Navy be to enable the nation to discharge these three commitments? That question can never be answered with finality. Strength is relative. Accordingly, the size of the Navy must vary from time to time in direct ratio with what you might call the blood pressure of the international community.

Quite obviously we do not need to keep in full commission during the period now at hand the enormous naval might which we accumulated in order to win this war. On the other hand, we might conceivably wish at some time in the future to muster almost our full naval strength. Therefore, we suggest that the postwar Navy be divided into three components: an active fleet, a ready reserve, and a laid-up reserve.

By the "active fleet," we mean vessels fully commissioned and with full peacetime crews. By the "ready reserve" we mean relatively few vessels that will be in commission with only nucleus crews—perhaps about a third of the peacetime total; they will be used to train midshipmen and naval reservists and will be available for active service in about thirty days. The "laid-up reserve," comprising 60 per cent of the total fleet, would be ships wholly out of commission, tied up and with only caretaker crews aboard.

The postwar active fleet would consist of approximately 300 major combatant ships, or about 28 per cent of the total fleet—together with auxiliary craft in proportion. Therefore, the number of fully commissioned major combatant ships in our proposed postwar active fleet would be numerically smaller than our prewar fleet of December, 1941. However, it would be faster and incomparably stronger in fire power and aviation. It would be augmented by many amphibious craft and other special types developed during the war. Hence, the postwar active fleet will require more men and more logistic support.

Approximately 100 additional major combatant ships would be in the ready reserve, that is, in reduced commission.

By types, the active fleet and ready reserve would be approximately as follows: 11 battleships; 15 aircraft carriers, including two 45,000-ton carriers; 21 escort carriers; 20 heavy and large cruisers; 29 light cruisers; 176 destroyers; 40 destroyer escorts, and 90 submarines, plus tenders, mine, patrol, service, and amphibious craft. All the battleships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines listed here are new ships, completed since our defense program started in 1940.

What should we do with the balance of our Navy? We suggest that a new element be introduced into our system of national preparedness—the laid-up reserve fleet of about 700 major combatant ships, plus required auxiliaries, securely preserved and ready on short notice to join the first-line battle fleet.

The laid-up reserve would include 7 old battleships; 22 carriers, all built since 1940; 58 escort carriers, all new since 1940; 14 heavy cruisers; 19 light cruisers; 191 destroyers; 256 destroyer escorts; 110 submarines; as well as mine, patrol, service, and amphibious forces. These figures for the laid-up reserve, plus those I have given you for the active fleet, add to the totals shown in Section 11 of the resolution before you.

The existence of a laid-up reserve would give the nation the ability to flex its strength quickly if we again enter a period, like 1930-41, of disturbed world conditions. This laid-up reserve is cheap insurance. It is estimated that the yearly preservation cost will amount to only one tenth of 1 per cent of the original cost of the ships.

We hope that all the ships earmarked for the laid-up reserve

will be out of commission by Sept. 1, 1946. However, we are using some combatant ships, notably CVE's, to bring men home from the Pacific, a fact which may delay the laying up of these vessels, and also, incidentally, mean the delayed demobilization of some Navy personnel, but a delay which I am sure you will agree is in a good cause, accelerating the homecoming of many fighting men who have been in the Pacific for many long months and years.

The number of combatant ships which I have listed here and which is contained in the concurrent resolution has been represented as being almost our full wartime strength. It also has been represented as being smaller than our fleet at the time of Pearl Harbor. It is both. The *active* fleet which we propose for the period immediately after the war is about the numerical size of our fleet before the war but measurably stronger. On the other hand, if world conditions deteriorated so that the *reserve* vessels must be called to active duty, the nation would have a Navy as big as our wartime aggregation of power. Between these two extremes—a prewar fleet and a wartime fleet—the nation should be able to vary its strength from time to time as world conditions require.

I have not discussed the air power, the bases, or the personnel which would be necessary to complement the surface vessels specifically set forth in Section I of the concurrent resolution. The resolution speaks only of "sufficient aircraft," "adequate facilities," and "sufficient personnel." These subjects will be dealt with by officers who will testify later.

Without going into detail, I can say that we estimate that the Navy outlined herein, with an adequate air arm but excluding the Marine Corps, can be manned with between 500,000 and 600,000 officers and men, of which not more than 40,000, or about 7 per cent, would be assigned to the laid-up reserve. The strength of the Marine Corps, as you know, is fixed at one fifth of the strength of the Navy.

The bases which we suggest outside the limits of the United States need not be catalogued here, except to say that we propose *major* bases at Kodiak and Adak in the Aleutians; Hawaii; Balboa in the Canal Zone; Guam, Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas; the Bonin-Volcano Islands; perhaps the Ryukyus; Manus in the Admiralties (if Australia will grant us the right to a base there), and the Philippines. In the Atlantic we suggest major installations at Argentia in Newfoundland, Bermuda, San Juan, Guantanamo Bay, Coco Solo and Trinidad.

I should like to say just a word at this point about the extreme importance of air power to the Navy. We estimate that something less than 12,000 planes—about 8,000 of them in full active duty status—will be necessary in order to have an adequate postwar Navy. The concurrent resolution before you does not specifically mention the air strength of the postwar Navy and I believe it would be unwise to try to fix a numerical ceiling on the Navy's air strength. I hope this omission will not be understood as any derogation of air power. The carrier task forces of this war have been the spearhead of our attack, both against the Japanese Empire and against the submarine packs in the Atlantic. These carrier task forces are a unique creation of the United States and are one of the most powerful forces in existence in the world today. They have a remarkable mobility and an enormous reach. In my judgment, these great carrier task forces, backed by the surface power of the fleet and by the amphibious striking force of the Marine Corps, constitute an all-purpose weapon which the United States, if Congress sees fit, can put at the disposal of an international organization for the maintenance of peace.

Before closing, I should like to digress to touch on one more subject which I realize is not an appropriate one for inclusion in this concurrent resolution, but which I believe cannot be too often stressed nor too much studied by the Congress. In my opinion, the Congress should insist that the administrative

—U. S. Navy

FIGHTER PATTERN
"Unwise to fix a numerical ceiling"

agencies of the Government, particularly the War, Navy, and State Departments, keep the organization plans that were found necessary to win this war constantly under review, seeing that they exist not merely in documents, but that they are living and animate things. I mean by that that we should have at all times the organization charts for our industrial mobilization—for the creation of the War Production Board, of the War Manpower Commission, and of similar necessary agencies. Some division of Government should endeavor to know through constant contact with business and industry who are the men—the executives—who should staff such an organization. Just as we have practice exercises of the fleet and maneuvers of the Army, so there should be annual or semiannual checks on the up-to-dateness of our machinery for making war.

All this sounds as if I did not have confidence in the world organizations for peace. I have. But that confidence can only be justified if, while these organizations are in the process of transfer from paper to living reality, all the world knows that the United States will not tolerate the disorder and the destruction of war being let loose again upon the world.

In summation, I should like to reiterate four points.

First, this nation can be secure and can discharge its international obligations only if it controls certain strategic ocean areas.

Second, this control is the mission of the Navy.

Third, that control is today firmly in the hands of the Navy as we know it: surface and submarine forces, amphibious forces, and great carrier striking forces which we believe will be capable of delivering atomic bomb attacks.

Fourth, in the future the Navy's weapons will certainly change but its mission—the control of the seas and the skies above them—will neither change nor decrease in importance.

Washington Whispers

Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

Fight Over Intelligence Agency . . . Why Rationing Stays on Meat . . . British Fear of Our Trustee Plan

Commerce Secretary Wallace's reorganization plans are regarded as his first test with Congress since his confirmation. His plans call for more employes, more money, more power. Congress once displayed coolness toward giving him any added authority.

★ ★ ★

Transfer of Office of Strategic Services to the State Department will not end the dispute over a postwar intelligence service. Backstage maneuvers can be expected: (1) for an independent service, and (2) to give control of intelligence functions back to the Army's G-2, and the Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence.

★ ★ ★

Now that OSS is abolished, it can be told that the Federal Bureau of Investigation once enrolled an agent in an OSS training school to find out what the agency did. The secrecy rule apparently extended to Government departments as well as to the public.

★ ★ ★

State Department policy of taking over more and more operating functions runs contrary to Secretary Hull's idea that State should be only a policy-making department. The Department now has OSS, Office of War Information, and is reaching for Foreign Economic Administration. State also wants a voice in world loans.

★ ★ ★

End of meat rationing is being held up in the Department of Agriculture, where some officials fear that, if they lift rationing now, they may be embarrassed next spring by having to restore it. The point is made that all meat apparently can be sold at ceiling prices now, which would discourage packers from storing some of this year's slaughter until next spring.

★ ★ ★

A plan to create a scientific research section for the Army and Navy is being held up in the Senate by White House pressure. An alternative plan to set up an independent agency is being suggested. Army-Navy oppose an independent agency on the ground that it might discourage the use of non-Government scientists in research work.

★ ★ ★

Scientists who worked on the atomic bomb can be expected to oppose future control and supervision of atomic research by the Army or Navy. They fear that too much secrecy would surround the project and hinder progress.

★ ★ ★

Britain is somewhat embarrassed over the U. S. plan for joint trusteeships of colonies. The policy might provide a precedent for changing the basis of the British mandate in Palestine and British control of Hong Kong.

★ ★ ★

Settlement of the British sterling debt, which U. S. insists upon before discussing dollar credits to Britain, is complicated by the fact that holders of sterling balances are not inclined to scale down debts. India, for example, wants to turn sterling into dollars so that industrialization can be speeded. The same situation prevails to a lesser extent in Australia.

★ ★ ★

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower is being mentioned for Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization, which is being planned by a Preparatory Commission meeting in London. General Eisenhower is reported by civilian officials back from Germany to be the ablest United States diplomat abroad.

★ ★ ★

War Production Board is trying to complete its work before the end of the year. If this goal is reached, remaining WPB functions will be transferred to the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, to be supervised by Robert Nathan as Deputy Director of Reconversion.

★ ★ ★

The Allied Control Council for Germany is scheduled to have a detailed inventory of existing German industry completed by February 1. After that time, final decisions on what industries are to be removed by France, Belgium and the Netherlands are expected to be made.

★ ★ ★

Marshal Stalin is banking on the desire of American businessmen for Russian orders to put over his request for a United States loan. That is why he took pains to lay his case before a group of business-minded Congressmen.

★ ★ ★

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes is finding that it is almost impossible to make peace settlements one by one. He thought terms for Italy would be rather simple, but now discovers that the Italian settlement involves the Balkans, balance of power in the Mediterranean, the future of Africa and a host of other world issues.

★ ★ ★

Some shipping officials say privately that they don't think the Maritime Commission can sell more than 200 surplus ships to foreign buyers, although 3,500 ships may be surplus. Reason is that even at 50 per cent of prewar prices, U. S. ships still are too expensive.

★ ★ ★

One trouble with the sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London is language difficulties. Messrs. Bevin and Byrnes speak only English; Molotov speaks only Russian; Bidault speaks only French. That takes a lot of translating.



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

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U.S. NAVY AT WAR

Final Official Repor

by

FLEET ADMIRAL
ERNEST J. KING

Commander in Chief,
United States Fleet,
and Chief of Naval Operations

☆ ☆ ☆

Covering the Period
March 1, 1945, to October 1, 1945

Compliments of

THE United States NEWS



FLEET ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ

Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, signs the formal instrument of Japanese surrender as representative for the United States.

UNITED STATES NAVY AT WAR

Final Official Report
to the Secretary of the Navy

Covering the period March 1, 1945, to October 1, 1945

by

FLEET ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING

Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
and Chief of Naval Operations

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On 1 March of this year I presented to you my second annual report of the progress of our naval operations and the expansion of our naval establishment during the preceding year.

Since the terminal date of my second report major hostilities on all fronts have terminated victoriously for the nations allied against the Axis powers, and I transmit to you herewith my third and final report of operations of the United States Navy in World War II. This report covers the period 1 March 1945 to 1 October 1945.

The Navy built and manned by the united efforts of this country continued to carry the action to the enemy, engaged him by sea and air, maintained control of the essential lanes of sea communication and transported men and supplies over all oceans to all theaters. The significant role of amphibious operations in this war was strikingly portrayed in the capture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, which were the outstanding operations of this type during the last months of the war. They exemplify the teamwork of all services which brought victory on both the European and Pacific fronts.

For the officers and men of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, I am happy to report, at the end of the war, that the missions and tasks assigned all of them, singly and collectively, have been successfully accomplished.

Ernest J. King

Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
and Chief of Naval Operations

The Honorable James Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.

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I—*Introduction*

My two previous reports carried to 1 March 1945 the account of the development of our naval strength and the participation of the United States Navy in combat operations. The present report is intended primarily to cover the period of the succeeding seven months, during which Germany surrendered and the war with Japan came to an end. This being my last report, however, I am including herein my considered general comment and observations on the war as a whole.

The major strategic decision of the war provided first for the defeat of Germany and then for the defeat of Japan. Both of these tasks have now been accomplished and we can view in clearer perspective the two major campaigns which led to victory. The contrast between them is at once apparent. The war in Europe was primarily a ground and air war with naval support, while the war in the Pacific was primarily a naval war with ground and air support.

In the European war, sea power was an essential factor because of the necessity of transporting our entire military effort across the Atlantic and supporting it there. Without command of the sea, this could not have been done. Nevertheless, the surrender of the land, sea and air forces of the German Reich on 8 May 1945 was the direct result of the application of air power over land and the power of the Allied ground forces.

In the Pacific war, the power of our ground and strategic air forces, like sea power in the Atlantic, was an essential factor. By contrast with Germany, however, Japan's armies were intact and undefeated and her air forces only weakened when she surrendered, but her navy had been destroyed and her merchant fleet had been fatally crippled. Dependent upon imported food and raw materials and relying upon sea transport to supply her armies at home and overseas, Japan lost the war because she lost command of the sea, and in doing so lost—to us—the island bases from which her factories and cities could be destroyed by air.

From the earliest days of the war our submarines, operating offensively in the farthest reaches of the Pacific, exacted a heavy toll of Japanese shipping. At a conservative estimate, they sank, in addition to many combatant ships, nearly two thirds of the merchant shipping which Japan lost during the war.

Our surface forces—fast task forces composed of aircraft carriers, fast battleships, cruisers, and destroyers—carried the war to the enemy homeland and destroyed impressive numbers of naval vessels and merchant ships. Our amphibious forces, operating initially behind air offensives and under air cover launched from carriers, seized the island bases which made possible the achievements of land-based aircraft in cutting enemy lines of communications and in carrying devastation to the Japanese home islands.

Thus our sea power separated the enemy from vital resources on the Asiatic mainland and in the islands which he had seized early in the war, and furnished us the bases essential to the operations of shore-based aircraft from which the atomic bombs finally were despatched, and on which troops and supplies were being massed for the invasion of Kyushu and of Honshu. The defeat of Japan was directly due to our overwhelming power at sea.

The destruction of the Japanese Navy followed the Nelsonian doctrine that naval victory should be followed up until the enemy fleet is annihilated. Of 12 battleships, 11 were sunk; of 26 carriers, 20 were sunk; of 43 cruisers, 38 were destroyed; and so on throughout the various types of ships, which collectively constituted a fleet considerably larger than ours was before the war began. The few ships that remained afloat were for the most part so heavily damaged as to be of no military value.

In striking contrast is the record of our ships. Although 2 old battleships were lost at Pearl Harbor, 8 new battleships have since joined the fleet. Against 5 aircraft carriers and 6 escort carriers lost, we completed 27 carriers and 110 escort carriers. While we lost 10 cruisers, 48 new cruisers have been commissioned. We lost 52 submarines and built 203. The capacity of the United States to build warships, auxiliary ships and merchant ships, while supporting our forces and our allies all over the world, exceeded all former records and surpassed our most sanguine hopes. It proved to be a vital component of that sea power which Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz has well defined in the following words:

> "Sea power is not a limited term. It includes many weapons and many techniques. Sea power means more than the combatant ships and aircraft, the amphibious forces and the merchant marine. It includes also the port facilities of New York and California; the bases in Guam and in Kansas; the factories which are the capital plant of war; and the farms which are the producers of supplies. All these are elements of sea power. Futhermore, sea power is not limited to materials and equipment. It includes the functioning organization which has directed its use in the war. In the Pacific we have been able to use our naval power effectively because we have been organized along sound lines. The present organization of our Navy Department has permitted decisions to be made effectively. It has allowed great flexibility. In each operation we were able to apply our force at the time and place where it would be most damaging to the enemy."

In the successful application of our sea power, a prime factor has been the flexibility and balanced character of our naval forces. In the Atlantic the German Navy was virtually limited to the use of submarines, without surface and naval air support. In the Pacific, Japanese sea power was hampered by army control, and Japanese naval officers lacked the freedom of initiative so necessary to gain and exercise command of the seas. On the other hand, while ours was a vast fleet, it was also a highly flexible and well balanced fleet, in which ships, planes, amphibious forces and service forces in due proportion were available for unified action whenever and wherever called upon.

It is of interest to note, in connection with formulation of plans for the future strength of our Navy, that our fleet in World War II was not solely engaged in fighting enemy fleets. On numerous occasions a large part of the fleet effort was devoted to operations against land objectives. A striking example is the capture of Okinawa. During the three months that this operation was in progress our Pacific Fleet—the greatest naval force ever assembled in the history of the world—was engaged in a continuous battle which for sustained intensity has never been equaled in naval history; yet at this time the Japanese Navy had virtually ceased to exist—we were fighting an island, not an enemy fleet.

With the possible exception of amphibious warfare, which covers a field of considerably broader scope, the outstanding development of the war in the field of naval strategy and tactics has been the convincing proof and general acceptance of the fact that, in accord with the basic concept of the United States Navy, a concept established some 25 years ago, naval aviation is and must always be an integral and primary component of the fleet. Naval aviation has proved its worth not only in its basic purpose of destroying hostile air and naval forces, but also in amphibious warfare involving attacks in support of landing operations, in reconnaissance over the sea and in challenging and defeating hostile land-based planes over positions held in force by the enemy. In these fields our naval aviation has won both success and distinction. Because of its mobility and the striking power and long range of its weapons, the aircraft carrier has proved itself a major and vital element of naval strength, whose only weakness—its vulnerability—demands the support of all other types, and thereby places an additional premium on the flexibility and balance of our fleet. The balanced fleet is the effective fleet.

In a balanced fleet the several components must be welded together rather than simply coordinated. For example, submarines normally operate "on their own" and hasty consideration might lead to the false conclusion that it would be advantageous for submarines to constitute a separate independent service. However, careful consideration will disclose the fallacy inherent in reasoning from this premise. Actually, the commanding officer of a submarine, to fight his ship most effectively, must be familiar with all phases of naval tactics and strategy. It is also essential that officers in surface ships understand the capabilities and limitations of submarines. This is accomplished in time of peace by requiring that submarine officers alternate periods of submarine duty with duty in vessels of other types. By this means, the point of view of the officer corps as a whole is broadened and in the higher echelons of command there are always included officers who have had submarine experience.

Aviation, though a specialty, is much more closely interwoven with the rest of the fleet than is the submarine branch of the Navy. It is, in fact, impossible to imagine an efficient, modern fleet in which there is not a complete welding of aviation and surface elements. This is accomplished by requiring aviators to rotate in other duties in the same manner as do submarine officers, and by requiring non-aviators to familiarize themselves with aircraft operations—not a difficult matter, since not only carriers but also battleships and cruisers are equipped with aircraft. Aviation is part of the ordinary daily life of the officer at sea.

Of course, it is not possible to effect rotation of duties of all submarine and air officers during war. As a matter of fact, this is true of duty in all classes of ships. It is necessary during wartime to train certain officers—especially the reserves—for one particular type of duty and to keep them at it. However, the long periods of peace-time training, in which an officer obtains the rounded experience to fit him for higher command, have been utilized in the past to give officers experience in varied duties and the practice will be continued in the future. The wisdom of that system was proved during the war by the efficiency of aircraft carriers, commanded by qualified aviators who also were experienced in handling ships, and, particularly, by the efficiency of the high combat commands of the Pacific Fleet. Many of the major units of the Pacific Fleet, composed of carriers and vessels of all other types, were commanded by aviators. The strength of the Navy lies in the complete integration of its submarine, surface and air elements.

The epic advance of our united forces across the vast Pacific, westward from Hawaii and northward from New Guinea, to the Philippines and to the shores of Japan, was spearheaded by naval aviation and closely supported by the power of our fleets. In these advances, some of the steps exceeded 2000 miles and the assaulting troops often had to be transported for much greater distances. The Navy moved them over water, landed them and supported them in great force at the beaches, kept them supplied and, particularly at Okinawa, furnished air cover during weeks of the critical fighting ashore.

The outstanding development of this war, in the field of joint undertakings, was the perfection of amphibious operations, the most difficult of all operations in modern warfare. Our success in all such operations, from Normandy to Okinawa, involved huge quantities of specialized equipment, exhaustive study and planning, and thorough training as well as complete integration of all forces, under unified command.

Integration and unification characterized every amphibious operation of the war and all were successful. Command was determined chiefly by application of the principle of paramount capability. A naval officer was in over-all command of an amphibious operation while troops were embarked and until they had been landed and were firmly established in their first main objectives ashore. Beyond that point, an officer of the ground forces was in command and directed whatever naval support was considered necessary.

Unity of command at the highest military level, in Washington, (as an extension of the principle of unity of command) was never attempted nor, in fact, seriously considered. It is a matter of record that the strategic direction of the war, as conducted collectively by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was fully as

Comparative Status of U.S. and Japanese Combatant Ships



Plate 1

—Official U. S. Navy

successful as were the operations which they directed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff system proved its worth. There is no over-all "paramount capability" among the Joint Chiefs of Staff to warrant elevating one of their members to a position of military commander of all the armed forces,—nor, in my opinion, is there any known system or experience which can be counted upon to produce the man qualified for such a position. This war has produced no such man —for the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will show that the proposals, or the convictions of no one member were as sound, or as promising of success, as the united judgment and agreed decisions of all of the members.

In connection with the matter of command in the field, there is perhaps a popular misconception that the Army and the Navy were intermingled in a standard form of joint operational organization in every theater throughout the world. Actually, the situation was never the same in any two areas. For example, after General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower had completed his landing in Normandy, his operation became purely a land campaign. The Navy was responsible for maintaining the line of communications across the ocean and for certain supply operations in the ports of Europe, and small naval groups became part of the land army for certain special purposes, such as the boat groups that helped in the crossing of the Rhine. But the strategy and tactics of the great battles leading up to the surrender of Germany were primarily army affairs and no naval officer had anything directly to do with the command of this land campaign.

A different situation existed in the Pacific, where, in the process of capturing small atolls, the fighting was almost entirely within range of naval gunfire; that is to say, the whole operation of capturing an atoll was amphibious in nature, with artillery and air support primarily naval. This situation called for a mixed Army-Navy organization which was entrusted to the command of Fleet Admiral Nimitz. A still different situation existed in the early days of the war during the Solomon Islands campaign where Army and Navy became, of necessity, so thoroughly intermingled that they were, to all practical purposes, a single service directed by Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr. Under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Army, Army Aviation, and the naval components of his command were separate entities tied together only at the top in the person of General MacArthur himself. In the Mediterranean the scheme of command differed somewhat from all the others.

All these systems of command were successful largely because each was placed in effect to meet a specific condition imposed by the characteristics of the current situation in the theater of operations. I emphasize this fact because it it important to realize that there can be no hard and fast rule for setting up commands in the field. Neither is it possible to anticipate with accuracy the nature of coming wars. Methods adopted in one may require radical alteration for the next, as was true of World Wars I and II. It was fortunate that the War Department and the Navy Department working together for many years—definitely since World War I—before the war began, had correctly diagnosed what was likely to occur and had instituted, not rigid rules, but a set of principles for joint action in the field which proved sufficiently flexible to meet the varying conditions that were encountered during the war.

We now have before us the essential lessons of the war. It is my earnest conviction that whatever else may have been learned as to the most effective relationship of the ground, naval and air forces, the most definite and most important lesson is that to attempt unity of command in Washington is ill-advised in concept and would be impracticable of realization.

II—*Combat Operations: Pacific*

The final phase of the Pacific naval war commenced with the assault on Iwo Jima in February 1945, closely followed by that on Okinawa in April. These two positions were inner defenses of Japan itself; their capture by United States forces meant that the heart of the Empire would from then on be exposed to the full fury of attack, not only by our carrier aircraft but also by land-based planes, the latter in a strength comparable to that which had wreaked such devastation against the better protected and less vulnerable cities of Germany. After Okinawa was in our hands, the Japanese were in a desperate situation, which could be alleviated only if they could strike a counterblow, either by damaging our fleet or by driving us from our advanced island positions. The inability of the Japanese to do either was strong evidence of their increasing impotence and indicated that the end could not be long delayed.

THE CAPTURE OF IWO JIMA

The strategic situation prior to the assault on Iwo Jima, the command organization for that operation and the forces involved, the landing on 19 February, and the first ten days of ground fighting, have been included in my previous report and will not be repeated herein. As March opened, fierce ground fighting on Iwo Jima was still in progress. The front line ran roughly parallel to the short axis of the island, the northeastern third of which was still held by the enemy. Our right flank (4th Marine Division) extended inland from the beach just beyond the East Boat Basin and faced the enemy's skillfully prepared defense positions in steep and rough terrain, which made progress difficult; our left flank (5th Marine Division) rested on Hiraiwa Bay directly across the island; in the center the 3rd Marine Division had

pushed a salient along the central Motoyama Plateau to occupy Motoyama village and the near end of Airfield No. 3. By nightfall of 2 March this last airfield and the whole of the Motoyama tableland were under our control, leaving the enemy in possession of a diminishing horseshoe-shaped area fringing the northeastern end of the island.

Airfield No. 1 had for some days been in use by light artillery spotting planes, but on 3 March it came into its own when a B-29, after a strike against the Japanese mainland, made a successful forced landing at Iwo Jima. More of such landings followed as the tempo of air strikes against Japan was stepped up. On 6 March the first land-based fighter planes came in, made patrol flights the following day, and relieved carrier aircraft in close support of troops on the third day after arrival. Airfield No. 2 was operational on 16 March.

Progress during the first week of March was slow despite daily artillery preparation, supplemented by naval gunfire and air strikes before each ground attack. On the night of 7-8 March the 4th Marine Division killed about 1000 enemy troops who had organized a major infiltration. Subsequently the resistance to our attacks diminished somewhat, and during the next three days control was secured of all the eastern coastline to a distance of approximately 4000 yards south of Kitano Point at the northeastern extremity of the island. On 16 March the northwest shore had been reached and Kitano Point isolated. Much mopping up remained to be done, particularly of a small stubborn pocket of resistance in one of the rugged gulches running southwest to the beaches from Kitano Point; but on 16 March all organized resistance was declared ended as of 1800, and the 4th Marine Division started re-embarking.

On 14 March the flag was raised officially and the establishment of military government was proclaimed. On 18 March the 5th Marine Division reembarked. On 20 March the U. S. Army 147th Infantry Regiment of the garrison force arrived. At 0800 on 26 March, responsibility for the defense and development of Iwo Jima passed to the garrison force and the Commander Forward Area, Central Pacific. The capture of the island had taken 26 days of actual combat; over 20,000 enemy troops were destroyed; and our casualties ashore, as reported on 17 March, were 20,196, of whom 4,305 were killed in action.

The diminutive size of Iwo Jima and its general barrenness, lack of natural facilities and resources should lead no one either to minimize the importance of capturing it or to deprecate as unreasonable and unnecessary our heavy losses in doing so. It was important solely as an air base, but as such its importance was great. Not only was the pressure of air attack by our Marianas-based B-29's materially intensified by the availability of Iwo for topping them off with fuel and for supplying them with fighter cover from there on, but also there was an increase in combat effectiveness of the B-29's due to the heightened morale of personnel, heavier bomb loads, and decrease in abortive flights. There was, moreover, a substantial saving in valuable life in the number of B-29's which would have been shot down over Japan had there been no fighter cover, and in the number which would have been lost at sea had Iwo Jima not been available for emergency landings. It is estimated that the lives saved through this latter factor alone, subsequent to the capture of Iwo Jima, exceeded the lives lost in the capture itself.

This loss of life during the capture resulted inevitably from the strength of Iwo Jima as a defensive position and from the readiness of the enemy. Neither strategic nor tactical surprise was possible in our landing since, with Luzon and the Marianas in our hands, the seizure of some point in the Nanpo Shoto chain was obviously our next move, and Iwo Jima was by its location and the character of its terrain the most profitable objective.

It had no extensive coast line to afford invading troops a choice of landing points where they would meet little opposition, either on the beaches or in subsequent deployments for advance against enemy positions. Landing was feasible on only two beaches of limited extent, and they were so situated that a single defensive organization could oppose an assault against either separately or both simultaneously. The Japanese were, therefore, well prepared to meet us.

The defensive organization of Iwo Jima was the most complete and effective yet encountered. The beaches were flanked by high terrain favorable to the defenders. Artillery, mortars, and rocket launchers were well concealed, yet could register on both beaches—in fact, on any point on the island. Observation was possible, both from Mount Suribachi at the south end and from a number of commanding hills rising above the northern plateau. The rugged volcanic crags, severe escarpments, and steep defiles sloping to the sea from all sides of the central Motoyama tableland afforded excellent natural cover and concealment, and lent themselves readily to the construction of subterranean positions to which the Japanese are addicted.

Knowing the superiority of the firepower that would be brought against them by air, sea, and land, they had gone underground most effectively, while remaining ready to man their positions with mortars, machine guns, and other portable weapons the instant our troops started to attack. The defenders were dedicated to expending themselves—but expending skillfully and protractedly in order to exact the uttermost toll from the attackers. Small wonder then that every step had to be won slowly by men inching forward with hand weapons, and at heavy costs. There was no other way of doing it.

The skill and gallantry of our Marines in this exceptionally difficult enterprise was worthy of their best traditions and deserving of the highest commendation. This was equally true of the naval units acting in their support, especially those engaged at the hazardous beaches. American history offers no finer example of courage, ardor and efficiency.

As a whole the operation affords a striking illustration of the inherently close relation between land, sea and air power. The fleet with its ships and planes delivered and supported the land forces. The Marines took an air base from which our land-based planes could operate with effectiveness far beyond that possible from our other bases in the rear. The

same general pattern marked our long progress all the way across the vast central and western Pacific.

ASSAULT ON OKINAWA AND ITS CAPTURE

Our capture of the Marianas and Philippines had placed us on a strategic line some 1300 miles from the Japanese homeland and across its direct routes of communication to the south. The occupation of Iwo Jima had advanced this line to within 640 miles of Tokyo at the eastern end. The next step directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to secure a position in the Nansei Shoto chain, which extends in a shallow loop from Kyushu, the southernmost of the main Japanese islands, down to Japanese held Formosa. Okinawa, the largest and most populous island in this chain, offered numerous sites for airfields from which almost any type of plane could reach industrial Kyushu, only 350 miles distant, and attack the enemy's communications to Korea, to the Chinese mainland, and to the Indo-China and Singapore areas. Since Okinawa also contained several excellent naval anchorages, it was chosen as the objective; the operations against it followed immediately on those for the capture of Iwo Jima.

From many standpoints the Okinawa operation was the most difficult ever undertaken by our forces in the Pacific. It was defended by about 120,000 men (including native Okinawans serving with the combat forces) with tanks and artillery. As possible reinforcements there were some 60,000 troops in various other positions in the Nansei Shoto chain, plus much larger forces in nearby Formosa, Kyushu, and the Shanghai area. Also of great importance was the large native population, which afforded the enemy an unlimited supply of labor, and which might easily become a serious problem to us by clogging roads and imposing a burden of relief.

The most serious threat to us, however, lay in the very factor for which we had initiated the operation, namely the short distance from Okinawa to the Japanese homeland, where lay the main reserves of air and naval power. Just as we would be able to strike Japan to better effect after securing Okinawa, the Japanese could strike us while we were attacking that island. Japan's naval strength had been so reduced that it could not hope for success against our own in a decisive action; but hit-and-run raids, or perhaps forlorn-hope, honor-saving attempts, were a possibility. Air attack, particularly of the suicide variety, was the greatest menace, since the Japanese airfields within easy range of Okinawa were too numerous to permit more than their partial and temporary interdiction by our own air strikes against them. Severe damage and losses, therefore, had to be expected and accepted as the price of our success.

The operations for the capture of Okinawa were under the command of Admiral R. A. Spruance, Commander Fifth Fleet. Major forces participating under him were: the Joint Expeditionary Force (all elements engaged directly in the landings), Vice Admiral (now Admiral) R. K. Turner; the Expeditionary Troops (all ground forces engaged), the late Lieutenant General S. B. Buckner, USA; the Fast Carrier Force, Vice Admiral M. A. Mitscher, (including the battleships and other fire support vessels of the late Vice Admiral W. A. Lee's Striking Force); the British Carrier Force, Vice Admiral H. B. Rawlings; the Logistic Supply Group (tankers and cargo vessels which serviced the fleet under way close to the combat areas), Rear Admiral D. B. Beary; Service Squadron Ten (the repair, supply and service vessels of all kinds, based on Leyte Gulf, the Marianas, etc.), Commodore W. R. Carter; the Amphibious Support Force (comprising escort carriers, mine sweepers, underwater demolition teams, gun-boats, and the gunnery ships assigned to bombardment missions), Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy; and the Gunfire and Covering Force (the battleships and other gunnery vessels not with the fast carriers), Rear Admiral M. L. Deyo. Numerous other participating task groups and units and their commanders are not mentioned herein. About 548,000 men of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps took part, with 318 combatant vessels and 1139 auxiliary vessels, exclusive of personnel landing craft of all types.

The greater part of the intelligence information required for the operation was obtained from photographic coverage. Adequate small scale coverage for mapping purposes was first obtained on 29 September 1944 by B-29's of the XXI Bomber Command; from then on until the conclusion of the operation, additional photographing was done at frequent intervals by Army planes and planes of the Fast Carrier Force. The prompt developing, printing, and interpreting of these photos, and the early and wide distribution of the prints and of the information gleaned from them, was an important feature of the operation.

The island of Okinawa, which is about 65 miles long, is roughly divided into almost equal northern and southern parts. The northern area is generally rugged, mountainous, wooded and undeveloped. The southern area, which is generally rolling but frequently broken by deep scarps and ravines, is the developed part of the island, containing the greater number of towns, roads, and cultivated areas, the capital city of Naha, all five of the island's airfields, and the strongest defenses.

The preferred plan called for our ground forces to land on six miles of beach on the southwest shore, protected from the prevailing northeast trade winds and closely bordering the island's Yontan and Kadena airfields. Four divisions were to be landed abreast on these beaches. With the two center divisions advancing directly across the island to the east coast, and with the left and right flank divisions pivoting toward the north and south respectively, the Japanese forces in the southern part of the island would be isolated by these maneuvers, and were then to be overcome by attack from the north. Coincident with the main troop attack, there was planned for the southeast coast a demonstration, and an actual landing, if necessary.

Planned operations preliminary to, and in support of the main landings, included the following: the seizure of the islands of the Kerama Retto group, 20 miles to the southwest, in order to establish therein a logistics supply and naval repair base and a seaplane base; the seizure of the small island of Keise Shima, about 20,000 yards from the landing beaches



—Official U. S. Navy



—Official Coast Guard photo

OKINAWA

Two Japanese planes shot down while attacking invasion fleet

and 11,000 yards from Naha city, and landing army artillery there to command the lower end of Okinawa; mine sweeping on a scale greater than in any previous operation; the usual work by underwater demolition teams; and the intensive bombardments by air and naval forces.

Cargo and troops were loaded and embarked on the United States west coast, in the Hawaiian Islands, in the southwestern Pacific, the Marshalls, the Carolines, and Leyte. The various elements proceeded to assemble afloat at Ulithi, Guadalcanal, Saipan, and Leyte. Following rehearsals the several forces departed for the objective in the more than 1200 ships of all kinds which the Joint Expeditionary Force contained. Movement of all forces to the objective was carried out without enemy interference. Operational breakdowns enroute were insignificant, a fact which speaks well for the efficiency of our material and our personnel in operation, maintenance, and repair. An indispensable element in the campaign as a whole was the covering operations of the Fast Carrier Force, which are given in some detail in the next section of this report.

The mine sweepers were in the van, and on L-minus-8 day, 24 March, commenced sweeping under cover of gunfire from battleships of the Fast Carrier Force, and continued this work up to L-day, 1 April. There were 75 sweepers; and the entire coastal perimeter of southern Okinawa was cleared of mines during this pre-assault phase, in addition to the sweeping necessary for the capture of Kerama Retto and Ie Shima. Including re-sweeping, over 3000 square miles were swept and declared safe prior to L-day. Some 177 mines were swept and about 80 floaters destroyed. The thoroughness of this task is evidenced by the safety with which bombardment and assault ships in great numbers closed the assault beaches without significant loss from mines.

On L-minus-6 day the assault on Kerama Retto was commenced, and by L-minus-1, 31 March, these islands and also Keise Shima had been occupied against minor resistance. Nets were immediately laid to protect the anchorages, and the seaplane base was established. Tankers, ammunition ships and repair vessels were brought directly to this anchorage, which assumed a progressively more important role as the principal haven for ships damaged by "kamikaze" attacks of suicide planes.

Since L-minus-7, 25 March, Okinawa itself had been under intermittent bombing and gunfire, and on L-day, 1 April, preceded by intense naval and air bombardment, the Tenth Army landed according to schedule over the Hagushi beaches on Okinawa against light enemy resistance. The assault waves, embarked in amphibious vehicles, hit the beach at 0830, moved rapidly inland, and by 1230 had captured both Yontan and Kadena airfields with light losses. Prior to dark the Tenth Army, with approximately 50,000 troops ashore, had gained a beachhead 4000 to 5000 yards in depth. Proceeding rapidly against initially weak resistance, our troops crossed the island to the east shore, and on 4 April the Yontan-Kadena segment of the island was in our hands.

The Japanese had made no serious attempt to stop us at the beaches where we had landed; as the attack progressed from day to day, it was evident that they had withdrawn most of their forces into the southernmost part of the island, and had estab-

lished their defenses in depth on terrain admirably suited for defense and delaying action tactics. The enemy defenses consisted of blockhouses, pillboxes, and caves, protected by double apron barbed wire and minefields. Here the enemy used his artillery unstintingly, and his defensive tactics were described as "artful and fantastic."

In the north progress was rapid against scattered opposition; on 22 April all organized resistance in the northern two thirds of the island had ceased, though patrolling and mopping up continued. In the south our advance was stubbornly contested. From 4 April to 26 May our lines had advanced only about four miles, and it took from 26 May to 21 June to cover the remaining ten miles to the southern tip of the island. On 21 June, after eighty-two days of bitter fighting, organized resistance was declared to have ended, although mopping up of two small enemy pockets remained to be done.

On 18 June, while observing the attack of the Marine 8th Regimental Combat Team, Lieutenant General Buckner, Commanding General of the Tenth Army and the Ryukyus Forces, was instantly killed by a shell burst. Command of the ground forces was then assumed by Major General Roy S. Geiger, USMC, until after the capture of the island, when he was relieved by General Joseph W. Stillwell, USA, on 23 June.

The general pattern of the operation for the capture of Okinawa was similar to those for the capture of Iwo Jima, the Marianas, the Marshalls, etc.; it differed mainly in the size of the air, naval, and ground forces employed, the length of time required to secure it after the initial landing, and the number of naval vessels damaged or sunk at the scene of operations by air attack, mainly of the suicide variety. Having been experienced in previous operations, this form of attack was not new, but the shorter distance from numerous air bases in Japan, and the desperate situation which would threaten the Japanese if our assault on Okinawa were successful, stimulated them to their greatest and most fanatical effort.

The time element was closely connected with the extent of our ship losses. By its very nature an amphibious invasion implies advancing a huge number of vessels, both combatant and noncombatant, from a zone dominated by one's own land-based air forces into one hitherto dominated by the enemy's. Our vessels are localized by the landing so that the enemy has not the problem of finding them, but only of hitting them. Thus exposed, their protection depends wholly on their own antiaircraft fire, smoke, and on cover from our own carrier-based air forces, which are to that extent diverted from offensive missions. This precarious situation for shipping continues until progress ashore at the objective results in relief: first, by the establishment of our own air forces, air facilities, antiaircraft radars, and fighter-directors ashore in strength sufficient to dominate the area; secondly, and more important, by releasing most of the shipping so that there are fewer vulnerable targets presented to an enemy that gets through. The longer this relief is delayed by the continuance of ground fighting, the higher our shipping casualties mount. The longer the Navy must remain in support of assault troop operations, the more vulnerable it is to attack, and the higher is the proportion of

—Official U.S. Navy photo

OKINAWA

Japanese bomber crashes into sea after unsuccessful attack on fast carrier task force

personnel and ship casualties. Slow progress on the ground is directly reflected, therefore, in naval losses.

The first enemy air attack at Okinawa occurred on 24 March when the mine sweepers arrived; the first damage was done on 26 March; and by 21 June, when organized resistance had ceased, about 250 vessels of all classes, from battleships and carriers down to destroyers and landing ships, had been hit by air attack, by far the greatest proportion of them in suicide crashes. Some 34 destroyers or smaller craft were sunk. Early warning of impending attacks proved to be the best countermeasure and for this purpose destroyers and other small vessels were stationed as pickets at appropriate distances from the concentrations of heavier shipping. These pickets took the heaviest losses themselves, but in so doing they undoubtedly saved many bigger and more valuable vessels during a critical three months.

FAST CARRIER FORCE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF OKINAWA INVASION

After the supporting operations for the Iwo Jima campaign were completed, Vice Admiral Mitscher proceeded with his fast carrier task force in support of the forthcoming Okinawa campaign. First he went toward the Nansei Shoto in order to obtain photographic coverage of that area. Planes were launched on 1 March, and excellent photo reconnaissance was obtained for use in planning the Okinawa campaign. While in this area, cruisers of the force bombarded Okino-Daito-Shima on 2 March, starting numerous fires and providing valuable training for the ships participating. The force then proceeded to Ulithi for a ten-day period of regrouping and logistic replenishment.

On 14 March the task force departed from Ulithi and proceeded toward Japan to carry out its part in the invasion of Okinawa. On 18-19 March, from a position 100 miles southeast of Kyushu, air strikes were launched against airfields on that island in order to eliminate future air-borne resistance to our Okinawa invasion forces. Fleet units at Kure and Kobe were also attacked with considerable success.

On the morning of the 19th the carrier FRANKLIN was badly damaged by fires started when she was hit by two bombs from an enemy plane. Outstanding rescue operations saved 850 men from the water, but the dead and missing totalled 772.

During that afternoon the task force retired southward, launching additional sweeps against enemy airfields to forestall an organized attack on the slowly moving damaged ships and escorts. On 21 March 48 enemy planes were intercepted 60 miles from the force by 24 carrier-based planes. In the ensuing battle all the Japanese planes were shot down with a loss of only two of our fighters.

In a four-day period Vice Admiral Mitscher's forces destroyed 528 enemy planes, damaged 16 enemy surface craft, and either destroyed or damaged scores of hangars, factories, and warehouses. Our own plane losses were 116. As a result of this operation, the enemy was unable to mount any strong air attack against our forces on Okinawa for a week after the initial landings.

On 24 March, under the command of Vice Admiral Lee, battleships of the task force bombarded the southeastern coast of Okinawa. This was part of a diversionary move to cover up the actual location of our landing beaches; apparently the ruse was successful.

When the invasion of Okinawa began on 1 April, planes from the fast carriers began a series of almost continuous strikes and combat air patrols in direct support of the operation. For a few days enemy air opposition was almost nonexistent, but on 6 April the Japanese finally struck with fury against our ground and supporting forces. All units of the carrier force performed admirably during the day's attack, knocking down 248 planes, while losing only 2.

The carrier task force then proceeded northward, and on 7 April attacked strong Japanese fleet units which had been located in the East China Sea off Kyushu. Heavy weather handicapped our airmen, but in spite of this they sank the battleship YAMATO, the cruiser YAHAGI, and 4 destroyers. Fires were started on 2 other destroyers, and only 3 destroyers in the entire force escaped without damage.

While our planes were otherwise occupied in striking the YAMATO and those ships, the enemy resumed the heavy assaults of the previous day against the carrier force. Combat air patrols destroyed 15 planes over the force, and ships' gunfire knocked down 3 more. One suicide plane penetrated the antiaircraft fire, however, and dropped a bomb on the carrier HANCOCK; it then crashed on her flight deck, killing 28 men, and badly damaging the carrier.

On 11 April the enemy resumed the air attacks on the fast carrier task force. The number of Japanese planes participating was not large, but their pilots were determined to destroy themselves by diving their planes directly on the chosen target. Fortunately there were no direct hits, but 8 near misses caused some damage. During the day our carrier-based planes shot down 17 of these suicide planes, and ships' gunfire destroyed 12 more, but they still constituted a serious threat to our forces.

The next day the enemy shifted the weight of his suicide attacks to the ships anchored at Okinawa, and the combat air patrols from both fast and escort carriers had little difficulty in shooting down 151 enemy planes over the islands.

On 15 April the carriers launched a surprise attack against southern Kyushu airfields, destroying 51 enemy planes on the ground and setting numerous ground installations afire. The Japanese managed to launch some planes in opposition, and 29 of these were shot down before our aircraft returned to the carriers.

Fighter sweeps were again launched against Kyushu on 16 April in an effort to break up an obvious major enemy air attack. They shot down 17 air-borne planes and destroyed 54 on the ground. In spite of this success, however, the enemy launched heavy air attacks during the day against our Okinawa forces and the fast carrier task force. All ground support was cancelled, and every effort was concentrated on a successful defense of the task force. The final score for the day was 210 enemy aircraft shot down,

against a loss of 9 of our planes. Heavy damage was caused to the carrier INTREPID when a suicide plane crashed on her flight deck at the height of the battle.

On 19 April Vice Admiral Lee commanded a division of fast battleships in the bombardment of the southeastern coast of Okinawa. This action coincided with the beginning of the Tenth Army's all-out offensive. The bombardment not only destroyed important military installations, but it assisted in making a feint landing at that point appear authentic.

On 29 April suicide planes again attacked the task force in strength, hitting and badly damaging two destroyers. The enemy paid for them, however, with 25 aircraft knocked out of the air by planes and guns of the task force.

After several days of relative calm, enemy aircraft returned in large numbers on 4 May to attack our land and amphibious forces in the Okinawa area. This attack was apparently part of a counter-landing operation to aid their own ground forces. The fast carrier task force was not attacked, however, and its fighters were free to defend the Okinawa area, shooting down 98 enemy aircraft, while losing only 5 planes.

On 11 May another major air battle was fought over Okinawa and the ships of the task force. Carrier-based planes shot down 69 enemy aircraft, ships' gunfire accounted for 3 more, while 2 were destroyed in suicide dives on the carrier BUNKER HILL. This ship was badly damaged, and 373 of her personnel were killed, with 19 missing.

The fast carriers moved northward on 12 May and launched additional air strikes against Kyushu airfields on 13-14 May. Few planes were found and virtually no air opposition was encountered over the fields. On the morning of the 14th, however, the enemy managed to launch a force of 26 planes against the ships of the task force. Of these 6 were shot down by ships' gunfire and 19 by combat air patrol; the remaining plane was destroyed in a damaging suicide crash on ENTERPRISE.

On 24 May the fast carriers launched a clean-up sweep by 98 planes against airfields in southern Kyushu. Except on Kanoya airfields little activity was found, and it was evident that the previous strikes against this area had been very effective. The score for the day was 84 enemy planes destroyed, while our losses were confined to 3 planes lost to antiaircraft fire off Kanoya.

On 28 May the late Vice Admiral J. S. McCain relieved Vice Admiral Mitscher as commander of the fast carrier task forces.

On 2-3 June further long-range sweeps were launched against Kyushu, but bad weather impaired their effectiveness. Only 30 enemy planes were destroyed, while our losses were 16. By 4 June the bad weather had developed into a typhoon, and the ships of the task force spent the next 24 hours in attempting to avoid the storm's center. Serious damage to 3 cruisers, 2 carriers, and 1 destroyer resulted.



—Official U.S. Navy photo

OKINAWA

Carrier INTREPID hit by a Japanese suicide plane on 16 April 1945

Operations were resumed on 8 June when a final attack was made on southern Kyushu. It was well executed, but previous raids had so reduced Japanese air strength in this area that only 29 planes could be destroyed. Only 4 of our carrier planes were lost. On 8 and 9 June cruisers and battleships from Vice Admiral McCain's task force bombarded Okino Daito and Minami Daito to the east of Okinawa. These attacks terminated the supporting action of the fast carrier task force, and on 10 June course was set for Leyte Gulf, where they anchored on 13 June for a period of replenishment and repair.

For a period of nearly three months, the fast carriers and their escorts had operated in and near the

Okinawa area, giving invaluable support to our occupation forces. During this time the task force had destroyed 2336 enemy planes, while losing 557 of its own aircraft. In addition, widespread damage had been inflicted upon shore installations in Japan, the Nansei Shoto, and upon important units of the Japanese fleet. This remarkable record detracted considerably from the ability of the enemy to oppose our landing forces on Okinawa, thereby contributing notably to our final success.

British Carrier Operations

A fast British carrier task force, under the command of Vice Admiral Rawlings, was assigned to Admiral Spruance's Fifth Fleet to assist in the air support operations for the Okinawa assault. From 26 March to 20 April, and again from 4 May to 25 May, planes from this force rendered valuable service in neutralizing the enemy air installations on Sakishima Gunto, southwest of Okinawa. Carriers of the force were subjected to frequent attacks by suicide planes, but none of them was put out of action. Battleships and cruisers of the force bombarded Miyako Jima on 4 May with satisfactory results.

JOINT OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES AND BORNEO

The situation in the Philippines on 1 March 1945 found United States forces controlling all of Leyte and Mindoro, most of Samar except a small area in the north, the central part of Luzon from Lingayen Gulf to Manila and certain areas to the south. Isolated resistance was still encountered within a few buildings in Manila and islands in the bay. Guerillas controlled substantial areas of the Visayan Islands and Mindanao. Landings had been made on 28 February at Puerto Princesa on the east coast of Palawan with practically no opposition. Control was quickly extended over adjacent territory, providing airfields from which enemy sea traffic in waters to the westward and southward could be observed and attacked. Japanese concentrations still existed in many key cities of the Philippines and along certain of the routes which our ships had to travel to bring up vitally needed supplies and munitions. In addition, though their general air strength in the area had greatly diminished, the Japanese still controlled a number of airfields which permitted harassing attacks.

A series of operations was undertaken to gain control of the important straits leading into central Philippine waters in order to cut off enemy reinforcements and to set the stage for the ultimate reduction of remaining Japanese strongholds in the Philippines. The capture of Palawan provided an effective barrier on the west and gave us a base for naval and air operations which controlled the Balabac Strait entrance from the South China Sea to the Sulu Sea. At the same time we secured the most direct sea lane to Manila with an amphibious assault on Lubang Island, controlling the Verde Island Passage just south of the capital. The islands of Burias and Ticao were seized on 4 March and Romblon and Simara on 12 March. Possession of these islands afforded protection to our shipping through San Bernardino Strait and obviated the need for the roundabout route through Surigao Strait which was still subject to air attacks from the Visayas.

The campaign to complete the reoccupation of the Philippines resolved itself naturally into a series of amphibious landings to seize control of coastal cities and other strongly held Japanese positions. In March three such landing were made by forces of Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet.

The first of these landings was made on 10 March at Zamboanga, at the southwest tip of Mindanao, in order to obtain control of the passage from the Sulu to the Celebes Sea, secure naval and air facilities with which to compress the Japanese remaining in the central Philippines, and provide a further steppingstone down the Sulu Archipelago for future operations towards Borneo. The attack group was under command of the late Rear Admiral F. B. Royal. Light cruisers and destroyers bombarded enemy positions there for two days while mine sweepers made sure the approaches were clear. On 10 March the 41st Division was put ashore under moderate enemy artillery and mortar fire. The troops quickly overran Zamboanga City and the two airfields nearby, driving the Japanese back into the hills. A further landing was made on Basilan Island on 16 March without enemy opposition.

On 18 March a similar assault force landed at Iloilo on the island of Panay. To clear this island and establish radar and air facilities as well as motor torpedo boat bases, the 40th Division was staged from Lingayen Gulf. Only token opposition to the landings was offered, and naval gunfire preparation was withheld to save the lives of natives. The assault group was commanded by Rear Admiral A. D. Struble. Iloilo City was secured on the 20th; the docks and harbor area were found practically undamaged. Subsequent minor operations had by the end of March virtually cleared Panay and nearby smaller islands.

Troops of the Americal Division were used for the landing at Cebu on 26 March. Captain A. T. Sprague, Jr., commanded the attack group, which was supported by a covering group of cruisers and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral R. S. Berkey. Although the beaches were well organized for defense, the enemy positions there were found abandoned. Cebu City was captured on the next day, but considerable opposition to the advance of the troops inland developed, requiring extensive ground operations to clear the island.

On 17 April, after naval bombardment and air strikes, the X Corps with two divisions landed at Malabang (on Moro Gulf in southern Mindanao) and moved overland toward Davao Gulf against light opposition. Rear Admiral A. G. Noble commanded the naval task group and Rear Admiral R. S. Riggs the cruiser force which covered the landing. Cotobato and its airfield were secured on the next day. A novel feature of this campaign was the successful use of light landing craft on rivers leading inland. Davao Gulf was reached late in April and Davao City was captured on 4 May, followed by further extension of control along the shores of the Gulf. In the mean-

time, troops also advanced northward and effected a junction on 23 May with a regimental combat team which had been landed at Macajalar on the north coast on 9 May. These operations effectively sealed off enemy garrisons in the interior of the island where they could be mopped up at leisure.

The landing at Malabang was the last large amphibious assault necessary for the reoccupation of the Philippines, but a number of minor landings on the small islands were required in order to eliminate their garrisons. The most important of these were: the crossing of a regimental combat team from Iloilo to Pulupandan Point on northern Negros on 29 March, to assist in clearing that island of the enemy; the landing of another at Legaspi, Luzon, on 1 April to facilitate the clearing of the Bicol Peninsula; and landings by a third such unit at Sanga Sanga in the Tawi Tawi group on 2 April and at Jolo on 8 April. Such landings were generally supported by naval gunfire, as well as by air strikes. Landings were also made at Masbate on 3 April; on Busuanga Island, lying between Mindoro and Palawan, on 9 April; and at Tagbiliran, Bohol Island, on 11 April. Bohol was the only major island in the Philippines on which we had not yet established a firm hold. From this time until the close of hostilities, most naval operations in the Philippines involved small groups transporting and covering American troops and guerrillas in shore-to-shore movements. The major units of the Seventh Fleet were occupied with the invasion of Borneo to the south.

The operations against Borneo, which began in May, were designed to deny the enemy the fruits of his conquests in the Netherlands East Indies and his use of the approaches to those areas. These included the capture of Tarakan to obtain its petroleum resources and to provide an airfield for support of the Balikpapan operation; the seizure of Brunei Bay to establish an advance fleet base and protect resources in that area; and the occupation of Balikpapan to establish naval air and logistic facilities and to conserve petroleum installations there. Vice Admiral D. E. Barbey was designated the commander of the Borneo attack force.

The first Borneo operation was directed against the island of Tarakan, approximately 185 miles southwest of Tawi Tawi, to overcome some 3000 Japanese that were estimated to be on the island, and to develop facilities for future operations. Australian and American cruisers and destroyers began shelling the island on 27 April and continued through 1 May. At the same time the mine-sweeping group cleared the necessary approaches. Numerous neutralizing air raids had been made on airfields in the area. On 1 May the attack group under Rear Admiral Royal moved in. Units of the 9th Australian Division were landed on schedule with only small arms opposition.

In the second Borneo operation the 9th Australian Division, reinforced, was transported from Morotai to the Brunei Bay area of northern Borneo. Three separate landings were made at Labuan Island and on the mainland at Bintang and Cape Polompong. Air support was furnished by the United States Thirteenth Air Force and the Australian First Tactical Air Force. For ten days preceding the target date air strikes neutralized enemy airfields and harassed troop movements and shipping in Borneo, with emphasis on Brunei Bay targets the last three days. Mine sweeping began on 7 June under the protection of Rear Admiral Berkey's covering force of cruisers and destroyers. The mine sweeper SALUTE struck a mine and sank with many casualties.

Beginning on 9 June a distant covering group of cruisers and destroyers under Rear Admiral Riggs patrolled 50 miles west of Brunei Bay to prevent enemy surface interference.

The attack group commander was again Rear Admiral Royal. On 10 June, after an hour of heavy bombardment which caused the enemy to retreat from the beaches, the assault waves landed without opposition and moved inland against slight resistance.

When the landings had been successfully executed and one of the two Japanese cruisers in the area had been sunk off the Malay coast by a British submarine, the distant cover group was withdrawn on 11 June. Throughout the operation motor torpedo boats rendered valuable assistance strafing shore targets and patrolling the area. One hundred twenty miles to the south at Miri-Lutong a supplementary landing was made by combined forces after a week of mine sweeping in which 458 mines were swept.

—Official U.S. Navy photo

BORNEO OPERATIONS

Australian troops landing from LST 560 at Brunei Bay, 10 June 1945

The operations against Balikpapan were carried out under Rear Admiral Noble as commander of the attack group, and Rear Admiral Riggs as commander of the cruiser covering group. In preparation for the attack heavy air strikes had been made for a month using the Army, Navy and Australian air forces with as many as 100 sorties a day. The target date was set for 1 July. Sixteen days prior to this, mine sweeping and underwater demolition activities began with covering fire from cruisers and destroyers. This was met with intense reaction from enemy coastal guns.



—Official U.S. Navy photo

BORNEO OPERATIONS

Rockets fired by LCI(R) 338 preparatory to landings at Balikpapan, 1 July 1945

Three mine sweepers were damaged by enemy fire and three were sunk and one damaged by exploding mines. There was some doubt as to whether the target date could be met, but finally on 24 June destroyers were able to get close enough inshore to smother the enemy guns before the landing. An escort carrier group under the late Rear Admiral W. D. Sample provided day and night air cover, since land planes were based too far distant to assure their presence in the case of bad weather.

The attack force consisted of the largest number of ships used in the Southwest Pacific area since the Lingayen landings. In the cover and carrier groups were 9 cruisers (including 2 Australian and 1 Dutch), 3 escort carriers and destroyer escorts. The attack group was of comparable scale. After an intense two-hour bombardment on 1 July, the assault waves moved ashore. In spite of enemy artillery, mortar and small arms fire, seventeen assault waves landed without a single casualty. Stiffening resistance was met as the troops progressed inland and fire support was rendered by cruisers both day and night. This support continued through 7 July. A further landing at Cape Penajam was made without casualties on 5 July. There was no surface or subsurface interference with the attacking forces, and only four light harassing attacks were made by enemy planes with no damage to our ships or personnel.

While the period covered by this report witnessed no single naval operation of the size and scope of the Leyte or Lingayen landings, the numerous amphibious operations in which the Seventh Fleet participated contributed materially to the consolidation of our positions in the Philippines and the wresting of vital resources from the enemy in Borneo.

These numerous amphibious landings were conducted on short notice and in many instances were so closely spaced that for all practical purposes they were concurrent operations. Their successful completion on schedule reflects great credit on the commanders responsible for their planning and execution. In addition to the landing operations, unre-

mitting and constantly mounting pressure was maintained on the enemy by Seventh Fleet submarines, aircraft, and motor torpedo boats, which by June had brought to a virtual standstill all enemy sea-borne and coastal transport in the Southwest Pacific area.

Of equal importance with the offensive operations mentioned above were the large movements of men and supplies into the Philippines, and the extensive redeployment of men and equipment within the area in preparation for the staging of the projected landings on the Japanese home islands. The control and protection of the large number of ships employed for this task were successfully accomplished without loss from enemy action, although a considerable strain was placed on the available facilities and forces.

With the cessation of hostilities, the Commander Seventh Fleet was relieved of all responsibilities as senior naval officer in the Southwest Pacific area and with a reconstituted Seventh Fleet assigned the tasks of occupying and controlling the waters of the Yellow Sea, Gulf of Pohai, the coastal waters of China south to twenty degrees north and the navigable portion of the Yangtze River; the landing and establishing of United States Army troops in Korea, and United States Marines in North China; the evacuation of ex-prisoners of war and internees; the support of operations of United States forces in the China Theater; the clearance of mine fields and opening of ports in the Seventh Fleet area; and the routing and protection of friendly shipping. The planning for and execution of these tasks in the initial stages were necessarily accomplished in great haste and with certain improvisation. However, the new organization has been perfected rapidly with attendant uniformly satisfactory progress.

FAST CARRIER FORCE PRE-INVASION OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN

After nearly three weeks of replenishment in Leyte Gulf, subsequent to their support of the Okinawa operation, the fast carrier forces of Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet, comprising the greatest mass of sea power ever assembled, proceeded northward on 1 July toward Japan. This huge armada was to complete the destruction of the Japanese fleet, conduct a pre-invasion campaign of destruction against every industry and resource contributing to Japan's ability to wage war, and maintain maximum pressure on the Japanese in order to lower their will to fight.

On 10 July the force arrived in the launching area, 170 miles southeast of Tokyo. On that day strikes were made against airfields and industrial plants in the Tokyo area; 72 planes were destroyed on the ground and extensive damage inflicted on other targets. No attempt was made to conceal the location of the fleet but, in spite of this, little enemy air opposition was encountered.

Admiral Halsey then moved north to attack northern Honshu and southern Hokkaido on 14-15 July. Aerial strikes dealt a severe blow to critical water transportation facilities between Hokkaido and Honshu, when 5 railroad ferries were sunk and 4 others damaged. Again, little air opposition was encountered by our planes. Simultaneously with these air strikes heavy units of the force shelled Kamaishi and Muroran, causing damage to the steel mills and oil installations in those cities.

On 17 July the Third Fleet moved south and was joined by units of the British Pacific Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Rawlings. Admiral Halsey was in over-all command and, on that day, ordered the first combined American-British bombardment of the Japanese homeland. Battleships fired 2000 tons of shells into the coastal area northeast of Tokyo and encountered no enemy opposition during the operation.

On the following day American and British carrier-based planes struck at enemy fleet units concealed at the Yokosuka naval base in Tokyo Bay. The NAGATO, one of two remaining Japanese battleships, was badly damaged. Numerous shore installations and transportation facilities were also hit.

On 24 and 25 July the combined British and American naval forces launched extensive air strikes against targets in the Inland Sea area. The planes concentrated on the major fleet units still afloat at the Kure naval base. Six major ships were badly damaged and, in all, 22 naval units totalling 258,000 tons were either sunk or put out of action, sounding the death knell of Japanese sea power. Intensive antiaircraft fire was met, and for the first time the enemy mounted aggressive, air-borne opposition. A total of 113 enemy aircraft were destroyed during the two-day attack, while only 12 British and American planes were lost.

A follow-up attack was made on Kure and the Inland Sea area by the carrier-based planes on 28 July. Reconnaissance indicated that the enemy fleet units had been effectively reduced by the previous strikes, but additional bombs were dropped for good measure. Extensive damage was also done to merchant shipping and to vital shore installations, particularly railroad facilities. Strong air opposition was encountered once more, but our aircraft knocked down 21 Japanese planes air-borne and destroyed 123 on the ground for a total of 144 for the day, while our forces lost 36.

On 30 July the Tokyo area was harassed for the third time in three weeks by aircraft from the fast carriers, our airmen destroying 121 enemy planes during the day, and inflicting severe damage on lighter enemy fleet units found in the region. Meanwhile, the fast battleships were shelling the port of Hamamatsu on the east coast of central Honshu, spreading havoc in that area.

For the first eight days of August the harassed Japanese homeland was given a temporary respite while Admiral Halsey's fleet was riding out a heavy typhoon. On 9 and 10 August, however, the offensive was renewed with another air attack on northern Honshu. It was known that the enemy had withdrawn a large part of his air force to fields in this area, and the strikes were designed to destroy as many of them as possible. The plan was partially successful, for during the two days 397 enemy planes were destroyed and 320 others damaged. Almost no



—Official U. S. Navy

air-borne opposition was encountered, and all but 10 of the destroyed planes were caught on the ground. The British and Americans lost only 34 planes. While these air strikes were in progress, battleships from the Third Fleet bombarded the coastal city of Kamaishi for a second time, inflicting further heavy damage on the steel mills in the area.

Admiral Halsey's final blow was delivered against Tokyo on 13 August. Airfields and other military installations were the primary targets, with 46 planes being destroyed on the ground. The Japanese tried to get through to the surface ships, but 21 planes were shot down in the futile attempt. The strong protective screen around the fleet was too much for the fading enemy air strength.

On 15 August the order of Fleet Admiral Nimitz to "cease fire" was received too late to stop the first of the day's air strikes planned for Tokyo. It knocked 30 enemy planes out of the air and destroyed 10 more on the ground. The second strike had also been launched, but it was recalled in time; its pilots were ordered to jettison their bombs and return to their carriers.

Since 10 July the forces under Admiral Halsey's command had destroyed or damaged 2804 enemy planes, sunk or damaged 148 Japanese combat ships, sunk or damaged 1598 enemy merchant ships, destroyed 195 locomotives, and damaged 109 more. In addition, heavy blows had been struck at industrial targets and war industries, effectively supplementing the bombing by B-29's. This impressive record speaks for itself and helps to explain the sudden collapse of Japan's will to resist. Naval air power, acting in close conjunction with naval surface power and Army bombers, had beaten enemy land-based air power besides inflicting critical losses on naval ships and seriously damaging many shore targets.

CONTRIBUTORY OPERATIONS

Although somewhat obscured by the more spectacular amphibious assaults and carrier force operations which marked our major advances toward the Japanese homeland, there were many other vital and necessary activities which by their nature had more the form of a continuous pressure than of major individual operations against the enemy. Outstanding parts were played by the submarines (whose achievements are summarized in a later chapter), by the land-based air forces, and, to a lesser extent, by the Northern Pacific forces.

Northern Pacific Forces

Although usually hampered by foul weather, which ran the gamut of fogs, rain, gales, snow, and floating ice fields, naval and air forces of the Northern Pacific continued to exert pressure against the Japanese-held northern Kurile Islands, posing a constant threat to the enemy's northern flank.

Army and Navy aircraft flew such searches as weather permitted, bombed and rocketed Japanese shipping and bases in the Kuriles several times each month, and maintained photographic coverage to detect any increase in enemy installations. Light naval task forces, usually consisting of 3 of the older cruisers and from 5 to 7 destroyers, bombarded coastal positions in the Kuriles once in March, once in May, twice in June, and once in July, and even penetrated the Okhotsk Sea in search of enemy shipping. On 11-12 August cruisers and destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral J. H. Brown, Jr., combining a high-speed antishipping sweep on both sides of the central and northern Kuriles with bombardments of enemy shore installations, intercepted two enemy convoys and destroyed 10 trawlers and a subchaser

Land-Based Air Forces

With the exception of the B-29's of the Twentieth Air Force, the principal missions of land-based air forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas were support of the Iwo Jima and Okinawa operations, attacks on Japanese shipping, and continued neutralization of by-passed enemy bases.

During the period of this report, the greatest expansion of land-based air forces took place in the Army's Twentieth Air Force. Airfields in the Marianas were constantly increased to accommodate greater numbers of B-29's. When Iwo Jima became available for emergency landings, greater bomb loads were carried safely, and fighter support became possible. From that time until the end of hostilities, strategic bombing against vital Japanese industries and cities was constantly stepped up, coordinating with bombing by fleet planes, and many thousands of mines were dropped in Japan's harbors and sea lanes. Destruction resulting from these raids, and the final blows dealt with two powerful atomic bombs, undoubtedly were a major factor in forcing Japanese capitulation.

Of less spectacular nature, yet also important in their effect on the war, were the operations of other land-based air forces against enemy shipping and by-passed islands in the Pacific. With the capture and development of airfields on Okinawa, Army and Marine Corps bombers and fighters of the Tactical Air Force and Fleet Air Wings One and Eighteen were brought within easy range of the China coast, Korea, Shikoku, Kyushu, and even Honshu, and were enabled to bring Japanese shipping in these waters to a virtual standstill. Okinawa, as did Iwo Jima, returned rich dividends for the investment involved in its capture by hastening the war's end.

Support of the Iwo Jima and Okinawa campaigns, routine searches, and constant neutralizing attacks against the many islands of the Pacific still in the hands of enemy garrisons, were tasks which absorbed much of the time and effort of Army, Navy, and Marine land-based aviators throughout the Pacific, and were well coordinated with the air operations of the fast carrier task forces in the advance toward Japan.

The last night of the war saw the first and only offensive mission carried out from Okinawa against Japan by the B-29's of the recently deployed Eighth Air Force, with their target the industrial city of Kumagaya in northern Honshu.

Antisubmarine Warfare in the Pacific

By 1 March Japanese submarines had been nearly driven out of the central Pacific by our countermeasures. Only an occasional supply or reconnaissance submarine ventured into this area. Near the beginning of March Japanese submarines were encountered near Iwo Jima, and during the Okinawa campaign the Japanese made their main submarine effort around that island. After the fall of Okinawa, most of the Japanese submarines were drawn back to the homeland to aid in the defense against our expected invasion. In addition to these anti-invasion employments, the enemy was building and using a number of cargo submarines in an attempt to supply by-passed positions. A considerable number of their submarines were also employed for antisubmarine work. Our submarines made many reports of sighting hostile periscopes and torpedo wakes. A number of German U-boats continued to operated out of Penang, even after the surrender of Germany.

In the main the Japanese submarines were ineffective, and our antisubmarine measures, bolstered by the advanced techniques used in the Atlantic, took heavy toll. In return we suffered very light losses, with the exception of the sinking—with heavy loss of life—of the heavy cruiser INDIANAPOLIS, probably by an enemy submarine, on 30 July. In March and April antisubmarine measures executed by screening vessels, by planes from land bases and carriers, and by regular hunter-killer groups, effectively checked the Japanese submarines and accounted for several kills. It is interesting to note that several of these kills were made by our own submarines. Through May, June, July, and August the Japanese put an increased underwater fleet around Okinawa and managed to cause some damage, including the sinking of a destroyer escort in July. For these operations the Japanese were building and operating large numbers of midget submarines and human torpedoes. It is believed that the destroyer escort mentioned above was sunk by ramming a human torpedo. The Japanese submarine effort was rapidly descending to the suicide level; but by the end of the war it was well under control, as the Japanese shipyards were taking heavy damage from the air and more escorts were being released from the Atlantic after the surrender of Germany.

THE SURRENDER AND OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

With the reduction of Okinawa in June 1945, the campaign against the Japanese Empire was concentrated on the home islands, with intensified bombing by the Army Strategic Air Force from the Marianas, a rapid acceleration of attacks by the Okinawa-based Tactical Air Force, and far-ranging air attacks and bombardments by the Third Fleet. These operations were climaxed by the employment of the atomic bomb against Hiroshima and Nagasaki and, almost simultaneously, Russia's entry into the war to open a strong three-pronged attack on Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea.

On 14 August Japan declared her acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation, which involved complete disarmament and surrender of all military forces and equipment as set forth by the heads of the states of Great Britain, the United States, and China. The instrument of surrender was presented to Japanese representatives by General of the Army MacArthur at Manila on 19 August 1945. This instrument provided that Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific should receive the surrender of the Imperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders, and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces in the main islands of Japan, minor islands adjacent thereto, Korea south of 38° North latitude, and the Philippines; whereas the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet was designated to receive the surrender of the senior Japanese commanders and of all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces in the Japanese mandated islands, Ryukyus, Bonins, and other Pacific islands.

For this purpose the Third and Fifth Fleets, which had heretofore been alternative organizational titles for much the same assemblage of ships, were now each assigned approximately equal forces and became separate entities. Correlating the fleet assignments with the various zones of responsibility assigned the various Army commands, Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet assigned naval responsibility to the Third Fleet for the zone of the Eighth Army (to the northward and eastward of a line crossing Honshu west of Yokohama and Tokyo); to the Fifth Fleet for the zone of the Sixth Army (the remainder of the Japanese home islands to the southward and westward of that line); to the Seventh Fleet for that of the XXIV Corps (Korea south of 38° North latitude), as well as any operations which might be carried out in Chinese waters; and to the Commander, North Pacific, local responsibility for northern Honshu and for Hokkaido.

Similarly, the three amphibious forces were coordinated with the respective fleets and armies; the Third Amphibious Force under the Commander Third Fleet for operations of the Eighth Army; the Fifth under the Commander Fifth Fleet for operations of the Sixth Army; and the Seventh under the Commander Seventh Fleet for operations of the XXIV Corps and of any troops which might require transportation to China. B-day (the date designated by Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific for the initiation of operations) was proclaimed as 15 August 1945. At that time orders were issued to the U. S. Pacific Fleet and to other forces under the command of Fleet Admiral Nimitz to cease offensive operations against the Japanese.

On 28 August a small force of our Army Air Force technicians landed at Atsugi Airfield, 14 miles southwest of Tokyo, to prepare the way for a subsequent large-scale air-borne landing and for the landing at the Yokosuka naval base of Marine and Navy units. Originally it had been planned that this preliminary air-borne force should land at Atsugi on the 26th, and that General of the Army MacArthur should land there personally on the 28th to discuss occupation arrangements with members of the Imperial General Staff; simultaneously, Marine and Navy

units should land at the Yokosuka naval base below Tokyo, as well as at points in Sagami Bay.

The beginning of the occupation, however, was delayed 48 hours by a typhoon, which also caused postponement from 31 August until 2 September of signing of the formal instrument of surrender, a copy of which Japanese emissaries had brought back from Manila. Nevertheless, on the morning of 27 August an advanced unit of the Third Fleet, guided by a group of Japanese naval officers, harbor pilots, and interpreters, and provided with maps and charts, moved into Sagami Bay, which is just southwest of Tokyo Bay.

On 29 August Fleet Admiral Nimitz arrived from Guam to break his flag in the battleship SOUTH DAKOTA. Aboard the MISSOURI, Admiral Halsey, Commander Third Fleet, entered Tokyo Bay and anchored off Yokosuka naval base. The following day General of the Army MacArthur arrived at Atsugi Airfield to set up General Headquarters at Yokohama. With him came an aerial armada of troop-carrying planes. At the same time about 10,000 Marines and naval personnel landed and took possession of the Yokosuka base and neighboring fortress islands. Working toward a junction, the two forces deployed. The last day of August many American prisoners of war were freed and the area of occupation was expanded; new forces came ashore from transports, some groups reaching the outskirts of Tokyo.

The Japanese naval base of Tateyama, across the bay from Yokosuka, was occupied by Marines on 1 September, as American control spread smoothly and swiftly throughout the whole area south of the capital.

The formal surrender of the Japanese Imperial Government, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and all Japanese and Japanese-controlled armed forces wherever located, was signed on board the battleship MISSOURI in Tokyo Bay at 0908 on 2 September 1945. General of the Army MacArthur signed as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and Fleet Admiral Nimitz signed as representative for the United States.

Even before the formal surrender of the Japanese government, the Japanese commander of Mille Atoll in the Marshall Islands had surrendered on 22 August aboard the destroyer escort LEVY, Mille being

—Official U.S. Navy photo

SAGAMI BAY, 28 AUGUST 1945
Mount Fujiyama in the background

the first of the many Japanese island possessions to capitulate as a result of the Emperor's acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation. Nine days later, on 31 August, on board the destoyer BAGLEY, Rear Admiral F. E. M. Whiting received the surrender of Marcus Island.

The largest-scale island surrender, however, came shortly after the senior Japanese Army and Navy officers at Truk Atoll had received word of the capitulation of the Imperial government. By the act of signing the terms of the surrender, the Commander of the 31st Imperial Japanese Army committed the following islands under his control to laying down their arms and awaiting United States occupation: Truk, Wake, the Palaus, Mortlock, Mille, Ponape, Kusaie, Jaluit, Maleolap, Wotje, Enderby, Mereyon, Rota and Pagan. The affixing of the signature of the Commander of the Imperial Japanese Fourth Fleet further entailed the surrender of the Japanese Navy-controlled bases of Namorik, Nauru, and Ocean. In the case of both Army and Navy surrenders, the actual capitulation by individual islands was effectuated over a period of several days following; however, their submission became only a matter of time after the Truk ceremony.

It was estimated that a total of 130,000 Japanese military personnel were involved in the Truk surrender—on Truk itself a total of 49,000 military and 9,000 civilians; on Babelthuap in the Palaus, 27,000 military and 12,000 civilians; on Ponape 8,900; and additional large groups on Rota and Yap, with the remainder spread thinly throughout the Caroline and Marianas Islands. On 3 September the surrender of the Bonin Islands was received, and four days later the capitulation of 105,000 Japanese Army and Navy forces in some 60 islands of the Ryukyu group was signed at General Stillwell's Tenth Army Headquarters on Okinawa.

Five days after the formal Japanese surrender, General of the Army MacArthur entered Tokyo, and his troops raised the United States flag over the American Embassy. It was the same flag which had flown over Washington, D. C., on 7 December 1941; which had been hoisted over Rome and Berlin; and which had been flown on the battleship MISSOURI while the Japanese signed their surrender there.

Our access to the Japanese homeland gave opportunity at last for securing reliable information as to conditions there, both by our own observation and by conversation with Japanese officials who no longer had the incentive or the ability to deceive either their enemies or their own people. It was at once apparent that while the damage to their cities and production centers by strategic bombing was fully as great as photographic reconnaissance had indicated, the strangulation from our less obvious but relentlessly effective surface and submarine blockade and from our carrier-based air attacks had been a decisive factor in the enemy's collapse. Their merchant marine had been reduced to a fraction of its former size; of the few remaining ships, mostly small ones, only half were still operable. Their food situation was critical, and their remaining resources in fuel and all strategic materials were not less so. It had been known that their few remaining carriers and heavy naval vessels had been damaged, but it appeared that the fury of our carrier strikes had forced them to withdraw all but a handful of men from these ships, practically abandoning them.

Never before in the history of war had there been a more convincing example of the effectiveness of sea power than when a well-armed, highly efficient and undefeated army of over a million men surrendered their homeland unconditionally to the invader without even token resistance.

True, the devastation already wrought by past bombings, as well as the terrible demonstration of power by the first atomic bombs, augured nothing less for the Japanese than total extinction; yet without sea power there would have been no possession of Saipan, Iwo Jima and Okinawa from which to launch these bombings. True, the Japanese homeland might have been taken by assault in one final amphibious operation of tremendous magnitude, yet without sea power such an assault could not have been attempted.

III—*Logistics and* Bases—*Pacific*

Before the conclusion of the war, plans were maturing for the invasion and occupation of the main Japanese islands. Two major operations were projected: the first, with the code name of "Olympic", against southern Kyushu; after consolidation there the next—"Coronet"—into the Tokyo plain area which is the industrial heart of Japan. The amphibious parts of these operations—involving the preparation of landing beaches by mine sweeping, underwater demolition teams, bombardment and bombing; the transportation of the assault troops; and the initial landing for the establishment of firmly held beachheads—were to have been the responsibility of Fleet Admiral Nimitz.

The large-scale bombardments and bombings of the Third Fleet that began on 10 July were actually in preparation for operation "Olympic". In mid-August, as the war ended, the United States Navy had in the Pacific 90 per cent of its combatant vessels of submarine size or larger and 42 per cent of its combatant aircraft. These ships, aircraft, support auxiliaries and landing craft included:

—Official U.S. Navy photo

OKINAWA

Aviation mechanics work over U.S. Navy PRIVATEER engines at an Okinawa base, while ground fighting is still in progress on the island

Battleships	23
Aircraft carriers	26
Escort carriers	64
Cruisers	52
Destroyers	323
Escort vessels	298
Submarines	181
Mine craft	160
Auxiliary vessels	1,060
Large landing craft	2,783
Combat aircraft	14,847
Transport, training and utility aircraft	1,286

All six Marine divisions, or 100 per cent of the Marine Corps combat strength, were also available for Pacific operations. The "Olympic" and "Coronet" operations as planned would have been the largest amphibious operations in history. While the Third Fleet provided strategic cover and support for the amphibious forces making the invasion, the Fifth Fleet was to have executed the amphibious phases of the invasions of Kyushu and Honshu by transporting their troops and equipment to the attack position on shore. By the application of naval force they would have established the necessary ground troops in positions favorable for further maneuvers to complete the destruction of Japanese ground forces.

In discharging its responsibilities for the amphibious phase of the Kyushu or "Olympic" operation the United States Navy would have employed 3033 combatant and noncombatant vessels of a size larger than personnel landing boats. Although the application of our sea power in its various forms proved sufficient to bring Japan to terms without the necessity of invading her home islands, the possibility of invasion on the scale contemplated indicates the amazing progress in matters of supply and support that has been made in less than four years of war.

In this evolution advance bases have played a vital role. The 1940 Navy had no properly equipped advance bases other than Pearl Harbor. More than 400 have since been established in the Atlantic and Pacific areas in order to maintain the fleet and air forces in the forward areas where there was fighting to be done. As we progressed across the Pacific, islands captured in one amphibious operation were converted into bases which became spring boards for the next advance. These bases were set up for various purposes depending upon the next operation. At first they were mainly air bases for the support of bombers and for the use of protective fighters. This gradually changed to the establishment of staging bases for the anchoring, fueling and refitting of armadas of transports and cargo ships, and for replenishing mobile support squadrons which actually accompanied the combat forces and serviced them at sea. Further advances made necessary the development of repair and refitting bases for large amphibious forces. As we progressed further and further across the Pacific, it became necessary to set up main repair bases for the maintenance, repair and servicing of larger fleet units. The first of such large bases was set up at Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides and was followed by a main repair base at Manus in the Admiralty Islands. It was then determined that so long as ships were in condition to function in the battle line, minor battle damage and derangements should be rectified in the forward area, thus eliminating the necessity of returning ships to continental bases or even to the Hawaiian Islands.

These conditions were recognized and steps were taken to support the entire fleet in the Marianas, Philippines and Okinawa areas. A very large base, capable of suporting one third of the Pacific Fleet, was set up at Guam; another large base was established at Leyte-Samar; a third was in process of construction at Okinawa when the war ended. Each of these bases was designed to dock ships of various sizes, some being able to take ships of the heaviest tonnage. All of the bases could repair major battle

damage to hull and equipment. Facilities were established ashore with piers, roads and machine shops, in large measure duplicating the type of facilities found at any of our navy yards. There was also provided the replenishment storage necessary to restock every type of vessel with fuel, ammunition and consumable supplies as well as food. The stocks currently on hand at Guam would have filled a train 120 miles long. The magnitude of the fuel supply alone is indicated by the total of 25,026,000 barrels of bulk fuel which was shipped to the Pacific in June 1945 for military purposes. At Guam alone one million gallons of aviation gas were used daily. As these bases were gradually pushed forward, assault forces were brought two to five days' steaming nearer the enemy. By proper selection of the strategic points necessary to accomplish the advance, we were able to by-pass and ignore many bases established by the Japanese which they could no longer use because of their loss of command of the sea.

But for this chain of advance bases the fleet could not have operated in the western reaches of the Pacific without the necessity for many more ships and planes than it actually had. A base to supply or repair a fleet 5000 miles closer to the enemy multiplies the power which can be maintained constantly against him and greatly lessens the problems of supply and repair. The scope of the advance base program is indicated by the fact that the personnel assigned directly to it aggregated almost one fifth of the entire personnel of the Navy—over half a million men, including almost 200,000 Seabees. In the concluding months of the war 82 per cent of the Seabees were in the Pacific, the vast majority of them at work on bases. In the Naval Supply Depot at Guam there were 93 miles of road. At Okinawa alone there were more than fifty naval construction battalions building roads, supply areas, airfields and fleet facilities for what would have been one of the gigantic staging areas for the final invasion of Japan.

In the period covered by this report almost two million measurement tons of materiel were shipped in connection with the advance base program.

An essential element in the facilities of our advance bases were floating drydocks, which were capable of receiving vessels ranging from small craft to the battleship MISSOURI. One hundred fifty two of these docks were produced. They proved their special value in the speed with which damaged ships could be returned to combat.



—Official U.S. Navy photo

FLOATING DRYDOCK AT A PACIFIC BASE

Capable of receiving vessels ranging from small craft to battleships

As our advance came nearer to the Japanese islands, the rear areas which had been the scene of combat operations in earlier months were utilized for logistic support. In the South Pacific, for example, more than 400 ships were staged for the Okinawa operation. They received varied replenishment services, including routine and emergency overhaul as required. Approximately 100,000 officers and men were staged from this area alone for the Okinawa campaign, including four Army and Marine combat divisions plus certain headquarters and corps troops and various Army and Navy service units. Concurrently with the movement of troops large quantities of combat equipment and necessary materiel were

transferred forward, thus contributing automatically to the roll-up of the South Pacific area. Similarly in the Southwest Pacific area Army service troops were moved with their equipment from the New Guinea area to the Philippines in order to prepare staging facilities for troops deployed from the European Theater. The roll-up was similarly continued and progress made in reducing our installations in Australia and New Guinea.

This vast deployment of our forces throughout the Pacific required careful planning not only at the front but also in the United States. During the last six months of the war the problem of materiel distribution became of primary importance, and throughout this period our system of logistic support had to be constantly modified to meet the rapidly changing tactical conditions. War production had shifted the emphasis from procurement to distribution; that is, while production was still of high importance, a still greater problem was that of getting well balanced materiel support to designated positions at certain fixed times. Put another way, motion, not size, had become the important factor. It was, nevertheless, essential in insuring the uninterrupted flow of materiel through the pipe-line of supply to our forces overseas that the reservoir within the United States which kept these pipe-lines full did not become too large. On 1 June 1945 a set of standards for Navy inventory control was promulgated which stressed a balance between procurement and inventory. The attainment of these standards was of primary importance to efficient distribution of materiel within the United States, and particularly on the west coast, which was our major base for the logistic support of the Pacific Fleet.

It has always been a cardinal principle of our Pacific logistic support policy that the west coast be utilized to its maximum capacity. There are two reasons for this: the source of supply must be as close to the point of requirement as possible so that inventories at advance bases may be kept to a minimum; secondly, greater utilization of shipping can be achieved by the shortest haul possible. The integration of these two elements, supply and shipping, was a major task in 1945.

When the collapse of Germany was imminent, a review in conjunction with the Army of our policy of maximum west coast utilization was necessary. It was concluded that approximately 68 per cent of the Navy's predicted logistic requirements would have to be moved from the west coast to bases in the Marianas, Philippines and Okinawa, as well as to the mobile logistic support forces—Service Squadrons Six and Ten. Bases in the Admiralties, New Guinea, and the Hawaiian Sea Frontier, since they were in nonoperational areas, could be supported from the east and Gulf coasts. In May, after a joint Army-Navy study, a ceiling was set on the amount of material which could be shipped to the Pacific from the west coast by the Army and Navy; this ceiling was based on the estimated capacity of the six major west coast ports. By detailed study of the capacities of port facilities and supply activities, as well as a complete analysis of the types of commodities shipped by the Navy since the first of the year,



—Official U.S. Navy photo

BATTLESHIP BEING REFUELED AT SEA

Commander, Western Sea Frontier (who coordinated naval logistic matters on the west coast) reallocated the Navy's share of west coast capacity among the various ports. Estimated tonnages were set for each port, both by types of commodity and by overseas destination to be served.

In the establishment and execution of this planned employment of west coast facilities, Commander, Western Sea Frontier provided one of the major links between the distribution systems of the continental United States and Pacific Theater. Since the flow of materiel and the ships to carry it are im-

—Official U.S. Navy photo

CARRIER RECEIVING AMMUNITION AT SEA

mobilized when more ships have sailed to a destination than that destination can receive, the planned employment of west coast ports was a matter of vital concern.

This was facilitated by the expansion of the functions of the Western Sea Frontier which had taken place in November 1944 when the necessity for coastal defense had assumed relatively minor proportions. The expansion of function included placing every major activity of the three west coast naval districts under a single command, with a view to coordinating all essential matters of materiel and personnel and to eliminating activities within the Western Sea Frontier which did not contribute to the major effort.

While defensive operations became secondary, the responsibility of the Western Sea Frontier to regulate the movement of ships and aircraft through frontier waters was greatly increased. The eastern Pacific had become a network of channels for the passage of traffic to the forward areas. These channels were the most heavily traveled military highways on and above the sea. In the period covered by this report there were over 17,000 sailings of vessels large and small through the six million square miles of Western Sea Frontier waters. In the same period an average of one aircraft arrived on or departed from the west coast each fifteen minutes on the longest over-water flight lane in the world.

The substantial increase in the level of Navy materiel movement which occurred between March and July 1945 fully justified the planning for an increased west coast load which had been undertaken. Total exports, excluding aircraft, from May through July showed a 25 per cent increase over March and April shipments. Items used in the construction of new bases doubled during May and July as compared with March and April. Ammunition shipments doubled, because of the considerable expenditures during the Okinawa campaign (where 50,000 tons of 5-inch to 16-inch projectiles were fired by surface ships) and the necessity for building up a reserve for the assault upon Japan.

By the vast system thus developed the great concluding operations in the Pacific were supported. Each month in the immediate past we shipped out 600,000 long tons a month into the Pacific Ocean areas. The momentum generated by this materiel operation can be imagined. The problem presented by the deceleration of this great tide of supply after V-J day can also be imagined. The following steps taken in the days immediately after the surrender of Japan indicate the effort the Navy has made to reduce its logistic energy as rapidly as possible without damage either to the domestic economy or to the support of fleet elements still at sea. All shipments of ammunition and of advance base components were stopped except those required for occupational purposes and those specifically requested by the fleet commanders as necessary for further operations. Maintenance materiel movements overseas were subjected to careful review and reduction. Stock levels at overseas bases of provisions, clothing, equipment, medical needs, aviation requirements and spare parts items were reduced to a thirty-day minimum and a sixty-day maximum. Orders prepared in advance cancelling procurement of materials were mailed in tremendous volume from the Navy Department on the night of 14 August. All continental public works construction projects, including those actually under construction and those on which it was possible to begin construction, were carefully reviewed—projects which were not required for demobilization purposes or postwar purposes were cancelled.

IV—*Submarine Operations*

Submarine warfare was an important factor in the defeat of the Japanese. With the end of hostilities, it is now possible to reveal in greater detail the splendid accomplishments of the submarines of the Pacific Fleet and the Seventh Fleet. Our submarines are credited with almost two thirds of the total tonnage of Japanese merchant marine losses, or a greater part than all other forces, surface and air, Army and Navy combined. Of the total number of Japanese naval vessels sunk, our submarines are credited with almost one third.

ATTACKS ON MERCHANT SHIPPING

Our submarines, operating thousands of miles from their bases and deep within enemy-controlled waters, began their campaign of attrition on Japanese shipping immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, and continued to fight with telling effectiveness until the Japanese capitulated. During the early part of 1942, while our surface forces were still weakened by the Japanese initial attack of 7 December 1941, submarines were virtually the only United States naval forces that could be risked in offensive operations. Although the number of submarines available at the start was so small that the 1500 ton fleet-type class was augmented by older types, submarine attacks produced immediate and damaging results, which were greatly needed at the time. They made it more difficult for the enemy to consolidate his forward positions, to reinforce his threatened areas, and to pile up in Japan an adequate reserve of fuel oil, rubber, and other loot from his newly conquered territory. Their operations thus hastened our ultimate victory and resulted in the saving of American lives.

Sinkings of enemy merchant ships rose from 134 ships totalling 580,390 tons in 1942 to 284 ships


Japanese Merchant Shipping of 1000 or more gross tons
Sunk 1941 - 1945 Inclusive
63%
Sunk by U.S. Submarines alone
37%
Sunk by all other means, Army and Navy combined

Plate 2

—Official U.S. Navy

totalling 1,341,968 tons in 1943. Then in 1944, when submarine coordinated attack groups reached the peak of their effectiveness, the merchant fleet of Japan suffered its worst and most crippling blow—492 ships of 2,387,780 tons were sunk or destroyed in submarine torpedo and gun attacks. The figures given above, which are based on evaluated estimates, include only ships of 1000 tons and larger. It should be borne in mind that our submarines sank or destroyed, chiefly by gunfire, large numbers of smaller vessels, particularly during the latter part of the war, when few large enemy ships still remained afloat.

In 1945, because of the tremendous attrition on Japanese shipping by our earlier submarine operations and the destructive sweeps by our fleets and carrier air forces, enemy merchantmen sunk by submarines dropped to 132 ships totalling 469,872 tons. The advance of our bases had further driven Japanese ships back to the coast lines and shallow waters of Japan and the Asiatic mainland. Our submarines followed the enemy shipping into these dangerous waters and made many skillful and daring attacks, such as the one in April when TIRANTE entered a patrolled anchorage in Quelpart Island to blow up a 10,000 ton tanker and two 1,500 ton escort vessels, which were peacefully lying at anchor. Further south, persistent submarine patrolling plus air sweeps had, by the end of March, stopped almost all enemy traffic along the sea lanes of the East Indies and the coast of Indo-China.

For a time, Japanese shipping continued to ply in the East China and Yellow Seas, but the invasion of Okinawa in April soon made the East China Sea untenable to the Japanese. Causing heavy damage, our submarines were very active during April and May in the Yellow Sea and along the east and south coasts of the main Japanese islands. In June the landlocked sea of Japan was penetrated in force. The submarines had excellent hunting, and in a series of coordinated attacks did tremendous damage to the remnants of the Japanese merchant fleet. One of the intruders, BARB, even landed a party on the coast of Honshu, and successfully blew up a bridge and the speeding train that was crossing it. By the end of the war, the Japanese merchant fleet was virtually nonexistent.

ATTACKS ON NAVAL VESSELS

While United States submarines were effectively eliminating the Japanese merchant fleet, they were also carrying out damaging attacks on Japanese naval units. During the course of the war, the following principal Japanese combatant types were sent to the bottom as a result of these attacks:

1 battleship
4 carriers
4 escort carriers
3 heavy cruisers
9 light cruisers
43 destroyers
23 submarines
189 minor combatant vessels and naval auxiliaries, including 60 escort vessels.

Details of these sinkings will be found in Appendix A. While the loss of the heavier naval units was

critical to the Japanese, especially as the strength of our surface fleet increased, the surprisingly high losses of enemy destroyers and escort vessels to submarine attack are particularly noteworthy. Our submarines, refusing to accept the role of the hunted, even after their presence was known, frequently attacked their arch-enemies under circumstances of such great risk that the failure of their attack on the enemy antisubmarine vessel placed the submarine in extreme danger of loss. So successful, however, were these attacks that the Japanese developed a dangerous deficiency of destroyer screening units in their naval task forces, and their merchant shipping was often inadequately escorted.

SPECIAL MISSIONS

Among the special missions performed by submarines were reconnaissance, rescue, supply and lifeguard duties. An outstanding result of effective submarine reconnaissance was the vital advance information furnished our surface and air forces prior to the Battle for Leyte Gulf, information which contributed materially to that victory. Our submarines in a number of instances rescued stranded personnel and performed personnel evacuation duties, notably from Corregidor. The supplies and equipment delivered by submarines to friendly guerrilla forces in the Philippines did much to keep alive the spirit of resistance in those islands.

When our air forces came into positions from which they could intensify their attacks on Japanese-held territory, United States submarines were called upon to carry out lifeguard operations to rescue aviators forced down at sea in enemy waters. Sometimes assisted by friendly aircraft, which provided fighter cover and assisted in locating survivors, and sometimes operating alone, our submarines rescued more than 500 aviators during the course of the war.

Fifty-two United States submarines were lost from all causes during the war, forty-six due to enemy action, six due to accidents and stranding. These losses were due to continued penetration deep within the enemy zone of defense, far from our bases, and, until the last phase of the war, far beyond the areas where our surface ships and aircraft could operate. Because of the nature of submarine operations and the general necessity of submarines operating alone, the personnel loss in most instances was the entire ship's company. As heavy as were the losses in submarine personnel and equipment, submarine training and building programs supplied replacements so effectively that our submarine force at the end of the war far exceeded its pre-Pearl Harbor strength—and was the most powerful and effective in the world. The Japanese capitulation found our submarines on station searching for the remnants of the Japanese Navy and merchant marine, and on the alert to rescue downed aviators off the coast of Japan.

Submarines of the Pacific Fleet have been commanded by Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, Jr., since February 1943. Rear Admiral James Fife, Jr., has commanded the Seventh Fleet submarines, including a number of British and Dutch submarines, since December 1944.

No account of submarine warfare in the Pacific would be complete without mention of the splendid contribution of the submarines of our Allies. These craft, operating in the southwest Pacific, contributed materially to the destruction of Japanese naval and merchant shipping, and inflicted losses over and above those previously listed.

V—*Atlantic Operations*

The operations of the United States Navy in the Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters culminated in the victory of the Allied nations in Europe. The success of the joint antisubmarine campaign and the tremendous achievements in shipbuilding were essential preludes to the landings in Normandy and southern France and the great land offensive, which in three months carried the Allied Expeditionary Forces to the German frontier and brought total victory on German soil six months later. This victory was possible because ships were available and their protection by the Navy effective.

ANTISUBMARINE OPERATIONS

In the antisubmarine campaign our Atlantic Fleet had responsibility for Atlantic areas under United States operational command, and the British Admiralty was responsible for North Atlantic and European operations in which United States naval task forces participated. In the British control areas Commander U. S. Naval Forces in Europe assured proper liaison between the Admiralty and the Tenth Fleet organization in my Headquarters, which was responsible for convoy and routing of United States shipping and the development of plans, weapons, and tactics to be employed in antisubmarine operations.

In the final month of the European war, German submarines made a last determined effort, in great strength, to reach the eastern coast of the United States. That attempt was thwarted by a powerful task force of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet, which, during an engagement lasting several days, destroyed five U-boats. The United States Navy's final successful action against German submarines occurred on 6 May, only two days before V-E day, when a U-boat was sunk off Block Island by the destroyer escort ATHERTON with the frigate MOBERLY assisting.

The development of new techniques, the intensive training of antisubmarine crews, and the persistence with which the U-boats were hunted offensively all played vital parts in the surrender campaign. German submarines began to surface and surrender shortly after V-E day, and U. S. Atlantic Fleet escort vessels brought several of them to United States east coast ports.

A review of antisubmarine and convoy operations since 1939 illustrates clearly these major naval contributions to victory in Europe. The summarized statistics on the Battle of the Atlantic are as follows:

Year	German Subs. Sunk	Allied Shipping Sunk	New Construction U. S.	New Construction British	New Construction Total	Net Gains or Losses
	(Number)		(In thousands of tons)			
1939 (4 mos.)	9	810	101	231	332	—478
1940	22	4,407	439	780	1,219	—3,188
1941	35	4,398	1,169	815	1,984	—2,414
1942	85	8,245	5,339	1,843	7,182	—1,063
1943	237	3,611	12,384	2,201	14,585	+10,974
1944	241	1,422	11,639	1,710	13,349	+11,927
1945 (4 mos.)	153	458	3,551	283	3,834	+3,376
Totals	782	23,351	34,622	7,863	42,485	+19,134

From the foregoing statistical summary the chief features of the Battle of the Atlantic are clear:

(a) Until the closing months of 1942 the German submarines were continuing to reduce the available total of Allied tonnage;

(b) Antisubmarine operations resulted in the sinking of an average of 12 German submarines per month after 1 January 1943, or a total of 480 in the two years 1943-44;

(c) American shipyards alone produced an average of a million tons per month of new merchant ships after 1 January 1943, or a total of 24,000,000 tons in two years.

In the 12 months from 1 June 1944, 135 convoys arrived in United Kingdom ports from overseas with a total of 7157 merchant ships totalling more than 50,000,000 gross tonnage. The escort of this shipping and the provision of trained naval armed guard crews aboard the merchant vessels were among the primary tasks performed by the United States Navy in the prosecution of the war in Europe. The Navy's antisubmarine campaign with the British-United States integrated convoy system was in great part responsible for the vital shipping necessary for the Allied land offensive which broke into the Fortress of Europe in 1944 and overwhelmed the Germans ashore in 1945.

TENTH FLEET

On 15 June 1945 the Tenth Fleet was dissolved. This effective organization was established 20 May 1943 under my direct command, with Headquarters in the Navy Department, to exercise unity of control over United States antisubmarine operations in that part of the Atlantic Ocean under United States strategic control. The first Chief of Staff of the Tenth Fleet was Rear Admiral Francis S. Low, who was relieved in January 1945 by Rear Admiral A. R. McCann.

To the Tenth Fleet were assigned the following tasks:

(a) Destruction of enemy submarines.

(b) Protection of Allied shipping in the Eastern, Gulf, and Caribbean Sea Frontiers.

(c) Support of other antisubmarine forces of our own and of the other Allied nations operating in the Atlantic areas.

(d) Exercise of control of convoys and shipping that were United States responsibilities.

(e) Correlation of United States antisubmarine training and materiel development.

To accomplish these tasks the Tenth Fleet was organized into four principal divisions: Operations; Antisubmarine Measures (materiel, training, analysis and statistics, and operational research); Convoy and Routing; and a Scientific Council composed of distinguished civilian scientists.

The Tenth was a fleet without a ship. However, this highly specialized command coordinated and directed our naval forces in the Battle of the Atlantic, making available the latest intelligence to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet and to other fleet and sea frontier commanders who directed the actual operations at sea, and supplying antisubmarine training and operating procedures to our forces afloat. The Tenth Fleet correlated the antisubmarine developments of the various technical bureaus of the Navy Department and the fleet training schools concerned with antisubmarine activities. In addition, it worked closely with the General Staff of the United States Army and with the British Admiralty and Canadian Naval Headquarters to avoid duplication and confusion, and to insure that maximum effort would be directed against the German underseas fleet. The effective work of the Tenth Fleet contributed outstandingly to the success of United States naval operations in the Battle of the Atlantic.

U. S. NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE

During the spring and summer of 1945 the United States Naval Forces in Europe were faced with a series of varied responsibilities. Until the surrender of Germany the Navy was actively engaged in coastal offensive operations and in supporting afloat the United States Army's build-up of men and supplies, which included assistance in areas as far inland as the Rhine; with the capitulation of the enemy came the establishment of United States naval commands in Germany to aid in the military occupation and government of that country and in the enforcement of the surrender terms. United States naval components also assumed duties with the Allied Military Missions to Denmark and Norway similar to those already established in France, Belgium and Holland. With the end of the war in Europe, the Navy speeded up the process of closing out the multitude of bases and other facilities which had been established earlier in the war in the United Kingdom, on the Continent, and in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Rhine River Crossing

The crossing of the Rhine River in March 1945 will be remembered as one of the spectacular achievements of the American forces during the closing months of the European war. In this operation the United States Navy had the honor of taking part as a floating segment of General of the Army Eisenhower's forces. LCVP's and LCM's, which had been used with great success in the coastal Normandy invasion, were again employed to carry our troops on rivers. The naval crews assigned to the operation began training in England in October 1944 and held their final practice maneuvers on the Continent later in the winter. Considerable ingenuity and improvisation were necessary to overcome technical difficulties, the craft employed having been constructed for salt water use and not as river craft in the fresh water of the swift-flowing Rhine. Five LCVP units of 24 craft each were formed in England and later moved to the Continent and placed under the operational control of United States Army commanders and administrative control of Vice Admiral Alan G. Kirk, Commander, U. S. Naval Forces France; of these, three actually participated in the crossings.

The first LCVP unit went into action with the United States First Army at the Remagen bridgehead on 11 March 1945, assisting, under heavy gunfire, in the erection of treadway and heavy pontoon bridges, in ferrying troops, and in patrolling the river. At Oppenheim on 23 March another LCVP unit carried portions of General Patton's Third Army across the Rhine, and the following day made a second crossing under heavy enemy fire at Boppard. Another crossing had been planned at St. Goar, but because of enemy resistance the operation was staged instead at Oberwesel, where, on 26 March, other units of the Third Army were ferried across. Still another crossing was made at Mainz. The LCVP units also served with the United States Ninth Army in its crossing of the Rhine south of Wesel, which occurred almost simultaneously with the Third Army's advance.

U. S. Naval Forces France

A second major operation in which the United States Navy played an important part during the last days of Nazi resistance was that directed against the German-held pockets in western France. Vice Admiral Kirk was placed in operational command of the French naval task force which was assembled for the attack. The United States Navy supplied fuel, training facilities, a repair unit, aircraft, and 24 LCVP's. The operation, which was directed against the enemy forces in the Ile d'Oleron and at the mouth of the Gironde River, began with a general naval bombardment at 0750 on 15 April. For five days the naval task force assisted the French ground forces with naval bombardment and aerial reconnaissance in the assault on Royan and the Point de Grave area at the mouth of the Gironde. By 20 April this section was cleared of the enemy and the assault on the Ile d'Oleron began the following day. Twenty-four United States LCVP's manned by French crews were used and supported by extensive naval bombardment. The actual landings on Ile d'Oleron took place on 30 April and all enemy resistance ceased there on 2 May. With the general capitulation of the enemy on 8 May, the remaining German pockets at La Rochelle, Lorient, St. Nazaire, etc., were occupied by French forces accompanied by American naval observers.

While the Rhine crossings and the attacks on the German pockets were going on, the Navy was continuing its less publicized but equally important task of assisting the Army's build-up of troops and materiel through its port operations, both along the English Channel and in the southern French ports. Men and munitions poured onto the Continent through Marseilles, Toulon, Cherbourg, Le Havre and Rouen. At the great port of Antwerp alone almost 20,000 tons of supplies were unloaded daily.

From the United States Navy's airfield at Dunkeswell in Devon, patrol planes of Fleet Air Wing Seven maintained a constant search of shipping lanes for enemy submarines. When the surrender of Germany came on 8 May, the German High Command was ordered to instruct its U-boats at sea to surface, radio their position, jettison their ammunition, fly a black flag and proceed by fixed routes to prescribed ports. The first U-boat to comply with this order surrendered on 9 May to a PB4Y-1 plane of Fleet Air Wing Seven on patrol off Lands End, England.

U. S. Naval Forces Germany

With the disintegration of the enemy armies and the movement of Allied forces deeper into Germany, the organization of the United States naval command for Germany was put into effect. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, as Commander, U. S. Naval Forces Germany, became responsible for all United States naval forces operating in Germany. As head of the Naval Division of the United States Group of the Allied Control Council, Vice Admiral Ghormley acted as General of the Army Eisenhower's adviser in all naval matters and conferred with the other Allied naval commanders in Germany on such questions as repairs of shipping and disposition of enemy naval vessels. In June Vice Admiral Ghormley established his headquarters in Frankfurt. On 1 July he assumed operational control of all naval forces on the Continent assigned to occupation duties or to the support of the Army in the European Theater of Operations. These included, in addition to the forces in Germany, the United States Naval Components of the Military Missions to Norway, Denmark, Holland and Belgium, the United States Naval Group France, and the Naval Division of the Allied Control Commission for Austria.

Under Admiral Ghormley's command in Germany was Rear Admiral A. G. Robinson, who, as Commander of U. S. Ports and Bases Germany, was charged with the operation of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven in the American-controlled Weser River Enclave. Rear Admiral Robinson's headquarters were established in Bremen on 15 May. This task force began operating at once, supervising the disposition of captured and surrendered naval per-

sonnel, clearing the port areas for incoming shipping, and seizing prize merchant ships which had been captured there. Of these the liner EUROPA was by far the most important. A modern ship in relatively good condition, she was converted into a troop transport almost immediately; although somewhat hampered by lack of facilities and skilled labor, the Europa was commissioned as U. S. Navy APA-177 and manned by naval personnel. She sailed from Bremerhaven on 11 September to Southampton to embark her first load of almost 5000 returning American troops.

Bremen and Bremerhaven, as the two United States naval controlled ports in Germany, had an important role to play in the occupation of the country. They served as important supply and evacuation ports for the United States occupation forces; their shipyards and repair facilities, under United States naval control, were used for the repair of German and Allied ships in the area.

Another United States naval command whose work was accelerated by the surrender of Germany was the U. S. Naval Technical Mission Europe, under Commodore H. A. Schade. This organization, which is under the operational control of the Chief of Naval Operations, is the agency for the collection of intelligence information from the surrendered nations for the use of the United States Navy. Working closely with the Army G-2 Staff Division and with Allied Intelligence Services, the U. S. Naval Technical Mission Europe has uncovered a vast amount of data concerning German wartime industrial and scientific developments, the status of experiments on secret weapons, etc.

U. S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters

In March 1945 the U. S. Eighth Fleet, which had been under the command of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt since March 1943, was dissolved; in April the naval forces and bases in the Mediterranean Theater were placed under the administrative control of Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in Europe. These forces, commanded by Vice Admiral W. A. Glassford as Commander, U. S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters, thereby became a task force of the Twelfth Fleet.

Although the over-all strength was reduced, small naval detachments were maintained in Italy to support the United States Army there, to assist United States merchant shipping, and to continue United States naval representation on the Allied Commission for Italy.

Changes in Command

In the Azores United States naval forces were engaged chiefly in patrolling routes used for Army aircraft being returned to the United States. Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in Europe assumed administrative control of the Azores forces in July 1945.

A little over two months after the signing of the German surrender at Rheims, the Supreme Allied Military command under General of the Army Eisenhower was dissolved. On 14 July control of the American, British and French military and naval forces reverted to their respective national commands. For the American forces General of the Army Eisenhower remained the Supreme Commander with a composite United States Army-Navy-Air European Theater Staff. Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in Europe in London retained administrative control of all remaining United States naval forces in the theater. On 16 August Admiral Hewitt relieved Admiral Harold R. Stark, as Commander, Twelfth Fleet and Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in Europe.

Redeployment

When the fighting in Europe ceased, the United States Army was faced with the gigantic task of redeploying millions of its forces. Some of its men were to be sent home for discharge; others were to be ordered to the Far East. During the summer of 1945, through its various port parties and naval detachments, the Navy cooperated closely with the Army in speeding troop movement. Over 53,000 men were embarked from northern French ports in May, and in June more than 210,000. The July figures approached 350,000. The southern French ports of Marseilles and Toulon were also used for this work. From Le Havre and Antwerp many shipments of war materiel no longer needed in this theater were sent back to the United States.

Similarly the United States Navy developed its own redeployment program, transferring to the United States or to the Pacific forces and materiel no longer required for naval activities in Europe. Hundreds of amphibious ships and craft which had been used for assault operations and for the support of the Army build-up were no longer needed and were returned to the United States. Nearly all United States naval advanced bases, supply and repair facilities, etc., in Britain and the Mediterranean were now unnecessary and their closing proceeded at a rapid rate.

In Great Britain the summer months of 1945 saw the closing of the amphibious bases at Falmouth, Plymouth, Dartmouth, Portland-Weymouth and Southampton. With the end of the submarine menace the planes of Fleet Air Wing Seven, based at Dunkeswell, Devon, were returned to the United States. In France, Italy and in North Africa the operation of most of the liberated ports was rapidly returned to the national authorities. Port detachments were maintained at Le Havre, Marseilles and Naples to aid in the Army's redeployment program. When the command of U. S. Naval Forces France was abolished as a separate task force on 1 July, a naval task group, under Commander, U. S. Naval Forces Germany, was substituted therefor. In the Mediterranean, United States naval activities were likewise reduced. Naval Operating Base Oran was closed out and a naval detachment took its place in July. During the same month the office of Commander, Moroccan Sea Frontier was abolished. The naval facilities at Port Lyautey, Casablanca, Dakar and Agadir were organized as a naval task group. The naval advanced base

at Bizerte was decommissioned and reductions were effected at Palermo and Naples.

U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET

During the entire war combat vessels, auxiliaries, and landing craft were built and trained in large numbers on the east coast of the United States for duty in the Pacific. With the capitulation of Germany, the U. S. Atlantic Fleet was able to increase and intensify the redeployment of ships, men, and supplies to the Pacific. By 1 June Atlantic convoys were stopped, and all available escort ships and tankers thus released were made ready for operations against the Japanese. Large numbers of landing craft were returned from Europe and overhauled for Pacific duty. The further necessity of providing refresher training for the crews of these ships and craft devolved upon the Atlantic Fleet Operational Training Command. The Battle of the Atlantic had been chiefly a war against submarines; now all training was concentrated upon meeting the requirements of the Pacific war for accurate antiaircraft firing and shore bombardment. During the period covered by this report the Operational Training Command, Atlantic Fleet, trained some 995 ships for duty in the Pacific, of which 358 were new ships receiving the normal shakedown and 637 were ships which had been engaged in some phase of the European war.

Similarly, the Air Force Atlantic Fleet turned with increased intensity to the training of carrier air units and shore-based patrol squadrons for the Pacific Fleet. Typical of the changing nature of the carrier training program was the decommissioning of all composite squadrons, which had produced such effective results against the U-boats, and the commissioning of air groups for the large new carriers of the MIDWAY class. These new air groups are approximately one and one-half times the size of a normal carrier air group.

The surrender of Japan, occurring when the Atlantic Fleet redeployment program was at its height, necessitated rapid readjustments. Many ships, which were on their way to the Pacific or had just reached the forward areas, were ordered to return to the east coast ports. Instructions were promulgated indicating the status of vessels in the postwar Atlantic Fleet, and an appraisal of berthing areas for the Atlantic Fleet Reserve ships was pressed to completion. Similarly the program for revising, absorbing or decommissioning shore-based Atlantic Fleet activities was accelerated. In the South Atlantic a similar process had long since begun. In March 1945 the Rio-Trinidad convoys were discontinued. Then on 15 April the Fourth Fleet became a task force of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet, with Vice Admiral W. R. Munroe as task force commander and Commander, South Atlantic Force. The roll-up of forces continued, and on 13 August Vice Admiral Munroe hauled down his flag; the remaining naval activities in the South Atlantic were placed under the Commandant, Naval Operating Base Rio de Janeiro.

VI—*Ships, Aircraft & Personnel*

Fighting men are not effective, individually or collectively, unless they are imbued with high morale. Morale may be defined as a state of mind wherein there is confidence, courage and zeal among men united together in a common effort—a "conviction of excellence." One factor largely responsible for the extremely high morale of the men of the naval services has been their confidence in the excellence of the ships and planes provided them.

SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM

During the period 1 March to 1 October 1945 the following combatant ships were completed: 4 aircraft carriers (one of which was MIDWAY, the first of the three 45,000 ton carriers under construction), 8 escort carriers, 3 light cruisers, 6 heavy cruisers, 53 destroyers, 2 destroyer escorts and 24 submarines. During this same period over 300 auxiliary ships were completed by the Navy and the Maritime Commission, among them six of the most modern air-conditioned hospital ships in existence. The landing craft and district craft construction programs were continued, with the delivery of large numbers of each type. Twenty-nine mine-sweeping vessels were delivered. It was necessary to place particular emphasis upon the production of repair ships of all types. The large numbers of these delivered during this period, together with existing ships of the type, performed indispensable services in the forward areas in returning quickly to service many of the ships damaged in the Okinawa operation.

To meet changing conditions of war during this period, it was necessary to undertake a number of conversions of ships from one type to another. Notable among these was the conversion of certain patrol craft to control vessels for amphibious operations; frigates and certain patrol craft to weather station ships; a large number of personnel landing ships to gunboats for close inshore support of amphibious operations; a number of destroyer escorts to fast transports; certain destroyers and destroyer escorts to radar picket ships; and a number of destroyers to high-speed mine sweepers.

During the later phases of the war, as Japanese sea power waned, a review was made of the Navy's shipbuilding program to bring it in line with estimated operational requirements. On 10 August 1945

the Secretary of the Navy approved the termination of contracts for the construction of 56 combatant ships and 39 vessels of other types. Following the surrender of Japan, a complete review was made of the status of the construction and conversion program of auxiliaries, landing craft, district craft and small boats, in consequence of which the total number of cancellations was raised to the following:

Combatant Ships	56
Auxiliaries	94
Landing Ships	2
Patrol Craft	44
District Craft	121
Small Landing Craft	over 8,000

The effect of these cancellations is shown graphically in Plate 6.

Every effort has been made to keep the ships of the fleet fitted with the latest available equipment to meet rapidly changing combat conditions. Improved radar sets, aircraft and antiaircraft weapons, fire-control systems for guns, and fire-fighting equipment have been installed. The improvement of the offensive and defensive qualities of our ships by such alterations has been going on since the beginning of the war; as the war drew to a close, most ships of the fleet had reached a point at which no additional weights could be added without compensatory weight removals. The problem of applying the latest technological developments to our ships has thus become more difficult; nevertheless such application has been accomplished on an extensive scale by the cooperation of all concerned, both afloat and ashore.



Plate 3 —Official U.S. Navy

AIRCRAFT

Comparisons between standard Navy aircraft types at the beginning of the war and the end vividly illustrate the outstanding technical advances accomplished in less than four years of fighting. At the war's end we had the best airplanes of every kind, both ashore and afloat, but newer and better planes were on the production lines and would soon have taken their place against the enemy. Among these were the Grumman *Tigercat,* a twin-engine, single-seat fighter plane with heavy firepower and bomb-carrying characteristics. Although this plane had arrived in the Pacific, it never got into actual combat. Three other fighter planes, faster and possessing higher tactical performance than standard existing types, had satisfactorily passed the long period of experiments and flight tests and were in production. These included the Ryan *Fireball,* the Navy's first fighter plane to use jet propulsion. The others were Grumman's *Bearcat* and Goodyear's *F2G* (to which no popular name has yet been given) both high-speed, highly maneuverable and fast climbing planes. The latter was the first naval fighter to use the new Pratt and Whitney 3000 horsepower engine.

The Grumman *Wildcat,* which was a new fighter at the time of Pearl Harbor, had an approximate speed of 300 miles an hour and mounted four .50-caliber machine guns. The *Hellcats* and *Corsairs,* which were both carrier and shore-based on V-J day, have speeds of more than 400 and 425 miles an hour, respectively, and mount six .50-caliber machine guns, or proportionate numbers of 20-millimeter cannon, in addition to rockets. Bombs weighing up to 2000 pounds could also be carried by these planes when



Plate 4 —Official U.S. Navy



Plate 5 —Official U.S. Navy

they were assigned fighter-bomber missions. These planes played the leading role in our tactical development of fighter-bombing, a World War II innovation. Other technical developments, primarily air-borne radar, helped to bring into existence the Navy's night-fighting force. The *Wildcat,* greatly improved by various modifications by General Motors to give it greater speed and climb, continued to be used on the escort carriers.

Our dive-bomber, the *Helldiver,* has a speed of more than 250 miles an hour, can carry 2000 pounds of bombs, and is equipped with eight rocket launchers, two 20-millimeter cannon and two .30-caliber machine guns. These characteristics were developed through five modifications. The Douglas *Dauntless* was the standard dive-bomber when the war began, and delivered heavy blows against the enemy before it was retired as a first line plane. Its top speed was 230 miles an hour; it carried 1000 pounds of bombs, and mounted two .30-caliber and two .50-caliber machine guns.

Our torpedo bomber at the start of the war was the Douglas *Devastator,* a plane which had a speed of about 150 miles an hour and was very lightly armed. The Grumman *Avenger,* and later modifications of this plane by General Motors, gave us a plane with a speed of more than 250 miles an hour, capable of carrying 2000 pounds of bombs or a torpedo, four machine guns and rockets. One modification of the *Avenger* was a carrier-based night bomber to operate with night fighters.

Development and research in the dive-bomber and torpedo bomber field during the war yielded designs by Consolidated, Douglas and Martin. A few production models had been turned out by Consolidated and Douglas and several experimental models by Martin when V-J day came.

The standard scout-observation plane based aboard battleships and cruisers became the Curtiss *Seahawk,* replacing the Chance Vought *Kingfisher* and Curtiss *Seagull.* The *Seahawk* and *Kingfisher* played no small part in air-sea rescues.

The Consolidated *Catalina,* the veteran twin-engine patrol plane, was in operation at the start of the war and has proved to be one of the most valuable all-purpose planes. Planes of the sixth modification—or sixth major change—giving it greater range and speed are now with the fleet. The Martin *Mariner,* a larger, heavier plane, has taken over many of the patrol duties formerly handled by the *Catalinas.* Both of these planes also have performed outstanding service in air-sea rescue work.

For our four-engine, land-based search plane, we have replaced the Consolidated *Liberator* with the Consolidated *Privateer,* a plane with a range of well over 3000 miles, heavy armament and a wealth of new navigational, radio and radar equipment, enabling it to fly long hours of reconnaissance over trackless oceans. These planes, which carry bombs and depth charges, have made impressive records against isolated Japanese ships, small convoys, submarines and enemy-held islands in their search areas. Our newest twin-engine search plane is the Lockheed *Harpoon,* which took over the duties of the Lockheed *Ventura.* It carries bombs and rockets and has ten .50-caliber machine guns with



Plate 6 —Official U.S. Navy

which to protect itself. The range of the *Harpoon* is in excess of 2000 miles and its speed is more than 300 miles an hour.

The Naval Air Transport Service utilizes as its standard transport planes the Martin *Mars*, Douglas *Skymasters (R5D)* and *Skytrains (R4D)*, and Consolidated *Coronado* flying boats, while Marine Corps air transport groups use the Curtiss *Commandos* in large numbers. Established on 1 December 1943, the Naval Air Transport Service routes extend over approximately 80,000 miles, covering three quarters of the globe. In addition to carrying freight and passengers, the Service flew whole blood daily from the west coast to combat areas in the Pacific and evacuated wounded during the Okinawa campaign.

Improved cooling and other changes have increased the horsepower of standard combat engines 10 per cent with little or no increase in weight. Thus it has been possible to translate added power into increased climb and speed. New superchargers made it possible to hold high take-off horsepower to higher altitudes than was possible before. The adoption of water injection for engines to give pilots greater speed in emergencies also became general for all combat types.

Our requirement for the utmost in reliability and our long-held conviction that an air-cooled power plant installation was less vulnerable to damage than a liquid-cooled, has caused us to devote primary attention to the development of air-cooled engines, and hence, has contributed substantially to the aircraft program of the country. It can be claimed without exaggeration that the air-cooled aircraft engine of today would not have been developed effectively had it not been for the Navy's continued interest.

Other technological advances in naval aircraft have included the development of jet-assisted take off (which made it possible for seaplanes to carry much heavier loads), the largest helicopter yet flying, and radio-controlled target drones and missiles.



Plate 7

—Official U.S. Navy

PERSONNEL

The personnel strength of the United States Navy on 2 September 1945 was as follows:

Navy Only	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*
Officers (including warrants)	316,675	8,399	325,074*
Nurses	.....	10,968	10,968
Officer Candidates	62,913	12	62,925‡
Enlisted	2,935,695	73,685	3,009,380
TOTAL.....	3,315,283	93,064	3,408,347

*Includes 4,038 male officers and 196 female officers whose separations are pending.

‡Includes 5,129 personnel in enlisted ratings who are taking officer candidate training.

PERSONNEL OUTSIDE U. S.



Plate 8

—Official U. S. Navy

Data concerning the number of personnel on board and the deployment of personnel overseas throughout the war is presented in graphic form in Plates 7 and 8.

After nearly four years of procuring personnel, the Navy is now faced with the task of ensuring the orderly return to civilian life of three million men and women. By January of 1946 one of every three persons in the wartime Navy will have been separated. By the end of January half the total personnel, and by the end of March two thirds, will have been demobilized. It is expected that the rest of the temporary personnel will be discharged by 1 September 1946.

Guided by national policy, as determined by the Congress, careful consideration is being given to the size of the Navy that will be required when demobilization is completed. Roughly the current estimate provides for an active Navy which will be 30 per cent of our present war strength.

The Navy's need for officers after the war is governed by the size of the fleet which the Congress determines is necessary to defend the United States and Western Hemisphere, and to discharge our international agreements and obligations. We know that the Navy will need more officers and men than it now has in the Regular Navy—approximately 30,000 more officers and a total of about 500,000 men. One of the best sources of the additional officers required is the Reserve and Temporary officers now on duty. The program for their selection and transfer is well under way. On 16 August 1945 the Secretary of the Navy addressed a message to the service requesting that Reserve and Temporary USN officers desiring to transfer to the Regular Navy submit their applications. The legislation upon which the program is dependent has been introduced in Congress.

The Navy is extremely proud of the work done by the Women's Reserve. It is our plan to keep a WAVES component in the Naval Reserve. Further, if Congress approves, we will seek to retain on active duty a reasonable number of WAVES who wish to remain and who may be needed in certain specialties. We know from experience that they can be useful after the war in such specialties as communications, the Medical Corps, and certain types of naval aviation duty.

HEALTH

During the spring and summer of 1945 the Medical Department applied the medical experience of earlier operations in its support of the Navy's assault upon the inner defenses of Japan. Improvements in medical care of naval personnel included a more effective chain of evacuation, of which large-scale use of aircraft formed an important part, the provision for a smoother and more rapid flow of medical supplies to the fighting fronts, and the development of an intensive program of preventive medicine, which kept illnesses throughout the Navy and Marine Corps at a low level.

In past wars, disease and infection have caused more deaths and disability in armed forces than actual combat itself. World War I significantly checked this tendency, but the real advantages of modern medical procedures, techniques, and knowledges were experienced during World War II. Navy medical statistics show that of the wounded who survived until they could receive medical care, about 98 out of 100 lived. The most recent tabulations indicate an estimated rate for casualty deaths of 8.7 for the first six months of 1945 in terms of total naval strength as against 4.3 per thousand in 1944. This is primarily a reflection of Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and the attacks of the Japanese "kamikaze" pilots. The total death rate from all causes was 6.7 per thousand for 1944 in terms of total naval strength as against 6.0 per thousand in 1943. According to preliminary data the total death rate from all causes for the first six months of 1945 was estimated at 11.9 per thousand. Over-all cases of sickness and injuries, exclusive of battle injuries, were at the rate of 495.4 per thousand average strength in 1944 as against a corresponding figure of 602.8 in 1943. Two statistical trends in naval morbidity are worthy of note as indicative of the effect of combat. The first is the average per cent of total strength in hospitals, which increased from 1.7 per thousand in 1941 to 2.1 per thousand in 1944 and 2.5 per thousand for the first six months of 1945. Among other things this shows the effect of the longer convalescent periods required for recovery and rehabilitation of war casualties from such injuries as penetrating wounds and fractured bones. Thus, even though the over-all casualty rate has been maintained at a relatively low figure, the total hospital population has been gradually increasing because of the trend toward a longer average number of sick days per patient. The second significant trend was that of mental disease case incidence, which increased from 9.5 per thousand of total naval strength in 1941 to 11.8 per thousand in 1943 and 14.2 per thousand in 1944. These statistics demonstrate clearly the increase in tempo of modern war with its grueling, unfamiliar horrors. This was the motivating factor which has caused the Medical Department of the Navy consistently to emphasize its neuropsychiatric services.

Statistically the wartime rates indicated above compare favorably with past experience in the Navy, even though the war years have necessitated the maintenance of a large number of naval personnel in foreign waters or on foreign shores where they are subjected to many endemic diseases and infections which are rarely encountered in times of peace. When final statistics are computed on medical care during the war years, there is every indication, upon the basis of preliminary figures, that medical science will be shown to have assumed an importance in the preservation of the health and lives of our fighting men never before equalled in the history of the United States Navy.

While the Navy Medical Department was actively engaged throughout the year in giving medical support to amphibious operations in the Pacific, it was also providing medical care for thousands of Navy men aboard the ships, submarines, and planes that were daily carrying the war into enemy skies and enemy waters. Good organization, careful training, and judicious dispersal of medical personnel and

supplies made it possible for the Medical Department to meet all demands made upon it in spite of heavy casualties aboard some vessels. These activities included careful classification of the wounded in terms of the urgency of their cases; the use of voluntary crewmen as stretcher bearers, thus releasing hospital corpsmen to assist in caring for the wounded; and the existence of the blood banks aboard many of the vessels making available whole blood for the more serious cases.

The Medical Department's second line of defense after the support given in actual battle areas has been its system of fleet, advance base, base and naval hospitals, its dispensaries, and its hospital ships. Scattered throughout the world, they have provided many thousands of beds and the other medical facilities to give patients complete and definitive care.

In order to give adequate support to the operational portion of the Medical Department, numerous technical and administrative services have been required. Medical research has been one of these. New drugs, new applications of earlier discoveries, and new techniques have been developed through untiring research and observation. Perhaps the most advertised of these is penicillin, which has been found capable of stopping infection, even where the sulfa drugs are powerless. Prevention and care of burns, use of blood plasma, transportation of whole blood by air to battle areas, and proper methods for healing fractures are some of the problems receiving attention to the end that the Navy Medical Department will not only stay abreast of the developments in medical science but may maintain its position as a leader.

Rehabilitation programs for casualties are being conducted at a number of hospital centers scattered throughout the United States. The essential purpose of the program is to develop a clear-cut integrated procedure for the rehabilitation of men for return to duty or to civilian life. This part of the program, involving as it does the best possible medical, surgical, and neuropsychiatric care, may be regarded as a policy of the Navy. Special facilities in various naval hospitals are made available to those casualties requiring them. A second part of the program provides for the close cooperation of the Medical Department with specialized rehabilitation agencies which are designed to assist men to make the necessary adjustments and receive the proper training to fit them for useful employment in civilian life. Considerable emphasis has been placed upon the development of a neuropsychiatric program, and efforts are made by the psychiatrists to reach casualties needing their services as quickly as possible after they are affected, so that permanent injuries are avoided. Moreover, psychiatrists assist naval offenders, who have been imprisoned, in making readjustments. As a result, many men who were formerly serious disciplinary problems are now returned to full active duty.

With the coming of peace, the previously prepared plans of the Medical Department for handling the medical aspects of demobilization have been put into effect. Every precaution is being taken to see that the men returned to civilian life are in sound physical condition, particularly in regard to infectious diseases and defects of a serious nature. Those requiring hospitalization, medical or dental attention, are cared for until fit for release, if desired by the individual, or until arrangements have been made for continued treatment outside of the Navy.

THE MARINE CORPS

Prior to 1 March 1945 the Marine Corps had organized and deployed as planned all combat units within the authorized strength of 478,000. In addition to the six divisions, four air wings and supporting units of the Fleet Marine Force, there were 11,000 Marines serving in detachments included within the complements of combatant naval vessels, and another 28,000 providing security for naval shore establishments both within and outside of the United States and at advance bases. The remainder of the Corps was employed in logistic establishments and in training activities necessary for the continuous support of field units.

Since practically all of the Marine Corps' efforts during the war were directed toward the Pacific Theater, the victory in Europe resulted in a negligible change in commitments. Consequently it was not possible to effect a reduction of the size of the Corps at that time.

When it became apparent that the authorized strength was inadequate to provide for the increasing numbers who were hospitalized or convalescent, and to maintain the desired rehabilitation program, the President, on 29 May 1945, raised the troop ceiling of the Corps to 503,000. Although the rate of procurement was increased to provide this new strength, the surrender of Japan occurred as the Corps attained a strength of 484,631, and plans for partial demobilization were put into effect at once.

In order to provide immediate replacements for Marines serving overseas who were entitled to early release from the service, training activities, other than recruit depots, sea-schools, and certain specialist schools, were suspended as soon as demobilization was directed. Upon completion of their recruit training, enlisted men now receive their advanced training in the organizations to which they are assigned. This is in accordance with former peacetime practices within the Corps. Training overhead was further reduced by initiating a program of restricting future officer training to candidates who appear to be postwar Regular officer material.

Demobilization of personnel is being effected at the maximum rate consistent with the availability of facilities and with the immediate commitments of the Corps, particularly the Fleet Marine Force. Concurrent with this demobilization is the reorganization of the regular component of the Corps to meet planned postwar requirements. Preparation is being made for the transfer of qualified Reserve and Temporary officers to the Regular service in such numbers as may be authorized. When Japan surrendered there were 71,460 Marines serving under current four-year regular enlistments. Recruiting of Regulars for four-year enlistments has been resumed, with the priority in opportunity to enlist in the Regular service being afforded to those who served in the war.

On V-J day there were 1000 Women's Reserves serving in or en route to Hawaii, and at that time their further assignments to overseas duty were cancelled. Women's Reserves are being demobilized as expeditiously as possible, and essentially in accordance with the same policies that apply to the men, but with lower critical scores.

THE COAST GUARD

On 1 September 1945 Coast Guard personnel totalled 170,480, including 9,624 in the SPARS. Since its total postwar military strength is planned at 34,500, the Coast Guard has taken prompt action looking toward the ultimate demobilization of its wartime forces. All enlistments in the Reserve and Women's Reserve (SPARS) have been discontinued and future enlistments will be in the Regular Coast Guard only and limited to 17-year olds. Legislation is being requested to permit the acceptance of a limited number of Reserve officers and enlisted men in the Regular Coast Guard.

In addition to the 1677 Coast Guard craft in active service at the end of the 1945 fiscal year, Coast Guard personnel on 1 August 1945 were manning 326 Navy craft and 254 Army vessels, about 50,000 Coastguardmen serving on Navy and 6,000 on Army craft. Only 84 Reserve vessels remained in service out of a total of 2,089 which had been taken over early in the war, principally to combat the submarine menace along the coasts. There had also been 908 other vessels acquired during the war through purchase, charter or gift, and all but 252 of these had been disposed of.

Following the defeat of Germany, port security measures on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts were relaxed. The examination of vessels leaving and entering ports was discontinued, as were identification card requirements and licenses for individual vessel movements. Certain restricted areas on these coasts were abolished along with anti-sabotage water patrols and guards on cargo vessels and waterfront facilities. By the end of the 1945 fiscal year, only 34 ports had Coast Guard port protection as against 117 ports a year earlier; the total personnel engaged in such activities had declined from 23,817 to 16,304.

After V-E day, three port protective programs were intensified—fire fighting, supervision over explosive handling, and anti-oil pollution. The training of personnel in fire prevention and fire fighting techniques was followed by a program coordinated with the Army to improve and strengthen fire protection measures at ports of embarkation. Thirty Navy fireboats, Coast Guard manned, were assigned to forward areas in the Pacific. Supervisory activities over the proper handling and stowage of explosives were extended to naval ammunition depots having port facilities, as well as to naval bases in the Pacific and to European ports handling explosives and ammunition then being deployed to the Pacific. Finally, an intensive educational campaign against oil pollution in American ports was begun. With the surrender of Japan the size of the Coast Guard's munition handling details in the Pacific was considerably increased and their task of supervising the handling and loading of explosives for return to the United States was expected to extend over a period of several months.

While the activities of Temporary Reservists, who serve without pay and are principally engaged in port security work, were being discontinued along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts and the inland waterways systems after V-E day, enrollments on the west coast did not relax with the heavy movements to the Pacific of personnel and supplies which continued up to the surrender of Japan. By 1 September 1945, however, there were less than 12,000 Temporary Reservists assigned to active duty out of a onetime total of 52,333. Some of these were pilots, who under limited control exercised by the Coast Guard had handled 120,000 pilotage assignments in 39 ports during the 1945 fiscal year.

In July 1945, 64 fixed and 17 mobile LORAN (Long Range Navigation) stations were being operated by the Coast Guard. This advanced method of establishing navigational positions by electronics had been installed promptly on Iwo Jima and Okinawa and provided LORAN lines of position over the Japanese mainland, making for successful bombing missions. Forty-five RACON (Radar Beacon) stations which give, within 120 miles of the station, the distance and bearing of an airplane or ship, had been installed and were being operated by the Coast Guard on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and in Alaska. While certain aids to navigation in the Atlantic area used primarily for war purposes, such as swept channel markings, were being removed, there was an accelerated demand for aids to navigation throughout the Pacific area to facilitate the forward movement of our armed forces. Meanwhile studies are being made of the possibility of designing lightships which could be operated without regular crews on board.

Some 1627 new vessels, aggregating 9,009,216 gross tons, which had been constructed during the fiscal year 1945, had been certificated by the Coast Guard under the marine inspection laws. Annual inspections on 9720 vessels were completed during the year. The passing of the peak of the emergency ship construction relieved a number of field inspectors who were transferred from the east coast and Great Lakes to Pacific ports for temporary duty.

Merchant Marine Hearing Units continued to operate in all important United States ports while others functioned in Europe, Suez, Ceylon, the south and southwest Pacific and the Canal Zone. They promptly investigated marine casualties and acted as government liaison officers in merchant marine affairs.

The Coast Guard maintained nine air stations along the coasts of the United States, under the operational control of the various sea frontiers, with a total of 165 planes. These have served as task units in the conduct of air-sea rescue. Assistance was rendered in 686 plane crashes and 786 lives were saved during the fiscal year; 5357 emergency medical cases were transported and 149 obstructions to navigation and derelicts were sighted for removal.

VII—*Naval Research and Development During World War II*

In December 1941 the United States faced seasoned enemies, who not only had long been preparing for war but who had actually been waging it for several years. Within the limited facilities and means available throughout the years of peace, the United States Navy had, however, equipped itself with weapons the equal of, or superior to, those of other navies and had laid the groundwork for still further development. During the war the science and industry of this country and our allies were mobilized to apply existing scientific knowledge to the perfection of these weapons and the development of new and more deadly means of waging war. As a result the United States Navy was able to maintain the technical advantage over the navies of our enemies, which contributed so materially to the outcome of World War II.

The means of accomplishing this were not so much directed towards making new discoveries, as towards the exploitation of the skills and techniques which civilian scientists had already cultivated in years of peace. When war appeared imminent, the War and Navy Departments and the National Academy of Sciences gave close attention to the most profitable manner of utilizing the strength of American science in military and naval research. It was decided to attempt a solution involving the maximum flexibility and initiative, in which the fundamental principle would be cooperation between science and the armed forces, rather than to bring the scientists into military and naval laboratories, as was done in England. The principle proved thoroughly sound. The arrangement adopted was the establishment by executive order of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, which had as its scientific and technical working bodies the National Defense Research Council, the Medical Research Council, and later the Office of Field Service. To assure full integration of the potentialities of these organizations with the Navy's own research and development program and the needs of the service, the late Secretary Knox, in July 1941, established the office of Coordinator of Research and Development. Throughout the war, the development of new weapons and devices has been accelerated by the teamwork between the users, the scientists, the engineer-designers and the producers.

The devices and weapons resulting from the research and development program have been put to use in every phase of naval warfare. Particular examples, cited because of their complexity and diversification, are amphibious warfare, carrier warfare, submarine and antisubmarine warfare. In each of these cases, our combat effectiveness has been materially increased by improvements in communications, navigational devices, fire control, detection equipment, firepower, aircraft performance (range, speed, armament, handling characteristics) and by advanced training methods and equipment.

Perhaps the greatest technological advances of the entire war have been made in the field of electronics, both within the naval laboratories and in collaboration with the Office of Scientific Research and Development. Pre-existing radar sets were developed and new models created for ship and air-borne search, fire control, and for accurate long-range navigation. Identification and recognition equipment were developed for use in conjunction with radar systems. New and highly efficient short-range radio telephones are now in use for tactical communication. In the successful antisubmarine campaign in the Atlantic, small radio-sono-buoys were used; these, when dropped from aircraft, listened for the noise made

—Official U.S. Navy photo

RADAR
Antennae of an ESSEX-class carrier

by a submarine and automatically relayed the information to the searching plane. Great strides have been made in electronic antisubmarine detection equipment. Underwater echo-ranging gear and listening equipment have been improved in quality and extended in function since the outbreak of the war. Countermeasures have been developed for jamming enemy radar and communication systems, disrupting the control signals for his guided missiles, and counteracting his measures to jam our own equipment.

The foundation for our shipboard radar systems had been laid before the war. The earliest observations of radio phenomena of the kind that are exploited by radar were made at the Naval Research Laboratory by groups working with Dr. A. H. Taylor and Dr. R. N. Page, and the military possibilities were immediately grasped by these scientists and by Rear Admiral H. G. Bowen, then Director of the Laboratory. Because of this, at the outset of the war, our Navy alone had on its ships a search radar specifically designed for shipboard use. We had already incorporated in these radars the technical development of using a single antenna for transmission and reception. Radar of this type contributed to the victories of the Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal. Over 26,000 sets of air-borne radar equipment were produced from the Naval Research Laboratory's redesign of British air-borne equipment. Ours was the first navy to install radar in submarines. Similarly, a highly efficient super-sonic echo-ranging gear for submarine and antisubmarine warfare had been completely developed, and was installed before the war began. The success of all these electronic devices can be traced back to intensive early development of new types of vacuum tubes.



—Official U.S. Navy photo

RADAR
Vertical chart in plot room

Initially, from want of experience against an enemy attacking with the persistence demonstrated by the Japanese, our antiaircraft batteries were inadequate. Particularly was this true in the case of automatic weapon batteries, consisting at that time of the .50-caliber and 1.1-inch machine guns. The main antiaircraft batteries in the fleet, consisting of 5-inch and 3-inch main batteries were controlled by directors employing optical range information. Although antiaircraft fire-control radar was under development, no installations were operative in the fleet.

By the time Japan surrendered, our defenses had been revolutionized. The fleet was equipped with accurate antiaircraft fire-control radar. Our antiaircraft gun defenses consisted of multiple power-driven 40-millimeter mounts, 20-millimeter mounts, and 5-inch twin and single mounts, many of which were controlled by small intermediate range radar-fed gun directors. The VT, or proximity influence fuse, initially sponsored by the Navy and by the Office of Scientific Research and Development, marked a radical change from previous methods of detonating a projectile and vastly increased the effectiveness of antiaircraft defenses.

At the end of the war, the 8-inch rapid-fire turret had been developed and was ready for introduction to the fleet. Completely automatic in action, it can be used against ship, aircraft, or land targets. The guns are loaded from the handling rooms automatically and are automatically laid.

When the threat of the German magnetic mines became known in 1939, the Navy immediately mobilized scientific talent and industrial capacity to produce a countermeasure. Several methods of demagnetizing our ships were developed. These were applied before Pearl Harbor to all combatant vessels, and later to all other vessels, and were of material assistance in maintaining the safety of our vital shipping lanes. At the same time, acoustic and magnetic firing devices were developed and produced in quantity for our mines and depth charges. Electric torpedoes were developed to supplement the air-steam torpedo, which at the outbreak of war was our weapon of underwater attack.

Rockets and rocket launchers were developed, with the assistance of California Institute of Technology and other agencies, for use on board ships and aircraft. Appropriate types of rockets were developed for use against submarines, for the support of amphibious landings, and for aircraft. These allowed heavy firepower to be concentrated in light craft.

Fighter-plane speed was greatly increased during



—Official U.S. Navy photo

ELECTRIC TORPEDO

Submarine crew, reprovisioning at an advance base, stow new electrically-driven weapon below decks

the war. At the end an experimental model ready for combat use had a speed of over 550 miles per hour. This plane was powered with turbo-jet engines, little known before 1941. Development of the conventional aircraft engine had also progressed; whereas initially the maximum size was 1000 horsepower, improved types of 3000 horsepower are now in use. Torpedo bombers, scout bombers, patrol bombers, and scout observation planes have all been rapidly developed during the period. Carrier-borne aircraft with increased speed, range, and armament carried the battle to the Japanese homeland, and patrol aircraft with high speed, long range, and greater offensive power aided in supplying the information necessary to the success of those operations. Development of the arresting gear, launching catapults, and handling equipment of our surface ships kept pace with the increasing weights of planes, and allowed more planes per ship to be carried than had been possible in peacetime.

Our aircraft were a focus for developments in many fields. Radar opened new possibilities for search, night combat, and operations under poor visibility conditions. Aircraft guns were increased in size from the .30-caliber World War I weapon to 20-millimeter, 37-millimeter, and 75-millimeter guns. Air-borne rockets up to 11.75 inches in diameter radically increased the striking power of conventional aircraft, with little penalty on performance. Rocket power was also used on seaplanes for assistance in take-off with heavy loads and in high seas, making possible the rescue of many downed aviators and thereby reducing our combat losses. Development of the "fire bomb" further extended the tactical versatility of aircraft.

Training was enormously expedited by the introduction of a great variety of synthetic training devices. These endeavored to offer trainees an approximation of battle experience and to develop the reactions of a veteran before actual combat. As an example, it is now possible for the entire crew of a submarine to rehearse approaches and torpedo attacks against enemy task forces in trainers on dry land, which provide simulated visual observation of the enemy, simulated radar and sonar information, and in which all of the complex battle gear and fire-control mechanisms operate as they do in a real submarine.

Certain developments, whose progress was most promising, were not completed in time for extensive combat use. These are primarily guided missiles and pilotless aircraft, utilizing remote control by electronic apparatus. These new developments will play a major role in warfare of the future, carrying new explosives over greatly increased ranges.

In the early days of research leading towards the application of atomic energy for military purposes, the Naval Research Laboratory was the only government facility engaged in this type of work. At the Laboratory there was developed a liquid thermal diffusion process for separation of uranium isotopes. Enriched chemicals, as well as basic designs and operating practices, were later supplied to the Army and used in one of the Oak Ridge plants manufacturing the atomic bomb.

The complexity of modern warfare in both methods and means demands exacting analysis of the measures and countermeasures introduced at every stage by ourselves and the enemy. Scientific research can not only speed the invention and production of weapons, but also assist in insuring their correct use. The application, by qualified scientists, of the scientific method to the improvement of naval operating techniques and material, has come to be called operations research. Scientists engaged in operations research are experts who advise that part of the Navy which is using the weapons and craft—the fleets themselves. To function effectively they must work under the direction of, and have close personal contact with the officers who plan and carry on the operations of war.

During the war we have succeeded in enlisting the services of a group of competent scientists to carry out operations research. This group was set up as a flexible organization able to reassign personnel quickly when new critical problems arose. Fiscal and administrative control of the group was originally vested in the Office of Scientific Research and Development. The group as a whole was assigned to the Navy for functional control, and in the course of time was attached to my Headquarters.

The initial impulse toward the formation of such a group arose in April 1942, during the early days of the antisubmarine war. With the cooperation of the Antisubmarine Division of the National Defense Research Committee, seven scientists were recruited by Columbia University and assigned to the Antisubmarine Warfare Unit, Atlantic Fleet.

During the year 1942 the group was considerably increased in size, and in July 1943, at a strength of approximately forty members, it was incorporated

into the staff of the Tenth Fleet as the Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Group. Subsequently the administrative responsibility for the group was transferred from Columbia University to the Office of Field Service, without alteration in relationships with the Navy. In October 1944, with the decline of the submarine menace, the group was transferred to the Readiness Division of my Headquarters and renamed the Operations Research Group. At the close of the war it consisted of seventy-three scientists, drawn from a wide variety of backgrounds. Many of the members were attached, as the need arose, to the staffs of fleet and type commanders overseas, and at operating bases in war theaters. So far as possible they were afforded the opportunity of observing combat operations at first hand.

Operations research, as it has developed, falls into two main categories: theoretical analysis of tactics, strategy and the equipment of war on the one hand; and statistical analysis of operations on the other. Each type of naval operation had to be analyzed theoretically to determine the maximum potentialities of the equipment involved, the probable reactions of the personnel, and the nature of the tactics which would combine equipment and personnel in an optimum manner. Action reports, giving the actual results obtained in this type of operation, were studied in a quantitative manner in order to amplify, correct, and correlate closely the theoretical analysis with what was actually happening on the field of battle. The knowledge resulting from this continued cross-check of theory with practice made it possible to work out improvements in tactics which sometimes increased the effectiveness of weapons by factors of three or five, to detect changes in the enemy's tactics in time to counter them before they became dangerous, and to calculate force requirements for future operations.

The late war, more than any other, has involved the interplay of new technical measures and opposing countermeasures. For example, the German U-boats had to revise their tactics and equipment when we began to use radar on our antisubmarine aircraft; and we, in turn had to modify our tactics and radar equipment to counter their changes. In this see-saw of techniques the side which countered quickly, before the opponent had time to perfect the new tactics and weapons, had a decided advantage. Operations research, bringing scientists in to analyze the technical import of the fluctuations between measure and countermeasure, made it possible to speed up our reaction rate in several critical cases.

Likewise, in their struggle to counteract our improved convoy escort tactics, the U-boats introduced the acoustic torpedo, which steers for a ship by listening to the sound it makes under water. Our development of countermeasures was based on studies by the Operations Research Group into the pattern of sound produced in the sea by ships' propellers and on the probable reaction of the torpedo to various decoy devices. In this and other cases, information derived from intelligence sources was interpreted by the members of the group in the light of their own scientific knowledge and utilized to devise improved countermeasures.



—Official U.S. Navy photo

JET-ASSISTED FIGHTER PLANE

U.S. Navy carrier plane takes off for one of the last strikes against Japan

Submarine and antisubmarine operations are closely complementary. Methods developed for attack have as a counterpart methods for defense based on the principles underlying both. In the subgroup devoted to submarine warfare, theoretical and operational studies were carried out on coordination of attack by groups of submarines; torpedo fire control; effectiveness of rescue of downed aviators; causes of loss of United States submarines; the relative merits of various types of torpedoes under differing circumstances; and enemy countermeasures to our radar search equipment.

Research on air problems has been devoted in the main to perfection of tactics designed to minimize flak hazard to naval aircraft attacking gun-defended targets, and to analysis of accuracy and effectiveness of aerial weapons, primarily against sea-borne targets. Bombs, rockets, and torpedoes are designed for distinct uses, conditioned by the accuracy of launching and by their lethal effectiveness. Studies of the peculiarities of these weapons have led to recommendations for tactics and training procedures.

Studies were carried out by other subgroups on defense of task forces against suicide attacks, on the effectiveness of antiaircraft fire, and on problems of naval gunfire as a support for amphibious landings.

The Operations Research Group, to be renamed the Operations Evaluation Group as more closely descriptive of its function, will be continued as part of the naval organizaiton at appropriate peacetime strength.

The assistance and cooperation of industry and science have been indispensable. Without this assistance, many of the weapons which have come into

being as the result of intensive wartime research and development otherwise never would have been completed and introduced into the fleet.

It had often been predicted that in a national emergency the totalitarian countries would have a great technical advantage over the democracies because of their ability to regiment scientific facilities and manpower at will. The results achieved by Germany, Italy and Japan do not bear out this contention. Studies made since the close of the war indicate that in none of these countries was the scientific effort as effectively handled as in the United States. The rapid, effective and original results obtained in bringing science into our war effort are proof of the responsiveness of our form of government to meeting emergencies, the technical competence of American scientists, and the productive genius of American industry.

It would be unfair to others to single out by name individual scientists who made important scientific and technical contributions to the improvement of old or the development of new weapons. There were thousands of such contributions. It is generally conceded that with respect to originality of ideas and individual resourcefulness the scientists in the axis countries were as competent as our own. Where American science outdistanced the axis powers was in the superior administration of the over-all effort so that the available scientific manpower of the country could function with the maximum effectiveness. The leadership for what may be broadly termed the civilian emergency scientific effort was provided by the same individuals during the entire war period. These individuals deserve special mention among those responsible for the superb administrative efficiency which characterized the American conduct of the war throughout. Dr. Vannevar Bush as the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development carried the over-all administrative and technical responsibility for that organization. Under him Dr. James B. Conant as Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee; Dr. Alfred N. Richards as Chairman of the Committee on Medical Research, and Dr. Karl T. Compton as the head of the Office of Field Services administered the scientific and technical activities of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. Dr. Frank B. Jewett as the President of the National Academy of Sciences and of its

—Official U.S. Navy photo

working body the National Research Council, and Dr. Jerome C. Hunsaker as the Chairman of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics directed the activities of these organizations during this period. The coordination of the work of these groups with the Navy was handled by the Office of the Coordinator of Research and Development headed by Rear Admiral J. A. Furer.

I wish to pay particular tribute to the group of scientists, industrialists and officers of the Army and Navy who, under the direction of Major General L. R. Groves, USA, achieved the final outstanding technical success of the war—the development of a practical atomic bomb and the method of using it from aircraft.

Sufficient progress in the technical development and use of improved weapons and associated equipment has been made during the war to emphasize the necessity for continued progress. Working under the stress of an emergency, the factor of primary importance was immediate effectiveness against the enemy. This resulted in "crash designs" and production that required considerably more personnel, weight and space, than the more seasoned designs that might have been produced had time been available. Thus, the rapid expansion and development of new weapons and devices during the war was often at the cost of factors of major importance, such as the reserve buoyancy and stability of the ships in which they were installed. Those wartime designs, while they have well served their purpose against the enemy, have nevertheless created problems of refinement and improvement in the ultimate design of equipment, which must be so resolved that a minimum of personnel, weight and space will be required to attain the desired effect. These problems must be energetically attacked in the coming years of peace. Only by continuing vigorous research and development can this country hope to be protected from any potential enemies and maintain the position which it now enjoys in possessing the greatest effective naval fighting force in history.

VIII—*Conclusion*

In my previous reports, I have touched upon the effective cooperation between our Allies which has been of such fundamental and signal importance in accounting for the success of our combined undertakings. This cooperation has continued and been extended in the period since my last report.

I have spoken before of the full measure of cooperation and support rendered by the ground, air and service forces of the Army in a partnership of accomplishment, which neither Navy nor Army could have carried out singly. For that cooperation, undiminished throughout the war, and to the wholehearted support from the great body of citizens who performed the countless and varied tasks which made up our war effort, I reaffirm my appreciation.

Just as the Navy depended upon its sister services and upon the multitude of activities which produced the implements of war, so also did the Navy rely for success upon the Reserves and the Regulars, the men and the women who constituted in its mutually supporting elements—the Fleet, the Shore Establishment, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard and the Seabees—each of which contributed its full share to victory.

The end of the war came before we had dared to expect it. As late as August 1943 strategic studies drawn up by the British and United States planners contemplated the war against Japan continuing far into 1947. Even the latest plans were based upon the Japanese war lasting a year after the fall of Germany. Actually Japan's defeat came within three months of Germany's collapse. The nation can be thankful that the unrelenting acceleration of our power in the Pacific ended the war in 1945.

The price of victory has been high. Beginning with the dark days of December 1941 and continuing until September 1945, when ships of the Pacific Fleet steamed triumphant into Tokyo Bay, the Navy's losses were severe. The casualties of the United States Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard reached the totals of 56,206 dead, 80,259 wounded, and 8,967 missing. Many of these gallant men fell in battle; many were lost in strenuous and hazardous operations convoying our shipping or patrolling the seas and skies; others were killed in training for the duties that Fate would not permit them to carry out. All honor to these heroic men. To their families and to those who have suffered the physical and mental anguish of wounds, the Navy includes its sympathy in that of the country they served so well.

It is my sincere hope—and expectation—that the United States will hereafter remain ever ready to support and maintain the peace of the world by being ever ready to back up its words with deeds.


THE TIDES OF WAR IN THE PACIFIC
1941–1945
1 JAPANESE ATTACK PEARL HARBOR .. 7 DECEMBER 1941
2 JAPANESE ATTACK PHILIPPINE ISLANDS..... 8 DECEMBER 1941
3 BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA ..... 7-8 MAY 1942
4 BATTLE OF MIDWAY..... 3-6 JUNE 1942
5 SOLOMON ISLANDS CAMPAIGN ..... AUGUST 1942 - JUNE 1944
6 ALEUTIANS CAMPAIGN ..... AUGUST 1942 - AUGUST 1943
7 GILBERT ISLANDS OPERATION ..... NOVEMBER 1943
8 MARSHALL ISLANDS OPERATION ..... FEBRUARY 1944
9 HOLLANDIA OPERATION ..... APRIL 1944
10 MARIANAS ISLANDS OPERATION ..... JUNE - AUGUST 1944
11 WESTERN CAROLINES OPERATION ..... SEPTEMBER 1944
12 LEYTE LANDINGS - BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF... OCTOBER 1944
13 LINGAYEN GULF LANDINGS ..... JANUARY 1945
14 IWO JIMA OPERATION ..... FEBRUARY - MARCH 1945
15 OKINAWA OPERATION ..... APRIL - JUNE 1945
16 BORNEO OPERATION ..... MAY - JULY 1945
17 PRE-INVASION OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN ... JULY - AUGUST 1945
18 SIGNING OF JAPANESE SURRENDER ..... 2 SEPTEMBER 1945
SEA OF OKHOTSK
SEA OF JAPAN
TOKYO
14 AUGUST 1945
1 MARCH 1945
MANPO SHOTO
NANSEI SHOTO
FOOCHOW
OKINAWA JIMA
CHICHI JIMA
HAHA JIMA
IWO JIMA
CANTON
HONG KONG
FORMOSA
CALCUTTA
BAY OF BENGAL
SOUTH CHINA SEA
LUZON
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
MANILA
MINDORO
SAMAR
LEYTE
MARIANAS ISLANDS
SAIPAN
TINIAN
GUAM
ANDAMAN ISLANDS
CEYLON
NICOBAR ISLANDS
ULITHI
YAP
MINDANAO
PELELIU
PALAU ISLANDS
TRUK
CAROLINE ISLANDS
CELEBES SEA
BORNEO
MOROTAI
HALMAHERA
NOEMFOOR
BIAK
WAKDE
HOLLANDIA
CELEBES
CERAM
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RABAUL
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

—Official U. S. Navy

APPENDIX A

Status of major combatant ships of Japanese Navy at the conclusion of hostilities

Ships	*Date Commissioned*	*Final Disposition*
BATTLESHIPS		
FUSO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 October 1944 in Surigao Straits, P.I. by U.S. destroyers
HARUNA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 28 July 1945 at Kure by U.S. carrier planes
HIYEI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 13 November 1942 off Savo Is., Solomons by U.S fleet units and aircraft
HYUGA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 28 July 1945 at Kure by U.S. carrier planes
ISE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 28 July 1945 at Kure by U.S. carrier planes
KIRISHIMA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 15 November 1942 off Savo Is., Solomons by U.S. fleet units
KONGO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 21 November 1944 off Foochow, China by U.S. submarine
MUSASHI	August 1942	SUNK 25 October 1944 in Sibuyan Sea, P.I. by U.S. carrier planes
MUTSU	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 8 June 1943 in Hiroshima Bay by accidental explosion
NAGATO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	HEAVILY DAMAGED 18 July 1945 at Yokosuka by U.S. carrier planes
YAMASHIRO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 15 October 1944 in Surigao Straits, P.I. by U.S. fleet units
YAMATO	December 1941	SUNK 7 April 1945 off Kyushu by U.S. carrier planes
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS		
AKAGI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 4 June 1942 off Midway by U.S. carrier planes
AMAGI	August 1944	HEAVILY DAMAGED 24-28 July 1945 at Kure by U.S. carrier planes
CHITOSE	January 1944	SUNK 25 October 1944 N.E. of Luzon by U.S. carrier planes
CHIYODA	October 1943	SUNK 25 October 1944 N.E. of Luzon by U.S. carrier planes and fleet units
HAYATAKA (JUNYO)	May 1942	HEAVILY DAMAGED 9 December 1944 off Nagasaki; out of action at Sasebo
HIRYU	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 5 June 1942 off Midway by U.S. carrier planes
HITAKA (HIYO)	July 1942	SUNK 20 June 1944 in Philippine Sea by U.S. carrier planes
HOSHO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	OUT OF ACTION, lightly damaged, in Japan area
KAGA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 4 June 1942 off Midway by U.S. carrier planes

Ships	*Date Commissioned*	*Final Disposition*
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS—Concluded		
KASAGI	Not commissioned	Under camouflage at Sasebo; fitting out discontinued
KATSURAGI	October 1944	HEAVILY DAMAGED 24-28 July 1945 at Kure by U.S. carrier planes
RYUHO	November 1942	HEAVILY DAMAGED 19 March 1945 at Kure by U.S. carrier planes
RYUJO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 24 August 1942 off Malaita Is., Solomons by U.S. carrier planes
SHINANO	November 1944	SUNK 29 November 1944. S. of Honshu by U.S. submarine
SHOHO	December 1941	SUNK 7 May 1942 in Coral Sea by U.S. carrier planes
SHOKAKU	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 19 June 1944 off Yap by U.S. submarine
SORYU	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 4 June 1942 off Midway by U.S. carrier planes and submarine
TAIHO	March 1944	SUNK 19 June 1944 off Yap by U.S. submarine
UNRYU	1944	SUNK 19 December 1944 in E. China Sea by U.S. submarine
ZUIHO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 October 1944 N.E. of Luzon by U.S. carrier planes
ZUIKAKU	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 October 1944 N.E. of Luzon by U.S. carrier planes
ESCORT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS		
CHUYO	November 1942	SUNK 4 December 1943 S.E. of Honshu by U.S. submarine
KAIYO	November 1943	SUNK 24 July 1945 in Beppu Bay, Japan by U.S. carrier planes
JINYO	December 1943	SUNK 17 November 1944 in S. Yellow Sea by U.S. submarine
OTAKA	1942	SUNK 18 August 1944 N.W. of Luzon by U.S. submarine
UNYO	1942	SUNK 16 September 1944 in S. China Sea by U.S. submarine
HEAVY CRUISERS		
AOBA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 28 July 1945 at Kure by U.S. carrier planes
ASHIGARA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 8 June 1945 S.E. of Singapore by British submarine
ATAGO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 23 October 1944 off Palawan, P.I. by U.S. submarine
CHIKUMA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 October 1944 E. of Samar, P.I. by U.S. carrier planes and fleet units

Ships	Date Commissioned	Final Disposition
HEAVY CRUISERS—Concluded		
CHOKAI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 24 October 1944 in Sibuyan Sea, P.I. by U.S. carrier planes
KURUTAKA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 11 October 1942 off Savo Is., Solomons by U.S. fleet units
HAGURO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 16 May 1945 off Penang by British carrier planes and destroyers
KAKO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 10 August 1942 off New Ireland by U.S submarine
KINUGASA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 14 November 1942 off Savo Is., Solomons by U.S. carrier planes
KUMANO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 November 1944 off W. Luzon by U.S carrier planes
MAYA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 23 October 1944 off Palawan, P.I by U.S. submarine
MIKUMA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 6 June 1942 off Midway Is. by U.S. carrier planes
MOGAMI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 October 1944 in Mindanao Sea, P.I. by U.S. fleet units and aircraft
MYOKO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	OUT OF ACTION at Singapore; heavily damaged 13 December 1944 S.W. of Saigon by U.S. submarine
NACHI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 5 November 1944 in Manila Bay by U.S carrier planes
SUZUYA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 October 1944 E. of Samar, P.I. by U.S. carrier planes
TAKAO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	OUT OF ACTION at Singapore; heavily damaged 23 October 1944 off Palawan, P.I. by U.S. submarine
TONE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 28 July 1945 at Kure by U.S. carrier aircraft
LIGHT CRUISERS		
ABUKUMA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 26 October 1944 off Negros, P.I. by B-24's and fleet units
AGANO	October 1942	SUNK 16 February. 1944 N. of Truk by U.S. submarine
ISUZU	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 7 April 1945 N. of Soembawa, N.E.I., by U.S submarines
JINTSU	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 13 July 1943 N. of Kolombangara, Solomons by U.S. fleet units
KINU	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 26 October 1944 S.W. of Masbate, P.I by U.S. carrier planes
KISO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 13 November 1944 in Manila Bay by U.S carrier planes
KITAGAMI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	HEAVILY DAMAGED 24-28 July 1945 off Kure by U.S. carrier planes
KUMA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 11 January 1944 off Penang by British submarine
NAGARA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 7 August 1944 W. of Kyushu by U.S. submarine

Ships	Date Commissioned	Final Disposition
LIGHT CRUISERS—Concluded		
NAKA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 17 February 1944 S.W. of Truk by U.S. carrier planes
NATORI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 18 August 1944 E. of Samar, P.I. by U.S. submarine
NOSHIRO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 26 October 1944 N.W. of Panay, P.I. by U.S. carrier planes
OI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 19 July 1944 in S. China Sea by U.S. submarine
OYODO	February 1943	SUNK 28 July 1945 at Kure by U.S. carrier planes
SAKAWA	November 1944	In Japan
SENDAI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 2 November 1943 W. of Bougainville, Solomons by U.S. fleet units
TAMA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 October 1944 N.E. of Luzon by U.S. submarine
TATSUTA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 14 March 1944 S. of Yokohama by U.S. submarine
TENRYU	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 18 December 1942 in Bismarck Sea by U.S. submarine
YAHAGI	December 1943	SUNK 7 April 1945 off Kyushu by U.S. carrier planes
YUBARI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 27 April 1944 S. of Palau by U.S. submarine
YURA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 October 1942 off Santa Isabel, Solomons by U.S. planes
TRAINING CRUISERS		
KASHII	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 12 January 1945 in S. China Sea by U.S. carrier planes
KASHIMA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	In Japan
KATORI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 17 February 1944 at Truk by U.S. fleet units and carrier planes
DESTROYERS		
AKATSUKI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 13 November 1942 off Savo Is., Solomons by U.S. cruiser
AKEBONO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 13 November 1944 in Manila Bay by U.S. carrier planes
AKIGUMO	1942	SUNK 11 April 1944 off Zamboanga, Mindanao by U.S. submarine
AKIKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 3 November 1944 in S. China Sea by U.S submarine
AKISHIMO	1944	SUNK 13 November 1944 in Manila Bay by U.S carrier planes
AKITSUKI	1942	SUNK 22 December 1944 off Omai Saki, Honshu by U.S. submarine
AMAGIRI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 23 April 1944 in Makassar Strait by mine
AMATSUKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	DESTROYED 6 April 1945 off Amoy by B-25's
ARARE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 5 July 1942 off Kiska by U.S. submarine
ARASHI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 6 August 1943 in Vella Gulf, New Georgia by U.S. destroyers

Ships	Date Commissioned	Final Disposition
DESTROYERS—Continued		
ARASHIO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 3 March 1943 in Huon Gulf, New Guinea by U.S. Army bombers
ARIAKE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 28 July 1943 off Cape Gloucester, New Britain by B-25's
ASAGAO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	HEAVILY DAMAGED 22 August 1945 near Moji; in Japan
ASAGIRI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 28 August 1942 off Santa Isabel, Solomons by Marine bombers
ASAGUMO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 October 1944 in Surigao Strait by U.S. fleet units
ASAKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 23 August 1944 off Cape Bolinao, Luzon by U.S. submarine
ASANAGI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 22 May 1944 N.W. of Bonin Is. by U.S. submarine
ASASHIMO	1943	SUNK 7 April 1945 off Kyushu by U.S. carrier planes
ASASHIO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 3 March 1943 in Huon Gulf, New Guinea by U.S. Army bombers
AYANAMI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 15 November 1942 off Savo Is., Solomons by U.S. fleet units
ENOKI	1945	HEAVILY DAMAGED 24 July 1945 near Maizuru; in Japan
FUBUKI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 11 October 1942 off Savo Is., Solomons by U.S. fleet units
FUJINAMI	1943	SUNK 27 October 1944 S. of Mindoro, P.I. by U.S. carrier planes
FUMITSUKI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 17 February 1944 at Truk by U.S. carrier planes
FUYO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 20 December 1943 off Manila by U.S. submarine
FUYUTSUKI	1944	HEAVILY DAMAGED at Moji by mine; decommissioned
HAGI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	DAMAGED; in Japan
HAGIKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 6 August 1943 in Vella Gulf, New Georgia by U.S. destroyers
HAKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 23 January 1943 off Steffen Strait, Bismarcks by U.S. submarine
HAMAKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 7 April 1945 off Kyushu by U.S. carrier planes
HAMANAMI	1944	SUNK 11 November 1944 in Ormoc Bay by U.S. carrier planes
HANATSUKI	1945	LIGHTLY DAMAGED; in Japan
HARUKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	HEAVILY DAMAGED 21 January 1945 at Bako; in Japan
HARUSAME	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 8 June 1944 N.W. of Manokwari, New Guinea by B-25's
HARUTSUKI	1945	In Japan
HASU	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	HEAVILY DAMAGED 16 January 1945 off Hongkong; at Tsingtao
HATAKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 15 January 1945 in Takao Harbor
HATSUHARU	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 13 November 1944 in Manila Bay by U.S. carrier planes
HATSUKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 2 November 1943 W. of Bougainville Is. by U.S. fleet units
HATSUME	1945	Not manned; in Japan
HATSUSHIMO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 30 July 1945 in Miyazu Bay
HATSUYUKI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 17 July 1943 off Kahili, Bougainville by U.S. Navy and Marine planes
HATSUZAKURA	1945	Not manned; in Japan
HATSUZUKI	1942	SUNK 25 November 1944 S.W. of Manila by U.S. submarine
HAYANAMI	1943	SUNK 7 June 1944 S.E. of Sibutu Passage, P.I. by U.S. submarine
HAYASHIMO	1944	SUNK 26 October 1944 S.E. of Mindoro, P.I. by U.S. carrier planes
HAYASHIO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 24 November 1942 in Huon Gulf, New Guinea by B-17's
HAYATE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 11 December 1941 off Wake Is. by shore batteries
HIBIKI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	HEAVILY DAMAGED 29 March 1945 at Himejima; in Japan
HINOKI	1944	HEAVILY DAMAGED 5 January 1945 off Manila; in Japan
HOKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 6 July 1944 in S. Celebes Sea by U.S. submarine
IKAZUCHI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 13 April 1944 S.W. of Guam by U.S. submarine
INAZUMA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 14 May 1944 off Tawi Tawi, P.I. by U.S. submarine
ISOKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 7 April 1945 off Kyushu by U.S. carrier planes
ISONAMI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 9 April 1943 in Buton passage, Celebes by U.S. submarine
IWANAMI	1944	SUNK 4 December 1944 in S. China Sea by U.S. submarine
KABA	1944	HEAVILY DAMAGED 24 July 1945 in Inland Sea; in Japan
KAEDE	1944	HEAVILY DAMAGED 31 January 1945 S. of Formosa; in Japan
KAGERO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 8 May 1943 in Blackett Strait, New Georgia by mines and aircraft
KAKI	1944	Not manned; in Japan
KAMIKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	Operational; at Singapore
KARUKAYA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 10 May 1944 off Manila Bay by U.S. submarine
KASHI	1944	HEAVILY DAMAGED 21 January 1945 at Takao; in Japan
KASHIWA	Not commissioned	In Japan
KASUMI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 7 April 1945 off Kyushu by U.S. carrier planes

Ships	Date Commissioned	Final Disposition
DESTROYERS—Continued		
KAWAKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 6 August 1943 in Vella Gulf, New Georgia by U.S. destroyers
KAYA	1944	HEAVILY DAMAGED 27 December 1944 off Mindoro; in Japan
KAZEGUMO	1942	SUNK 8 June 1944 off Davao, Mindanao, P.I by U.S. submarine
KEYAKI	1945	Not manned; in Japan
KIKUTSUKI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 4 May 1942 off Tulagi, Solomons by U. S. carrier planes
KIRI	1944	HEAVILY DAMAGED 12 December 1944 near Leyte; in Japan
KISARAGI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 11 December 1941 off Wake Is by shore batteries
KISHINAMI	1943	SUNK 20 November 1944 in Luzon Strait by U.S. submarine (?)
KIYONAMI	1943	SUNK 20 July 1943 in Vella Gulf, New Georgia by U.S. Army and Navy planes
KIYOSHIMO	1944	SUNK 26 December 1944 off Mindoro, P.I. by U.S PT's and Army planes
KURETAKE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 30 December 1944 in Luzon Strait by U.S. submarine
KURI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	At Tsingtao
KUROSHIO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 8 May 1943 in Blackett Strait, New Georgia by mine
KUSUNOKI	1945	At Maizuru; not manned
KUWA	1944	SUNK 3 December 1944 in Ormoc Bay by U.S. destroyers
MAIKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 17 February 1944 N.W. of Truk by U.S. fleet units and carrier planes
MAKI	1944	HEAVILY DAMAGED 9 December 1944 off Mejima Is.; in Japan
MAKIGUMO	1942	SUNK 1 February 1943 off Guadalcanal Is. by mine PT boat, or aircraft
MAKINAMI	1942	SUNK 25 November 1943 N.W. of Buka Is., Solomons by U.S. destroyers
MATSU	1944	SUNK 4 August 1944 N.W. of Bonin Is. by U.S. fleet units
MATSUKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 9 June 1944 E. of Bonin Is. by U.S. submarine
MICHISHIO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 October 1944 in Surigao Strait by U.S. destroyers
MIKATSUKI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 28 July 1943 off Cape Gloucester. New Britain by B-25's
MINAZUKI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 6 June 1944 S. of Sibutu passage, P.I by U.S. submarine
MINEGUMO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 6 March 1943 in Kula Gulf, New Georgia by U.S. fleet units
MINEKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 10 February 1944 E. of Formosa by U.S submarine
MOCHIZUKI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 24 October 1943 E. of New Britain by U.S Navy patrol bomber
MOMI	1944	SUNK 5 January 1945 S.W of Manila Bay by U.S. carrier planes
MOMO	1944	Uncertain
MURAKUMO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 12 October 1942 off New Georgia Is. by U.S carrier planes
MURASAME	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 6 March 1943 in Kula Gulf, New Georgia by U.S. fleet units
MUTSUKI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 August 1942 off Santa Isabel, Solomons by B-17's
NAGANAMI	1942	SUNK 11 November 1944 in Ormoc Bay by U.S. carrier planes
NAGATSUKI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 6 July 1943 in Kula Gulf, New Georgia by U. S. fleet units
NAMIKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	HEAVILY DAMAGED 8 September 1944 in Kuriles; in Japan
NARA	1945	HEAVILY DAMAGED 30 June 1945 in Shimonoseki Strait; in Japan
NASHI	1945	SUNK 28 July 1945 at Kure
NATSUGUMO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 11 October 1942 off Savo Is., Solomons by U.S. fleet units
NATSUSHIO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 8 February 1942 off Makassar, Celebes by U.S. submarine
NATSUZUKI	1945	HEAVILY DAMAGED 16 June 1945 near Matsure; in Japan
NENOHI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 4 July 1942 off Agattu, Aleutians by U.S. submarine
NIRE	1945	HEAVILY DAMAGED 22 June 1945 at Kure; in Japan
NIIZUKI	1943	SUNK 6 July 1943 in Kula Gulf, New Georgia by U.S. fleet units
NOKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 20 February 1945 N.E. of Saigon by U.S. submarines
NOWAKE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 October 1944 in Surigao Strait by U.S. fleet units
NUMAKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 18 December 1943 in E. China Sea by U.S submarine
OBORO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 12 August 1942 S. of Honshu by U.S submarine
OINAMI	Not commissioned	
OITE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 18 February 1944 at Truk by U.S carrier planes
OKIKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 10 January 1943 off Honshu by U.S submarine
OKINAMI	1944	SUNK 13 November 1944 in Manila Bay by U.S. carrier planes
ONAMI	1943	SUNK 25 November 1943 N.W. of Buka Is., Solomons by U.S. destroyers
OSHIO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 20 February 1943 N. of Admiralty Is. by U. S. submarine
OTAKE	1945	At Maizuru; not manned

Ships	Date Commissioned	Final Disposition
DESTROYERS—Continued		
OYASHIO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 8 May 1943 in Blackett Strait, New Georgia by mines and aircraft
SAGIRI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 24 December 1941 off Kuching, Borneo by Dutch submarine
SAKURA	1945	SUNK 11 July 1945 near Osaka
SAMIDARE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 26 August 1944 off Palau by U.S. carrier planes and submarine
SANAE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 18 November 1943 in Celebes Sea by U.S. submarine
SATSUKI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 21 September 1944 in Manila Bay by U.S. carrier planes
SAWAKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	DECOMMISSIONED; in Japan
SAZANAMI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 14 January 1944 S.E. of Yap Is. by U.S. submarine
SHII	1945	Operational; in Japan area
SHIGEZAKURA	1945	SUNK 18 July 1945 at Yokosuka by U.S. carrier planes
SHIGURE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 24 January 1945 N.W. of Borneo by U.S. submarine
SHIKINAMI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 12 September 1944 S. China Sea by U.S. submarine
SHIMAKAZE	1943	SUNK 11 November 1944 in Ormoc Bay by U.S. carrier planes
SHIMOTSUKI	1944	SUNK 25 November 1944 W of Borneo by U.S. submarine
SHINONOME	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 18 December 1941 off Miri, Borneo by mine
SHIOKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	HEAVILY DAMAGED 31 January 1945 S. of Formosa; in Japan
SHIRAKUMO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 16 March 1944 S.E. of Hokkaido by U.S. submarine
SHIRANUHI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 27 October 1944 in P.I. by U.S. carrier planes
SHIRATSUYU	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 20 June 1944 in Philippine Sea by U.S. carrier planes
SHIRAYUKI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 3 March 1943 Huon Gulf, New Guinea by U.S. Army bombers
SUGI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	HEAVILY DAMAGED 21 January 1945 at Takao; in Japan
SUMIRE	1945	At Maizuru; not manned
SUZUKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 26 January 1944 N.W. of Ponape by U.S. submarine
SUZUNAMI	1943	SUNK 11 November 1943 at Rabaul by U.S. carrier planes
SUZUTSUKI	1942	HEAVILY DAMAGED 7 April 1945 S. of Kyushu; decommissioned; in Japan
TACHIBANA	1945	SUNK 15 July 1945 at Ominato by U.S. fleet units
TACHIKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 17 February 1944 at Truk by U.S. carrier planes

Ships	Date Commissioned	Final Disposition
DESTROYERS—Continued		
TAKANAMI	1942	SUNK 30 November 1942 off Savo Is., Solomons by U.S. fleet units
TAKE	1944	In Inland Sea
TAMANAMI	1943	SUNK 7 July 1944 S.W. of Manila by U.S. submarine
TANIKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 9 June 1944 in Sibutu passage, P.I by U.S.submarine
TERUTSUKI	1942	SUNK 12 December 1942 off New Georgia Is. by U.S. PT boats
TOKITSUKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 3 March 1943 in Huon Gulf, New Guinea by U.S. Army bombers
TSUBAKI	1945	HEAVILY DAMAGED 24 July 1945 near Okayama; in Japan
TSUGA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 15 January 1945 off Pescadores Is. by U.S. carrier planes
TSUTA	1945	In Inland Sea
UME	1944	SUNK 31 January 1945 S.W. of Takao by B-25's
UMIKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 1 February 1944 S.E. of Truk by U.S. submarine
URAKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 9 June 1944 in Sibutu passage, P.I. by U.S. submarine
URANAMI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 26 October 1944 S.W. of Masbate, P.I. by U.S. carrier planes
USHIO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	HEAVILY DAMAGED 14 November 1944 at Manila; in Japan
USUGUMO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 7 July 1944 in Sea of Okhotsk by U.S. submarine
UZUKI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 11 December 1944 off Leyte by U.S. PT boats
WAKABA	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 24 October 1944 S. of Mindoro by U.S. carrier planes
WAKATAKE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 30 March 1944 at Palau by U.S. carrier planes
WAKATSUKI	1943	SUNK 11 November 1944 in Ormoc Bay by U.S. carrier planes
YAKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	Converted to target ship; in Japan area
YAMAGUMO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 October 1944 in Surigao Strait by U.S. destroyers
YAMAKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 June 1942 off Yokohama by U. S. submarine
YANAGI	1945	HEAVILY DAMAGED 15 July 1945 at Ominato by U.S. fleet units
YAYOI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 11 September 1942 off Normanby Is. by B-17's
YOITSUKI	1945	HEAVILY DAMAGED 2 June 1945 N. of Himejima; in Japan
YUDACHI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 13 November 1942 off Savo Is., Solomons by U.S. fleet units
YUGIRI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 November 1943 N.W. of Buka Is., Solomons by U.S. destroyers

Ships	Date Commissioned	Final Disposition
DESTROYERS—Concluded		
YUGUMO	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 6 October 1943 N.W. of Vella Lavella, Solomons by U.S. destroyers
YUGURE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 20 July 1943 in Vella Gulf, New Georgia by U.S. Navy bombers
YUKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	Converted to target ship; in Japan
YUKIKAZE	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	HEAVILY DAMAGED 30 July 1945 at Miyazu; in Japan
YUNAGI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 August 1944 off N.W. Luzon by U.S submarine
YUZUKI	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 13 December 1944 in Leyte area by U.S. carrier planes
SUBMARINES		
I-1	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 29 January 1943 off Guadalcanal by New Zealand corvettes
I-2	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 7 April 1944 E. of Admiralty Is by U.S. destroyer
I-3	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 9 December 1942 off Guadalcanal by U.S. PT boat
I-4	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 21 December 1942 S. of Rabaul by U.S submarine
I-5	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 10 June 1944 N.W of Bismarck Is. by U.S destroyer
I-6	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 4 July 1944 E. of Saipan by U.S. fleet units
I-7	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 22 June 1943 off Kiska by U.S. destroyer
I-8	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 31 March 1945 S.W. of Okinawa by U.S. destroyers
I-9	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 10 June 1943 N.E. of Attu by U.S. patrol craft
I-10	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 18 July 1944 N. of Truk by U.S. destroyer escort
I-11	May 1942	SUNK 17 February 1944 E. of Marshall Is. by U.S. destroyer
I-12	May 1944	SUNK May 1945 in South Pacific
I-13	December 1944	SUNK 16 July 1945 E. of Honshu by U.S. carrier aircraft
I-14	March 1945	Captured at sea 27 August 1945; in Japan; decommissioned
I-15	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK October/November 1942 in South Pacific
I-16	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 19 May 1944 N.E of Solomons by U.S. destroyer escort
I-17	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 19 August 1943 off New Caledonia by Allied surface craft and planes
I-18	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 December 1942 off Kumusi R., New Guinea by U.S. PT boat
I-19	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 26 November 1943 W. of Makin Is. by U.S destroyers
I-20	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 1 October 1943 N of Kolombangara Is. by U.S. destroyer
I-21	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 5 February 1944 in S. Marshalls by U.S. destroyer escorts
I-22	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 19 November 1942 off San Cristobal Is. by U.S. destroyer
I-23	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 26 April 1942 off Johnston Is. by U.S. submarine
I-24	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 27 July 1943 S.W. of New Hanover by U.S submarine
I-25	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK October/November 1943 in Central Pacific
I-26	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 25 October 1944 in Leyte Gulf by U.S. destroyer escort
I-27	February 1942	SUNK 12 February 1944 S.W. of Maldive Is. by British destroyers
I-28	February 1942	SUNK 17 May 1942 S. of Truk by U.S. submarine
I-29	February 1942	SUNK 26 July 1944 in Luzon Strait by U.S. submarine
I-30	March 1942	SUNK May/June 1942 in Western Pacific
I-31	May 1942	SUNK 13 June 1943 N. of Kiska by U.S. destroyer
I-32	April 1942	SUNK 24 March 1944 E. of Marshall Is. by U.S. fleet units
I-33	June 1942	SUNK May/June 1942 in Western Pacific by accident
I-34	August 1942	SUNK 13 November 1943 in Malacca Straits by British submarine
I-35	August 1942	SUNK 23 November 1943 off Tarawa by U.S. destroyers
I-36	September 1942	In Japan
I-37	March 1943	SUNK 18 November 1944 E. of Samar by U.S. destroyer and carrier planes
I-38	January 1943	SUNK 13 November 1944 N.E. of Oahu by U.S. fleet units
I-39	April 1943	SUNK 24 December 1943 off Guadalcanal by U.S. destroyer
I-40	July 1943	SUNK March/April 1944 in Central Pacific
I-41	September 1943	SUNK 16 September 1944 E. of Honshu by U.S submarine
I-42	November 1943	SUNK 23 March 1944 S.W. of Palau by U.S. submarine
I-43	November 1943	SUNK 15 February 1944 N.W. of Truk by U.S. submarine
I-44	1944	SUNK 18 April 1945 E. of Okinawa by U.S. destroyers
I-45	December 1943	SUNK 29 October 1944 E. of Dinegat Is. by U.S. destroyer escort
I-46	February 1944	SUNK December 1944 in Western Pacific
I-47	July 1944	Operational; in Japan area

Ships	Date Commissioned	Final Disposition
	SUBMARINES—Continued	
I-43	September 1944	SUNK 23 January 1945 off Ulithi by U.S. destroyer escorts
I-49	May 1944	In Japan
I-52	December 1943	SUNK 24 June 1944 in Atlantic Ocean by U.S. carrier planes
I-53	February 1944	HEAVILY DAMAGED 30 March 1945; in Japan
I-54	March 1944	SUNK 28 October 1944 E. of Leyte Gulf by U.S. destroyer
I-55	April 1944	SUNK 27 July 1944 E. of Saipan by U.S. destroyer escort
I-56	June 1944	SUNK 5 April 1945 W. of Okinawa by U.S. destroyer
I-58	September 1944	Operational; in Japan
I-121	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	Operational; in Japan
I-122	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 10 June 1945 in Japan Sea by U.S. submarine
I-123	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 29 August 1942 E. of Guadalcanal Is. by U.S. destroyer
I-124	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 20 January 1942 off Port Darwin by Allied surface craft
I-153	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	DECOMMISSIONED; in Japan
I-154	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	DECOMMISSIONED; in Japan
I-155	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	DECOMMISSIONED; in Japan
I-156	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	In Japan
I-157	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	In Japan
I-158	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	Operational; in Japan
I-159	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	Operational; in Japan
I-160(60)	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 17 January 1942 in Sunda Straits by British destroyer
I-162	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	In Japan
I-164	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 17 May 1942 S. of Kyushu by U.S. submarine
I-165	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	DECOMMISSIONED September 1945; in Japan
I-166	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 17 July 1944 off Penang by British submarine
I-168	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 3 September 1943 off New Hebrides by U. S. destroyer
I-169	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 4 April 1944 at Truk
I-170(70)	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 10 December 1941 off Pearl Harbor by U.S. carrier plane
I-171	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 1 February 1944 W. of Buka by U.S. destroyer
I-172	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK October/November 1942 in South Pacific
I-173(73)	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 27 January 1942 off Midway by U.S. submarine
I-174	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 12 April 1944 N. of Truk by U.S. Navy bomber
I-175	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 30 April 1944 S. of Truk by U.S. destroyers
I-176	July 1942	SUNK 17 May 1944 N.E. of Buka by U.S. destroyers
I-177	December 1942	SUNK November 1944 in South Pacific
I-178	December 1942	SUNK June 1943 in Central Pacific
I-179	June 1943	SUNK February 1944 in South Pacific
I-180	June 1943	SUNK 26 April 1944 off Kodiak, Alaska by U.S destroyer
I-181	May 1943	SUNK 16 January 1944 off St. George Channel, Bismarcks, by U.S. Navy planes
I-182	May 1943	SUNK 9 September 1943 in Surigao Strait by U.S. submarine
I-183	October 1943	SUNK 29 April 1944 off Bungo Channel, Japan by U.S. submarine
I-184	October 1943	SUNK 21 June 1944 E. of Saipan by U.S. fleet units
I-185	September 1943	SUNK 17 June 1944 N.W. of Guam by U.S. destroyers
I-201	February 1945	In Japan
I-202	February 1945	In Japan
I-203	June 1945	In Japan
I-351	January 1945	SUNK 15 July 1945 N.W. of Borneo by U.S. submarine
I-361	May 1944	SUNK 30 May 1945 in Japanese waters
I-362	May 1944	SUNK 27 November 1944 in Camotes Sea by U.S. destroyers
I-363	July 1944	Operational; in Japan
I-364	June 1944	SUNK October 1944 in South Pacific
I-365	August 1944	SUNK 29 November 1944 S.E. of Tokyo Bay by U.S. submarine
I-366	August 1944	Operational; in Japan
I-367	August 1944	Operational; in Japan
I-368	August 1944	SUNK 26 February 1945 S. of Iwo Jima by U.S. destroyer escort
I-369	October 1944	DECOMMISSIONED September 1945; in Japan
I-370	September 1944	SUNK 26 February 1945 N.W. of Iwo Jima by U.S. carrier planes
I-371	October 1944	SUNK January 1945 in Truk area
I-372	November 1944	SUNK 18 July 1945 at Yokosuka by carrier planes
I-373	April 1945	SUNK 14 August 1945 in E. China Sea by U.S. submarine
I-400	December 1944	Captured at sea 27 August 1945; in Japan; decommissioned
I-401	January 1945	Captured at sea 29 August 1945; in Japan; decommissioned
I-402	July 1945	DECOMMISSIONED September 1945; in Japan
I-501	July 1945	At Singapore
I-502	July 1945	At Singapore
I-503	July 1945	In Japan
I-504	July 1945	In Japan
I-505	July 1945	At Batavia

Ships	Date Commissioned	Final Disposition
SUBMARINES—Continued		
I-506	July 1945	At Surabaya
RO-30	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK April 1942 in Western Pacific
RO-31	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	DECOMMISSIONED during 1944; in Japan
RO-32	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK April 1942 in Western Pacific
RO-33	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 29 August 1942 S.E. of New Guinea by Australian destroyer
RO-34	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 7 April 1943 N.W. of San Cristobal Is. by U.S. destroyer
RO-35	March 1943	SUNK October 1943 in Solomons
RO-36	May 1943	SUNK 13 June 1944 E. of Saipan by U.S. destroyer
RO-37	June 1943	SUNK 22 January 1944 E. of Solomons by U.S. destroyer
RO-38	July 1943	SUNK February/March 1944 in Central Pacific
RO-39	September 1943	SUNK 3 February 1944 off Wotje, Marshalls by U.S destroyer
RO-40	June 1943	SUNK February/March 1944 in Central Pacific
RO-41	November 1943	SUNK 31 March 1945 E. of Okinawa by U.S. destroyer
RO-42	August 1943	SUNK 10 June 1944 N.E. of Kwajalein by U.S destroyer escort
RO-43	December 1943	SUNK 14 February 1945 N.E. of Luzon by U.S. submarine
RO-44	September 1943	SUNK 16 June 1944 E. of Eniwetok by U.S. destroyer escort
RO-45	January 1944	SUNK 20 April 1944 W. of Saipan by U.S. submarine
RO-46	February 1944	SUNK 9 April 1945 S.E. of Okinawa by U.S. destroyers
RO-47	January 1944	SUNK 23 March 1945 in Philippine Sea by U.S. destroyer
RO-48	March 1944	SUNK 14 July 1944 W. of Saipan by U.S. fleet units
RO-49	1944	SUNK 24 February 1945 off Bungo Channel, Japan by U.S. submarine
RO-50	July 1944	Operational; in Japan
RO-55	September 1944	SUNK 14 February 1945 N.E. of Luzon by U.S submarine
RO-56	November 1944	SUNK May 1945 in Kuriles
RO-57	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	DECOMMISSIONED
RO-58	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	DECOMMISSIONED
RO-59	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	DECOMMISSIONED
RO-60	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 29 December 1941 at Kwajalein by grounding
RO-61	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 31 August 1942 in Aleutians by U.S. destroyer and plane
RO-62	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	DECOMMISSIONED September 1945; in Japan area
RO-63	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	DECOMMISSIONED September 1945; in Japan area
RO-64	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK May 1945 in Hiroshima Bay

Ships	Date Commissioned	Final Disposition
SUBMARINES—Continued		
RO-65	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 28 September 1942 at Kiska by B-24's
RO-66	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 17 December 1941 W. of Wake Is. by collision
RO-67	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	SUNK 4 April 1945 in Inland Sea by mine
RO-68	Prior 7 Dec. 1941	DECOMMISSIONED September 1945; in Japan
RO-100	September 1942	SUNK 25 November 1943 off Bougainville Is. by U.S. fleet units
RO-101	October 1942	SUNK 1 July 1943 E. of Rendova Is., Solomons by U.S. destroyer
RO-102	November 1942	SUNK 4 April 1943 S. of Santa Isabel Is. by U.S. destroyer
RO-103	October 1942	SUNK 29 May 1943 off New Hebrides by U.S. patrol craft
RO-104	February 1943	SUNK 23 May 1944 N. of Bismarck Is. by U.S. destroyer escort
RO-105	March 1943	SUNK 31 May 1944 N. of Bismarck Is. by U.S. fleet units
RO-106	December 1942	SUNK 22 May 1944 N. of Bismarck Is. by U.S. destroyer escort
RO-107	December 1942	SUNK May/June 1943 in South Pacific
RO-108	April 1943	SUNK 26 May 1944 N. of Bismarck Is. by U.S. destroyer escort
RO-109	April 1943	SUNK 29 April 1945 S.E. of Okinawa by U.S. fleet units
RO-110	July 1943	SUNK 11 February 1944 off Vizagapatam, India by Allied sloops
RO-111	July 1943	SUNK 16 June 1944 off Truk by U.S. Navy PBY
RO-112	September 1943	SUNK 11 February 1945 N. of Luzon by U.S. submarine
RO-113	October 1943	SUNK 13 February 1945 N. of Luzon by U.S. submarine
RO-114	November 1943	SUNK 16 June 1944 W. of Guam by U.S. destroyers
RO-115	November 1943	SUNK 10 February 1945 N. of Luzon by U.S. submarine
RO-116	January 1944	SUNK 24 May 1944 N. of Bismarck Is. by U.S. destroyer escort
RO-117	January 1944	SUNK 17 June 1944 N.W. of Truk by U.S. Navy PBY
RO-500	September 1943	DECOMMISSIONED September 1945; in Japan
RO-501	February 1944	SUNK 13 May 1944 in Atlantic Ocean by U.S. destroyer
HA-101	November 1944	DECOMMISSIONED September 1945
HA-102	December 1944	DECOMMISSIONED September 1945
HA-103	February 1945	In Japan
HA-104	December 1944	DECOMMISSIONED September 1945
HA-105	February 1945	In Japan
HA-106	December 1944	DECOMMISSIONED September 1945

Ships	Date Commissioned	Final Disposition
SUBMARINES—Continued		
HA-107	February 1945	In Japan
HA-108	May 1945	In Japan
HA-109	March 1945	In Japan
HA-111	July 1945	In Japan
HA-201	May 1945	In Japan
HA-202	May 1945	In Japan
HA-203	June 1945	DECOMMISSIONED September 1945
HA-204	June 1945	DECOMMISSIONED September 1945
SUBMARINES—Concluded		
HA-205	July 1945	In Japan
HA-207	August 1945	In Japan
HA-208	August 1945	In Japan
HA-209	August 1945	In Japan
HA-210	August 1945	In Japan
HA-215	Not commissioned	In Japan
HA-216	August 1945	In Japan
HA-217	June 1945	In Japan
HA-218	July 1945	In Japan

APPENDIX B

Major combatant ships added to United States Fleet

7 December 1941—1 October 1945

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
BATTLESHIPS				
BB 57	SOUTH DAKOTA	20 March 1942		
58	INDIANA	30 April 1942		
59	MASSACHUSETTS	12 May 1942		
60	ALABAMA	16 Aug 1942		
61	IOWA	22 Feb. 1943		
62	NEW JERSEY	23 May 1943		
63	MISSOURI	11 June 1944		
64	WISCONSIN	16 April 1944		
			8	
HEAVY CRUISERS				
CA 68	BALTIMORE	15 April 1943		
69	BOSTON	30 June 1943		
70	CANBERRA	14 Oct. 1943		
71	QUINCY	15 Dec. 1943		
72	PITTSBURG	10 Oct. 1944		
73	SAINT PAUL	17 Feb. 1945		
74	COLUMBUS	8 June 1945		
75	HELENA	4 Sept. 1945		
130	BREMERTON	29 April 1945		
131	FALL RIVER	1 July 1945		
132	MACON	26 Aug. 1945		
135	LOS ANGELES	22 July 1945		
136	CHICAGO	10 Jan. 1945		
			13	
LARGE CRUISERS				
CB 1	ALASKA	17 June 1944		
2	GUAM	17 Sept 1944		
			2	
LIGHT CRUISERS				
CL 51	ATLANTA	24 Dec. 1941		Sunk
52	JUNEAU	14 Feb. 1942		Sunk
53	SAN DIEGO	10 Jan 1942		
54	SAN JUAN	28 Feb. 1942		
55	CLEVELAND	15 June 1942		
56	COLUMBUS	29 July 1942		
57	MONTPELIER	9 Sept. 1942		
58	DENVER	15 Oct. 1942		
60	SANTA FE	24 Nov. 1942		
62	BIRMINGHAM	29 Jan. 1943		
63	MOBILE	24 March 1943		
64	VINCENNES	21 Jan. 1944		
65	PASADENA	8 June 1944		
66	SPRINGFIELD	9 Sept. 1944		

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
LIGHT CRUISERS—Concluded				
CL 67	TOPEKA	28 Dec. 1944		
80	BILOXI	31 Aug. 1943		
81	HOUSTON	20 Dec. 1943		
82	PROVIDENCE	15 May 1945		
86	VICKSBURG	12 June 1944		
87	DULUTH	18 Sept. 1944		
89	MIAMI	28 Dec. 1943		
90	ASTORIA	17 May 1944		
91	OKLAHOMA CITY	22 Dec. 1944		
92	LITTLE ROCK	17 June 1945		
95	OAKLAND	17 July 1943		
96	RENO	28 Dec 1943		
97	FLINT	31 Aug 1944		
98	TUCSON	3 Feb. 1945		
101	AMSTERDAM	8 Jan. 1945		
102	PORTSMOUTH	25 June 1945		
103	WILKES-BARRE	1 July 1944		
104	ATLANTA	2 Dec. 1944		
105	DAYTON	7 Jan. 1945		
			33	
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS				
CV 9	ESSEX	31 Dec. 1942		
10	YORKTOWN	15 April 1943		
11	INTREPID	16 Aug. 1943		
12	HORNET	29 Nov. 1943		
13	FRANKLIN	31 Jan. 1944		
14	TICONDEROGA	8 May 1944		
15	RANDOLPH	9 Oct. 1944		
16	LEXINGTON	17 Feb. 1943		
17	BUNKER HILL	25 May 1943		
18	WASP	24 Nov. 1943		
19	HANCOCK	15 April 1944		
20	BENNINGTON	6 Aug. 1944		
21	BOXER	16 April 1945		
31	BON HOMME RICHARD	26 Nov. 1944		
36	ANTIETAM	28 Jan. 1945		
38	SHANGRI-LA	15 Sept. 1944		
39	LAKE CHAMPLAIN	3 June 1945		
			17	
LARGE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS				
CVB 41	MIDWAY	10 Sept. 1945		
			1	

LIGHT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
CVL 22	INDEPENDENCE	14 Jan. 1943		
23	PRINCETON	25 Feb. 1943		Sunk
24	BELLEAU WOOD	31 March 1943		
25	COWPENS	28 May 1943		
26	MONTEREY	17 June 1943		
27	LANGLEY	31 Aug. 1943		
28	CABOT	24 July 1943		
29	BATAAN	17 Nov. 1943		
30	SAN JACINTO	15 Dec. 1943		
			9	

ESCORT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
CVE 6	BATTLER			To U.K. 10-31-42
7	ATTACKER			To U.K. 9-30-42
8	HUNTER			To U.K. 1-9-43
9	BOGUE	26 Sept. 1942		
10	CHASER			To U.K. 4-9-43
11	CARD	8 Nov. 1942		
12	COPAHEE	15 June 1942		
13	CORE	10 Dec. 1942		
14	FENCER			To U.K. 3-1-43
15	STALKER			To U.K. 12-21-42
16	NASSAU	20 Aug. 1942		
17	PURSUER			To U.K. 6-14-43
18	ALTAMAHA	15 Sept. 1942		
19	STRIKER			To U.K. 4-28-43
20	BARNES	20 Feb. 1943		
21	BLOCK ISLAND	8 March 1943		Sunk
22	SEARCHER			To U.K. 4-7-43
23	BRETON	12 April 1943		
24	RAVAGER			To U.K. 4-25-43
25	CROATAN	28 April 1943		
26	SANGAMON	25 Aug. 1942		ex-AO 28
27	SUWANEE	24 Sept. 1942		ex-AO 33
28	CHENANGO	19 Sept. 1942		ex-AO 31
29	SANTEE	24 Aug. 1942		ex-AO 29
30	CHARGER	3 March 1942		ex-BAVG 4
31	PRINCE WILLIAM	9 April 1943		
32	SLINGER			To U.K. 8-11-43
33	ATHELING			To U.K. 7-31-43
34	EMPEROR			To U.K. 8-6-43
35	AMEER			To U.K. 7-19-43
36	BEGUM			To U.K. 8-2-43
37	TRUMPETER			To U.K. 8-4-43
38	EMPRESS			To U.K. 8-13-43
39	KHEDIVE			To U.K. 8-25-43
40	SPEAKER			To U.K. 11-20-43
41	NABOB			To U.K. 9-7-43
42	PREMIER			To U.K. 11-3-43
43	SHAH			To U.K. 9-27-43
44	PATROLLER			To U.K. 10-22-43
45	RAJAH			To U.K. 1-17-44
46	RANEE			To U.K. 11-8-43
47	TROUNCER			To U.K. 1-31-44
48	THANE			To U.K. 11-19-43
49	QUEEN			To U.K. 12-7-43
50	RULER			To U.K. 12-22-43
51	ARBITER			To U.K. 12-31-43
52	SMITER			To U.K. 1-20-44
53	PUNCHER			To U.K. 2-5-44
54	REAPER			To U.K. 2-18-44
55	CASABLANCA	8 July 1943		
56	LISCOME BAY	7 Aug. 1943		Sunk
57	ANZIO	27 Aug. 1943		
58	CORREGIDOR	31 Aug. 1943		
59	MISSION BAY	13 Sept. 1943		
60	GUADALCANAL	25 Sept. 1943		
61	MANILA BAY	5 Oct. 1943		
62	NATOMA BAY	14 Oct. 1943		
63	ST. LO	23 Oct. 1943		Sunk
64	TRIPOLI	31 Oct. 1943		

ESCORT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS—Concluded

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
CVE 65	WAKE ISLAND	7 Nov. 1943		
66	WHITE PLAINS	15 Nov. 1943		
67	SOLOMONS	21 Nov. 1943		
68	KALININ BAY	27 Nov. 1943		
69	KASAAN BAY	4 Dec. 1943		
70	FANSHAW BAY	9 Dec. 1943		
71	KITKUN BAY	15 Dec. 1943		
72	TULAGI	21 Dec. 1943		
73	GAMBIER BAY	28 Dec. 1943		Sunk
74	NEHENTA BAY	3 Jan. 1944		
75	HOGGATT BAY	11 Jan. 1944		
76	KADASHAN BAY	18 Jan. 1944		
77	MARCUS ISLAND	26 Jan 1944		
78	SAVO ISLAND	3 Feb. 1944		
79	OMMANEY BAY	11 Feb. 1944		Sunk
80	PETROF BAY	18 Feb. 1944		
81	RUDYERD BAY	25 Feb. 1944		
82	SAGINAW BAY	2 March 1944		
83	SARGENT BAY	9 March 1944		
84	SHAMROCK BAY	15 March 1944		
85	SHIPLEY BAY	21 March 1944		
86	SITKOH BAY	28 March 1944		
87	STEAMER BAY	4 April 1944		
88	CAPE ESPERANCE	9 April 1944		
89	TAKANIS BAY	15 April 1944		
90	THETIS BAY	21 April 1944		
91	MAKASSAR STRAIT	27 April 1944		
92	WINDHAM BAY	3 May 1944		
93	MAKIN ISLAND	9 May 1944		
94	LUNGA POINT	14 May 1944		
95	BISMARCK SEA	20 May 1944		Sunk
96	SALAMAUA	26 May 1944		
97	HOLLANDIA	1 June 1944		
98	KWAJALEIN	7 June 1944		
99	ADMIRALTY ISLANDS	13 June 1944		
100	BOUGAINVILLE	18 June 1944		
101	MATANIKAN	24 June 1944		
102	ATTU	30 June 1944		
103	ROI	6 July 1944		
104	MUNDA	8 July 1944		
105	COMMENCEMENT BAY	27 Nov. 1944		
106	BLOCK ISLAND	30 Dec. 1944		
107	GILBERT ISLANDS	5 Feb. 1945		
108	KULA GULF	12 May 1945		
109	CAPE GLOUCESTER	5 March 1945		
110	SALERNO BAY	19 May 1945		
111	VELLA GULF	9 April 1945		
112	SIBONEY	14 May 1945		
113	PUGET SOUND	18 June 1945		
115	BAIROKO	16 July 1945		
117	SAIDOR	4 Sept. 1945		
			110	(33 Leased)
BAVG 2	AVENGER			To U.K. 3-2-42
3	BITER			To U.K. 5-6-42
5	DASHER			To U.K. 7-2-42
6	TRACKER			To U.K. 1-31-43
			4	(4 Leased)

DESTROYERS

DD 445	FLETCHER	30 June 1942	
446	RADFORD	22 July 1942	
447	JENKINS	31 July 1942	
448	LA VALLETTE	12 Aug. 1942	

DESTROYERS—Continued

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
DD 449	NICHOLAS	4 June 1942		
450	O'BANNON	26 June 1942		
451	CHEVALIER	20 July 1942		Sunk
455	HAMBLETON	22 Dec. 1941		Now DMS 20
456	RODMAN	27 Jan. 1942		Now DMS 21
458	MACOMB	26 Jan. 1942		Now DMS 23
459	LAFFEY	31 March 1942		Sunk
460	WOODWORTH	30 April 1942		
461	FORREST	13 Jan. 1942		Now DMS 24
462	FITCH	3 Feb. 1942		Now DMS 25
463	CORRY	18 Dec. 1941		Sunk
464	HOBSON	22 Jan 1942		Now DMS 26
465	SAUFLEY	29 Aug. 1942		
466	WALLER	1 Oct. 1942		
467	STRONG	7 Aug. 1942		Sunk
468	TAYLOR	28 Aug. 1942		
469	DE HAVEN	21 Sept. 1942		Sunk
470	BACHE	14 Nov. 1942		
471	BEALE	23 Dec. 1942		
472	GUEST	15 Dec. 1942		
473	BENNETT	9 Feb. 1943		
474	FULLAM	2 March 1943		
475	HUDSON	13 April 1943		
476	HUTCHINS	17 Nov. 1942		
477	PRINGLE	15 Sept. 1942		Sunk
478	STANLY	15 Oct. 1942		
479	STEVENS	1 Feb. 1943		
480	HALFORD	10 April 1943		
481	LEUTZE	4 March 1944		
483	AARON WARD	4 March 1942		Sunk
484	BUCHANAN	21 March 1942		
485	DUNCAN	16 April 1942		Sunk
486	LANSDOWNE	29 April 1942		
487	LARDNER	13 May 1942		
488	McCALLA	27 May 1942		
489	MERVINE	17 June 1942		Now DMS 31
490	QUICK	3 July 1942		Now DMS 32
491	FARENHOLT	2 April 1942		
492	BAILEY	11 May 1942		
493	CARMICK	28 Dec. 1942		Now DMS 33
494	DOYLE	27 Jan. 1943		Now DMS 34
495	ENDICOTT	25 Feb. 1943		Now DMS 35
496	McCOOK	15 March 1943		Now DMS 36
497	FRANKFORD	31 March 1943		
498	PHILIP	21 Nov. 1942		
499	RENSHAW	5 Dec. 1942		
500	RINGGOLD	24 Dec. 1942		
501	SCHROEDER	1 Jan. 1943		
502	SIGSBEE	23 Jan. 1943		
507	CONWAY	9 Oct. 1942		
508	CONY	30 Oct. 1942		
509	CONVERSE	20 Nov. 1942		
510	EATON	4 Dec. 1942		
511	FOOTE	22 Dec. 1942		
512	SPENCE	8 Jan. 1943		Sunk
513	TERRY	26 Jan. 1943		
514	THATCHER	10 Feb. 1943		
515	ANTHONY	26 Feb. 1943		
516	WADSWORTH	16 March 1943		
517	WALKER	3 April 1943		
518	BROWNSON	3 Feb. 1943		Sunk
519	DALY	10 March 1943		
520	ISHERWOOD	12 April 1943		
521	KIMBERLY	24 May 1943		
522	LUCE	21 June 1943		Sunk
526	ABNER READ	5 Feb. 1943		Sunk
527	AMMEN	12 March 1943		
528	MULLANY	23 April 1943		
529	BUSH	10 May 1943		Sunk
530	TRATHEN	28 May 1943		
531	HAZELWOOD	18 June 1943		
532	HEERMAN	6 July 1943		
533	HOEL	29 July 1943		Sunk
534	McCORD	19 Aug. 1943		
535	MILLER	31 Aug. 1943		

DESTROYERS—Continued

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
DD 536	OWEN	20 Sept. 1943		
537	THE SULLIVANS	30 Sept. 1943		
538	STEPHEN POTTER	21 Oct. 1943		
539	TINGEY	25 Nov. 1943		
540	TWINING	1 Dec. 1943		
541	YARNELL	30 Dec. 1943		
544	BOYD	8 May 1943		
545	BRADFORD	12 June 1943		
546	BROWN	10 July 1943		
547	COWELL	23 Aug. 1943		
550	CAPPS	23 June 1943		
551	DAVID W. TAYLOR	18 Sept. 1943		
552	EVANS	11 Dec. 1943		
553	JOHN D. HENLEY	2 Feb. 1944		
554	FRANK	30 July 1943		
555	HAGGARD	31 Aug. 1943		
556	HAILEY	30 Sept. 1943		
557	JOHNSTON	27 Oct. 1943		Sunk
558	LAWS	18 Nov. 1943		
559	LONGSHAW	4 Dec. 1943		Sunk
560	MORRISON	18 Dec. 1943		Sunk
561	PRICKETT	15 Jan. 1944		
562	ROBINSON	31 Jan. 1944		
563	ROSS	21 Feb. 1944		
564	ROWE	13 March 1944		
565	SMALLEY	31 March 1944		
566	STODDARD	15 April 1944		
567	WATTS	29 April 1944		
568	WREN	20 May 1944		
569	AULICK	27 Oct. 1942		
570	CHARLES AUSBURNE	24 Nov. 1942		
571	CLAXTON	8 Dec. 1942		
572	DYSON	30 Dec. 1942		
573	HARRISON	25 Jan. 1943		
574	JOHN RODGERS	9 Feb. 1943		
575	McKEE	31 March 1943		
576	MURRAY	20 April 1943		
577	SPROSTON	19 May 1943		
578	WICKES	16 June 1943		
579	WILLIAM D. PORTER	6 July 1943		Sunk
580	YOUNG	31 July 1943		
581	CHARRETTE	18 May 1943		
582	CONNER	8 June 1943		
583	HALL	6 July 1943		
584	HALLIGAN	19 Aug. 1943		Sunk
585	HARADEN	16 Sept. 1943		
586	NEWCOMB	10 Nov. 1943		
587	BELL	4 March 1943		
588	BURNS	3 April 1943		
589	IZARD	15 May 1943		
590	PAUL HAMILTON	25 Oct. 1943		
591	TWIGGS	4 Nov. 1943		Sunk
592	HOWORTH	3 April 1944		
593	KILLEN	4 May 1944		
594	HART	4 Nov. 1944		
595	METCALF	18 Nov. 1944		
596	SHIELDS	8 Feb. 1945		
597	WILEY	22 Feb. 1945		
598	BANCROFT	30 April 1942		
599	BARTON	29 May 1942		Sunk
600	BOYLE	15 Aug. 1942		
601	CHAMPLIN	12 Sept. 1942		
602	MEADE	22 June 1942		
603	MURPHY	27 July 1942		
604	PARKER	31 Aug. 1942		
605	CALDWELL	10 June 1942		
606	COGHLAN	10 July 1942		
607	FRAZIER	30 July 1942		

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
	DESTROYERS—Continued			
DD 608	GANSEVOORT	25 Aug. 1942		
609	GILLESPIE	18 Sept. 1942		
610	HOBBY	18 Nov. 1942		
611	KALK	17 Oct. 1942		
612	KENDRICK	12 Sept. 1942		
613	LAUB	24 Oct. 1942		
614	MAC KENZIE	21 Nov. 1942		
615	Mc LANAHAN	19 Dec. 1942		
616	NIELDS	15 Jan. 1943		
617	ORDRONAUX	13 Feb. 1943		
618	DAVISON	11 Sept. 1942		Now DMS 37
619	EDWARDS	18 Sept. 1942		
620	GLENNON	8 Oct. 1942		Sunk
621	JEFFERS	5 Nov. 1942		Now DMS 24
622	MADDOX	31 Oct. 1942		Sunk
623	NELSON	26 Nov. 1942		
624	BALDWIN	30 April 1943		
625	HARDING	25 May 1943		Now DMS 28
626	SATTERLEE	1 July 1943		
627	THOMPSON	10 July 1943		Now DMS 38
628	WELLES	16 Aug. 1943		
629	ABBOT	23 April 1943		
630	BRAINE	11 May 1943		
631	ERBEN	28 May 1943		
632	COWIE	1 June 1942		Now DMS 39
633	KNIGHT	23 June 1942		Now DMS 40
634	DORAN	4 Aug. 1942		Now DMS 41
635	EARLE	1 Sept. 1942		Now DMS 42
636	BUTLER	15 Aug. 1942		Now DMS 29
637	GHERARDI	15 Sept. 1942		Now DMS 30
638	HERNDON	20 Dec. 1942		
639	SHUBRICK	7 Feb. 1943		
640	BEATTY	7 May 1942		Sunk
641	TILLMAN	4 June 1942		
642	HALE	15 June 1943		
643	SIGOURNEY	29 June 1943		
644	STEMBEL	16 July 1943		
645	STEVENSON	15 Dec. 1942		
646	STOCKTON	11 Jan. 1943		
647	THORN	1 April 1943		
648	TURNER	15 April 1943		Sunk
649	A. W. GRANT	24 Nov. 1943		
650	CAPERTON	30 July 1943		
651	COGSWELL	17 Aug. 1943		
652	INGERSOLL	31 Aug. 1943		
653	KNAPP	16 Sept. 1943		
654	BEARSS	12 April 1944		
655	JOHN HOOD	7 June 1944		
656	VAN VALKENBURGH	2 Aug. 1944		
657	BADGER	23 July 1943		
658	COLAHAN	23 Aug. 1943		
659	DASHIELL	20 March 1943		
660	BULLARD	9 April 1943		
661	KIDD	23 April 1943		
662	BENNION	14 Dec. 1943		
663	H. L. EDWARDS	26 Jan. 1944		
664	R. P. LEARY	23 Feb. 1944		
665	BRYANT	4 Dec. 1943		
666	BLACK	21 May 1943		
667	CHAUNCEY	31 May 1943		
668	C. K. BRONSON	11 June 1943		
669	COTTEN	24 July 1943		
670	DORTCH	7 Aug. 1943		
671	GATLING	19 Aug. 1943		
672	HEALY	3 Sept. 1943		
673	HICKOX	10 Sept. 1943		
674	HUNT	22 Sept. 1943		
675	LEWIS HANCOCK	29 Sept. 1943		
676	MARSHALL	16 Oct. 1943		
677	McDERMUT	19 Nov. 1943		
678	McGOWAN	20 Dec. 1943		
679	McNAIR	30 Dec. 1943		
680	MELVIN	24 Nov. 1943		

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
	DESTROYERS—Continued			
DD 681	HOPEWELL	30 Sept. 1943		
682	PORTERFIELD	30 Oct. 1943		
683	STOCKHAM	11 Feb. 1944		
684	WEDDERBURN	9 March 1944		
685	PICKING	21 Sept. 1943		
686	HALSEY POWELL	25 Oct. 1943		
687	UHLMANN	22 Nov. 1943		
688	REMEY	30 Sept. 1943		
689	WADLEIGH	19 Oct. 1943		
690	NORMAN SCOTT	5 Nov. 1943		
691	MERTZ	19 Nov. 1943		
692	ALLEN M. SUMNER	26 Jan. 1944		
693	MOALE	28 Feb. 1944		
694	INGRAHAM	10 March 1944		
695	COOPER	27 March 1944		Sunk
696	ENGLISH	4 May 1944		
697	CHARLES S. SPERRY	17 May 1944		
698	AULT	31 May 1944		
699	WALDRON	8 June 1944		
700	HAYNSWORTH	22 June 1944		
701	JOHN W. WEEKS	21 July 1944		
702	HONK	28 Aug. 1944		
703	WALLACE L. LIND	8 Sept. 1944		
704	BORIE	21 Sept. 1944		
705	COMPTON	4 Nov. 1944		
706	GAINARD	23 Nov. 1944		
707	SOLEY	7 Dec. 1944		
708	HARLAN R. DICKSON	17 Feb. 1945		
709	HUGH PURVIS	1 March 1945		
710	GEARING	3 May 1945		
711	EUGENE A. GREENE	8 June 1945		
712	GYATT	2 July 1945		
713	KENNETH D. BAILEY	31 July 1945		
714	WILLIAM R. RUSH	19 Sept. 1945		
722	BARTON	30 Dec. 1943		
723	WALKE	21 Jan. 1944		
724	LAFFEY	8 Feb. 1944		
725	O'BRIEN	25 Feb. 1944		
726	MEREDITH	14 March 1944		Sunk
727	DE HAVEN	31 March 1944		
728	MANSFIELD	14 April 1944		
729	L. K. SWENSON	2 May 1944		
730	COLLETT	16 May 1944		
731	MADDOX	2 June 1944		
732	HYMAN	16 June 1944		
733	MANNERT L. ABELE	4 July 1944		Sunk
734	PURDY	18 July 1944		
741	DREXLER	14 Nov. 1944		Sunk
742	FRANK KNOX	11 Dec. 1944		
743	SOUTHERLAND	22 Dec. 1944		
744	BLUE	20 March 1944		
745	BRUSH	17 April 1944		
746	TAUSSIG	20 May 1944		
747	SAMUEL N. MOORE	24 June 1944		
748	HARRY HUBBARD	22 July 1944		
752	ALFRED F. CUNNINGHAM	23 Nov. 1944		
753	JOHN R. PIERCE	29 Dec. 1944		
754	FRANK E. EVANS	3 Feb. 1945		
755	JOHN A. BOLE	3 March 1945		

DESTROYERS—Continued

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
DD 756	BEATTY	31 March 1945		
757	PUTNAM	12 Oct. 1944		
758	STRONG	8 March 1945		
759	LOFBERG	26 April 1945		
770	LOURY	23 July 1944		
774	HUGH W. HADLEY	25 Nov. 1944		
775	WILLARD KEITH	27 Dec. 1944		
776	JAMES C. OWENS	17 Feb. 1945		
777	ZELLARS	25 Oct. 1944		
778	MASSEY	24 Nov. 1944		
779	DOUGLAS H. FOX	26 Dec. 1944		
780	STORMES	27 Jan. 1945		
781	ROBERT K. HUNTINGTON	3 March 1945		
782	ROWAN	31 March 1945		
783	GURKE	12 May 1945		
784	Mc KEAN	9 June 1945		
785	HENDERSON	4 Aug. 1945		
786	RICHARD B. ANDERSON	28 Sept. 1945		
792	CALLAGHAN	27 Nov. 1943		Sunk
793	CASSIN YOUNG	31 Dec. 1943		
794	IRWIN	14 Feb. 1944		
795	PRESTON	20 March 1944		
796	BENHAM	20 Dec. 1943		
797	CUSHING	17 Jan. 1944		
798	MONSSEN	12 Feb. 1944		
799	JARVIS	3 June 1944		
800	PORTER	24 June 1944		
801	COLHOUN	8 July 1944		Sunk
802	GREGORY	29 July 1944		
803	LITTLE	19 Aug. 1944		Sunk
804	ROOKS	2 Sept. 1944		
805	CHEVALIER	9 Jan. 1945		
806	HIGBEE	27 Jan. 1945		
807	BENNER	13 Feb. 1945		
808	DENNIS J. BUCKLEY	2 March 1945		
829	MYLES C. FOX	20 March 1945		
830	EVERETT F. LARSON	6 April 1945		
831	GOODRICH	24 April 1945		
832	HANSON	11 May 1945		
833	HERBERT J. THOMAS	29 May 1945		
834	TURNER	12 June 1945		
835	CHARLES P. CECIL	29 June 1945		
836	GEORGE K. MAC KENZIE	13 July 1945		
837	SARSFIELD	31 July 1945		
838	ERNEST G. SMALL	21 June 1945		
839	POWER	13 Sept. 1945		
857	BRISTOL	17 March 1945		
858	FRED T. BERRY	12 May 1945		
859	MORRIS	9 June 1945		
860	McCAFFERY	26 July 1945		
861	HARWOOD	29 Sept. 1945		
862	VOGELGESANG	28 April 1945		
863	STEINAKER	26 May 1945		
864	HAROLD J. ELLISON	23 June 1945		
865	CHARLES R. WARE	21 July 1945		
866	CONE	17 Aug. 1945		
867	STRIBLING	28 Sept. 1945		
873	HAWKINS	10 Feb. 1945		
874	DUNCAN	25 May 1945		
875	HENRY W. TUCKER	12 March 1945		

DESTROYERS—Concluded

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
DD 876	ROGERS	26 March 1945		
877	PERKINS	5 April 1945		
878	VESOLE	23 April 1945		
879	LEARY	7 May 1945		
880	DYESS	21 May 1945		
881	BORDELON	5 June 1945		
882	FURSE	10 July 1945		
883	NEWMAN K. PERRY	26 July 1945		
884	FLOYD B. PARKS	31 July 1945		
885	JOHN R. CRAIG	20 Aug. 1945		
886	ORLECK	6 Sept. 1945		
887	BRINKLEY BOSS	14 Sept. 1945		
888	STICKELL	26 Sept. 1945		
			352	

LIGHT MINE LAYERS

DM 23	ROBERT H. SMITH	4 Aug. 1944		ex-DD 735
24	THOMAS E. FRASER	22 Aug. 1944		ex-DD 736
25	SHANNON	8 Sept. 1944		ex-DD 737
26	HARRY E. BAUER	22 Sept. 1944		ex-DD 738
27	ADAMS	10 Oct. 1944		ex-DD 739
28	TOLMAN	27 Oct. 1944		ex-DD 740
29	HENRY A. WILEY	31 Aug. 1944		ex-DD 749
30	SHEA	30 Sept. 1944		ex-DD 750
31	J. WILLIAM DITTER	28 Oct. 1944		ex-DD 751
32	LINDSEY	20 Aug. 1944		ex-DD 771
33	GWIN	30 Sept. 1944		ex-DD 772
34	AARON WARD	28 Oct. 1944		ex-DD 773
			12	

DESTROYER ESCORTS

BDE 1	BAYNTUN		To U.K. 2-13-43
2	BAZELY		To U.K. 2-18-43
3	BERRY		To U.K. 3-15-43
4	BLACKWOOD		To U.K. 3-27-43
12	BURGES		To U.K. 6-2-43
46	DRURY		To U.K. 4-12-43
		6	(6 Leased)

DESTROYER ESCORTS

DE 5	EVARTS	15 April 1943	
6	WYFFELS	21 April 1943	
7	GRISWOLD	28 April 1943	
8	STEELE	4 May 1943	
9	CARLSON	10 May 1943	
10	BEBAS	15 May 1943	
11	CROUTER	25 May 1943	
13	BRENNON	20 Jan. 1943	
14	DOHERTY	6 Feb. 1943	
15	AUSTIN	13 Feb. 1943	
16	EDGAR G. CHASE	20 March 1943	
17	EDWARD C. DALY	3 April 1943	
18	GILMORE	17 April 1943	
19	BURDEN R. HASTINGS	1 May 1943	
20	LE HARDY	15 May 1943	
21	HAROLD C. THOMAS	31 May 1943	
22	WILEMAN	11 June 1943	
23	CHARLES ROGER GREER	25 June 1943	
24	WHITMAN	3 July 1943	
25	WINTLE	10 July 1943	

DESTROYER ESCORTS—Continued

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
DE 26	DEMPSEY	24 July 1943		
27	DUFFY	5 Aug. 1943		
28	EMERY	14 Aug. 1943		
29	STADTFELD	26 Aug. 1943		
30	MARTIN	4 Sept. 1943		
31	SEDERSTROM	11 Sept. 1943		
32	FLEMING	18 Sept. 1943		
33	TISDALE	11 Oct. 1943		
34	EISELE	18 Oct. 1943		
35	FAIR	23 Oct. 1943		
36	MANLOVE	8 Nov. 1943		
37	GREINER	18 Aug. 1943		
38	WYMAN	1 Sept. 1943		
39	LOVERING	17 Sept. 1943		
40	SANDERS	1 Oct. 1943		
41	BRACKETT	18 Oct. 1943		
42	REYNOLDS	1 Nov. 1943		
43	MITCHELL	7 Nov. 1943		
44	DONALDSON	1 Dec. 1943		
45	ANDRES	15 March 194		
47	DECKER	3 May 1943		
48	DOBLER	17 May 1943		
49	DONEFF	10 June 1943		
50	ENGSTROM	21 June 1943		
51	BUCKLEY	30 April 1943		
52	BENTINCK			To U.K. 5-19-43
53	CHARLES LAWRENCE	31 May 1943		Now APD 37
54	DANIEL T. GRIFFIN	9 June 1943		Now APD 38
55	BYARD			To U.K. 6-18-43
56	DONNELL	26 June 1943		Now IX 182
57	FOGG	7 July 1943		
58	CALDER			To U.K. 7-15-43
59	FOSS	23 July 1943		
60	GANTNER	29 July 1943		Now APD 42
61	DUCKWORTH			To U.K. 8-4-43
62	GEORGE W. INGRAM	11 Aug. 1943		Now APD 43
63	IRA JEFFERY	15 Aug. 1943		Now APD 44
64	DUFF			To U.K. 8-23-43
65	LEE FOX	30 Aug. 1943		Now APD 45
66	AMESBURY	31 Aug. 1943		Now APD 46
67	ESSINGTON			To U.K. 9-7-43
68	BATES	12 Sept. 1943		Now APD 47
69	BLESSMAN	19 Sept. 1943		Now APD 48
70	JOSEPH E. CAMPBELL	23 Sept. 1943		Now APD 49
71	AFFLECT			To U.K. 9-29-43
72	AYLMER			To U.K. 9-30-43
73	BALFOUR			To U.K. 10-7-43
74	BENTLEY			To U.K. 10-13-43
75	BRICKERTON			To U.K. 10-17-43
76	BLIGH			To U.K. 10-22-43
77	BRAITHWAITE			To U.K. 11-13-43
78	BULLEN			To U.K. 10-25-43
79	BYRON			To U.K. 10-30-43
80	CONN			To U.K. 10-31-43
81	COTTON			To U.K. 11-8-43
82	CRANSTOWN			To U.K. 11-13-43
83	CUBITT			To U.K. 11-17-43
84	CURZON			To U.K. 11-20-43
85	DAKINS			To U.K. 11-23-43
86	DEANE			To U.K. 11-26-43
87	EKINS			To U.K. 11-29-43
88	FITZROY			To U.K. 10-16-43
89	REDMILL			To U.K. 11-30-43
90	RETALICK			To U.K. 12-8-43
91	HALSTEAD			To U.K. 11-3-43
92	RIOU			To U.K. 12-14-43
93	RUTHERFORD			To U.K. 12-16-43
94	COSBY			To U.K. 12-20-43
95	ROWLEY			To U.K. 12-22-43
96	RUPERT			To U.K. 12-24-43
97	STOCKHAM			To U.K. 12-28-43

DESTROYER ESCORTS—Continued

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
DE 98	SEYMOUR			To U.K. 12-23-43
99	CANNON	26 Sept. 1943		To Brazil 12-19-44
100	CHRISTOPHER	23 Oct. 1943		To Brazil 12-19-44
101	ALGER	12 Nov. 1943		To Brazil 3-10-45
102	THOMAS	21 Nov. 1943		
103	BOSTWICK	1 Dec. 1943		
104	BREEMAN	12 Dec. 1943		
105	BURROWS	19 Dec. 1943		
106	SENEGALAIS			To French 1-2-44
107	ALGERIEN			To French 1-23-44
108	TUNISIEN			To French 2-11-44
109	MAROCAIN			To French 2-29-44
110	HOVA			To French 3-18-44
111	SOMALI			To French 4-9-44
112	CARTER	2 May 1944		
113	CLARENCE L. EVANS	25 June 1944		
129	EDSALL	10 April 1943		
130	JACOB JONES	29 April 1943		
131	HAMMANN	17 May 1943		
132	ROBERT E. PEARY	31 May 1943		
133	PILLSBURY	7 June 1943		
134	POPE	25 June 1943		
135	FLAHERTY	26 June 1943		
136	FREDERICK C. DAVIS	14 July 1943		Sunk
137	HERBERT C. JONES	21 July 1943		
138	DOUGLAS L. HOWARD	29 July 1943		
139	FARQUHAR	5 Aug. 1943		
140	J.R.Y. BLAKELY	16 Aug. 1943		
141	HILL	16 August 1943		
142	FESSENDEN	25 Aug. 1943		
143	FISKE	25 Aug. 1943		Sunk
144	FROST	30 Aug. 1943		
145	HUSE	30 Aug. 1943		
146	INCH	8 Sept. 1943		
147	BLAIR	13 Sept. 1943		
148	BROUGH	18 Sept. 1943		
149	CHATELAIN	22 Sept. 1943		
150	NEUNZER	27 Sept. 1943		
151	POOLE	29 Sept. 1943		
152	PETERSON	29 Sept. 1943		
153	REUBEN JAMES	1 April 1943		
154	SIMS	24 April 1943		Now APD 50
155	HOPPING	21 May 1943		Now APD 51
156	REEVES	9 June 1943		Now APD 52
157	FECHTELER	1 July 1943		Sunk
158	CHASE	18 July 1943		Now APD 54
159	LANING	1 Aug. 1943		Now APD 55
160	LOY	12 Sept. 1943		Now APD 56
161	BARBER	10 Oct. 1943		Now APD 57
162	LEVY	13 May 1943		
163	McCONNELL	28 May 1943		
164	OSTERHAUS	12 June 1943		
165	PORKS	23 June 1943		
166	BARON	5 July 1943		
167	ACREE	19 July 1943		
168	AMICK	26 July 1943		
169	ATHERTON	29 Aug. 1943		
170	BOOTH	19 Sept. 1943		
171	CARROLL	24 Oct. 1943		
172	COONER	21 Aug. 1943		
173	ELDRIDGE	27 Aug. 1943		
174	MARTS	3 Sept. 1943		To Brazil 3-20-45
175	PENNEWILL	15 Sept. 1943		To Brazil 8-1-44
176	MICKA	23 Sept. 1943		
177	REYBALD	29 Sept. 1943		To Brazil 8-15-44
178	HERZOG	6 October 1943		To Brazil 8-1-44
179	McANN	11 Oct. 1943		To Brazil 8-15-44
180	TRUMPETER	16 Oct. 1943		
181	STRAUB	25 Oct. 1943		
182	GUSTAFSON	1 Nov. 1943		

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
	DESTROYER ESCORTS—Continued			
DE 183	SAMUEL S. MILES	4 Nov. 1943		
184	WESSON	11 Nov. 1943		
185	RIDDLE	17 Nov. 1943		
186	SWEARER	23 Nov. 1943		
187	STERN	1 Dec. 1943		
188	O'NEILL	6 Dec. 1943		
189	BRONSTEIN	13 Dec. 1943		
190	BAKER	23 Dec. 1943		
191	COFFMAN	27 Dec. 1943		
192	EISNER	1 Jan. 1944		
193	GARFIELD THOMAS	24 Jan. 1944		
194	WINGFIELD	28 Jan. 1944		
195	THORNHILL	1 Feb. 1944		
196	RINEHART	12 Feb. 1944		
197	ROCHE	21 Feb. 1944		
198	LOVELACE	7 Nov. 1943		
199	MANNING	1 Oct. 1943		
200	NEUENDORF	18 October 1943		
201	JAMES E. CRAIG	1 Nov. 1943		
202	EICHEN-BERGER	17 Nov. 1943		
203	THOMASON	10 Dec. 1943		
204	JORDAN	17 Dec. 1943		
205	NEWMAN	26 Nov. 1943		Now APD 59
206	LIDDLE	6 Dec. 1943		Now APD 60
207	KEPHART	7 Jan. 1944		Now APD 61
208	COFER	19 Jan. 1944		Now APD 62
209	LLOYD	11 Feb. 1944		Now APD 63
210	OTTER	21 Feb. 1944		
211	HUBBARD	6 March 1944		Now APD 53
212	HAYTER	16 March 1944		Now APD 80
213	WILLIAM T. POWELL	28 March 1944		
214	SCOTT	20 July 1943		
215	BURKE	20 Aug. 1943		Now APD 65
216	ENRIGHT	21 Sept. 1943		Now APD 66
217	COOLBAUGH	15 Oct. 1943		
218	DARBY	15 Nov. 1943		
219	J. DOUGLAS BLACKWOOD	15 Dec. 1943		
220	FRANCIS M. ROBINSON	15 Jan. 1944		
221	SOLAR	15 Feb. 1944		
222	FOWLER	15 March 1944		
223	SPANGEBERG	15 April 1944		
224	RUDDEROW	15 May 1944		
225	DAY	10 June 1944		
230	CHAFEE	9 May 1944		
231	HODGES	27 May 1944		
238	STEWART	31 May 1943		
239	STURTEVANT	16 June 1943		
240	MOORE	1 July 1943		
241	KEITH	19 July 1943		
242	TOMICH	26 July 1943		
243	J. RICHARD WARD	5 July 1943		
244	OTTERSTETTER	6 Aug. 1943		
245	SLOAT	16 Aug. 1943		
246	SNOWDEN	23 Aug. 1943		
247	STANTON	7 Aug. 1943		
248	SWASEY	31 Aug. 1943		
249	MARCHAND	8 Sept. 1943		
250	HURST	30 Aug. 1943		
251	CAMP	16 Sept. 1943		
252	HOWARD D. CROW	27 Sept. 1943		
253	PETTIT	23 Sept. 1943		
254	RICKETTS	5 Oct. 1943		
255	SELLSTROM	12 Oct. 1943		
256	SEID	11 June 1943		
257	SMARTT	18 June 1943		
258	WALTER S. BROWN	25 June 1943		

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
	DESTROYER ESCORTS—Continued			
DE 259	WILLIAM C. MILLER	2 July 1943		
260	CABANA	9 July 1943		
261	DIONNE	16 July 1943		
262	CANFIELD	22 July 1943		
263	DEEDE	29 July 1943		
264	ELDEN	5 Aug. 1943		
265	CLOUES	10 Aug. 1943		
266	CAPEL			To U.K. 8-24-43
267	COOKE			To U.K. 8-30-43
268	DACRES			To U.K. 8-31-43
269	DOMETT			To U.K. 9-10-43
270	FOLEY			To U.K. 9-16-43
271	GARLIES			To U.K. 9-20-43
272	GOULD			To U.K. 9-25-43
273	GRINDALL			To U.K. 9-30-43
274	GARDINER			To U.K. 9-30-43
275	GOODALL			To U.K. 10-11-43
276	GOODSON			To U.K. 10-16-43
277	GORE			To U.K. 10-22-43
278	KEATS			To U.K. 10-28-43
279	KEMPTHORNE			To U.K. 10-31-43
280	KINGSMILL			To U.K. 11-6-43
301	LAKE	5 Feb. 1944		
302	LYMAN	19 Feb. 1944		
303	CROWLEY	25 March 1944		
304	RALL	8 April 1944		
305	HALLORAN	27 May 1944		
306	CONNOLLY	8 July 1944		
307	FINNEGAN	19 Aug. 1944		
316	HARVESON	12 Oct. 1943		
317	JOYCE	30 Sept. 1943		
318	KIRKPATRICK	23 Oct. 1943		
319	LEOPOLD	18 Oct. 1943		Sunk
320	MENGES	26 Oct. 1943		
321	MOSLEY	30 Oct. 1943		
322	NEWELL	30 Oct. 1943		
323	PRIDE	13 Nov. 1943		
324	FALGOUT	15 Nov. 1943		
325	LOWE	22 Nov. 1943		
326	THOMAS J. GARY	27 Nov. 1943		
327	BRISTER	30 Nov. 1943		
328	FINCH	13 Dec. 1943		
329	KRETCHMER	13 Dec. 1943		
330	O'REILLY	28 Dec. 1943		
331	KOINER	27 Dec. 1943		
332	PRICE	12 Jan. 1944		
333	STRICKLAND	10 Jan. 1944		
334	FORSTER	25 Jan. 1944		
335	DANIEL	24 Jan. 1944		
336	ROY O. HALE	3 Feb. 1944		
337	DALE W. PETERSON	17 Feb. 1944		
338	MARTIN H. RAY	28 Feb. 1944		
339	JOHN C. BUTLER	31 March 1944		
340	O'FLAHERTY	8 April 1944		
341	RAYMOND	15 April 1944		
342	RICHARD W. SUESENS	26 April 1944		
343	ABERCROMBIE	29 April 1944		
344	ABERRENDER	11 May 1944		Stricken
345	ROBERT BRAZIER	18 May 1944		
346	EDWIN A. HOWARD	25 May 1944		
347	JESSE RUTHER-FORD	31 May 1944		
348	KEY	5 June 1944		
349	GENTRY	14 June 1944		
350	TRAW	20 June 1944		
351	MAURICE J. MANUEL	30 June 1944		

DESTROYER ESCORTS—Continued

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
DE 352	NAIFEH	4 July 1944		
353	DOYLE C. BARNES	13 July 1944		
354	KENNETH M. WILLET	19 July 1944		
355	JACCARD	26 July 1944		
356	LLOYD E. ACREE	1 Aug. 1944		
357	GEORGE E DAVIS	11 Aug. 1944		
358	MACK	16 Aug. 1944		
359	WOODSON	24 Aug. 1944		
360	JOHNNIE HUTCHINS	28 Aug. 1944		
361	WALTON	4 Sept. 1944		
362	ROLF	7 Sept. 1944		
363	PRATT	18 Sept. 1944		
364	ROMBACK	20 Sept. 1944		
365	McGINTY	25 Sept. 1944		
366	ALVIN C. COCKRELL	7 Oct. 1944		
367	FRENCH	9 Oct. 1944		
368	CECIL P. DOYLE	16 Oct. 1944		
369	THADDEUS PARKER	25 Oct. 1944		
370	JOHN L. WILLIAMSON	31 Oct. 1944		
371	PRESLEY	7 Nov. 1944		
372	WILLIAMS	11 Nov. 1944		
382	RAMSDEN	19 Oct. 1943		
383	MILLS	12 Oct. 1943		
384	RHODES	25 Oct. 1943		
385	RICKEY	30 Oct. 1943		
386	SAVAGE	29 Oct. 1943		
387	VANCE	1 Nov. 1943		
388	LANSING	10 Nov. 1943		
389	DURANT	16 Nov. 1943		
390	CALCATERRA	17 Nov. 1943		
391	CHAMBERS	22 Nov. 1943		
392	MERRILL	27 Nov. 1943		
393	HAVERFIELD	29 Nov. 1943		
394	SWENNING	1 Dec. 1943		
395	WILLIS	10 Dec. 1943		
396	JANSSEN	18 Dec. 1943		
397	WILHOITE	16 Dec. 1943		
398	COCKRILL	24 Dec. 1943		
399	STOCKDALE	31 Dec. 1943		
400	HISSEM	13 Jan. 1944		
401	HOLDER	18 Jan. 1944		Scrapped
402	RICHARD S. BULL	26 Feb. 1944		
403	HOWARD M ROWELL	9 March 1944		
404	EVERSOLE	21 March 1944		Sunk
405	DENNIS	20 March 1944		
406	EDMONDS	3 April 1944		
407	SHELTON	4 April 1944		Sunk
408	STRAUS	6 April 1944		
409	LA PRADE	20 April 1944		
410	JACK MILLER	13 April 1944		
411	STAFFORD	19 April 1944		
412	WALTER C WANN	2 May 1944		
413	SAMUEL B. ROBERTS	28 April 1944		Sunk
414	LE ROY WILSON	10 May 1944		
415	LAWRENCE TAYLOR	13 May 1944		
416	MELVIN R. NAWMAN	16 May 1944		
417	OLIVER MITCHELL	14 June 1944		
418	TABBERER	23 May 1944		
419	ROBERT F. KELLER	17 June 1944		
420	LELAND E. THOMAS	19 June 1944		
421	CHESTER T. O'BRIEN	3 July 1944		
422	DOUGLAS A. MUNRO	11 July 1945		
423	DUFILHO	21 July 1944		
424	HAAS	2 Aug. 1944		
438	CORBESIER	31 March 1944		
439	CONKLIN	21 April 1944		
440	McCOY REYNOLDS	2 May 1944		
441	WILLIAM SEIVERLING	1 June 1944		
442	ULVER M. MOORE	18 July 1944		
443	KENDALL C. CAMPBELL	31 July 1944		
444	GOSS	26 Aug. 1944		
445	GRADY	11 Sept. 1944		
446	CHARLES E. BANNON	1 Nov. 1944		
447	ALBERT T. HARRIS	29 Nov. 1944		
448	CROSS	8 Jan. 1945		
449	HANNA	27 Jan. 1945		
450	JOSEPH E. CONNOLLY	28 Feb. 1945		
508	GILLIGAN	12 May 1944		
509	FORMOE	5 Oct. 1944		
510	HEYLIGER	24 March 1945		
516	LAWFORD			To U.K. 11-3-43
517	LOUIS			To U.K. 11-18-43
518	LAWSON			To U.K. 11-25-43
519	PAISLEY			To U.K. 11-29-43
520	LORING			To U.K. 12-5-43
521	HOSTE			To U.K. 12-14-43
522	MOORSOM			To U.K. 12-20-43
523	MANNERS			To U.K. 12-27-43
524	MOUNSEY			To U.K. 12-31-43
525	INGLIS			To U.K. 1-12-44
526	INMAN			To U.K. 1-24-44
527	O'TOOLE	22 Jan. 1944		
528	JOHN J. POWERS	29 Feb. 1944		
529	MASON	20 March 1944		
530	JOHN M. BERMINGHAM	8 April 1944		
531	EDWARD H ALLEN	16 Dec. 1943		
532	TWEEDY	12 Feb. 1944		
533	HOWARD F. CLARK	25 May 1944		
534	SILVERSTEIN	14 July 1944		
535	LEWIS	5 Sept. 1944		
536	BIVIN	31 Oct. 1944		
537	RIZZI	26 June 1945		
563	SPRAGGE			To U.K. 1-14-44
564	STAYMER			To U.K. 12-30-43
565	THORNBOROUGH			To U.K. 12-31-43
566	TROLLOPE			To U.K. 1-10-44
567	TYLER			To U.K. 1-14-44
568	TORRINGTON			To U.K. 1-18-44
569	NARBROUGH			To U.K. 1-21-44
570	WALDEGRAVE			To U.K. 1-25-44
571	WHITAKER			To U.K. 1-28-44
572	HOLMES			To U.K. 1-31-44
573	HARGOOD			To U.K. 2-7-44
574	HOTHAM			To U.K. 2-8-44
575	AHRENS	12 Feb. 1944		
576	BARR	15 Feb. 1944		Now APD 39

DESTROYER ESCORTS—Continued

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
DE 577	ALEXANDER J. LUKE	19 Feb. 1944		
578	ROBERT I. PAINE	28 Feb. 1944		
579	RILEY	13 March 1944		
580	LESLIE L. B. KNOX	22 March 1944		
581	McNULTY	13 March 1944		
582	METIVIER	7 April 1944		
583	GEORGE A. JOHNSON	15 April 1944		
584	CHARLES J. KIMMEL	20 April 1944		
585	DANIEL A. JOY	28 April 1944		
586	LOUGH	2 May 1944		
587	THOMAS F. NICKEL	9 June 1944		
588	PFEIFFER	15 June 1944		
589	TINSMAN	26 June 1944		
633	FOREMAN	22 Oct. 1943		
634	WHITEHURST	19 Nov. 1943		
635	ENGLAND	10 Dec. 1943		Now APD 41
636	WITTER	29 Dec. 1943		Now APD 58
637	BOWERS	27 Jan. 1944		Now APD 40
638	WILLMARTH	13 March 1944		
639	GENDREAU	17 March 1944		
640	FIEBERLING	11 April 1944		
641	WILLIAM C. COLE	12 May 1944		
642	PAUL G. BAKER	25 May 1944		
643	DAMON M. CUMMINGS	29 June 1944		
644	VAMMEN	27 July 1944		
665	JENKS	19 Jan. 1944		
666	DURIK	24 March 1944		
667	WISEMAN	4 April 1944		
675	WEBER	30 June 1943		Now APD 75
676	SCHMITT	24 July 1943		Now APD 76
677	FRAMENT	15 Aug. 1943		Now APD 77
678	HARMON	31 Aug. 1943		
679	GREENWOOD	25 Sept. 1943		
680	LOESER	10 Oct. 1943		
681	GILLETTE	27 Oct. 1943		
682	UNDERHILL	13 Nov. 1943		Sunk
683	HENRY R. KENYON	30 Nov. 1943		
684	DE LONG	31 Dec. 1943		
685	COATES	24 Jan. 1944		
686	EUGENE E. ELMORE	4 Feb. 1944		
693	BULL	12 Aug. 1943		Now APD 78
694	BUNCH	21 Aug. 1943		Now APD 79
695	RICH	1 Oct. 1943		Sunk
696	SPANGLER	31 Oct. 1943		
697	GEORGE	20 Nov. 1943		
698	RABY	7 Dec. 1943		
699	MARSH	12 Jan. 1944		
700	CURRIER	1 Feb. 1944		
701	OSMUS	23 Feb. 1944		
702	EARL V. JOHNSON	18 March 1944		
703	HOLDON	1 May 1944		
704	CRONIN	5 May 1944		
705	FRYBARGER	18 May 1944		
706	HOLT	9 June 1944		
707	JOBB	4 July 1944		
708	PARLE	29 July 1944		
709	BRAY	4 Sept. 1944		Now APD 139
739	BANGUST	30 Oct. 1943		
740	WATERMAN	30 Nov. 1943		
741	WEAVER	31 Dec. 1943		
742	HILBERT	4 Feb. 1944		
743	LAMONS	28 Feb. 1944		
744	KYNE	4 April 1944		
745	SNYDER	5 May 1944		

DESTROYER ESCORTS—Concluded

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
DE 746	HEMMINGER	30 May 1944		
747	BRIGHT	30 June 1944		
748	TILLS	8 Aug. 1944		
749	ROBERTS	2 Sept. 1944		
750	McCLELLAND	19 Sept. 1944		
763	CATES	15 Dec. 1943		
764	GANDY	7 Feb. 1944		
765	EARL K. OLSEN	10 April 1944		
766	SLATER	1 May 1944		
767	OSWALD	12 June 1944		
768	EBERT	12 July 1944		
769	NEAL A. SCOTT	31 July 1944		
770	MUIR	30 Aug. 1944		
771	SUTTON	22 Dec. 1944		
789	TATUM	22 Nov. 1943		Now APD 81
790	BORUM	30 Nov. 1943		
791	MALOY	13 Dec. 1943		
792	HAINES	27 Dec. 1943		Now APD 84
793	RUNELS	3 Jan. 1944		Now APD 85
794	HOLLIS	24 Jan. 1944		Now APD 86
795	GUNASON	1 Feb. 1944		
796	MAJOR	12 Feb. 1944		
797	WEEDEN	20 Feb. 1944		
798	VARIEN	29 Feb. 1944		
799	SCROGGINS	30 March 1944		
800	JACK W. WILKE	7 March 1944		
			498	(86 Leased)

HIGH SPEED TRANSPORTS

APD 69	YOKES	18 Dec. 1944		ex-DE 668
70	PAVLIC	29 Dec. 1944		ex-DE 669
71	ODUM	12 Jan. 1945		ex-DE 670
72	JACK C. ROBINSON	2 Feb. 1945		ex-DE 671
73	BASSETT	23 Feb. 1945		ex-DE 672
74	JOHN P. GRAY	15 March 1945		ex-DE 673
87	CROSLEY	22 Oct. 1944		ex-DE 226
88	CREAD	29 July 1945		ex-DE 227
89	RUCHAMKIN	11 Sept. 1945		ex-DE 228
91	KINZER	1 Nov. 1944		ex-DE 232
92	REGISTER	11 Jan. 1945		ex-DE 233
93	BROCK	9 Feb. 1945		ex-DE 234
94	JOHN Q. ROBERTS	8 March 1945		ex-DE 235
95	WILLIAM M. HOBBY	4 April 1945		ex-DE 236
96	RAY K. EDWARDS	11 June 1945		ex-DE 237
97	ARTHUR L. BRISTOL	25 June 1945		ex-DE 281
98	TRUXTUN	9 July 1945		ex-DE 282
99	UPHAM	23 July 1945		ex-DE 283
100	RINGNESS	25 Oct 1944		ex-DE 590
101	KNUDSON	25 Nov. 1944		ex-DE 591
102	REDNOUR	30 Dec. 1944		ex-DE 592
103	TOLLBERG	31 Jan. 1945		ex-DE 593
104	WILLIAM J. PATTISON	27 Feb. 1945		ex-DE 594
105	MYERS	26 March 1945		ex-DE 595
106	WALTER B COBB	25 April 1945		ex-DE 596
107	EARL B. HALL	15 May 1945		ex-DE 597
108	HARRY L. CORL	5 June 1945		ex-DE 598
109	BELET	15 June 1945		ex-DE 599
110	JULIUS A RAVEN	28 June 1945		ex-DE 600
111	WALSH	11 July 1945		ex-DE 601
H2	HUNTER MARSHALL	17 July 1945		ex-DE 602
113	EARHEART	26 July 1945		ex-DE 603
114	GORKA	7 Aug. 1945		ex-DE 604
115	ROGERS BLOOD	22 Aug. 1945		ex-DE 505
116	FRANCOVICH	6 Sept. 1945		ex-DE 606
117	JOSEPH M. AUMAN	25 April 1945		ex-DE 674

HIGH SPEED TRANSPORTS—Concluded

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
APD	118 DON O. WOOD	28 May 1945		ex-DE 721
	119 BEVERLY W. REID	25 June 1945		ex-DE 722
	120 KLINE	18 Oct. 1944		ex-DE 687
	121 RAYMON W. HERNDON	3 Nov. 1944		ex-DE 688
	122 SCRIBNER	20 Nov. 1944		ex-DE 689
	123 DIACHENKO	8 Dec. 1944		ex-DE 690
	124 HORACE A. BASS	21 Dec. 1944		ex-DE 691
	125 WANTUCK	30 Dec. 1944		ex-DE 692
	126 GOSSELIN	31 Dec. 1944		ex-DE 710
	127 BEGOR	14 March 1945		ex-DE 711
	128 CAVALLARO	13 March 1945		ex-DE 712
	129 DONALD W. WOLF	14 April 1945		ex-DE 713
	130 COOK	25 April 1945		ex-DE 714
	131 WALTER X. YOUNG	1 May 1945		ex-DE 715
	132 BALDUCK	7 May 1945		ex-DE 716
	133 BURDO	2 June 1945		ex-DE 717
	134 KLEINSMITH	12 June 1945		ex-DE 718
	135 WEISS	7 July 1945		ex-DE 719
	136 CARPELLOTTI	30 July 1945		ex-DE 720
			55	

SUBMARINES

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
SS	212 GATO	31 Dec. 1941		
	213 GREENLING	21 Jan. 1942		
	214 GROUPER	12 Feb. 1942		
	215 GROWLER	20 March 1942		Sunk
	216 GRUNION	11 April 1942		Sunk
	217 GUARDFISH	8 May 1942		
	218 ALBACORE	1 June 1942		Sunk
	219 AMBERJACK	19 June 1942		Sunk
	220 BARB	8 July 1942		
	221 BLACKFISH	22 July 1942		
	222 BLUEFISH	24 May 1943		
	223 BONEFISH	31 May 1943		Sunk
	224 COD	21 June 1943		
	225 CERO	4 July 1943		
	226 CORVINA	6 Aug. 1943		Sunk
	227 DARTER	7 Sept. 1943		Sunk
	229 FLYING FISH	10 Dec. 1941		
	230 FINBACK	31 Jan. 1942		
	231 HADDOCK	14 March 1942		
	232 HALIBUT	10 April 1942		
	233 HERRING	4 May 1942		Sunk
	234 KINGFISH	20 May 1942		
	235 SHAD	12 June 1942		
	236 SILVERSIDES	15 Dec. 1942		
	237 TRIGGER	31 Jan. 1942		Sunk
	238 WAHOO	15 May 1942		Sunk
	239 WHALE	1 June 1942		
	240 ANGLER	1 Oct. 1943		
	241 BASHAW	25 Oct. 1942		
	242 BLUEGILL	11 Nov. 1943		
	243 BREAM	24 Jan. 1944		
	244 CAVALLA	29 Feb. 1944		
	245 COBIA	29 March 1944		
	246 CROAKER	21 April 1944		
	247 DACE	23 July 1943		
	248 DORADO	28 Aug. 1943		Sunk
	249 FLASHER	25 Sept. 1943		
	250 FLIER	18 Oct. 1943		Sunk
	251 FLOUNDER	29 Nov. 1943		
	252 GABILAN	28 Dec. 1943		
	253 GUNNEL	20 Aug. 1942		
	254 GUNARD	18 Sept. 1942		
	255 HADDO	9 Oct. 1942		
	256 HAKE	30 Oct. 1942		
	257 HARDER	2 Dec. 1942		Sunk
	258 HOE	16 Dec. 1942		
	259 JACK	6 Jan. 1943		
	260 LAPON	23 Jan. 1943		

SUBMARINES—Continued

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
SS	261 MINGO	12 Feb. 1943		
	262 MUSKALLUNGE	15 March 1943		
	263 PADDLE	29 March 1943		
	264 PARGO	26 April 1943		
	265 PETO	21 Nov. 1942		
	266 POGY	10 Jan. 1943		
	267 POMPON	17 March 1943		
	268 PUFFER	27 April 1943		
	269 RASHER	8 June 1943		
	270 RATON	13 July 1943		
	271 RAY	27 July 1943		
	272 REDFIN	31 Aug. 1943		
	273 ROBALO	28 Sept. 1943		Sunk
	274 ROCK	26 Oct. 1943		
	275 RUNNER	30 July 1942		Sunk
	276 SAWFISH	26 Aug. 1942		
	277 SCAMP	18 Sept. 1942		Sunk
	278 SCORPION	1 Oct. 1942		Sunk
	279 SNOOK	24 Oct. 1942		Sunk
	280 STEELHEAD	7 Dec. 1942		
	281 SUNFISH	15 July 1942		
	282 TUNNY	1 Sept. 1942		
	283 TINOSA	15 Jan. 1943		
	284 TULLIBEE	15 Feb. 1943		Sunk
	285 BALAO	4 Feb. 1943		
	286 BILLFISH	20 April 1943		
	287 BOWFIN	1 May 1943		
	288 CABRILLA	24 May 1943		
	289 CAPELIN	4 June 1943		Sunk
	290 CISCO	10 May 1943		Sunk
	291 CREVALLE	24 June 1943		
	292 DEVILFISH	1 Sept. 1944		
	293 DRAGONET	6 March 1944		
	294 ESCOLAR	2 June 1944		Sunk
	295 HACKLEBACK	7 Nov. 1944		
	297 LING	8 June 1945		
	298 LIONFISH	1 Nov. 1944		
	299 MANTA	18 Dec. 1944		
	300 MORAY	26 Jan. 1945		
	301 RONCADOR	27 March 1945		
	302 SABALO	19 June 1945		
	304 SEAHORSE	31 March 1943		
	305 SKATE	15 April 1943		
	306 TANG	15 Oct. 1943		Sunk
	307 TILEFISH	28 Dec. 1943		
	308 APOGON	16 July 1943		
	309 ASPRO	31 July 1943		
	310 BATFISH	21 Aug. 1943		
	311 ARCHERFISH	4 Sept. 1943		
	312 BURRFISH	14 Sept. 1943		
	313 PERCH	7 Jan. 1944		
	314 SHARK	12 Feb. 1944		Sunk
	315 SEALION	8 March 1944		
	316 BARBEL	3 April 1944		Sunk
	317 BARBERO	29 April 1944		
	318 BAYA	20 May 1944		
	319 BECUNA	27 May 1944		
	320 BERGALL	12 June 1944		
	321 BESUGO	19 June 1944		
	322 BLACKFIN	4 July 1944		
	323 CAIMAN	17 July 1944		
	324 BLENNY	27 July 1944		
	325 BLOWER	10 Aug. 1944		
	326 BLUEBACK	28 Aug. 1944		
	327 BOARFISH	23 Sept. 1944		
	328 CHARR	23 Sept. 1944		
	329 CHUB	21 Oct. 1944		
	330 BRILL	26 Oct. 1944		
	331 BUGARA	15 Nov. 1944		
	332 BULLHEAD	4 Dec. 1944		
	333 BUMPER	9 Dec. 1944		
	334 CABEZON	30 Dec. 1944		
	335 DENTUDA	30 Dec. 1944		
	336 CAPITAINE	26 Jan. 1945		
	337 CARBONERO	7 Feb. 1945		

SUBMARINES—Continued

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
SS 338	CARP	28 Feb. 1945		
339	CATFISH	19 March 1945		
340	ENTEMEDOR	6 April 1945		
341	CHIVO	28 April 1945		
342	CHOPPER	25 May 1945		
343	CLAMAGORE	28 June 1945		
344	COBBLER	8 Aug. 1945		
345	COCHINO	25 Aug. 1945		
361	GOLET	30 Nov. 1943		Sunk
362	GUAVINA	23 Dec. 1943		
363	GUITARRO	26 Jan. 1944		
364	HAMMERHEAD	1 March 1944		
365	HARDHEAD	18 April 1944		
366	HAWKBILL	17 May 1944		
367	ICEFISH	10 June 1944		
368	JALLAO	8 July 1944		
369	KETE	31 July 1944		Sunk
370	KRAKEN	8 Sept. 1944		
371	LARGARTO	14 Oct. 1944		Sunk
372	LAMPREY	17 Nov. 1944		
373	LIZARDFISH	30 Dec. 1944		
374	LOGGERHEAD	9 Feb. 1945		
375	MACABI	29 March 1945		
376	MAPIRO	30 April 1945		
377	MENHADEN	22 June 1945		
378	MERO	17 Aug. 1945		
381	SAND LANCE	9 Oct. 1943		
382	PICUDO	16 Oct. 1943		
383	PAMPANITO	6 Nov. 1943		
384	PARCHE	20 Nov. 1943		
385	BANG	4 Dec. 1943		
386	PILOTFISH	16 Dec. 1943		
387	PINTADO	1 Jan. 1944		
388	PIPEFISH	22 Jan. 1944		
389	PIRANHA	5 Feb. 1944		
390	PLAICE	12 Feb. 1944		
391	POMFRET	19 Feb. 1944		
392	STERLET	4 March 1944		
393	QUEENFISH	11 March 1944		
394	RAZORBACK	3 April 1944		
395	REDFISH	12 April 1944		

SUBMARINES—Concluded

Type & No.	Name	Date Commissioned	Total	Remarks
SS 396	RONQUIL	22 April 1944		
397	SCABBARDFISH	29 April 1944		
398	SEGUNDO	9 May 1944		
398	SEA CAT	16 May 1944		
400	SEA DEVIL	24 May 1944		
401	SEA DOG	3 June 1944		
402	SEA FOX	13 June 1944		
403	ATULE	21 June 1944		
404	SPIKEFISH	30 June 1944		
405	SEA OWL	17 July 1944		
406	SEA POACHER	31 July 1944		
407	SEA ROBIN	7 Aug. 1944		
408	SENNET	22 Aug. 1944		
409	PIPER	23 Aug. 1944		
410	THREADFIN	30 Aug. 1944		
411	SPADEFISH	9 March 1944		
412	TREPANG	22 May 1944		
413	SPOT	3 Aug. 1944		
414	SPRINGER	18 Oct. 1944		
415	STICKLEBACK	29 March 1945		
417	TENCH	6 Oct. 1944		
418	THORNBACK	13 Oct. 1944		
419	TIGRONE	25 Oct. 1944		
420	TIRANTE	6 Nov. 1944		
421	TRULTA	16 Nov. 1944		
422	TORO	8 Dec. 1944		
423	TORSK	16 Dec. 1944		
424	QUILLBACK	29 Dec. 1944		
475	ARGONAUT	15 Jan. 1945		
476	RUNNER	6 Feb. 1945		
477	CONGER	14 Feb. 1945		
478	CUTLASS	17 March 1945		
479	DIABLO	31 March 1945		
480	MEDREGAL	14 April 1945		
481	REQUIN	28 April 1945		
482	IREX	14 May 1945		
483	SEA LEOPARD	11 June 1945		
484	ODAX	11 July 1945		
485	SIRAGO	13 Aug. 1945		
			203	

All other classes of Vessels that have been completed

7 December 1941—1 October 1945

(Figures for September 1945 estimated)

SUMMARY

Class	Number of Vessels
MINE CRAFT	875
PATROL CRAFT	1,828
AUXILIARIES	1,541
DISTRICT CRAFT (Self Propelled)	1,372
DISTRICT CRAFT (Non-Self Propelled)	1,441
LARGE LANDING CRAFT	4,094
SMALL LANDING CRAFT	79,125
SMALL BOATS	19,366
TOTAL	109.642

Note: Figures include New Construction Vessels built, Vessels Converted, and Vessels Acquired, no conversion required.

Lend-Lease Vessels included.

MINE CRAFT

Type	Number	Total
ACM	8	
AM	219	
AMb	21	
AMc	50	
BAM	20	
CM	3	
YMS	474	
BYMS	80	
		875

PATROL CRAFT

PC	315	
PCE	51	
PCE (R)	13	
PCS	59	
PF	96	
PG	41	
PGM	23	

PATROL CRAFT—Concl'd

Type	Number	Total
PT	694	
BPT	58	
PY	10	
PYc	24	
SC	444	
		1828

AUXILIARIES

AD	7
AE	14
AF	30
AG	40
AGC	13
AGP	15
AGS	3
AH	9
AK	147

Type	Number	Total
AUXILIARIES—Concluded		
AKA	95	
AKN	3	
AKS	12	
AN	45	
AO	64	
AOG	63	
AP	99	
APA	203	
APB	6	
APc	100	
APH	3	
APL	42	
AR	8	
ARB	12	
ARG	12	
ARH	1	
ARL	34	
ARS	36	
ARS (T)	3	
ARV	2	
ARV (A)	2	
ARV (E)	2	
AS	10	
ASR	6	
AT	11	
ATA	48	
ATF	54	
ATR	100	
AV	8	
AVP	27	
AW	4	
BAK	4	
BARS	6	
BAT	11	
IX	127	
		1541
DISTRICT CRAFT (SP)		
YAG	27	
YCF	2	
YDG	9	
YDT	2	
YF	83	
YFB	33	
YG	15	
YH	2	
YHB	16	
YHT	1	
YMT	11	
YN	11	
YNT	1	
YO	109	
YOG	42	
YP	497	
YSD	53	
YSR	1	
YT	4	
BYT	3	
PYT	2	
YTB	169	
YTL	208	
YTM	32	
YW	39	
		1372
DISTRICT CRAFT (NSP)		
YC	400	
YCF	89	
YCK	51	
YCV	14	
YF	610	
YFT	4	
YG	10	
YHB	5	
YNg	17	
YO	52	
YOG	38	
YOS	15	
YR	42	
YRD (H)	8	
YRD (M)	8	
YS	17	
YSP	6	
YSR	29	
YTT	3	
YW	23	
		1441
LARGE LANDING CRAFT		
LCI (L)	921	
LCS (L) (3)	130	
LCT (5)	470	
LCT (6)	965	
LSD	22	
LSM	481	
LSM (R)	58	
LST	1041	
LSV	6	
		4094
SMALL LANDING CRAFT		
LCC (1)	54	
LCC (2)	45	
LCM (6)	2730	
LCM (3)	8631	
LCM (2)	31	
LCS (S) (1)	150	
LCS (S) (2)	408	
LCP (L)	1755	
LCP (R)	2635	
LCVP	23398	
LCV	2279	
LVT (1)	1174	
LVT (A) (1)	510	
LVT (2)	2962	
LVT (A) (2)	450	
LVT (3)	2964	
LVT (4)	8350	
LVT (A) (4)	1799	
LVT (A) (5)	125	
LCP (N)	12	
LCR (L)	9981	
LCR (S)	8150	
45-ft. Artillery Lighters	6	
26-ft. Outboard Landing Craft	4	
Army Storm Boats	6	
Army Assault Boats	226	
Landing Craft Electric	287	
Landing Craft Inflatable	3	
		79,125

APPENDIX C

Losses of United States Naval Vessels from all causes

7 December 1941—1 October 1945

Name of Ship	Location	Date
BATTLESHIPS		
ARIZONA	Pearl Harbor	7 Dec. 1941
OKLAHOMA	Pearl Harbor	7 Dec. 1941
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS		
HORNET	08 38 S, 166 43 E	26 Oct. 1942
LEXINGTON	15 12 S, 155 27 E	8 May 1942
PRINCETON	15 21 N, 121 31 E	24 Oct. 1944
WASP	12 25 S, 164 08 E	15 Sept. 1942
YORKTOWN	30 36 N, 176 34 W	7 June 1942
ESCORT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS		
BISMARCK SEA	Off Iwo Jima	21 Feb. 1945
BLOCK ISLAND	31 13 N, 23 03 W	29 May 1944
GAMBIER BAY	11 31 N, 126 12 E	25 Oct. 1944
LISCOME BAY	02 54 N, 172 30 E	24 Nov. 1943
OMMANEY BAY	Off Panay I., P.I.	4 Jan. 1945
SAINT LO	11 13 N, 126 05 E	25 Oct. 1944
HEAVY CRUISERS		
ASTORIA	Off Savo I., Solomons	9 Aug. 1942
CHICAGO	11 25 S, 160 56 E	30 Jan. 1943
HOUSTON	Off Java, N.E.I.	1 March 1942
INDIANAPOLIS	NE of Leyte I., P.I.	29 July 1945
NORTHAMPTON	Off Savo I., Solomons	30 Nov. 1942
QUINCY	Off Savo I., Solomons	9 Aug. 1942
VINCENNES	Off Savo I., Solomons	9 Aug. 1942
LIGHT CRUISERS		
ATLANTA	10 34 S, 161 04 E	13 Nov. 1942
HELENA	Kula Gulf, Solomons	6 July 1943
JUNEAU	10 34 S, 161 04 E	13 Nov. 1942
DESTROYERS		
AARON WARD	9,10 S, 160 12 E	7 April 1943
ABNER READ	10 47 N, 125 22 E	1 Nov. 1944
BARTON	Off Guadalcanal I., Solomons	13 Nov. 1942
BEATTY	37 10 N, 6 00 E	6 Nov. 1943
BENHAM	Off Savo I., Solomons	15 Nov. 1942
BLUE	9 17 S, 160 02 E	22 Aug. 1943
BORIE	North of Azores	1 Nov. 1943
BRISTOL	37 19 N, 6 19 E	13 Oct. 1943
BROWNSON	Off New Brita n	26 Dec. 1943
BUCK	40 00 N, 14 30 E	9 Oct. 1943
BUSH	27 16 N, 127 48 E	6 April 1945
CALLAGHAN	26 30 N, 127 30 E	29 July 1945
CHEVALIER	Off Vella Lavella. Solomons	6 Oct. 1943
COLHOUN	Off Okinawa, Ryukyus	6 April 1945

DESTROYERS—Concluded

Name of Ship	Location	Date
COOPER	Ormoc Bay, P.I.	3 Dec. 1944
CORRY	49 31 N, 1 11 W	6 June 1944
CUSHING	Off Savo I., Solomons	13 Nov. 1942
DE HAVEN	9 09 S, 159 52 E	1 Feb. 1943
DREXLER	Off Okinawa, Ryukyus	28 May 1945
DUNCAN	Off Savo I., Solomons	12 Oct. 1942
EDSALL	S of Java, N.E.I.	1 March 1942
GLENNON	50 32 N, 1 12 W	8 June 1944
GWIN	7 41 S, 157 27 E	13 July 1943
HALLIGAN	26 10 N, 127 30 E	26 March 1945
HAMMANN	30 36 N, 176 34 W	6 June 1942
HENLEY	7 40 S, 148 06 E	3 Oct. 1943
HOEL	11 46 N, 126 33 E	25 Oct. 1944
HULL	12 00 N, 129 00 E	18 Dec. 1944
INGRAHAM	42 34 N, 60 05 W	22 Aug. 1942
JACOB JONES	38 42 N, 74 39 W	28 Feb. 1942
JARVIS	Off Guadalcanal I., Solomons	9 Aug. 1942
JOHNSTON	11 46 N, 126 09 E	25 Oct. 1944
LAFFEY	Off Savo I., Solomons	13 Nov. 1942
LANSDALE	37 03 N, 3 51 E	20 April 1944
LEARY	45 00 N, 22 00 W	24 Dec. 1943
LITTLE	26 24 N, 126 15 E	3 May 1945
LONGSHAW	26 11 N, 127 37 E	18 May 1945
LUCE	26 35 N, 127 10 E	4 May 1945
MADDOX	Off Sicily	10 July 1943
MAHAN	Ormoc Bay, P.I.	7 Dec. 1944
MANNERT L. ABELE	26 26 N, 177 43 E	12 April 1945
MEREDITH (DD 434)	Off San Cristobal I., Solomons	15 Oct. 1942
MEREDITH (DD 726)	49 33 N, 1 06 W	8 June 1944
MONAGHAN	12 00 N, 129 00 E	18 Dec. 1944
MONSSEN	9 04 S, 159 54 E	13 Nov. 1942
MORRISON	27 10 N, 127 58 E	4 May 1945
O'BRIEN	12 28 S, 164 08 E	15 Sept. 1942
PARROTT	Norfolk, Virginia	2 May 1944
PEARY	Port Darwin, Australia	19 Feb. 1942
PERKINS	Off New Guinea	29 Nov. 1943
PILLSBURY	Bali Strait, N.E.I.	1 March 1942
POPE	Java Sea	1 March 1942
PORTER	8 32 S, 167 17 E	26 Oct. 1942
PRESTON	Off Savo I., Solomons	15 Nov. 1942
PRINGLE	27 25 N, 126 59 E	16 April 1945
REID	9 50 N 124 55 E	11 Dec. 1944
REUBEN JAMES	51 59 N, 27 05 W	31 Oct. 1941
ROWAN	40 07 N, 14 18 E	11 Sept. 1943
SIMS	Coral Sea	7 May 1942
SPENCE	12 00 N, 129 00 E	18 Dec. 1944
STEWART	Surabaya, Java, N.E.I.	2 March 1942
STRONG	Kula Gulf, Solomons	5 July 1943
STURTEVANT	Off Key West, Fla.	26 April 1942
TRUXTON	Placentia Bay, Newfoundland	18 Feb. 1942
TUCKER	Off Espiritu Santo I., New Hebrides	4 Aug. 1942
TURNER	Off Ambrose Light, New York	3 Jan. 1944
TWIGGS	26 08 N, 127 35 E	16 June 1945
WALKE	Off Savo I., Solomons	15 Nov. 1942
WARRINGTON	27 00 N, 73 00 W	13 Sept. 1944
WILLIAM D. PORTER	27 06 N, 127 38 E	10 June 1945
WORDEN	Amchitka I., Aleutians	12 Jan. 1943

DESTROYER ESCORT VESSELS

EVERSOLE	10 10 N, 127 28 E	28 Oct. 1944
FECHTELER	36 07 N, 02 40 W	5 May 1944
FISKE	47 10 N, 32 40 W	2 Aug. 1944
FREDERICK C. DAVIS	43 52 N, 40 15 W	24 April 1945
HOLDER	Mediterranean Sea	11 April 1944
LEOPOLD	58 44 N, 25 50 W	9 March 1944
OBERRENDER	Off Okinawa, Ryukyus	9 May 1945
RICH	49 31 N, 1 10 W	8 June 1944
SAMUEL B. ROBERTS	Off Samar I., P.I.	25 Oct. 1944
SHELTON	2 32 N, 129 13 E	3 Oct. 1944
UNDERHILL	19 20 N, 126 42 E	24 July 1945

SUBMARINES

Name of Ship	Location	Date
ALBACORE	Japanese home waters	Nov. 1944
AMBERJACK	Off New Britain	Feb. 1943
ARGONAUT	Off New Britain	10 Jan. 1943
BARBEL	Off Borneo	Feb. 1945
BONEFISH	Japanese home waters	May 1945
BULLHEAD	Java Sea	Aug. 1945
CAPELIN	Celebes Sea	Dec. 1943
CISCO	South Pacific Ocean	Oct. 1943
CORVINA	Marshall Islands	Nov. 1943
DARTER	Palawan Passage, P.I.	24 Oct. 1944
DORADO	Canal Zone, Panama	Oct. 1943
ESCOLAR	Japanese home waters	Oct. 1944
FLIER	Off Borneo	Aug. 1944
GOLET	Japanese home waters	June 1944
GRAMPUS	Off New Britain	Feb. 1943
GRAYBACK	Ryukyu Islands	Feb. 1944
GRAYLING	Philippine waters	Aug. 1943
GRENADIER	Malayan waters	April 1943
GROWLER	Philippine waters	Nov. 1944
GRUNION	Aleutian waters	July 1942
GUDGEON	Marianas Islands	May 1944
HARDER	Philippine waters	Aug. 1944
HERRING	Kurile Islands	May 1944
KETE	Ryukyu Islands	March 1945
LAGARTO	South China Sea	June 1945
PERCH	Java Sea	Feb. 1942
PICKEREL	Japanese home waters	May 1943
POMPANO	Japanese home waters	Sept. 1943
R-12	Off Key West, Fla.	12 June 1943
ROBALO	Off Borneo	July 1944
RUNNER	Japanese home waters	June 1943
S-26	Gulf of Panama	24 Jan. 1942
S-27	Amchitka I., Aleutians	19 June 1942
S-28	Off Oahu, T.H.	4 July 1944
S-36	Straits of Makassar, N.E.I.	20 Jan. 1942
S-39	Off Rossell I., SWPacific	14 Aug. 1942
S-44	Kurile Islands	Oct. 1943
SCAMP	Japanese home waters	Nov. 1944
SCORPION	East China Sea	Jan. 1944
SCULPIN	Gilbert Islands	Dec. 1943
SEALION	Cavite, P.I.	10 Dec. 1941
SEAWOLF	Off Morotai I., N.E.I.	Oct. 1944
SHARK (SS 174)	Molucca Sea	Feb. 1942
SHARK (SS 314)	Off Hong Kong, China	Oct. 1944
SNOOK	Off Hainan I., S. China Sea	April 1945
SWORDFISH	Ryukyu Islands	Jan. 1945
TANG	Formosa Strait	Oct. 1944
TRIGGER	Ryukyu Islands	March 1945
TRITON	Admiralty Islands	March 1943
TROUT	Ryukyu Islands	Feb. 1944
TULLIBEE	Off Palau I.	April 1944
WAHOO	Japanese home waters	Oct. 1943

MINELAYERS

GAMBLE	Off Iwo Jima	18 Feb. 1945
MIANTONOMAH	Off Le Havre, France	25 Sept. 1944
MONTGOMERY	Ngulu Lagoon, South Pacific	17 Oct. 1944

MINESWEEPERS

BITTERN	At Cavite, P.I.	10 Dec. 1941
BUNTING	San Francisco Bay	3 June 1942
CROW	Puget Sound	3 Sept. 1943
EMMONS	Off Okinawa, Ryukyus	6 April 1945
FINCH	At Corregidor, P.I.	10 April 1942
HORNBILL	San Francisco Bay	30 June 1942
HOVEY	Lingayen Gulf, P.I.	6 Jan. 1945
LONG	16 12 N, 120 11 E	6 Jan. 1945
OSPREY	50 12 N, 1 20 W	5 June 1944
PALMER	Lingayen Gulf, P.I.	7 Jan. 1945
PENGUIN	At Guam	8 Dec. 1941
PERRY	Off Palau I.	13 Sept. 1944

Name of Ship	Location	Date
MINESWEEPERS—Concluded		
PORTENT	41 23 N, 12 43 E	22 Jan. 1944
QUAIL	Corregidor, P.I.	5 May 1942
SALUTE	5 07 N, 115 04 E	8 June 1945
SENTINEL	Off Licata, Sicily	12 July 1943
SKILL	40 20 N, 14 35 E	25 Sept. 1943
SKYLARK	26 20 N, 127 41 E	28 March 1945
SWALLOW	Off Okinawa, Ryukyus	22 April 1945
SWERVE	41 31 N, 12 28 E	9 July 1944
TANAGER	At Corregidor, P.I.	4 May 1942
TIDE	49 37 N, 1 05 W	7 June 1944
VALOR	41 28 N, 70 57 W	29 June 1944
WASMUTH	Aleutian Islands	29 Dec. 1942
SUBMARINE CHASERS		
PC 496	37 23 N, 9 52 W	4 June 1943
PC 558	38 41 N, 13 43 E	9 May 1944
PC 1129	Off Luzon, P.I.	31 Jan. 1945
PC 1261	Off France	6 June 1944
PC 1603	26 25 N, 127 56 E	21 May 1945
SC 521	11 03 S, 164 50 E	10 July 1945
SC 694	Off Palermo, Sicily	23 Aug. 1943
SC 696	Off Palermo, Sicily	23 Aug. 1943
SC 700	Vella Lavella, Solomons	10 March 1944
SC 709	Cape Breton, Nova Scotia	21 Jan. 1943
SC 740	15 32 S, 147 06 E	17 June 1943
SC 744	Tacloban Bay, P.I.	27 Nov. 1944
SC 751	21 56 S, 113 53 E	22 June 1943
SC 984	In New Hebrides	9 April 1944
SC 1019	22 28 N, 84 30 W	22 April 1945
SC 1024	35 12 N, 74 57 W	2 March 1943
SC 1059	In Bahama Islands	12 Dec. 1944
SC 1067	Off Attu, Aleutians	19 Nov. 1943
GUNBOATS		
PGM 7	Bismarck Sea	18 July 1944
PGM 17	Off Okinawa	4 May 1945
PGM 18	26 13 N, 127 54 E	8 April 1945
ASHEVILLE	South of Java, N.E.I.	3 March 1942
ERIE	12 03 N, 68 58 W	12 Nov. 1942
LUZON	At Corregidor, P.I.	5 May 1942
MINDANAO	Off Corregidor, P.I.	2 May 1942
OAHU	At Corregidor, P.I.	4 May 1942
PLYMOUTH	37 22 N, 74 25 W	5 Aug. 1943
ST. AUGUSTINE	38 00 N, 75 05 W	6 Jan. 1944
WAKE	At Shanghai, China	8 Dec. 1941
PE 56	Portland, Maine	23 April 1945
COAST GUARD VESSELS		
CG 58012	41 53 N, 70 30 W	2 May 1943
CG 83415	Off France	21 June 1944
CG 83421	26 14 N, 79 05 W	30 June 1943
CG 83471	Off France	21 June 1944
ACACIA	Caribbean Sea	15 March 1942
ALEXANDER HAMILTON	Off Iceland	29 Jan. 1942
BEDLOE	Off Cape Hatteras	14 Sept. 1944
BODEGA	Gulf of Mexico	20 Dec. 1943
CATAMOUNT	Off Ambrose Light, New York	27 March 1943
DOW	Caribbean Sea	15 Oct. 1943
ESCANABA	60 50 N, 52 00 W	13 June 1943
JACKSON	Off North Atlantic Coast	14 Sept. 1944
NATSEK	Belle Island Strait	17 Dec. 1942
VINEYARD SOUND	Vineyard Sound	14 Sept. 1944
WILCOX	Off Cape Hatteras	30 Sept. 1943
SEAPLANE TENDERS		
GANNET	Off Bermuda	7 June 1942
LANGLEY	South of Java, N.E.I.	27 Feb. 1942
THORNTON	24 24 N, 128 58 E	5 April 1945

Name of Ship	Location	Date
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS		
PT 22	North Pacific	11 June 1943
PT 28	Dora Harbor, Alaska	12 Jan. 1943
PT 31	Subic Bay, P.I.	19 Jan. 1942
PT 32	Sulu Sea	13 Mar. 1942
PT 33	Off Pt. Santiago, P.I.	15 Dec. 1941
PT 34	Off Cauit Island, P.I.	9 April 1942
PT 35	At Cebu, P.I.	12 April 1942
PT 37	Off Guadalcanal I., Solomons	1 Feb. 1943
PT 41	Lake Lanao, Mindanao, P.I.	15 April 1942
PT 43	Off Guadalcanal I., Solomons	10 Jan. 1943
PT 44	In South Pacific	12 Dec. 1942
PT 63	Off New Ireland	18 June 1944
PT 67	Off Tufi, New Guinea	17 March 1943
PT 68	New Guinea	1 Oct. 1943
PT 73	Philippines	15 Jan. 1945
PT 77	Off Talin Pt., Luzon, P.I.	1 Feb. 1945
PT 79	Off Talin Pt., Luzon, P.I.	1 Feb. 1945
PT 107	Off New Ireland	18 June 1944
PT 109	In Blackett Straits, Solomons	2 Aug. 1943
PT 110	Off New Guinea	26 Jan. 1944
PT 111	Off Guadalcanal I., Solomons	1 Feb. 1943
PT 112	Off Guadalcanal I., Solomons	10 Jan. 1943
PT 113	Off Buna, New Guinea	8 Aug. 1943
PT 117	Rendova Harbor, Solomons	1 Aug. 1943
PT 118	Vella Lavella, Solomons	7 Sept. 1943
PT 119	Off Tufi, New Guinea	17 March 1943
PT 121	5 S, 151 E	27 March 1944
PT 123	Off Guadalcanal I., Solomons	1 Feb. 1943
PT 133	Off New Guinea	15 July 1944
PT 135	5 29 S, 152 09 E	12 April 1944
PT 136	Vitiaz Strait, New Guinea	17 Sept. 1943
PT 145	New Guinea	4 Jan. 1944
PT 147	New Guinea	19 Nov. 1943
PT 153	Solomons	4 July 1943
PT 158	Off Munda Pt., Solomons	5 July 1943
PT 164	In Rendova Harbor, Solomons	1 Aug. 1943
PT 165	23 45 S, 166 30 E	23 May 1943
PT 166	Solomons	20 July 1943
PT 172	Off Vella Lavella, Solomons	7 Sept. 1943
PT 173	23 45 S, 166 30 E	23 May 1943
PT 193	00 55 S, 134 52 E	25 June 1944
PT 200	41 N, 71 W	22 Feb. 1944
PT 202	43 23 N, 6 43 E	16 Aug. 1944
PT 218	43 23 N, 6 43 E	16 Aug. 1944
PT 219	Off Attu, Aleutians	Sept. 1943
PT 239	Solomons	14 Dec. 1943
PT 247	6 38 S, 156 01 E	5 May 1944
PT 251	Off Bougainville I., Solomons	26 Feb. 1944
PT 279	Off Bougainville I., Solomons	11 Feb. 1944
PT 283	Off Bougainville I., Solomons	17 March 1944
PT 300	Off Mindoro I., P.I.	18 Dec. 1944
PT 301	Off New Guinea	7 Nov. 1944
PT 311	43 N, 9 E	18 Nov. 1944
PT 320	Off Leyte, P.I.	5 Nov. 1944
PT 321	San Isidoro Bay, P. I.	11 Nov. 1944
PT 322	Off New Guinea	23 Nov. 1943
PT 323	10 33 N, 125 14 E	10 Dec. 1944
PT 337	Hansa Bay, New Guinea	7 March 1944
PT 338	12 06 N, 121 23 E	28 Jan. 1945
PT 339	Off Biak, New Guinea	27 May 1944
PT 346	Off New Britain	29 April 1944

Name of Ship	Location	Date
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS—Concluded		
PT 347	Off New Britain	29 April 1944
PT 353	5 S, 151 E	27 March 1944
PT 363	Kaoe Bay, Halmahera, N.E.I.	25 Nov. 1944
PT 368	Off Halmahera, N.E.I.	11 Oct. 1944
PT 371	2 05 N, 127 51 E	19 Sept. 1944
PT 493	In Surigao Strait, P.I.	25 Oct. 1944
PT 509	English Channel	9 Aug. 1944
PT 555	Off Cape Couronne. Mediterranean	23 Aug. 1944
TANK LANDING SHIPS		
LST 6	In Seine River, France	18 Nov. 1944
LST 43	Pearl Harbor	21 May 1944
LST 69	Pearl Harbor	21 May 1944
LST 158	Off Licata, Sicily	11 July 1943
LST 167	At Vella Lavella	25 Sept. 1943
LST 179	Pearl Harbor	21 May 1944
LST 203	Near Nanumea, Union Islands	1 Oct. 1943
LST 228	In Azores	20 Jan. 1944
LST 282	Off southern France	15 Aug. 1944
LST 313	At Gela, Sicily	10 July 1943
LST 314	49 43 N, 00 52 W	9 June 1944
LST 318	Off Caronia, Sicily	9 Aug. 1943
LST 333	37 59 N, 4 01 E	22 June 1943
LST 342	9 03 S, 158 11 E	18 July 1943
LST 348	40 57 N, 13 14 E	20 Feb. 1944
LST 349	Off Ponzo, Italy	26 Feb. 1944
LST 353	Pearl Harbor	21 May 1944
LST 359	42 N, 19 W	20 Dec. 1944
LST 376	Off northern France	9 June 1944
LST 396	8 18 S, 156 55 E	18 Aug. 1943
LST 447	26 9 N, 127 18 E	6 April 1945
LST 448	Off Vella Lavella, Solomons	1 Oct. 1943
LST 460	11 10 N, 121 11 E	21 Dec. 1944
LST 472	Off Mindoro, P.I.	15 Dec. 1944
LST 480	At Pearl Harbor	21 May 1944
LST 493	50 20 N, 4 09 W	12 April 1945
LST 496	Off northern France	11 June 1944
LST 499	Off northern France	8 June 1944
LST 507	50 29 N, 2 52 W	28 April 1944
LST 523	Off northern France	19 June 1944
LST 531	50 29 N, 2 52 W	28 April 1944
LST 563	Southwest of Mexico	22 Dec. 1944
LST 577	8 1 N, 130 22 E	11 Feb. 1945
LST 675	Off Okinawa	4 April 1945
LST 738	Off Mindoro, P.I.	15 Dec. 1944
LST 749	11 10 N, 121 11 E	21 Dec. 1944
LST 750	Off Negros, P.I.	28 Dec. 1944
LST 808	Off Ie Shima	20 May 1945
LST 906	At Leghorn, Italy	18 Oct. 1944
LST 921	In English Channe	14 Aug. 1944
MEDIUM LANDING SHIPS		
LSM 12	Off Okinawa	4 April 1945
LSM 20	10 12 N, 125 19 E	5 Dec. 1944
LSM 59	Off Okinawa	21 June 1945
LSM 135	Off Okinawa	25 May 1945
LSM 149	In Philippines	5 Dec. 1944
LSM 190	26 35 N, 127 10 E	4 May 1945
LSM 194	Off Okinawa	4 May 1945
LSM 195	Off Okinawa	3 May 1945
LSM 318	10 56 N, 124 38 E	7 Dec. 1944
TANK LANDING CRAFT		
LCT 19	Off Salerno, Italy	14 July 1943
LCT 21	Off Oran	1 Jan. 1943
LCT 23	At Algiers	3 May 1943
LCT 25	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCT 26	41 4 N, 13 30 E	25 Feb. 1944
LCT 27	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCT 28	In Mediterranean	30 May 1943

Name of Ship	Location	Date
TANK LANDING CRAFT—Concluded		
LCT 30	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCT 35	Off Anzio, Italy	15 Feb. 1944
LCT 36	Off Naples, Italy	26 Feb. 1944
LCT 71	53 38 N, 146 5 W	11 Sept. 1943
LCT 147	Off northern France	June 1944
LCT 154	37 8 N, 10 58 E	31 Aug. 1943
LCT 175	4 27 N, 133 40 E	21 Feb. 1945
LCT 182	Solomons	7 Aug. 1944
LCT 185	Off Bizerte, Tunisia	24 Jan. 1944
LCT 196	Off Salerno, Italy	27 Sept. 1943
LCT 197	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCT 200	Off northern France	June 1944
LCT 208	Off Algeria	30 June 1943
LCT 209	Off northern France	10 June 1944
LCT 215	Off Salerno, Italy	1943
LCT 220	At Anzio, Italy	13 Feb. 1944
LCT 241	Off Salerno, Italy	15 Sept. 1943
LCT 242	Off Naples, Italy	2 Dec. 1943
LCT 244	Off northern France	June 1944
LCT 253	On passage to Tarawa	21 Jan. 1945
LCT 293	In English Channel	11 Oct. 1944
LCT 294	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCT 305	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCT 311	Off Bizerte, Tunisia	9 Aug. 1943
LCT 315	At Eniwetok Atoll	23 March 1944
LCT 319	At Kiska	27 Aug. 1943
LCT 332	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCT 340	36 49 N, 11 55 E	20 Feb. 1944
LCT 342	Off Salerno, Italy	29 Sept. 1943
LCT 362	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCT 364	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCT 366	53 1 N, 152 W	9 Sept. 1943
LCT 413	Off northern France	June 1944
LCT 458	Off northern France	7 June 1944
LCT 459	Off western France	9 Oct. 1944
LCT 486	Off northern France	7 June 1944
LCT 496	English Channel	2 Oct. 1943
LCT 548	At Portsmouth, England	Nov. 1944
LCT 555	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCT 572	Off northern France	June 1944
LCT 579	Off Palau	4 Oct. 1944
LCT 582	In Azores	22 Jan. 1944
LCT 593	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCT 597	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCT 612	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCT 703	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCT 713	Off northern France	June 1944
LCT 714	Off northern France	June 1944
LCT 777	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCT 823	Off Palau	27 Sept. 1944
LCT 961	Pearl Harbor	21 May 1944
LCT 963	Pearl Harbor	21 May 1944
LCT 983	Pearl Harbor	21 May 1944
LCT 984	20 N, 157 W	15 May 1944
LCT 988	20 N, 157 W	15 May 1944
LCT 1029	At Iwo Jima	2 March 1945
LCT 1075	Off Leyte, P.I.	10 Dec. 1944
LCT 1090	Off Luzon, P.I.	26 March 1945
LCT 1151	1 N, 138 36 E	26 Jan. 1945
LCT 1358	Off California	4 May 1945
INFANTRY LANDING CRAFT		
LCI 1	At Bizerte, Tunisia	17 Aug. 1943
LCI 20	Off Anzio, Italy	22 Jan. 1944
LCI 32	Off Anzio, Italy	26 Jan. 1944
LCI 82	Off Okinawa	4 April 1945
LCI 85	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCI 91	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCI 92	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCI 93	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCI 219	Off northern France	11 June 1944
LCI 232	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCI 339	Off New Guinea	4 Sept. 1943
LCI 365	Off Luzon, P.I.	10 Jan. 1945
LCI 416	Off northern France	9 June 1944

Name of Ship	Location	Date
INFANTRY LANDING CRAFT—Concluded		
LCI 459	Off Palau	19 Sept. 1944
LCI 468	13 28 N, 148 18 E	17 June 1944
LCI 474	Off Iwo Jima	17 Feb. 1945
LCI 497	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCI 553	Off northern France	6 June 1944
LCI 600	In Ulithi, Carolines	12 Jan. 1945
LCI 684	In Southwest Pacific	1945
LCI 974	16 6 N, 120 14 E	10 Jan. 1945
LCI 1065	Off Leyte, P.I.	24 Oct. 1944
SUPPORT LANDING CRAFT		
LCS 7	Off Luzon, P.I.	16 Feb. 1945
LCS 15	27 20 N, 127 10 E	22 April 1945
LCS 26	Off Luzon, P.I.	14 Feb. 1945
LCS 33	Off Okinawa	12 April 1945
LCS 49	Off Luzon, P.I.	14 Feb. 1945
LCS 127	Off California	5 March 1945
TUGS		
ATR 15	49 N, 00 26 W	19 June 1944
ATR 98	44 05 N, 24 08 W	12 April 1944
GENESEE	At Corregidor, P.I.	5 May 1942
GREBE	In South Pacific	2 Jan. 1943
NAPA	At Bataan, P.I.	8 April 1942
NAUSET	40 38 N, 14 38 E	9 Sept. 1943
NAVAJO	Off New Hebrides	11 Sept. 1943
PARTRIDGE	Off northern France	11 June 1944
SEMINOLE	Off Tulagi I., Solomons	25 Oct. 1942
SONOMA	At Leyte, P.I.	24 Oct. 1944
TANKERS		
KANAWHA	9 10 S, 160 12 E	7 April 1943
MISSISSINEWA	10 6 N, 139 43 E	20 Nov. 1944
NECHES	21 1 N, 160 6 W	23 Jan. 1942
NEOSHO	Coral Sea	7 May 1942
PECOS	14 30 S, 106 30 E	1 March 1942
SHEEPSCOT	Off Iwo Jima	6 June 1945
TROOP TRANSPORTS		
APC 21	Off New Britain	17 Dec. 1943
APC 35	Off New Georgia, Solomons	22 Sept. 1943
BARRY	Off Okinawa	25 May 1945
BATES	Off Okinawa	25 May 1945
COLHOUN	9 24 S, 160 1 E	30 Aug. 1942
DICKERSON	Off Okinawa	2 April 1945
EDWARD RUTLEDGE	Off Morocco	12 Nov. 1942
GEORGE F. ELLIOTT	Off Guadalcanal I., Solomons	8 Aug. 1942
GREGORY	Off Guadalcanal I., Solomons	5 Sept. 1942
HUGH L. SCOTT	Off Morocco	12 Nov. 1942
JOHN PENN	Off Guadalcanal I., Solomons	13 Aug. 1943
JOSEPH HEWES	Off Morocco	11 Nov. 1942
LEEDSTOWN	Off Algiers	9 Nov. 1942
LITTLE	Solomons	5 Sept. 1942
Mc CAWLEY	8 25 S, 157 28 E	30 June 1943
Mc KEAN	6 31 S, 154 52 E	17 Nov. 1943
NOA	7 1 N, 134 30 E	12 Sept. 1944
SUSAN B. ANTHONY	49 32 N, 00 48 W	7 June 1944
TASKER H. BLISS	Off Morocco	12 Nov. 1942
THOMAS STONE	37 31 N, 00 00 E	7 Nov. 1942
WARD	10 51 N, 124 32 E	7 Dec. 1944
DISTRICT PATROL CRAFT		
YP 16	Philippines	Dec. 1941
YP 17	Philippines	Dec. 1941
YP 26	In Canal Zone	19 Nov. 1942
YP 47	Off Staten Island, New York	26 April 1943
YP 72	At Adak, Aleutians	22 Feb. 1943

Name of Ship	Location	Date
DISTRICT PATROL CRAFT—Concluded		
YP 73	In Kodiak Harbor, Alaska	15 Jan. 1945
YP 74	54 23 N, 164 10 W	6 Sept. 1942
YP 77	Off Atlantic Coast	28 April 1942
YP 88	At Amchitka, Aleutians	28 Oct. 1943
YP 94	56 32 N, 154 22 W	18 Feb. 1945
YP 95	At Adak, Aleutians	1 May 1944
YP 97	Philippines	March 1942
YP 128	Off Monterey, California	30 June 1942
YP 183	On west coast of Hawaii	12 Jan. 1943
YP 205	18 30 N, 65 00 W	1 Nov. 1942
YP 235	In Gulf of Mexico	1 April 1943
YP 270	25 30 N, 122 06 W	30 June 1942
YP 277	East of Hawaii	23 May 1942
YP 279	Off Townsville, Australia	5 Sept. 1943
YP 281	16 53 S, 177 18 W	9 Jan. 1944
YP 284	Off Guadalcanal I., Solomons	25 Oct. 1942
YP 331	24 56 N, 81 58 W	23 May 1944
YP 336	In Delaware River	23 Feb. 1943
YP 345	Southeast of Midway	31 Oct. 1942
YP 346	In South Pacific	9 Sept. 1942
YP 383	8 22 N, 79 29 W	24 Nov. 1944
YP 387	39 N, 75 W	20 May 1942
YP 389	Off Cape Hatteras	19 June 1942
YP 405	In Caribbean Sea	20 Nov. 1942
YP 422	Off New Caledonia	23 April 1943
YP 426	31 59 N, 80 48 W	16 Dec. 1943
YP 438	At Port Everglades, Fla.	20 March 1943
YP 453	In the Bahamas	15 April 1943
YP 481	At Charleston, S.C.	25 April 1943
YP 492	Off east Florida	8 Jan. 1943
YP 577	Great Lakes	23 Jan. 1943
MISCELLANEOUS DISTRICT CRAFT		
YA 52	Philippines	1942
YA 59	Philippines	1942
YA 65	Philippines	1942
YAG 2	Philippines	1942
YAG 3	Philippines	1942
YAG 4	Philippines	1942
YAG 17	36 57 N, 76 13 W	14 Sept. 1944
YC 178	Philippines	1942
YC 181	Philippines	1942
YC 523	Off Portsmouth, N.H.	24 Feb. 1944
YC 537	Philippines	1942
YC 643	Philippines	1942
YC 644	Philippines	1942
YC 646	Philippines	1942
YC 647	Philippines	1942
YC 648	Philippines	1942
YC 649	Philippines	1942
YC 652	Philippines	1942
YC 653	Philippines	1942
YC 654	Philippines	1942
YC 664	Guam	1942
YC 665	Guam	1942
YC 666	Guam	1942
YC 667	Guam	1942
YC 668	Guam	1942
YC 669	Philippines	1942
YC 670	Guam	1942
YC 671	Guam	1942
YC 672	Guam	1942
YC 673	Guam	1942
YC 674	Guam	1942
YC 683	Philippines	1942
YC 685	Guam	1942
YC 693	Alaska	Feb. 1945
YC 714	Philippines	1942
YC 715	Philippines	1942
YC 716	Philippines	1942
YC 717	Guam	1942
YC 718	Guam	1942
YC 857	Off Cape Cod, Mass.	12 Nov. 1943
YC 869	Off Imperial Beach, Calif.	23 March 1943

MISCELLANEOUS DISTRICT CRAFT —Continued

Name of Ship	Location	Date
YC 886	Guantanamo	3 Feb. 1943
YC 887	Guantanamo	3 Feb. 1943
YC 891	Off Key West, Fla.	18 April 1943
YC 898	Off Key West, Fla.	29 Sept. 1942
YC 899	Off Key West, Fla.	29 Sept. 1942
YC 912	In North Pacific	13 Jan. 1945
YC 961	At Biorka Island	May 1945
YC 970	In Puget Sound, Wash.	14 Aug. 1943
YC 1272	Near San Pedro	June 1945
YC 1278	Off Atlantic coast	10 March 1943
YCF 23	En route to Eniwetok	March 1945
YCF 29	En route to Eniwetok	March 1945
YCF 36	En route to Eniwetok	March 1945
YCF 37	En route to Eniwetok	March 1945
YCF 42	34 47 N, 75 5 W	Dec. 1944
YCF 59	Off Delaware	Jan. 1945
YCK 1	Wake Island	1942
YCK 2	45 47 N, 58 57 W	5 Nov. 1943
YCK 8	Off Key West, Fla.	13 Dec. 1943
YD 19	Philippines	1942
YD 47	Philippines	1942
YD 56	Philippines	1942
YD 60	Philippines	1942
YDG 4	Off New Caledonia	1 Oct. 1943
YF 86	Philippines	1942
YF 177	Philippines	1942
YF 178	Philippines	1942
YF 179	Philippines	1942
YF 180	Philippines	1942
YF 181	Philippines	1942
YF 212	Philippines	1942
YF 223	Philippines	1942
YF 224	Philippines	1942
YF 230	Philippines	1942
YF 317	Philippines	1942
YF 401	35 7 N, 69 W	20 June 1943
YF 415	42 24 N, 70 36 W	11 May 1944
YF 487	In Caribbean	18 July 1943
YF 575	Off Atlantic City, N. J.	6 May 1943
YF 579	At San Francisco	20 Sept. 1943
YF 724	Off Farallones	22 March 1945
YF 725	Off Farallones	22 March 1945
YF 926	En route Pearl Harbor	8 March 1945
SAN FELIPE	Philippines	1942
SANTA RITA	Philippines	1942
ROSAL	Philippines	1942
CAMIA	Philippines	1942
DAPDAP	Philippines	1942
RIVERA	Philippines	1942
MAGDALENA	Philippines	1942
YACAL	Philippines	1942
DEWEY DRYDOCK	At Bataan, P. I.	10 April 1942
YFD 20	Off California	31 Jan. 1943
YG 39	10 10 N, 79 51 W	27 Sept. 1944
YM 4	Philippines	1942
YM 13	Guam	1942
YMS 14	In Boston Harbor	11 Jan. 1945
YMS 19	Off Palau	24 Sept. 1944
YMS 21	43 6 N, 5 54 E	1 Sept. 1944
YMS 24	43 23 N, 6 43 E	16 Aug. 1944
YMS 30	41 23 N, 12 45 E	25 Jan. 1944
YMS 39	1 19 S, 116 49 E	26 June 1945
YMS 48	14 25 N, 120 34 E	14 Feb. 1945
YMS 50	Off Java, N.E.I.	18 June 1945
YMS 70	In Leyte Gulf, P.I.	17 Oct. 1944
YMS 71	4 58 N, 119 47 E	3 April 1945
YMS 84	Off Balikpapan, Borneo	9 July 1945
YMS103	26 13 N, 127 54 E	8 April 1945
YMS127	Near Seattle, Wash.	May 1944
YMS133	Off Oregon Coast	20 Feb. 1943
YMS304	Off northern France	30 July 1944
YMS350	Off Cherbourg	2 July 1944
YMS365	1 18 S, 116 50 E	26 June 1945
YMS378	49 33 N, 1 13 W	1944

MISCELLANEOUS DISTRICT CRAFT —Concluded

Name of Ship	Location	Date
YMS385	Off Ulithi, Caroline Islands	1 Oct. 1944
YMS409	Off Atlantic Coast	14 Sept. 1944
YMS481	Off Tarakan, Borneo	2 May 1945
YO 41	Philippines	1942
YO 42	Philippines	1942
YO 64	Philippines	Jan. 1942
YO 156	At Sitka, Alaska	May 1945
YO 157	At Sitka, Alaska	May 1945
YO 159	Off New Hebrides	14 Jan. 1944
YPD 22	Philippines	1942
YPK 6	Philippines	1942
YPK 7	Philippines	1942
YR 43	In Gulf of Alaska	28 March 1945
YRC 4	Philippines	1942
YSP 41	Philippines	1942
YSP 42	Philippines	1942
YSP 43	Philippines	1942
YSP 44	Philippines	1942
YSP 45	Philippines	1942
YSP 46	Philippines	1942
YSP 47	Philippines	1942
YSP 48	Philippines	1942
YSP 49	Philippines	1942
YSP 50	Philippines	1942
YSR 2	Philippines	1942
BANAAG	Philippines	1942
IONA	Philippines	1942
MERCEDES	Philippines	1942
VAGA	At Corregidor, P.I.	5 May 1942
YT 198	Off Anzio, Italy	18 Feb. 1944
YT 247	14 14 N, 158 59 W	5 April 1944
SHAHAKA	27 21 N, 13 29 W	9 May 1944
YTM 467	Marshall or Gilbert Islands	March 1944
YW 50	Guam	1942
YW 54	Philippines	1942
YW 55	Guam	1942
YW 58	Guam	1942

CARGO VESSELS

ALUDRA	11 26 S, 162 E	23 June 1943
DEIMOS	11 26 S, 162 E	23 June 1943
POLLUX	Off Newfoundland Coast	18 Feb. 1942
SERPENS	At Guadalcanal I., Solomons	29 Jan. 1945

MISCELLANEOUS AUXILIARIES

AILANTHUS	In Aleutians	26 Feb. 1944
ASPHALT	At Saipan	6 Oct. 1944
CANOPUS	At Bataan, P.I.	10 April 1942
CYTHERA	Off Atlantic Coast	May 1942
EXTRACTOR	In Marianas	1 Jan. 1945
MACAW	At Midway Channel	12 Feb. 1944
MOONSTONE	Off Delaware Capes	16 Oct. 1943
MOUNT HOOD	At Manus, Admiralty Islands	10 Nov. 1944
MUSKEGET	In Atlantic Ocean	10 Oct. 1942
NIAGARA	In Solomons	23 May 1943
PIGEON	At Corregidor, P.I.	3 May 1942
PONTIAC	Off Halifax, Nova Scotia	30 Jan. 1945
PORCUPINE	At Mindoro, P.I.	28 Dec. 1944
REDWING	37 22 N, 9 55 E	28 June 1943
RESCUER	In Aleutians	1 Jan. 1943
ROBERT BARNES	Guam	Dec. 1941
RONAKI	Off eastern Australia	18 June 1943
UTAH	Pearl Harbor	7 Dec. 1941
ex FISHERIES	At Corregidor, P.I.	5 May 1942
ex MARYANN	At Corregidor, P.I.	5 May 1942
ex PERRY	At Corregidor, P.I.	5 May 1942
DCH 1	En route to Pearl Harbor	28 Dec. 1941

In the above list the dates are those of the effective loss; that is, the date of the attack or damage which resulted in loss, rather than that of sinking.

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LONGITUDE 139° 45' 36" EAST